Search results for 'Superassertability' (try it on Scholar)

16 found
Sort by:
  1. Glen Hoffmann (2008). Truth, Superassertability, and Conceivability. Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (3):287-299.score: 18.0
    The superassertability theory of truth, inspired by Crispin Wright (1992, 2003), holds that a statement is true if and only if it is superassertable in the following sense: it possesses warrant that cannot be defeated by any improvement of our information. While initially promising, the superassertability theory of truth is vulnerable to a persistent difficulty highlighted by James Van Cleve (1996) and Terrence Horgan (1995) but not properly fleshed out: it is formally illegitimate in a similar sense that (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Deborah C. Smith (2007). Superassertibility and the Equivalence Schema: A Dilemma for Wright's Antirealist. Synthese 157 (1):129 - 139.score: 6.0
    Crispin Wright champions the notion of superassertibility as providing a truth predicate that is congenial to antirealists in many debates in that it satisfies relevant platitudes concerning truth and does so in a very minimal way. He motivates such a claim by arguing that superassertibility can satisfy the equivalence schema: it is superassertible that P if and only if P. I argue that Wright’s attempted proof that superassertibility can satisfy this schema is unsuccessful, because it requires a premise that has (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Jim Edwards (1996). Anti-Realist Truth and Concepts of Superassertibility. Synthese 109 (1):103 - 120.score: 4.0
    Crispin Wright offers superassertibility as an anti-realist explication of truth. A statement is superassertible, roughly, if there is a state of information available which warrants it and it is warranted by all achievable enlargements of that state of information. However, it is argued, Wright fails to take account of the fact that many of our test procedures are not sure fire, even when applied under ideal conditions. An alternative conception of superassertibility is constructed to take this feature into account. However, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Paul Tomassi (2006). Truth, Warrant and Superassertibility. Synthese 148 (1):31 - 56.score: 4.0
    In a recent paper on Truth, Knowability and Neutrality Timothy Kenyon sets out to defend the coherence of a putative anti-realist truth-predicate, superassertibility, due to Wright (1992, 1999), against a number of Wright’s critics. By his own admission, the success of Kenyon’s defensive strategies turns out to hinge upon a realist conception of absolute warrant which conflicts with the anti-realist character of the original proposal, based, as it was, on a notion of defeasible warrant. Kenyon’s potential success in resisting Wright’s (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Anthony Brueckner (1998). Is "Superassertible" a Truth Predicate? Noûs 32 (1):76-81.score: 3.0
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. J. L. Kvanvig (1999). Truth and Superassertibility. Philosophical Studies 93 (1):1-19.score: 3.0
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Jason Holt (1999). Superassertibility and Asymptotic Truth. Dialogue 38 (01):109-.score: 3.0
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Tadeusz Szubka (2000). Idealized Acceptability Versus Superassertibility. Philosophical Studies 98 (2):175-186.score: 3.0
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1999). ``Truth and Superassertibility&Quot. Philosophical Studies 93:1-19.score: 3.0
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Jonathan Kvanvig, Wright on Truth and Superassertibility.score: 3.0
    Crispin Wright argues persuasively that truth cannot be understood in terms of warranted assertibility, on the basis of some very simple facts about negation. The argument, he claims, undermines not only simply assertibility theories of truth, but more idealized ones according to which truth is to be understood in terms of what is assertible in the long run, or assertible within some ideal scientific theory.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Daniel Laurier (2008). Mind-Dependence, Irrealism and Superassertibility. Philosophia Scientiae 12:143-157.score: 3.0
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. John Nolt (2008). Truth as an Epistemic Ideal. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (3):203 - 237.score: 2.0
    Several philosophers—including C. S. Peirce, William James, Hilary Putnam and Crispin Wright—have proposed various versions of the notion that truth is an epistemic ideal. More specifically, they have held that a proposition is true if and only if it can be fixedly warranted by human inquirers, given certain ideal epistemic conditions. This paper offers a general critique of that idea, modeling conceptions of ideality and fixed warrant within the semantics that Kripke developed for intuitionistic logic. It is shown that each (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Mikko Salmela (2006). True Emotions. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):382-405.score: 1.0
    Philosophers widely agree that emotions may have or lack appropriateness or fittingness, which in the emotional domain is an analogue of truth. I defend de Sousa's account of emotional truth by arguing that emotions have cognitive content as digitalized evaluative perceptions of the particular object of emotion, in terms of the relevant formal property. I argue that an emotion is true if and only if there is an actual fit between the particular and the formal objects of emotion, and the (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. María Ponte Azcárate (2007). A Proposal for a Non-Realist Theory of Truth. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:105-109.score: 1.0
    My aim in this article is to analyze and to discuss what I think are the two most important approaches to a theory of truth from a non-realist standpoint: the proposal of Crispin Wright and the proposal enounced by Putnam in Reason, Truth and History. Wright argues for a minimalist theory of truth according to which truth has to be a metaphysically neutral notion and admits several possible models. One of these possible models is Putnam's notion of "rational acceptability under (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Jim Edwards (1999). Prizing Truth From Warranted Assertibility: Reply to Tennant. Analysis 59 (4):300–308.score: 1.0
    Crispin Wright has argued that an antirealist should not equate truth with warrant. Neil Tennant has disputed this. This paper continues the discussion with Tennant. Firstly, it expands upon the radical difference between Tennant's conception of a warrant and Wright's. Secondly, it shows that, even if we were to adopt Tennant's own conception of a warrant, there is a reading available to Wright of 'There is no warrant for P' and of 'There is a warrant for not-P' such that the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Michel Seymour (1995). Critical Notice of Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):637-658.score: 1.0
    Crispin Wright attempts to develop a theory of truth which could be characterized as a form of minimalism, and he is favourable to a pluralistic account which allows for many different uses of the predicate "true", including one where the word is constrained by a norm of "superassertibility". In assessing these different claims made by the author, I adopt the position held by the deflationist philosopher. I try to show that his criticism of deflationism fails, and that there is a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation