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  1. Amanda C. Brandone, Susan A. Gelman & Jenna Hedglen (2014). Children's Developing Intuitions About the Truth Conditions and Implications of Novel Generics Versus Quantified Statements. Cognitive Science 38 (7).
    Generic statements express generalizations about categories and present a unique semantic profile that is distinct from quantified statements. This paper reports two studies examining the development of children's intuitions about the semantics of generics and how they differ from statements quantified by all, most, and some. Results reveal that, like adults, preschoolers (a) recognize that generics have flexible truth conditions and are capable of representing a wide range of prevalence levels; and (b) interpret novel generics as having near-universal prevalence implications. (...)
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  2. Susan A. Gelman, Nicholaus S. Noles & Sarah Stilwell (2014). Tracking the Actions and Possessions of Agents. Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (4):599-614.
    We propose that there is a powerful human disposition to track the actions and possessions of agents. In two experiments, 3-year-olds and adults viewed sets of objects, learned a new fact about one of the objects in each set (either that it belonged to the participant, or that it possessed a particular label), and were queried about either the taught fact or an unrelated dimension (preference) immediately after a spatiotemporal transformation, and after a delay. Adults uniformly tracked object identity under (...)
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  3. Shelbie L. Sutherland, Andrei Cimpian, Sarah‐Jane Leslie & Susan A. Gelman (2014). Memory Errors Reveal a Bias to Spontaneously Generalize to Categories. Cognitive Science 38 (7).
    Much evidence suggests that, from a young age, humans are able to generalize information learned about a subset of a category to the category itself. Here, we propose that—beyond simply being able to perform such generalizations—people are biased to generalize to categories, such that they routinely make spontaneous, implicit category generalizations from information that licenses such generalizations. To demonstrate the existence of this bias, we asked participants to perform a task in which category generalizations would distract from the main goal (...)
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  4. Elizabeth A. Ware & Susan A. Gelman (2014). You Get What You Need: An Examination of Purpose‐Based Inheritance Reasoning in Undergraduates, Preschoolers, and Biological Experts. Cognitive Science 38 (2):197-243.
    This set of seven experiments examines reasoning about the inheritance and acquisition of physical properties in preschoolers, undergraduates, and biology experts. Participants (N = 390) received adoption vignettes in which a baby animal was born to one parent but raised by a biologically unrelated parent, and they judged whether the offspring would have the same property as the birth or rearing parent. For each vignette, the animal parents had contrasting values on a physical property dimension (e.g., the birth parent had (...)
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  5. Susan A. Gelman (2013). Artifacts and Essentialism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (3):449-463.
    Psychological essentialism is an intuitive folk belief positing that certain categories have a non-obvious inner “essence” that gives rise to observable features. Although this belief most commonly characterizes natural kind categories, I argue that psychological essentialism can also be extended in important ways to artifact concepts. Specifically, concepts of individual artifacts include the non-obvious feature of object history, which is evident when making judgments regarding authenticity and ownership. Classic examples include famous works of art (e.g., the Mona Lisa is authentic (...)
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  6. Susan A. Gelman, Meredith A. Meyer & Nicholaus S. Noles (2013). History and Essence in Human Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (2):142 - 143.
    Bullot & Reber (B&R) provide compelling evidence that sensitivity to context, history, and design stance are crucial to theories of art appreciation. We ask how these ideas relate to broader aspects of human cognition. Further open questions concern how psychological essentialism contributes to art appreciation and how essentialism regarding created artifacts (such as art) differs from essentialism in other domains.
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  7. Susan A. Gelman (2011). Thinking About Possibilities. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):341-342.
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  8. Andrei Cimpian, Amanda C. Brandone & Susan A. Gelman (2010). Generic Statements Require Little Evidence for Acceptance but Have Powerful Implications. Cognitive Science 34 (8):1452-1482.
    Generic statements (e.g., “Birds lay eggs”) express generalizations about categories. In this paper, we hypothesized that there is a paradoxical asymmetry at the core of generic meaning, such that these sentences have extremely strong implications but require little evidence to be judged true. Four experiments confirmed the hypothesized asymmetry: Participants interpreted novel generics such as “Lorches have purple feathers” as referring to nearly all lorches, but they judged the same novel generics to be true given a wide range of prevalence (...)
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  9. Alison Gopnik, Henry M. Wellman, Susan A. Gelman & Andrew N. Meltzoff (2010). A Computational Foundation for Cognitive Development: Comment on Griffths Et Al. And McLelland Et Al. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (8):342-343.
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  10. Amanda C. Brandone & Susan A. Gelman (2009). Differences in Preschoolers' and Adults' Use of Generics About Novel Animals and Artifacts: A Window Onto a Conceptual Divide. Cognition 110 (1):1-22.
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  11. Susan A. Gelman & Sandra R. Waxman (2009). Response to Sloutsky: Taking Development Seriously: Theories Cannot Emerge From Associations Alone. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (8):332-333.
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  12. Sandra R. Waxman & Susan A. Gelman (2009). Early Word-Learning Entails Reference, Not Merely Associations. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (6):258-263.
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  13. Grant Gutheil, Susan A. Gelman, Eileen Klein, Katherine Michos & Kara Kelaita (2008). Preschoolers' Use of Spatiotemporal History, Appearance, and Proper Name in Determining Individual Identity. Cognition 107 (1):366-380.
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  14. Tamar Kushnir, Henry M. Wellman & Susan A. Gelman (2008). The Role of Preschoolers' Social Understanding in Evaluating the Informativeness of Causal Interventions. Cognition 107 (3):1084-1092.
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  15. Cristine H. Legare & Susan A. Gelman (2008). Bewitchment, Biology, or Both: The Co‐Existence of Natural and Supernatural Explanatory Frameworks Across Development. Cognitive Science 32 (4):607-642.
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  16. Marjorie Rhodes, Daniel Brickman & Susan A. Gelman (2008). Sample Diversity and Premise Typicality in Inductive Reasoning: Evidence for Developmental Change. Cognition 108 (2):543-556.
  17. Josep Call, Olga Kochukhova, Gustaf Gredebäck, Sorel Cahan, Yaniv Mor, Nina Kazanina, Colin Phillips, Ori Friedman, Alan M. Leslie & Susan A. Gelman (2007). Number 1 Regular Articles. Cognition 105:726-729.
     
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  18. Susan A. Gelman (2005). Psychological Models Often Assume That Young Children Learn Words and Concepts Bymeansof Associative Learning Mechanisms, Without the Need to Posit Any Innate Predispositions. For Example, Smith, Jones, and Landau (1996) Propose That Children Learn Concepts by Hearing Specific Linguistic Frames While Viewing Specific Object Properties. The Environment Provides All the Information That Children Need; the Conjunction of Sights and Sounds is Proposed to Be Sufficient to Enable Children. [REVIEW] In Peter Carruthers (ed.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York: Oxford University Press New York. 1--198.
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  19. Susan A. Gelman (2005). Two Insights About Naming in the Preschool Child. In Peter Carruthers (ed.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York: Oxford University Press New York. 198--215.
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  20. Susan Goldin-Meadow, Susan A. Gelman & Carolyn Mylander (2005). Expressing Generic Concepts with and Without a Language Model. Cognition 96 (2):109-126.
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  21. Susan A. Gelman (2004). Defining Essentialism. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (9):404-409.
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  22. Gail D. Heyman, Ann T. Phillips & Susan A. Gelman (2003). Children's Reasoning About Physics Within and Across Ontological Kinds. Cognition 89 (1):43-61.
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  23. Woo-Kyoung Ahn, Charles Kalish, Susan A. Gelman, Douglas L. Medin, Christian Luhmann, Scott Atran, John D. Coley & Patrick Shafto (2001). Why Essences Are Essential in the Psychology of Concepts. Cognition 82 (1):59-69.
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  24. Woo-Kyoung Ahn, Susan A. Gelman, Jennifer A. Amsterlaw, Jill Hohenstein & Charles W. Kalish (2000). Causal Status Effect in Children's Categorization. Cognition 76 (2):B35-B43.
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  25. Susan A. Gelman & Lawrence A. Hirschfeld (1999). How Biological is Essentialism. In D. Medin & S. Atran (eds.), Folkbiology. Mit Press. 403--446.
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  26. Susan A. Gelman & Karen S. Ebeling (1998). Shape and Representational Status in Children's Early Naming. Cognition 66 (2):B35-B47.
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  27. Woo-Kyoung Ahn, Charles W. Kalish, Douglas L. Medin & Susan A. Gelman (1995). The Role of Covariation Versus Mechanism Information in Causal Attribution. Cognition 54 (3):299-352.
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  28. Susan A. Gelman & Henry M. Wellman (1991). Insides and Essences: Early Understandings of the Non-Obvious. Cognition 38 (3):213-244.
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  29. Susan A. Gelman & Ellen M. Markman (1986). Categories and Induction in Young Children. Cognition 23 (3):183-209.
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