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Susanna Siegel [50]Susanna Claire Siegel [1]
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Profile: Susanna Siegel (Harvard University)
  1. Susanna Siegel & Alex Byrne (forthcoming). Rich or Thin? In Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception. Routledge
    Siegel and Byrne debate whether perceptual experiences present rich properties or exclusively thin properties.
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  2.  73
    Susanna Siegel (2010). The Contents of Visual Experience. Oxford.
    In this book, Susanna Siegel develops a framework for understanding the contents of visual experience, and argues that these contents involve all sorts of ...
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  3. Susanna Siegel (2014). Affordances and the Contents of Perception. In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford 39-76.
  4. Susanna Siegel (2012). Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification. Noûs 46 (2):201-222.
    In this paper I argue that it's possible that the contents of some visual experiences are influenced by the subject's prior beliefs, hopes, suspicions, desires, fears or other mental states, and that this possibility places constraints on the theory of perceptual justification that 'dogmatism' or 'phenomenal conservativism' cannot respect.
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  5. Susanna Siegel (forthcoming). Epistemic Charge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
    I give some reasons to think that perceptual experiences redound on the rational standing of the subject, and explore the consequences of this idea for the global structure of justification.
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  6. Susanna Siegel (2016). How Is Wishful Seeing Like Wishful Thinking? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1).
    This paper makes the case that when wishful thinking ill-founds belief, the belief depends on the desire in ways can be recapitulated at the level of perceptual experience. The relevant kinds of desires include motivations, hopes, preferences, and goals. I distinguish between two modes of dependence of belief on desire in wishful thinking: selective or inquiry-related, and responsive or evidence-related. I offers a theory of basing on which beliefs are badly-based on desires, due to patterns of dependence that can found (...)
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  7. Zoe Jenkin & Susanna Siegel (2015). Cognitive Penetrability: Modularity, Epistemology, and Ethics. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):531-545.
    Introduction to Special Issue of Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Overview of the central issues in cognitive architecture, epistemology, and ethics surrounding cognitive penetrability. Special issue includes papers by philosophers and psychologists: Gary Lupyan, Fiona Macpherson, Reginald Adams, Anya Farennikova, Jona Vance, Francisco Marchi, Robert Cowan.
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  8. Susanna Siegel (2013). The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):697-722.
    In this paper I offer a theory of what makes certain influences on visual experiences by prior mental states (including desires, beliefs, moods, and fears) reduce the justificatory force of those experiences. The main idea is that experiences, like beliefs, can have rationally assessable etiologies, and when those etiologies are irrational, the experiences are epistemically downgraded.
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  9. Susanna Siegel & Nicholas Silins (2015). The Epistemology of Perception. In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception. Oxford
    An overview of the epistemology of perception, covering the nature of justification, immediate justification, the relationship between the metaphysics of perceptual experience and its rational role, the rational role of attention, and cognitive penetrability. The published version will contain a smaller bibliography, due to space constraints in the volume.
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  10. Susanna Siegel (2015). Epistemic Evaluability and Perceptual Farce. In A. Raftopoulos (ed.), Cognitive Effects on Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford
  11. Susanna Siegel (2006). Which Properties Are Represented in Perception? In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press 481--503.
    In discussions of perception and its relation to knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver comes to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content.
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  12. Susanna Siegel (2013). Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role? In Tamar Gendler (ed.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology volume 4. Oxford 240.
    I distinguish between two kinds of selection effects on experience: selection of objects or features for experience, and anti-selection of experiences for cognitive uptake. I discuss the idea that both kinds of selection effects can lead to a form of confirmation bias at the level of perception, and argue that when this happens, selection effects can influence the rational role of experience.
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  13. Susanna Siegel (2010). Do Visual Experiences Have Contents? In Bence -Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford
  14. Susanna Siegel (2013). Are There Edenic Grounds of Perceptual Intentionality? Analysis 73 (2):329-344.
    This is a critical piece on *The Character of Consciousness* by David Chalmers. It focuses on Chalmers's two-stage view of perceptual content and the epistemology of perceptual belief that flows from this theory, and criticizes his theories of Edenic concepts, perceptual acquaintance, and perceptual belief.
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  15. Ned Block & Susanna Siegel (2013). Attention and Perceptual Adaptation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):205-206.
  16. Susanna Siegel & Nicholas Silins (forthcoming). Attention and Perceptual Justification. In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Festschrift for Ned Block. MIT Press
  17. Susanna Siegel (2006). Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience. Philosophical Review 115 (3):355--88.
    In this paper, I argue that certain perceptual relations are represented in visual experience.
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  18. Nicholas Silins & Susanna Siegel (2014). Consciousness, Attention, and Justification. In Elia Zardini & Dylan Dodd (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism and Perceptual Jusification. Oxford University Press
    We discuss the rational role of highly inattentive experiences, and argue that they can provide rational support for beliefs.
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  19. Susanna Siegel (2009). The Visual Experience of Causation. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):519-540.
    In this paper I argue that causal relations between objects are represented in visual experience, and contrast my argument and its conclusion with Michotte's results from the 1960's.
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  20. Susanna Siegel (2008). The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge. Oxford University Press 205--224.
    Early formulations of disjunctivism about perception refused to give any positive account of the nature of hallucination, beyond the uncontroversial fact that they can in some sense seem to the same to the subject as veridical perceptions. Recently, some disjunctivists have attempt to account for hallucination in purely epistemic terms, by developing detailed account of what it is for a hallucinaton to be indiscriminable from a veridical perception. In this paper I argue that the prospects for purely epistemic treatments of (...)
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  21. Susanna Siegel (2013). Reply to Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):749-757.
    Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath each contributed to a symposium on "The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience" in Philosophical Studies. These are my replies their contributions.
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  22.  22
    Susanna Siegel (2015). XV—Epistemic Charge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3 pt 3):277-306.
    It is often assumed that while beliefs redound on the rational standing of a subject, perceptions do not. An irrational belief detracts from the rationality of believers, according to this assumption, but perceptions cannot do the same. I argue that perceptual experiences can have a rational standing, and that their epistemic status can be modulated by other psychological states that help produce them. Drawing on a metaphor from electricity, I call the epistemic status that perceptual experiences can have ‘epistemic charge'.
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  23. Susanna Siegel (2013). Reply to Prinz. Philosophical Studies 163 (3).
    Reply to Jesse Prinz's contribution to a symposium on *The Contents of Visual Experience*.
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  24. Susanna Siegel (2007). How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience? Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):127-42.
    In this paper I discuss several proposals for how to find out which contents visual experiences have, and I defend the method I.
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  25. Susanna Siegel (2004). Indiscriminability and the Phenomenal. Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):91-112.
    In this paper, I describe and criticize M.G.F. Martin's version of disjunctivism, and his argument for it from premises about self-knowledge.
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  26. Susanna Siegel (2006). How Does Phenomenology Constrain Object-Seeing? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):429 – 441.
    Perception provides a form of contact with the world and the other people in it. For example, we can learn that Franco is sitting in his chair by seeing Franco; we can learn that his hair is gray by seeing the colour of his hair. Such perception enables us to understand primitive forms of language, such as demonstrative expressions.
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  27. Alex Byrne, David Hilbert & Susanna Siegel (2007). Do We See More Than We Can Access? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (5-6):501-502.
    Short commentary on a paper by Ned Block.
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  28. Susanna Siegel (2006). Direct Realism and Perceptual Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):378-410.
    In The Problem of Perception, A.D. Smith’s central aim is to defend the view that we can directly perceive ordinary objects, such as cups, keys and the like.1 The book is organized around the two arguments that Smith considers to be serious threats to the possibility of direct perception: the argument from illusion, and the argument from hallucination. The argument from illusion threatens this possibility because it concludes that indirect realism is true. Indirect realism is the view that we perceive (...)
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  29. Susanna Siegel, The Contents of Perception. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This is the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the contents of perception.
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  30.  83
    Susanna Siegel, Dialogue About Philosophy in Spanish.
    This is a compilations of short talks presented at a workshop held at Harvard in April 14 on the life of analytic philosophy today in Spanish. Authors include Susanna Siegel, Diana Acosta and Patricia Marechal, Diana Perez, Laura Pérez, and Josefa Toribio.
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  31. Susanna Siegel (2002). The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference. Philosophers' Imprint 2 (1):1-21.
    Siegel defends "Limited Intentionism", a theory of what secures the semantic reference of uses of bare demonstratives ("this", "that" and their plurals). According to Limited Intentionism, demonstrative reference is fixed by perceptually anchored intentions on the part of the speaker.
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  32.  56
    Michael Glanzberg & Susanna Siegel (2006). Presupposition and Policing in Complex Demonstratives. Noûs 40 (1):1–42.
    In this paper, we offer a theory of the role of the nominal in complex demonstrative expressions, such as 'this dog' or 'that glove with a hole in it'.
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  33. Susanna Siegel (2013). Reply to Travis. Philosophical Studies 163 (3).
    Reply to Charles Travis's contribution to a symposium on *The Contents of Visual Experience*.
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  34.  76
    Susanna Siegel (2005). The Phenomenology of Efficacy. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):265-84.
    In this paper I argue that certain type of first-personal causal property, efficacy, is represented in perceptual experience.
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  35.  90
    Susanna Siegel (2013). Reply to Campbell. Philosophical Studies 163 (3).
    Reply to John Campbell's contribution to a symposium on *The Contents of Visual Experience*.
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  36.  75
    Susanna Siegel (2013). Precise of The Contents of Visual Experience. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):813-816.
  37.  62
    Susanna Siegel (2013). Replies to Campbell, Prinz, and Travis. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):847-865.
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  38. Susanna Siegel, Misperception.
    In discussions of perception and its provision of knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver would normally come to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content.
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  39.  30
    Susanna Siegel (2013). Precise of The Contents of Visual Experience. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):813-816.
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  40. Susanna Siegel (forthcoming). The Contents of Experience. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
     
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  41.  88
    Susanna Siegel, The Dog and the Zombie.
  42.  23
    Susanna Siegel (2004). Reference and Consciousness. Philosophical Review 113 (3):427-431.
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  43.  27
    Susanna Siegel (2013). Erratum To: Precis of The Contents of Visual Experience. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):817-817.
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  44.  50
    Susanna Siegel, The Contents of Consciousness.
    A short overview of the philosophical significance of perceptual contents.
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  45. Susanna Siegel (2011). The Contents of Visual Experience. Oxford University Press Usa.
    What do we see? We are visually conscious of colors and shapes, but are we also visually conscious of complex properties such as being John Malkovich? In this book, Susanna Siegel develops a framework for understanding the contents of visual experience, and argues that these contents involve all sorts of complex properties. Siegel starts by analyzing the notion of the contents of experience, and by arguing that theorists of all stripes should accept that experiences have contents. She then introduces a (...)
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  46.  31
    Susanna Siegel (2013). Erratum To: Precis of The Contents of Visual Experience. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 163 (3):817-817.
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  47.  53
    Susanna Siegel (2002). Review of A Theory of Sentience, by Austen Clark. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 111 (1).
    First, what it is for a sentient being to sense is for it to employ two distinct capacities: one for representing places-at-times; the other for representing "features" (60, cf. 70). Exercised together, the result is akin to feature-placing, which brings us to the second thesis: what sensory systems represent is that features are instantiated at place-times. Accordingly, sensory systems do not, for instance, attribute properties to objects, such as trees, tables, bodies, or persons (163).
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  48.  18
    Susanna Siegel (2004). Review of Reference and Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 113 (3):427-431.
  49. Tamar Gendler, Susanna Siegel & Steven M. Cahn (eds.) (2008). The Elements of Philosophy: Readings From Past and Present. Oxford University Press.
    The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and Present is a comprehensive collection of historical and contemporary readings across the major fields of philosophy. With depth and quality, this introductory anthology offers a selection of readings that is both extensive and expansive; the readings span twenty-five centuries. They are organized topically into five parts: Religion and Belief, Moral and Political Philosophy, Metaphysics and Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind and Language, and Life and Death. The product of the collaboration of three highly (...)
     
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  50. Tamar Szabo Gendler, Susanna Siegel & Steven M. Cahn (eds.) (2007). The Elements of Philosophy: Readings From Past and Present. Oxford University Press Usa.
    The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and Present offers an extensive collection of classic and contemporary readings, organized topically into five main sections: Religion and Belief, Moral and Political Philosophy, Metaphysics and Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind and Language, and Life and Death. Within these broad areas, readings are arranged in clusters that address both traditional issues--such as the existence of God, justice and the state, knowledge and skepticism, and free will--and contemporary topics--including God and science, just war theory, vegetarianism, (...)
     
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