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  1.  589 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1969). Time Without Change. Journal of Philosophy 66 (12):363-381.
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  2.  478 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1975). Functionalism and Qualia. Philosophical Studies 27 (May):291-315.
  3.  406 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1959). Personal Identity and Memory. Journal of Philosophy 56 (October):868-902.
  4.  285 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1968). Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):555-67.
  5.  277 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1994). The Mind-Body Problem. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell
    * Argument from authoritative self-knowledge 1. We have a "privileged access" to our own mental states in the sense we have the authority on what mental states we are in. 2. Through introspection, we are aware of our mental states but not aware of them as physical states of any sort or as functional states. 3. Therefore, our mental states cannot be physical states.
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  6.  274 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1998). Causal and Metaphysical Necessity. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1):59–77.
    Any property has two sorts of causal features: “forward-looking” ones, having to do with what its instantiation can contribute to causing, and ldquo;backward-looking” ones, having to do with how its instantiation can be caused. Such features of a property are essential to it, and properties sharing all of their causal features are identical. Causal necessity is thus a special case of metaphysical necessity. Appeals to imaginability have no more force against this view than they do against the Kripkean view that (...)
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  7.  250 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (2008). Persons, Animals, and Identity. Synthese 162 (3):313 - 324.
    The paper is concerned with how neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity should respond to the challenge of animalist accounts. Neo-Lockean accounts that hold that persons can change bodies via brain transplants or cerebrum transplants are committed to the prima facie counterintuitive denial that a person is an (biologically individuated) animal. This counterintuitiveness can be defused by holding that a person is biological animal (on neo-Lockean views) if the “is” is the “is” of constitution rather than the “is” of identity, and (...)
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  8.  245 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1982). The Inverted Spectrum. Journal of Philosophy 79 (July):357-381.
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  9.  233 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1963). Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity. Cornell University Press.
  10.  230 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (2004). Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Since the appearance of a widely influential book, Self-Knowledge and Self-ldentity, Sydney Shoemaker has continued to work on a series of interrelated issues in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This volume contains a collection of the most important essays he has published since then. The topics that he deals with here include, among others, the nature of personal and other forms of identity, the relation of time to change, the nature of properties and causality and the relation between the (...)
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  11.  229 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1994). Phenomenal Character. Noûs 28 (1):21-38.
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  12.  211 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (2002). Kim on Emergence. Philosophical Studies 58 (1-2):53-63.
    Emergence requires that the ultimate physical micro-entities have micro-latent causal powers, which manifest themselves only when the entities are combined in ways that are emergence-engendering, in addition to the micro-manifest powers that account for their behavior in other circumstances. Subjects of emergent properties will have emergent micro-structural properties, specified partly in terms of these micro-latent powers, each of which will be determined by a micro-structural property specified only in terms of the micro-manifest powers of the constituents and the way they (...)
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  13.  210 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker, Content, Character and Color I: Against Standard Representationalism.
    The words “content” and “character” in my title refer to the representational content and phenomenal character of color experiences. So my topic concerns the nature of our experience of color. But I will, of course, be talking about colors as well as color experience. Let me set the stage by mentioning some things, some more controversial than others, that I will be taking for granted. I assume, to begin with, that objects in the world have colors, and have them independently (...)
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  14.  188 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1981). Some Varieties of Functionalism. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):93-119.
    Fleshing out Ramsey-sentence functionalism; against Lewis's "mad pain" mixed theory; relating functionalism to the causal theory of properties. Empirical functionalism is chauvinistic so probably false. A terrific, in-depth paper.
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  15.  175 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (2001). Introspection and Phenomenal Character. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):247--73.
    […] One view I hold about the nature of phenomenal character, which is also a view about the relation between phenomenal character and the introspective belief about it, is that phenomenal character is “self intimating.” This means that it is of the essence of a state’s having a certain phenomenal character that this issues in the subject’s being introspectively aware of that character, or does so if the subject reflects. Part of my aim is to give an account which makes (...)
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  16.  162 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1981). Absent Qualia Are Impossible -- A Reply to Block. Philosophical Review 90 (October):581-99.
  17.  158 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1991). Qualia and Consciousness. Mind 100 (399):507-24.
  18.  153 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (2004). Functionalism and Personal Identity: A Reply. Noûs 38 (3):525-533.
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  19.  151 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1994). The First-Person Perspective. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 68 (2):7-22.
  20.  139 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (2010). Reply to My Critics. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):125 - 132.
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  21.  138 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (2006). On the Way Things Appear. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press 461--480.
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  22.  137 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (2000). Phenomenal Character Revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):465-467.
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  23.  130 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker, Content, Character, and Color Ii: A Better Kind of Representationalism.
    From now on I will assume that it is possible in principle for there to be cases of spectrum inversion in which the invertees are equally good perceivers of the colors. What I want to show next is that while allowing this possibility is incompatible with standard representationalism, it requires acceptance of a different version of representationalism. Consider the standard way of describing a case of spectrum inversion. Returning to Jack and Jill, we say that red things look to Jack (...)
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  24.  130 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker, Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience.
    These lectures have been organized around the question of whether there is any good sense in which our introspective access to our own mental states is a kind of perception, something that can appropriately be called "inner sense." In my first lecture I distinguished two versions of the perception model of introspection, based on two different stereotypes of sense perception. One of these, based primarily on the case of vision, is what I called the object perceptual model -- it takes (...)
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  25.  125 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (2009). Self-Intimation and Second Order Belief. Erkenntnis 71 (1):35 - 51.
    The paper defends the view that there is a constitutive relation between believing something and believing that one believes it. This view is supported by the incoherence of affirming something while denying that one believes it, and by the role awareness of the contents one’s belief system plays in the rational regulation of that system. Not all standing beliefs are accompanied by higher-order beliefs that self-ascribe them; those that are so accompanied are ones that are “available” in the sense that (...)
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  26.  122 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (2011). Review of Tim Bayne, The Unity of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (1).
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  27.  118 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1979). Identity, Properties, and Causality. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):321-342.
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  28.  118 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1999). On David Chalmers's The Conscious Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):439-444.
  29.  116 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1988). On Knowing One's Own Mind. Philosophical Perspectives 2:183-209.
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  30.  109 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1999). Self and Body: Sydney Shoemaker. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):287–306.
    [Sydney Shoemaker] A major objection to the view that the relation of persons to human animals is coincidence rather than identity is that on this view the human animal will share the coincident person's physical properties, and so should (contrary to the view) share its mental properties. But while the same physical predicates are true of the person and the human animal, the difference in the persistence conditions of these entities implies that there will be a difference in the properties (...)
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  31.  109 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1994). Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense": Lecture I: The Object Perception Model. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):249-269.
  32.  108 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1970). Persons and Their Pasts. American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (4):269-85.
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  33.  108 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1984). Personal Identity. B. Blackwell.
  34.  103 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1996). The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press.
    Sydney Shoemaker is one of the most influential philosophers currently writing on philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The essays in this collection deal with the way in which we know our own minds, and with the nature of those mental states of which we have our most direct conscious awareness. Professor Shoemaker opposes the 'inner sense' conception of introspective self-knowledge. He defends the view that perceptual and sensory states have non-representational features - 'qualia' - that determine what it is like (...)
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  35.  102 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (2011). On What We Are. In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press
  36.  101 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (2011). Realization, Powers and Property Identity. The Monist 94 (1):3-18.
    This paper is about the relation between two metaphysical topics: the nature of properties, and way the instantiation of a property is sometimes “realized in” something more fundamental. It is partly an attempt to develop further, but also to correct, my earlier treatments of these topics. In my published work on realization, including my book Physical Realization, I was at pains to insist that acceptance of my view about this does not commit one to the causal theory of properties I (...)
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  37.  101 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1995). Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):211-28.
  38.  100 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1986). Introspection and the Self. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):101-120.
    The absence of identification of oneself tells against the view that introspection is a form of self-perception.
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  39.  98 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1984). Churchland on Reduction, Qualia, and Introspection. Philosophy of Science Association 1984:799-809.
  40.  96 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1996). Color, Subjective Reactions, and Qualia. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues. Atascadero: Ridgeview 55-66.
    Let me begin by indicating where I think Harman and I are in agreement. We both think that "subjective reactions" must come into an account of color, although we have different views about how they do. We both think that perceptual experience has a "presentational or representational character," and that color is represented by our visual experiences as a feature of external objects, not as a feature of our experience. Moreover, we agree that, as Harman puts it, "color is experienced (...)
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  41.  96 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (2007). Physical Realization. Oxford University Press.
    In Physical Realization, Sydney Shoemaker considers the question of how physicalism can be true: how can all facts about the world, including mental ones, be ...
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  42.  92 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1993). Functionalism and Consciousness. In G. R. Bock & James L. Marsh (eds.), Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174) 481-499.
  43.  90 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (2003). Moran on Self-Knowledge. European Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):391-401.
  44.  89 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1990). Qualities and Qualia: What's in the Mind? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (Supplement):109-131.
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  45.  85 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (2003). Realization, Micro-Realization, and Coincidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):1-23.
    Let thin properties be properties shared by coincident entities, e.g., a person and her body, and thick properties ones that are not shared. Thick properties entail sortal properties, e.g., being a person, and the associated persistence conditions. On the first account of realization defined here, the realized property and its realizers will belong to the same individual. This restricts the physical realizers of mental properties, which are thick, to thick physical properties. We also need a sense in which mental properties (...)
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  46.  85 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1992). Unger's Psychological Continuity Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):139-143.
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  47.  83 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (2003). Content, Character, and Color. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):253-78.
  48.  81 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (2009). Self-Knowing Agents – Lucy O'Brien. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):752-754.
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  49.  79 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1990). First-Person Access. Philosophical Perspectives 4:187-214.
  50.  77 DLs
    Sydney Shoemaker (1997). Self and Substance. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):283-304.
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