Search results for 'Systematicity' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Brian P. McLaughlin (2009). Systematicity Redux. Synthese 170 (2):251 - 274.score: 24.0
    One of the main challenges that Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn (Cognition 28:3–71, 1988) posed for any connectionist theory of cognitive architecture is to explain the systematicity of thought without implementing a Language of Thought (LOT) architecture. The systematicity challenge presents a dilemma: if connectionism cannot explain the systematicity of thought, then it fails to offer an adequate theory of cognitive architecture; and if it explains the systematicity of thought by implementing a LOT architecture, then it (...)
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  2. James Blackmon, David Byrd, Robert C. Cummins, Pierre Poirier, Martin Roth & George Schwarz (2001). Systematicity and the Cognition of Structured Domains. Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):1-19.score: 24.0
    The current debate over systematicity concerns the formal conditions a scheme of mental representation must satisfy in order to explain the systematicity of thought.1 The systematicity of thought is assumed to be a pervasive property of minds, and can be characterized (roughly) as follows: anyone who can think T can think systematic variants of T, where the systematic variants of T are found by permuting T’s constituents. So, for example, it is an alleged fact that anyone who (...)
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  3. Robert F. Hadley (2004). On the Proper Treatment of Semantic Systematicity. Minds and Machines 14 (2):145-172.score: 24.0
    The past decade has witnessed the emergence of a novel stance on semantic representation, and its relationship to context sensitivity. Connectionist-minded philosophers, including Clark and van Gelder, have espoused the merits of viewing hidden-layer, context-sensitive representations as possessing semantic content, where this content is partially revealed via the representations'' position in vector space. In recent work, Bodén and Niklasson have incorporated a variant of this view of semantics within their conception of semantic systematicity. Moreover, Bodén and Niklasson contend that (...)
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  4. Robert Cummins, James Blackmon, David Byrd, Pierre Poirier, Martin Roth & Georg Schwarz (2001). Systematicity and the Cognition of Structured Domains. Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):167 - 185.score: 24.0
    The current debate over systematicity concerns the formal conditions a scheme of mental representation must satisfy in order to explain the systematicity of thought.1 The systematicity of thought is assumed to be a pervasive property of minds, and can be characterized (roughly) as follows: anyone who can think T can think systematic variants of T, where the systematic variants of T are found by permuting T’s constituents. So, for example, it is an alleged fact that anyone who (...)
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  5. Wayne A. Davis (2005). On Begging the Systematicity Question. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:399-404.score: 24.0
    Robert Cummins has argued that Jerry Fodor’s well-known systematicity argument begs the question. I show that the systematicity argument for thought structure does not beg the question, nor run in either explanatory nor inferential circles, nor illegitimately project sentence structure onto thoughts. Because the evidence does not presuppose that thought has structure, connectionist explanations of the same interconnections between thoughts are at least possibilities. Butthey are likely to be ad hoc.
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  6. Robert C. Cummins, James Blackmon & David Byrd (2005). What Systematicity Isn't. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:405-408.score: 24.0
    In “On Begging the Systematicity Question,” Wayne Davis criticizes the suggestion of Cummins et al. that the alleged systematicity of thought is not as obvious as is sometimes supposed, and hence not reliable evidence for the language of thought hypothesis. We offer a brief reply.
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  7. Shimon Edelman & Nathan Intrator (2003). Towards Structural Systematicity in Distributed, Statically Bound Visual Representations. Cognitive Science 23 (1):73-110.score: 24.0
    The problem of representing the spatial structure of images, which arises in visual object processing, is commonly described using terminology borrowed from propositional theories of cognition, notably, the concept of compositionality. The classical propositional stance mandates representations composed of symbols, which stand for atomic or composite entities and enter into arbitrarily nested relationships. We argue that the main desiderata of a representational system — productivity and systematicity — can (indeed, for a number of reasons, should) be achieved without recourse (...)
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  8. Kent Johnson (2004). On the Systematicity of the Language of Thought. Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):111-139.score: 21.0
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  9. Robert C. Cummins (1996). Systematicity. Journal of Philosophy 93 (12):591-614.score: 21.0
  10. Andrew Chignell (2006). Beauty as a Symbol of Natural Systematicity. British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (4):406-415.score: 18.0
    I examine Kant's claim that a relation of symbolization links judgments of beauty and judgments of ‘systematicity’ in nature (that is, judgments concerning the ordering of natural forms under hierarchies of laws). My aim is to show that the symbolic relation between the two is, for Kant, much closer than many commentators think: it is not only the form but also the objects of some of our judgments of taste that symbolize the systematicity of nature. -/- .
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  11. David J. Chalmers, Deep Systematicity and Connectionist Representation.score: 18.0
    1. I think that by emphasizing theoretical spaces of representations, Andy has put his finger on an issue that is key to connectionism's success, and whose investigation will be a key determinant of the field's further progress. I also think that if we look at representational spaces in the right way, we can see that they are deeply related to classical phenomenon of systematicity in representation. I want to argue that the key to understanding representational spaces, and in particular (...)
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  12. Lara Ostaric (2009). Kant's Account of Nature's Systematicity and the Unity of Theoretical and Practical Reason. Inquiry 52 (2):155 – 178.score: 18.0
    In this paper I argue that if one is to do justice to reason's unity in Kant, then one must acknowledge that reason's practical ends are presupposed in every theoretical investigation of nature. Thus, contrary to some other commentators, I contend that the notion of the metaphysical ground of the unity of nature should not be attributed to the “dynamics of reason” and its “own practical purposes.” Instead, the metaphysical ground of the unity of nature is in fact an indispensable (...)
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  13. Kenneth Aizawa (2003). The Systematicity Arguments. Kluwer.score: 18.0
    The Systematicity Arguments is the only book-length treatment of the systematicity and productivity arguments.
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  14. Jurgen Schroder (1998). Knowledge of Rules, Causal Systematicity, and the Language of Thought. Synthese 117 (3):313-330.score: 18.0
    Martin Davies' criterion for the knowledge of implicit rules, viz. the causal systematicity of cognitive processes, is first exposed. Then the inference from causal systematicity of a process to syntactic properties of the input states is examined. It is argued that Davies' notion of a syntactic property is too weak to bear the conclusion that causal systematicity implies a language of thought as far as the input states are concerned. Next, it is shown that Davies' criterion leads (...)
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  15. Robert F. Hadley & M. B. Hayward (1997). Strong Semantic Systematicity From Hebbian Connectionist Learning. Minds and Machines 7 (1):1-55.score: 18.0
    Fodor's and Pylyshyn's stand on systematicity in thought and language has been debated and criticized. Van Gelder and Niklasson, among others, have argued that Fodor and Pylyshyn offer no precise definition of systematicity. However, our concern here is with a learning based formulation of that concept. In particular, Hadley has proposed that a network exhibits strong semantic systematicity when, as a result of training, it can assign appropriate meaning representations to novel sentences (both simple and embedded) which (...)
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  16. Robert F. Hadley (1997). Explaining Systematicity: A Reply to Kenneth Aizawa. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 12 (4):571-79.score: 18.0
    In his discussion of results which I (with Michael Hayward) recently reported in this journal, Kenneth Aizawa takes issue with two of our conclusions, which are: (a) that our connectionist model provides a basis for explaining systematicity within the realm of sentence comprehension, and subject to a limited range of syntax (b) that the model does not employ structure-sensitive processing, and that this is clearly true in the early stages of the network''s training. Ultimately, Aizawa rejects both (a) and (...)
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  17. S. Phillips & G. S. Halford, Systematicity: Psychological Evidence with Connectionist Implications.score: 18.0
    At root, the systematicity debate over classical versus connectionist explanations for cognitive architecture turns on quantifying the degree to which human cognition is systematic. We introduce into the debate recent psychological data that provides strong support for the purely structure-based generalizations claimed by Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988). We then show, via simulation, that two widely used connectionist models (feedforward and simple recurrent networks) do not capture the same degree of generalization as human subjects. However, we show that this limitation (...)
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  18. Robert J. Matthews (1994). Three-Concept Monte: Explanation, Implementation, and Systematicity. Synthese 101 (3):347-63.score: 18.0
    Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988), Fodor and McLaughlin (1990) and McLaughlin (1993) challenge connectionists to explain systematicity without simply implementing a classical architecture. In this paper I argue that what makes the challenge difficult for connectionists to meet has less to do with what is to be explained than with what is to count as an explanation. Fodor et al. are prepared to admit as explanatory, accounts of a sort that only classical models can provide. If connectionists are to meet (...)
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  19. Jürgen Schröder (1998). Knowledge of Rules, Causal Systematicity, and the Language of Thought. Synthese 117 (3):313 - 330.score: 18.0
    Martin Davies' criterion for the knowledge of implicit rules, viz. the causal systematicity of cognitive processes, is first exposed. Then the inference from causal systematicity of a process to syntactic properties of the input states is examined. It is argued that Davies' notion of a syntactic property is too weak to bear the conclusion that causal systematicity implies a language of thought as far as the input states are concerned. Next, it is shown that Davies' criterion leads (...)
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  20. Brian P. McLaughlin (1992). Systematicity, Conceptual Truth, and Evolution. Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences 34:217-234.score: 18.0
    Smolensky's (1995) proposal for a connectionist explanation of systematicity doesn't work.
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  21. Angela Schwering & Kai-Uwe Kühnberger (2008). Child Versus Adult Analogy: The Role of Systematicity and Abstraction in Analogy Models. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):395-396.score: 18.0
    The target article develops a computational connectionist model for analogy-making from a developmental perspective and evaluates this model using simple analogies. Our commentary critically reviews the advantages and limits of this approach, in particular with respect to its expressive power, its capability to generalize across analogous structure and analyze systematicity in analogies.
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  22. Rolf Ahlers (2005). Reinhold and Hegel on the Principle and Systematicity of Philosophy. Idealistic Studies 35 (2-3):215-253.score: 18.0
    In the United States the relationship between Hegel and Schelling divides into two camps: The first sees Hegel’s critical remarks in the Phenomenology not directed against Schelling himself but against Schelling’s adherents. I provide here detailed arguments for the minority view: Although Hegel did collaborate with Schelling in the early Jena years even opposing Reinhold, he nonetheless worked with Reinhold’s arguments on the origins and systematicity of philosophy differently than did Schelling: The rift between the two giants really goes (...)
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  23. Paco Calvo & John Symons (eds.) (2014). The Architecture of Cognition: Rethinking Fodor and Pylyshyn's Systematicity Challenge. The Mit Press.score: 18.0
    Philosophers and cognitive scientists reassess systematicity in the post-connectionist era, offering perspectives from ecological psychology, embodied and distributed cognition, enactivism, and other methodologies.
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  24. Barbara C. Scholz (2007). Systematicity and Natural Language Syntax. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):375-402.score: 18.0
    A lengthy debate in the philosophy of the cognitive sciences has turned on whether the phenomenon known as ‘systematicity’ of language and thought shows that connectionist explanatory aspirations are misguided. We investigate the issue of just which phenomenon ‘systematicity’ is supposed to be. The much-rehearsed examples always suggest that being systematic has something to do with ways in which some parts of expressions in natural languages (and, more conjecturally, some parts of thoughts) can be substituted for others without (...)
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  25. Elisabeth Camp (2009). Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Systematicity, and Stimulus-Independence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):275-311.score: 16.0
    I argue that we can reconcile two seemingly incompatible traditions for thinking about concepts. On the one hand, many cognitive scientists assume that the systematic redeployment of representational abilities suffices for having concepts. On the other hand, a long philosophical tradition maintains that language is necessary for genuinely conceptual thought. I argue that on a theoretically useful and empirically plausible concept of 'concept', it is necessary and sufficient for conceptual thought that a thinker be able to entertain many of the (...)
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  26. Paul Hoyningen-Huene (2008). Systematicity: The Nature of Science. Philosophia 36 (2):167-180.score: 16.0
    This paper addresses the question of what the nature of science is. I will first make a few preliminary historical and systematic remarks. Next, I shall give an answer to the question that has to be qualified, clarified and justified. Finally, I will compare my answer with alternative answers and draw consequences for the demarcation problem.
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  27. Elisabeth Camp, Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Systematicity, and Stimulus-Independence and the Generality Constraint.score: 16.0
    A venerable philosophical tradition claims that only language users possess concepts. But this makes conceptual thought out to be an implausibly rarified achievement. A more recent tradition, based in cognitive science, maintains that any creature who can systematically recombine its representational capacities thereby deploys concepts. But this makes conceptual thought implausibly widespread. I argue for a middle ground: it is sufficient for conceptual thought that one be able to entertain many of the thoughts produced by recombining one.
     
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  28. Jerry A. Fodor (1997). Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity (Continued): Why Smolensky's Solution Still Doesn't Work. Cognition 62 (1):109-19.score: 15.0
  29. Jerry A. Fodor & Brian P. McLaughlin (1990). Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky's Solution Doesn't Work. Cognition 35 (2):183-205.score: 15.0
  30. Paul W. Franks (2005). All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism. Harvard University Press.score: 15.0
    In this work, the first overview of the German Idealism that is both conceptual and methodological, Paul W. Franks offers a philosophical reconstruction that is...
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  31. Paul Guyer (2003). Beauty, Systematicity, and the Highest Good: Eckart Förster's Kant's Final Synthesis. Inquiry 46 (2):195 – 214.score: 15.0
    Contrary to Eckart Förster, I argue that the Opus postumum represents more of an evolution than a revolution in Kant's thought. Among other points, I argue that Kant's Selbstsetzungslehre, or theory of self-positing, according to which we cannot have knowledge of the spatio-temporal world except through recognition of the changes we initiate in it by our own bodies, does not constitute a radicalization of Kant's transcendental idealism, but is a development of the realist line of argument introduced by the "Refutation (...)
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  32. W. F. G. Haselager & J. F. H. Van Rappard (1998). Connectionism, Systematicity, and the Frame Problem. Minds and Machines 8 (2):161-179.score: 15.0
    This paper investigates connectionism's potential to solve the frame problem. The frame problem arises in the context of modelling the human ability to see the relevant consequences of events in a situation. It has been claimed to be unsolvable for classical cognitive science, but easily manageable for connectionism. We will focus on a representational approach to the frame problem which advocates the use of intrinsic representations. We argue that although connectionism's distributed representations may look promising from this perspective, doubts can (...)
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  33. Paul Guyer (1990). Reason and Reflective Judgment: Kant on the Significance of Systematicity. Noûs 24 (1):17-43.score: 15.0
  34. Robert J. Matthews (1997). Can Connectionists Explain Systematicity? Mind and Language 12 (2):154-77.score: 15.0
  35. Kenneth Aizawa (1997). Explaining Systematicity. Mind and Language 12 (2):115-36.score: 15.0
  36. Jacqueline Mariña (2007). All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism by Paul W. Franks. [REVIEW] Zeitschrift für Neuere Theologiegeschichte/Journal for the History of Modern Theology 14 (1):145-149.score: 15.0
  37. Kenneth Aizawa (1997). The Role of the Systematicity Argument in Classicism and Connectionism. In S. O'Nuallain (ed.), Two Sciences of Mind. John Benjamins.score: 15.0
  38. Robert F. Hadley (1997). Cognition, Systematicity, and Nomic Necessity. Mind and Language 12 (2):137-53.score: 15.0
  39. Reinhard Blutner, Petra Hendriks, Helen de Hoop & Oren Schwartz (2004). When Compositionality Fails to Predict Systematicity. In Simon D. Levy & Ross Gayler (eds.), Compositional Connectionism in Cognitive Science. AAAI Press.score: 15.0
    has to do with the acquisition of encyclopedic knowledge.
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  40. Keith Butler (1993). On Clark on Systematicity and Connectionism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):37-44.score: 15.0
  41. Robert F. Hadley (1994). Systematicity in Connectionist Language Learning. Mind and Language 9 (3):247-72.score: 15.0
  42. Brian O'Connor (2006). Review of Paul W. Franks, All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (3).score: 15.0
  43. Steven Phillips (2007). Kenneth Aizawa, The Systematicity Arguments, Studies in Brain and Mind. Minds and Machines 17 (3):357-360.score: 15.0
  44. Paul Guyer (2003). Kant on the Systematicity of Nature: Two Puzzles. History of Philosophy Quarterly 20 (3):277 - 295.score: 15.0
  45. Paul Pietrowski (2007). Systematicity Via Monadicity. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):343-374.score: 15.0
    Words indicate concepts, which have various adicities. But words do not, in general, inherit the adicities of the indicated concepts. Lots of evidence suggests that when a concept is lexicalized, it is linked to an analytically related monadic concept that can be conjoined with others. For example, the dyadic concept CHASE(_,_) might be linked to CHASE(_), a concept that applies to certain events. Drawing on a wide range of extant work, and familiar facts, I argue that the (open class) lexical (...)
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  46. W. Dudley (2009). Review: Paul W. Franks: All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism. [REVIEW] Mind 118 (469):167-170.score: 15.0
  47. Robert F. Hadley (1994). Systematicity Revisited. Mind and Language 9 (4):431-44.score: 15.0
  48. Kenneth Aizawa (1997). Exhibiting Verses Explaining Systematicity: A Reply to Hadley and Hayward. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 7 (1):39-55.score: 15.0
  49. Daniel Breazeale (2007). All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism (Review). Journal of the History of Philosophy 45 (4):665-667.score: 15.0
  50. E. V. Garcia (2008). All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism. Philosophical Review 117 (2):300-303.score: 15.0
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