Search results for 'T. A. Warfield' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. B. P. McLaughlin & T. A. Warfield (1994). The Allure of Connectionism Reexamined. Synthese 101 (3):365 - 400.score: 960.0
    There is currently a debate over whether cognitive architecture is classical or connectionist in nature. One finds the following three comparisons between classical architecture and connectionist architecture made in the pro-connectionist literature in this debate: (1) connectionist architecture is neurally plausible and classical architecture is not; (2) connectionist architecture is far better suited to model pattern recognition capacities than is classical architecture; and (3) connectionist architecture is far better suited to model the acquisition of pattern recognition capacities by learning than (...)
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  2. T. A. Warfield (2001). Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Philosophical Review 110 (4):642-644.score: 870.0
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  3. S. Stich & T. Warfield (1995). Do Connectionist Minds Have Beliefs?–A Reply to Clark and Smolensky. In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell. 2.score: 810.0
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  4. Erik Carlson (2003). Counterexamples to Principle Beta: A Response to Crisp and Warfield. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):730-737.score: 288.0
    The well-known "Consequence Argument" for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism relies on a certain rule of inference; "Principle Beta". Thomas Crisp and Ted Warfield have recently argued that all hitherto suggested counterexamples to Beta can be easily circumvented by proponents of the Consequence Argument. I present a new counterexample which, I argue, is free from the flaws Crisp and Warfield detect in earlier examples.
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  5. Anthony L. Brueckner (2001). A Priori Knowledge of the World Not Easily Available. Philosophical Studies 104 (1):109-114.score: 207.0
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  6. T. Ryan Byerly (2011). Ockhamism Vs Molinism, Round 2: A Reply to Warfield. Religious Studies 47 (4):503 - 511.score: 198.0
    Ted Warfield has argued that if Ockhamism and Molinism offer different responses to the problems of foreknowledge and prophecy, it is the Molinist who is in trouble. I show here that this is not so -indeed, things may be quite the reverse.
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  7. Dana K. Nelkin (2001). The Consequence Argument and the "Mind" Argument. Analysis 61 (2):107-115.score: 162.0
  8. Michael Kremer (2004). How Not to Argue for Incompatibilism. Erkenntnis 60 (1):1-26.score: 114.0
    Ted A. Warfield has recently employed modal logic to argue that compatibilism in the free-will/determinism debate entails the rejection of intuitively valid inferences. I show that Warfield's argument fails. A parallel argument leads to the false conclusion that the mere possibility of determinism, together with the necessary existence of any contingent propositions, entails the rejection of intuitively valid inferences. The error in both arguments involves a crucial equivocation, which can be revealed by replacing modal operators with explicit quantifiers (...)
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  9. Danilo šuster (2004). Incompatibilism and the Logic of Transfer. Acta Analytica 19 (33):45-54.score: 108.0
    Modal arguments for incompatibility of freedom and determinism are typically based on the “transfer principle” for inability to act otherwise (Beta). The principle of agglomerativity (closure under conjunction introduction) is derivable from Beta. The most convincing counterexample to Beta is based on the denial of Agglomeration. The defender of the modal argument has two ways to block counterexamples to Beta: (i) use a notion of inability to act otherwise which is immune to the counterexample to agglomerativity; (ii) replace Beta with (...)
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  10. Rogier De Langhe (2013). Peer Disagreement Under Multiple Epistemic Systems. Synthese 190 (13):2547-2556.score: 81.0
    In a situation of peer disagreement, peers are usually assumed to share the same evidence. However they might not share the same evidence for the epistemic system used to process the evidence. This synchronic complication of the peer disagreement debate suggested by Goldman (In Feldman R, Warfield T (eds) (2010) Disagreement. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 187–215) is elaborated diachronically by use of a simulation. The Hegselmann–Krause model is extended to multiple epistemic systems and used to investigate the role (...)
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