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Profile: Trent Dougherty (Baylor University)
Profile: Tom Dougherty (Stanford University, University of Sydney)
  1. Trent Dougherty, Hell, Vagueness, and Justice: A Reply to Sider.
    Ted Sider’s paper “Hell and Vagueness” challenges a certain conception of Hell by arguing that it is inconsistent with God’s justice. Sider’s inconsistency argument works only when supplemented by additional premises. Key to Sider’s case is a premise that the properties upon which eternal destinies supervene are “a smear,” i.e., they are distributed continuously among individuals in the world. We question this premise and provide reasons to doubt it. The doubts come from two sources. The first is based on evidential (...)
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  2. Trent Dougherty, Realizing Virtue: A Unified Virtue Epistemology.
    In this paper I will offer a sketch of an account of knowledge which seeks to unify a number of disparate elements the inclusion of which I assume to be a desideratum of a theory of knowledge. The device I will utilize to achieve this unity-in-diversity is that of a functional property—a property multiply realizable in widely varying realization bases. The essential idea is that the property warrant is a functional property: that which epistemizes true belief, that which turns mere (...)
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  3. Trent Dougherty, Trent Dougherty.
    Fallibilism in epistemology is neither identical to nor unrelated to the ordinary notion of fallibility. In ordinary life we are forced to the conclusion that human beings are prone to error. The epistemological doctrine of fallibilism, though, is about the consistency of holding that humans have knowledge while admitting certain limitations in human ways of knowing. As will be seen, making the content of the basic intuition more precise is both somewhat contentious and the key to an adequate definition of (...)
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  4. Patrick Rysiew & Trent Dougherty, Pragmatics Without Pragmatism: Reply to Fantl & McGrath.
    To accept ‘pragmatic encroachment’ is to take the view that whether you are in a position to know is in part a function of practical stakes. This position strikes many as not just unorthodox but extremely implausible. According to Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath (F&M), however, the best account of the prima facie oddity of certain utterances incorporates just such a pragmatist maneuver. In reaching this conclusion, F&M begin with Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew’s (D&R’s) theory as the best on (...)
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  5. Trent G. Dougherty & Justin P. McBrayer (eds.) (forthcoming). Skeptical Theism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
  6. Trent Dougherty & Logan Paul Gage (forthcoming). New Atheist Approaches to Religion. In Graham Oppy (ed.), Acumen Handbook of Philosophy of Religion. Acumen.
    In this article, we examine in detail the New Atheists' most serious argument for the conclusion that God does not exist, namely, Richard Dawkins's Ultimate 747 Gambit. Dawkins relies upon a strong explanatory principle involving simplicity. We systematically inspect the various kinds of simplicity that Dawkins may invoke. Finding his crucial premises false on any common conception of simplicity, we conclude that Dawkins has not given good reason to think God does not exist.
     
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  7. Trent Dougherty & Alexander R. Pruss (forthcoming). Evil and the Problem of Anomaly. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.
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  8. Trent Dougherty & Chris Tweedt (forthcoming). Religious Epistemology. Philosophy Compass.
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  9. Tom Dougherty (2014). A Deluxe Money Pump. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):21-29.
    So-called money pump arguments aim to show that intransitive preferences are irrational because they will lead someone to accept a series of deals that leaves his/her financially worse off and better off in no respect. A common response to these arguments is the foresight response, which counters that the agent in question may see the exploitation coming, and refuse to trade at all. To obviate this response, I offer a “deluxe money pump argument” that applies dominance reasoning to a modified (...)
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  10. Tom Dougherty (2014). Fickle Consent. Philosophical Studies 167 (1):25-40.
    Why is consent revocable? In other words, why must we respect someone's present dissent at the expense of her past consent? This essay argues against act-based explanations and in favor of a rule-based explanation. A rule prioritizing present consent will serve our interests the best, in light of our interests in having flexibility over our consent and in minimizing the possibility of error in people's judgments about whether we consent.
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  11. Tom Dougherty (2013). Aggregation, Beneficence and Chance. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (2):1-19.
  12. Tom Dougherty (2013). Agent-Neutral Deontology. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):527-537.
    According to the “Textbook View,” there is an extensional dispute between consequentialists and deontologists, in virtue of the fact that only the latter defend “agent-relative” principles—principles that require an agent to have a special concern with making sure that she does not perform certain types of action. I argue that, contra the Textbook View, there are agent-neutral versions of deontology. I also argue that there need be no extensional disagreement between the deontologist and consequentialist, as characterized by the Textbook View.
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  13. Tom Dougherty (2013). No Way Around Consent: A Reply to Rubenfeld on 'Rape-by-Deception'. Yale Jaw Journal Online 123:321-333.
  14. Tom Dougherty (2013). Rational Numbers: A Non‐Consequentialist Explanation Of Why You Should Save The Many And Not The Few. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):413-427.
    You ought to save a larger group of people rather than a distinct smaller group of people, all else equal. A consequentialist may say that you ought to do so because this produces the most good. If a non-consequentialist rejects this explanation, what alternative can he or she give? This essay defends the following explanation, as a solution to the so-called numbers problem. Its two parts can be roughly summarised as follows. First, you are morally required to want the survival (...)
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  15. Tom Dougherty (2013). Sex Lies and Consent. Ethics 123 (4):717-744.
    How wrong is it to deceive someone into sex by lying, say, about one's profession? The answer is seriously wrong when the liar's actual profession would be a deal breaker for the victim of the deception: this deception vitiates the victim's sexual consent, and it is seriously wrong to have sex with someone while lacking his or her consent.
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  16. Tom Dougherty (2013). Vague Value. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):n/a-n/a.
    You are morally permitted to save your friend at the expense of a few strangers, but not at the expense of very many. However, there seems no number of strangers that marks a precise upper bound here. Consequently, there are borderline cases of groups at the expense of which you are permitted to save your friend. This essay discusses the question of what explains ethical vagueness like this, arguing that there are interesting metaethical consequences of various explanations.
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  17. Trent Dougherty (2013). Introduction. Res Philosophica 90 (2):125-126.
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  18. Trent Dougherty (2013). Knowledge in an Uncertain World, by Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath. Mind 122 (488):1078-1085.
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  19. Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew (2013). Experience First. In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 2.
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  20. Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew (2013). Still Nowhere Else to Start. In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 25.
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  21. Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew (2013). What Is Knowledge-First Epistemology? In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 10.
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  22. Trent Dougherty (2012). Achieving Knowledge. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):166-168.
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  23. Trent Dougherty (ed.) (2012). New Essays on Skeptical Theism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  24. Trent Dougherty (2012). Reducing Responsibility: An Evidentialist Account of Epistemic Blame. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):534-547.
    Abstract: This paper argues that instances of what are typically called ‘epistemic irresponsibility’ are better understood as instances of moral or prudenial failure. This hypothesis covers the data and is simpler than postulating a new sui generis form of normativitiy. The irresponsibility alleged is that embeded in charges of ‘You should have known better!’ However, I argue, either there is some interest at stake in knowing or there is not. If there is not, then there is no irresponsibility. If there (...)
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  25. Trent Dougherty (2012). Reconsidering the Parent Analogy: Unfinished Business for Skeptical Theists. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 72 (1):17-25.
    Skeptical theism has as its foundation the thesis that if God permits evil, his reasons for doing so will likely be beyond our ken. The only defense given for this thesis is the Parent Analogy. There is in the literature only one defense of this use of the Parent Analogy and it has never been confronted. I examine it and expose serious flaws, thus exposing a crack in the very foundation of skeptical theism.
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  26. T. Dougherty (ed.) (2011). Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
    Few concepts have been considered as essential to the theory of knowledge and rational belief as that of evidence. The simplest theory which accounts for this is evidentialism, the view that epistemic justification for belief--the kind of justification typically taken to be required for knowledge--is determined solely by considerations pertaining to one's evidence. In this ground-breaking book, leading epistemologists from across the spectrum challenge and refine evidentialism, sometimes suggesting that it needs to be expanded in quite surprising directions. Following this, (...)
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  27. T. Dougherty (2011). Recent Work on the Problem of Evil. Analysis 71 (3):560-573.
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  28. Tom Dougherty (2011). On Whether To Prefer Pain to Pass. Ethics 121 (3):521-537.
    Most of us are “time-biased” in preferring pains to be past rather than future and pleasures to be future rather than past. However, it turns out that if you are risk averse and time-biased, then you can be turned into a “pain pump”—in order to insure yourself against misfortune, you will take a series of pills which leaves you with more pain and better off in no respect. Since this vulnerability seems rationally impermissible, while time-bias and risk aversion seem rationally (...)
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  29. Trent Dougherty (ed.) (2011). Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Few concepts have been considered as essential to the theory of knowledge and rational belief as that of evidence. The simplest theory which accounts for this is evidentialism, the view that epistemic justification for belief--the kind of justification typically taken to be required for knowledge--is determined solely by considerations pertaining to one's evidence. In this ground-breaking book, leading epistemologists from across the spectrum challenge and refine evidentialism, sometimes suggesting that it needs to be expanded in quite surprising directions. Following this, (...)
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  30. Trent Dougherty (2011). Fallibilism. In Duncan Pritchard & Sven Bernecker (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge.
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  31. Trent Dougherty (2011). Further Epistemological Considerations Concerning Skeptical Theism. Faith and Philosophy 28 (3):332-340.
    I defend the position that the appearance of a conflict between common-sense epistemology and skeptical theism remains, even after one fully appreciates the role defeat plays in rational belief. In particular, Matheson’s recent attempt to establish peace is not fully successful.
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  32. Trent Dougherty (2011). In Defense of Propositionalism About Evidence. In , Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
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  33. Trent Dougherty (2011). Knowledge Happens: Why Zagzebski has Not Solved the Meno Problem. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):73-88.
    I argue that Linda Zagzebski's proposed solution to the Meno Problem faces serious challenges. The Meno Problem, roughly, is how to explain the value that knowledge, as such, has over mere true belief. Her proposed solution is that believings—when thought of more like actions—can have value in virtue of their motivations. This meshes nicely with her theory that knowledge is, essentially, virtuously motivated true belief. Her solution fails because it entails that, necessarily, all knowledge is motivated in a way that (...)
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  34. Trent Dougherty (2011). Naturalism. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2):344-345.
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  35. Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew (2011). Clarity About Concessive Knowledge Attributions: Reply to Dodd. Synthese 181 (3):395-403.
    Recently, Dylan Dodd (this Journal ) has tried to clear up what he takes to be some of the many confusions surrounding concessive knowledge attributions (CKAs)—i.e., utterances of the form “S knows that p , but it’s possible that q ” (where q entails not- p ) (Rysiew, Noûs 35(4): 477–514, 2001). Here, we respond to the criticisms Dodd offers of the account of the semantics and the sometime-infelicity of CKAs we have given (Dougherty and Rysiew, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (...)
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  36. Debbie Roberts, Tom Dougherty, Ian Carter, Anna Stilz & David Shoemaker (2011). 10. George Sher, Who Knew? Responsibility Without Awareness George Sher, Who Knew? Responsibility Without Awareness (Pp. 675-680). [REVIEW] Ethics 121 (3).
     
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  37. Trent Dougherty (2010). Review of Quentin Smith (Ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (1).
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  38. Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew (2009). Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Concessive Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):123-132.
    If knowing requires believing on the basis of evidence that entails what’s believed, we have hardly any knowledge at all. Hence the near-universal acceptance of fallibilism in epistemology: if it's true that "we are all fallibilists now" (Siegel 1997: 164), that's because denying that one can know on the basis of non-entailing evidence1is, it seems, not an option if we're to preserve the very strong appearance that we do know many things (Cohen 1988: 91). Hence the significance of concessive knowledge (...)
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  39. Trent Dougherty (2008). Epistemological Considerations Concerning Skeptical Theism. Faith and Philosophy 25 (2):172-176.
    The thesis of this short paper is that skeptical theism does not look very plausible from the perspective of a common sense epistemology. A corollary of this isthat anyone who finds common sense epistemology plausible and is attracted to skeptical theism has some work to do to show that they can form a plausiblewhole. The dialectical situation is that to the degree that this argument is a strong one, to that same degree (at least) the theorist who would like to (...)
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  40. Trent Dougherty & Ted Poston (2008). A User's Guide to Design Arguments. Religious Studies 44 (1):99-110.
    We argue that there is a tension between two types of design arguments-the fine-tuning argument (FTA) and the biological design argument (BDA). The tension arises because the strength of each argument is inversely proportional to the value of a certain currently unknown probability. Since the value of that probability is currently unknown, we investigate the properties of the FTA and BDA on different hypothetical values of this probability. If our central claim is correct this suggests three results: 1. It is (...)
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  41. Ted Poston & Trent Dougherty (2008). A User's Guide to Design Arguments. Religious Studies 44 (1):99 - 110.
    We argue that there is a tension between two types of design arguments: the fine-tuning argument (FTA) and the biological design argument (BDA). The tension arises because the strength of each argument is inversely proportional to the value of a certain currently unknown probability. Since the value of that probability is currently unknown, we investigate the properties of the FTA and BDA on different hypothetical values of this probability. If our central claim is correct this suggests three results: (1) It (...)
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  42. Ted Poston & Trent Dougherty (2008). Hell and Vagueness: Reply to Sider. Faith and Philosophy 25 (3):322-328.
    Ted Sider’s paper “Hell and Vagueness” challenges a certain conception of Hell by arguing that it is inconsistent with God’s justice. Sider’s inconsistency argument works only when supplemented by additional premises. Key to Sider’s case is a premise that the properties upon which eternal destinies supervene are “a smear,” i.e. they are distributed continuously among individuals in the <span class='Hi'>world</span>. We question this premise and provide reasons to doubt it. The doubts come from two sources. The first is based on (...)
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  43. Trent Dougherty (2007). Divine Hiddenness and the Nature of Belief. Religious Studies 43 (2):183 - 198.
    In this paper we argue that attention to the intricacies relating to belief illustrate crucial difficulties with Schellenberg's hiddenness argument. This issue has been only tangentially discussed in the literature to date. Yet we judge this aspect of Schellenberg's argument deeply significant. We claim that focus on the nature of belief manifests a central flaw in the hiddenness argument. Additionally, attention to doxastic subtleties provides important lessons about the nature of faith.
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  44. Ted Poston & Trent Dougherty (2007). Divine Hiddenness and the Nature of Belief. Religious Studies 43 (2):183 - 198.
    In this paper we argue that attention to the intricacies relating to belief illustrate crucial difficulties with Schellenberg's hiddenness argument. This issue has been only tangentially discussed in the literature to date. Yet we judge this aspect of Schellenberg's argument deeply significant. We claim that focus on the nature of belief manifests a central flaw in the hiddenness argument. Additionally, attention to doxastic subtleties provides important lessons about the nature of faith.
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  45. Trent Dougherty (2006). Epistemic Justification. Review of Metaphysics 60 (1):142-143.
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  46. Trent Dougherty (2006). Epistemic Justification: Internalism Vs. Externalism, Foundations Vs. Virtues. Review of Metaphysics 60 (1):142-143.
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  47. G. E. Meyer & T. J. Dougherty (1987). Sawtooth Pac People and the Realization of Illusory Edges-Computational, Cognitive, and Utilitarian Implications. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 25 (5):347-347.
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  48. Ge Meyer & T. Dougherty (1986). Sawtooth Pac-People and Illusory Contours-Their Conflict with Amodal Completion. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 24 (5):336-336.
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