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  1. T. Forcht Dagi (2009). Consenting to the Ineffable: The Problem of Neuromodulation and Altered Consciousness. Journal of Clinical Ethics 21 (2):140-142.
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  2. T. Forcht Dagi & Rebecca Kaufman (2001). Clarifying the Discussion on Brain Death. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 26 (5):503 – 525.
    Definitions of death are based on subjective standards, priorities, and social conventions rather than on objective facts about the state of human physiology. It is the meaning assigned to the facts that determines whensomeone may be deemed to have died, not the facts themselves. Even though subjective standards for the diagnosis of death show remarkable consistency across communities, they are extrinsic. They are driven, implicitly or explicitly, by ideas about what benefits the community rather than what benefits the indidvidual. The (...)
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  3. T. Forcht Dagi (1992). Commentary on" How Much of the Brain Must Die in Brain Death. Journal of Clinical Ethics 3 (1):27.
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  4. T. Forcht Dagi (1988). Physicians and Obligatory Social Activism. Journal of Medical Humanities and Bioethics 9 (1):50-59.
    This essay examines the claim that physicians have a special obligation to engage in social and political activism. Four ethical paradigms are considered. Two paradigms, the preventive medicine and the social medicine models, embody a limited professional obligation to advocate the priority of health in society; the justification for a more aggressive stance is limited by the failings of paternalism. The radical model and the heroic model speak to issues of personal virtue rather than professional obligation; they are not strictly (...)
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  5. T. Forcht Dagi (1976). Cause and Culpability. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1 (4):349-371.
    Summary and ConclusionMinutes before the jury would have returned a decision in Kaufman's favor, assessing damages of almost a half-million dollars against the physicians who treated her, she settled out of court for approximately half that sum. I would argue that responsibility in medicine, that liability for malpractice, should be restricted to cases of negligence in which there is no question concerning the proximate causality of the physician's proven negligence to the harm which resulted. It is clear that “negligence” covers (...)
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