231 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Terry Horgan (University of Arizona)
  1. Terence Horgan, Replies to Corbi and Barker.
    Josep Corbi raises several worries about the metaethical position that Mark Timmons and I have articulated and defended, which we call “nondescriptivist cognitivism.â€â€¦ His remarks prompt some points of clarification…. Timmons and I characterize descriptive content as “way-the-world-might-be†content. We maintain that “base case†beliefs—roughly, those non-evaluative and evaluative beliefs whose contents have the simplest kinds of logical form—are of two types: a non-evaluative belief is an is-commitment with respect to a core descriptive content, and an evaluative belief is an (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Terry Horgan & John Tienson, The Phenomenology of Embodied Agency.
    For the last 20 years or so, philosophers of mind have been using the term ‘qualia’, which is frequently glossed as standing for the “what-it-is-like” of experience. The examples of what-it-is-like that are typically given are feelings of pain or itches, and color and sound sensations. This suggests an identification of the experiential what-it-islike with such states. More recently, philosophers have begun speaking of the “phenomenology“ of experience, which they have also glossed as “what-it-is-like”. Many say, for example, that any (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Terry Horgan, The Two Envelope Paradox and the Foundations of Rational Decision Theory.
    You are given a choice between two envelopes. You are told, reliably, that each envelope has some money in it—some whole number of dollars, say—and that one envelope contains twice as much money as the other. You don’t know which has the higher amount and which has the lower. You choose one, but are given the opportunity to switch to the other. Here is an argument that it is rationally preferable to switch: Let x be the quantity of money in (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Terence Horgan (forthcoming). Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem, II. Erkenntnis.
    In “Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem,” Anna Mahtani and I offer a new argument for thirdism that relies on what we call “generalized conditionalization.” Generalized conditionalization goes beyond conventional conditionalization in two respects: first, by sometimes deploying a space of synchronic, essentially temporal, candidate-possibilities that are not “prior” possibilities; and second, by allowing for the use of preliminary probabilities that arise by first bracketing, and then conditionalizing upon, “old evidence.” In “Beauty and Conditionalization: Reply to Horgan and Mahtani,” (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Terence E. Horgan & David Sosa (eds.) (forthcoming). Collection on the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Terence Horgan, Marcelo Sabates & David Sosa (eds.) (forthcoming). Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes From the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim,. Cambridge University Press.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. David Henderson & Terence Horgan (2014). Relies to Our Critics. Philosophical Studies 169 (3):549-564.
    We respond to the central concerns raised by our commentators to our book, The Epistemological Spectrum. Casullo believes that our account of what we term “low-grade a priori” justification provides important clarification of a kind of philosophical reflection. However he objects to calling such reflection a priori. We explain what we think is at stake. Along the way, we comment on his idea of that there may be an epistemic payoff to making a distinction between assumptions and presumptions. In the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Robert Barnard & Terence Horgan (2013). The Synthetic Unity of Truth. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. 180.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. David Henderson & Terry Horgan (2013). Conceptually Grounded Necessary Truths. In Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy. Oup Oxford. 111.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. David Henderson & Terry Horgan (2013). Risk Sensitive Animal Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):599-608.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Terence Horgan (2013). Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality. The Monist 96 (2):232-251.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Terry Horgan & Anna Mahtani (2013). Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Erkenntnis 78 (2):333-351.
    We present a new argument for the claim that in the Sleeping Beauty problem, the probability that the coin comes up heads is 1/3. Our argument depends on a principle for the updating of probabilities that we call ‘generalized conditionalization’, and on a species of generalized conditionalization we call ‘synchronic conditionalization on old information’. We set forth a rationale for the legitimacy of generalized conditionalization, and we explain why our new argument for thirdism is immune to two attacks that Pust (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2013). Epistemological Skepticism, Semantic Blindness, and Competence-Based Performance Errors. Acta Analytica 28 (2):161-177.
    The semantic blindness objection to contextualism challenges the view that there is no incompatibility between (i) denials of external-world knowledge in contexts where radical-deception scenarios are salient, and (ii) affirmations of external-world knowledge in contexts where such scenarios are not salient. Contextualism allegedly attributes a gross and implausible form of semantic incompetence in the use of the concept of knowledge to people who are otherwise quite competent in its use; this blindness supposedly consists in wrongly judging that there is genuine (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Terry Horgan (2012). Introspection About Phenomenal Consciousness: Running the Gamut From Infallibility to Impotence. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Terry Horgan & George Graham (2012). Phenomenal Intentionality and Content Determinacy. In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning. De Gruyter.
  16. Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2012). Existence Monism Trumps Priority Monism. In Philip Goff (ed.), Spinoza on Monism. Palgrave Macmillan. 51--76.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. David K. Henderson & Terence Horgan (2011). The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis. OUP Oxford.
    David Henderson and Terence Horgan set out a broad new approach to epistemology, which they see as a mixed discipline, having both a priori and empirical elements. They defend the roles of a priori reflection and conceptual analysis in philosophy, but their revisionary account of these philosophical methods allows them a subtle but essential empirical dimension. They espouse a dual-perspective position which they call iceberg epistemology, respecting the important differences between epistemic processes that are consciously accessible and those that are (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. T. Horgan (2011). Our Knowledge of the Internal World, by Robert C. Stalnaker. Mind 120 (478):561-565.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Terry Horgan (2011). From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed. In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. 57.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Terry Horgan (2011). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Evidential Role of Perceptual Experience: Comments on Jack Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 153 (3):447 - 455.
    Phenomenal intentionality and the evidential role of perceptual experience: comments on Jack Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9604-2 Authors Terry Horgan, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Terry Horgan (2011). The Phenomenology of Agency and Freedom: Lessons From Introspection and Lessons From Its Limits. Humana. Mente 15:77-97.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2011). Attention, Morphological Content and Epistemic Justification. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):73-86.
    In the formation of epistemically justified beliefs, what is the role of attention, and what is the role (if any) of non-attentional aspects of cognition? We will here argue that there is an essential role for certain nonattentional aspects. These involve epistemically relevant background information that is implicit in the standing structure of an epistemic agent’s cognitive architecture and that does not get explicitly represented during belief-forming cognitive processing. Since such “morphological content” (as we call it) does not become explicit (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2011). Introspection and the Phenomenology of Free Will: Problems and Prospects. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1):180-205.
  24. Terry Horgan (2010). Transvaluationism About Vagueness: A Progress Report. Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):67-94.
    The philosophical account of vagueness I call "transvaluationism" makes three fundamental claims. First, vagueness is logically incoherent in a certain way: it essentially involves mutually unsatisfiable requirements that govern vague language, vague thought-content, and putative vague objects and properties. Second, vagueness in language and thought (i.e., semantic vagueness) is a genuine phenomenon despite possessing this form of incoherence—and is viable, legitimate, and indeed indispensable. Third, vagueness as a feature of objects, properties, or relations (i.e., ontological vagueness) is impossible, because of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Terry Horgan (2010). The Phenomenology of Agency and the Libet Results. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Lynn Nadel (eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet. Oup Usa. 159.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2010). The Epistemic Relevance of Morphological Content. Acta Analytica 25 (2):155-173.
    Morphological content is information that is implicitly embodied in the standing structure of a cognitive system and is automatically accommodated during cognitive processing without first becoming explicit in consciousness. We maintain that much belief-formation in human cognition is essentially morphological : i.e., it draws heavily on large amounts of morphological content, and must do so in order to tractably accommodate the holistic evidential relevance of background information possessed by the cognitive agent. We also advocate a form of experiential evidentialism concerning (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2010). Mandelbaum on Moral Phenomenology and Moral Realism. In Ian Verstegen (ed.), Maurice Mandelbaum and American Critical Realism. Routledge. 105.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2010). Untying a Knot From the Inside Out: Reflections on the “Paradox” of Supererogation. Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):29-63.
    In his 1958 seminal paper “Saints and Heroes”, J. O. Urmson argued that the then dominant tripartite deontic scheme of classifying actions as being exclusively either obligatory, or optional in the sense of being morally indifferent, or wrong, ought to be expanded to include the category of the supererogatory. Colloquially, this category includes actions that are “beyond the call of duty” (beyond what is obligatory) and hence actions that one has no duty or obligation to perform. But it is a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. George Graham, Terence Horgan & John Tienson (2009). Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of Mind. In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. 512--537.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. George Graham, Terence Horgan & John Tienson (2009). Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oup Oxford.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons (2009). Analytical Moral Functionalism Meets Moral Twin Earth. In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press. 221--236.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Terry Horgan (2009). Materialism, Minimal Emergentism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
  33. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2009). Analytical Moral Functionalism Meets Moral Twin Earth. In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press.
    In Chapters 4 and 5 of his 1998 book From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Frank Jackson propounds and defends a form of moral realism that he calls both ‘moral functionalism’ and ‘analytical descriptivism’. Here we argue that this metaethical position, which we will henceforth call ‘analytical moral functionalism’, is untenable. We do so by applying a generic thought-experimental deconstructive recipe that we have used before against other views that posit moral properties and identify them with certain (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2009). Expressivism and Contrary-Forming Negation. Philosophical Issues 19 (1):92-112.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2009). Meets Moral Twin Earth. In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press. 221.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2009). What Does the Frame Problem Tell Us About Moral Normativity? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):25 - 51.
    Within cognitive science, mental processing is often construed as computation over mental representations—i.e., as the manipulation and transformation of mental representations in accordance with rules of the kind expressible in the form of a computer program. This foundational approach has encountered a long-standing, persistently recalcitrant, problem often called the frame problem; it is sometimes called the relevance problem. In this paper we describe the frame problem and certain of its apparent morals concerning human cognition, and we argue that these morals (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Cei Maslen, Terry Horgan & Helen Daly (2009). Mental Causation. In Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oup Oxford.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. George Graham & Terence Horgan (2008). Qualia Realism, Its Phenomenal Contents and Discontents. In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. The Mit Press. 89--107.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. D. Henderson & T. Horgan (2008). Would You Really Rather Be Lucky Than Good? On the Normative Status of Naturalizing Epistemology. In Chase Wrenn (ed.), Naturalism, Reference and Ontology: Essays in Honor of Roger F. Gibson. Peter Lang Publishing Group. 47--76.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. T. Horgan (2008). Sobreveniência. Critica.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Terence E. Horgan & Matjaž Potrc (2008). Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology. The Mit Press.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Terence M. Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind. The Monist 91 (2):347-373.
    We argue that the letter of the Extended Mind hypothesis can be accommodated by a strongly internalist, broadly Cartesian conception of mind. The argument turns centrally on an unusual but (we argue) highly plausible view on the mark of the mental.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Terry Horgan (2008). Review of Amie L. Thomasson, Ordinary Objects. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (5).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Terry Horgan (2008). Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Sleeping Beauty Problem: Reply to Pust. Synthese 160 (2):155 - 159.
    I maintain, in defending “thirdism,” that Sleeping Beauty should do Bayesian updating after assigning the “preliminary probability” 1/4 to the statement S: “Today is Tuesday and the coin flip is heads.” (This preliminary probability obtains relative to a specific proper subset I of her available information.) Pust objects that her preliminary probability for S is really zero, because she could not be in an epistemic situation in which S is true. I reply that the impossibility of being in such an (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Terry Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind. The Monist 91 (2):347-373.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2008). Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology. The Mit Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2008). Prolegomena to a Future Phenomenology of Morals. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):115-131.
    Moral phenomenology is (roughly) the study of those features of occurrent mental states with moral significance which are accessible through direct introspection, whether or not such states possess phenomenal character – a what-it-is-likeness. In this paper, as the title indicates, we introduce and make prefatory remarks about moral phenomenology and its significance for ethics. After providing a brief taxonomy of types of moral experience, we proceed to consider questions about the commonality within and distinctiveness of such experiences, with an eye (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2008). What Does Moral Phenomenology Tell Us About Moral Objectivity? Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):267-300.
    Moral phenomenology is concerned with the elements of one's moral experiences that are generally available to introspection. Some philosophers argue that one's moral experiences, such as experiencing oneself as being morally obligated to perform some action on some occasion, contain elements that (1) are available to introspection and (2) carry ontological objectivist purportargument from phenomenological introspection.neutrality thesisthe phenomenological data regarding one's moral experiences that is available to introspection is neutral with respect to the issue of whether such experiences carry ontological (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Uriah Kriegel & Terence Horgan (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind. The Monist 91 (2):347-373.
  50. Ian Evans, Don Fallis, Peter Gross, Terry Horgan, Jenann Ismael, John Pollock, Paul D. Thorn, Jacob N. Caton, Adam Arico, Daniel Sanderman, Orlin Vakerelov, Nathan Ballantyne, Matthew S. Bedke, Brian Fiala & Martin Fricke (2007). An Objectivist Argument for Thirdism. Analysis 68.
    Bayesians take “definite” or “single-case” probabilities to be basic. Definite probabilities attach to closed formulas or propositions. We write them here using small caps: PROB(P) and PROB(P/Q). Most objective probability theories begin instead with “indefinite” or “general” probabilities (sometimes called “statistical probabilities”). Indefinite probabilities attach to open formulas or propositions. We write indefinite probabilities using lower case “prob” and free variables: prob(Bx/Ax). The indefinite probability of an A being a B is not about any particular A, but rather about the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 231