Search results for 'T. M. Scanlon Jr' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jussi Suikkanen (2007). T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other. [REVIEW] Utilitas 19 (4):524-526.score: 526.5
    This paper is a short review of T.M. Scanlon's book What We Owe to Each Other. The book itself is already a philosophical classic. It defends a contractualist ethical theory but also has many interesting things to say about reasons, value, well-being, promises, relativism, and so on.
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  2. Jussi Suikkanen (2011). Intentions, Blame, and Contractualism: A Review of T.M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. [REVIEW] Jurisprudence 2 (2):561-573.score: 526.5
    This is a longer critical notice of T.M. Scanlon's book Moral Dimensions. The main crux of the article is to investigate how Scanlon's claims about the moral significance of intentions and reactive attitudes in this book fit with the earlier contractualist ethical theory which he presented in What We Owe to Each Other.
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  3. R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar & Samuel Richard Freeman (eds.) (2011). Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon. Oxford University Press.score: 447.8
    Reasons and Recognition brings together fourteen new papers on an array of topics from the many areas to which Scanlon has made path-breaking contributions, ...
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  4. S. Matthew Liao, What We Owe to Each Other by T. M. Scanlon.score: 447.8
    Scanlon’s book aims to offer us a moral theory of right and wrong and of our obligations to one another. The theory is called contractualism and its central claim is that an act is right or wrong if and only if it could or could not be justified to others on grounds that they could not reasonably reject (p. 4). Scanlon recognizes that so stated, his contractualism might seem empty in the sense that one might think that the (...)
     
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  5. Robert Merrihew Adams (2001). Scanlon's Contractualism: Critical Notice of T. M. Scanlon, "What We Owe to Each Other". Philosophical Review 110 (4):563-586.score: 438.8
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  6. David Copp & David Sobel (2000). What We Owe to Each Other, T. M. Scanlon, the Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998, IX + 420 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 16 (2):333-378.score: 438.8
  7. Travis N. Rieder (2011). T. M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Meaning, Permissibility and Blame. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (4):529-533.score: 438.8
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  8. David Sosa (2004). A Big, Good Thing: T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998). Noûs 38 (2):359–377.score: 438.8
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  9. Nicholas Southwood (2005). The Difficulty of Tolerance, by T. M. Scanlon. Cambridge University Press, 2003, IX + 273 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 21 (2):326-333.score: 438.8
  10. David Sosa (2004). T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998) A Big, Good Thing. Noûs 38 (2):359-377.score: 438.8
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  11. Paul Weithman (2004). T. M. Scanlon, The Difficulty of Tolerance:The Difficulty of Tolerance. Ethics 114 (4):836-842.score: 438.8
  12. Anton Markoč (2013). Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon, Edited by R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar, and Samuel Freeman. [REVIEW] Mind 122 (488):1208-1213.score: 438.8
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  13. Martin O'Neill (2013). Symposium on the Political Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon Introduction. Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (4):371-374.score: 438.8
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  14. Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). Being Realistic About Reasons, by Scanlon, T.M. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.score: 427.5
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  15. Erica K. Rangel (2008). Innovation and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Critical Reflections on the Vitures of Profit , H.T. Engelhardt, Jr. And J.R. Garrett (Eds.) (Salem: M & M Scrivener Press, 2008). [REVIEW] HEC Forum 20 (4):375-378.score: 405.0
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  16. D. S. Colman (1948). School Books Alston Hurd Chase and Henry Phillips Jr.: A New Introduction to Greek. Pp. 128. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (London: Oxford University Press), 1946. Paper, 10s. F. Kinchin Smith and T. W. Melluish: Teach Yourself Greek. Pp. 331. London: Hodder and Stoughton (for the English Universities Press), 1947. Cloth, 4s. 6d. K. C. Masterman: A Latin Word-List. Pp. 3. Melbourne: Macmillan, 1945. Paper, 2s. 6d. K. D. Robinson and R. L. Chambers: The Latin Way. Pp. Xxviii+380 (Many Drawings by Hilary M. Crosse). London: Christophers, 1947. Cloth, 6s. 6d. O. N. Jones: Faciliora Reddenda. Pp. 96. London and Glasgow: Blackie, 1947. Cloth, 2s. I. Williamson: The Friday Afternoon Latin Book. Pp. 79 (Illustrated by Drawings). London and Glasgow: Blackie, 1947. Cloth, 2s. 3d. [REVIEW] The Classical Review 62 (3-4):158-159.score: 405.0
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  17. Ted F. Andrews (1969). Review Feature High School Biology H. Kolb N. A. Anderson R. G. Beidleman D. S. Farner V. Larsen W. V. Mayer E. M. Palmer S. Perrott P. G. Pearson Biological Science: Molecules to Man C. A. Welch D. I. Arnon H. Cochran F. C. Erk J. Fishleder W. V. Mayer, Sr. M. Pius J. Shaver F. W. Smith, Jr. Biological Science: An Inquiry Into Life J. A. Moore E. F. Degenhardt B. Glass L. Hallenbeck M. Kennedy W. V. Mayer T. G. Meyer I. D. Olsen W. N. Stewart. [REVIEW] Bioscience 19 (5):475-476.score: 405.0
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  18. Maria Letizia Zanier (2001). P.M. Sniderman, P. Peri, R.J.P. De Figueiredo, Jr. E T. Piazza, "The Outsider". Polis 15 (1):158-160.score: 405.0
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  19. Carina Fourie (2012). What is Social Equality? An Analysis of Status Equality as a Strongly Egalitarian Ideal. Res Publica 18 (2):107-126.score: 263.3
    What kind of equality should we value and why? Current debate centres around whether distributive equality is valuable. However, it is not the only (potentially) morally significant form of equality. David Miller and T. M. Scanlon have emphasised the importance of social equality—a strongly egalitarian notion distinct from distributive equality, and which cannot be reduced to a concern for overall welfare or the welfare of the worst-off. However, as debate tends to focus on distribution, social equality has been neglected (...)
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  20. S. Matthew Liao (2010). The Buck-Passing Account of Value: Lessons From Crisp. Philosophical Studies 151 (3):421 - 432.score: 263.3
    T. M. Scanlon's buck-passing account of value (BPA) has been subjected to a barrage of criticisms. Recently, to be helpful to BPA, Roger Crisp has suggested that a number of these criticisms can be met if one makes some revisions to BPA. In this paper, I argue that if advocates of the buck-passing account accepted these revisions, they would effectively be giving up the buck-passing account as it is typically understood, that is, as an account concerned with the conceptual (...)
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  21. Michael Cholbi (2014). Luck, Blame, and Desert. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):313-332.score: 263.3
    T.M. Scanlon has recently proposed what I term a ‘double attitude’ account of blame, wherein blame is the revision of one’s attitudes in light of another person’s conduct, conduct that we believe reveals that the individual lacks the normative attitudes we judge essential to our relationship with her. Scanlon proposes that this account justifies differences in blame that in turn reflect differences in outcome luck. Here I argue that although the double attitude account can justify blame’s being sensitive (...)
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  22. Michael Otsuka (2000). Scanlon and the Claims of the Many Versus the One. Analysis 60 (3):288–293.score: 202.5
    In "What We Owe to Each Other", T. M. <span class='Hi'>Scanlon</span> argues that one should save the greater number when faced with the choice between saving one life and two or more different lives. It is, <span class='Hi'>Scanlon</span> claims, a virtue of this argument (which is traceable to Frances Kamm) that it does not appeal to the claims of groups of individuals but only to the claims of individuals. I demonstrate that this argument for saving the greater number, (...)
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  23. T. M. Scanlon Jr (1986). Equality of Resources and Equality of Welfare: A Forced Marriage? Ethics 97 (1):111-118.score: 198.0
  24. Pamela Hieronymi (2011). Of Metaethics and Motivation: The Appeal of Contractualism. In R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar & Samuel Richard Freeman (eds.), Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon. Oxford University Press.score: 193.5
    In 1982, when T. M. Scanlon published “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” he noted that, despite the widespread attention to Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, the appeal of contractualism as a moral theory had been under appreciated. In particular, the appeal of contractualism’s account of what he then called “moral motivation” had been under appreciated.1 It seems to me that, in the intervening quarter century, despite the widespread discussion of Scanlon’s work, the appeal of contractualism, in precisely this regard, has (...)
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  25. R. M. Byrn (1978). The Antelope. By John T. Noonan, Jr. Berkeley: University of California Press. American Journal of Jurisprudence 23 (1):237-242.score: 189.0
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  26. George T. Dennis (1985). Walter Emil Kaegi Jr., Byzantine Military Unrest, 471–843: An Interpretation. Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1981. Paper. Pp. Xii, 373. [REVIEW] Speculum 60 (1):164-165.score: 189.0
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  27. Margaret Gilbert, Andrew Mason, Elizabeth S. Anderson, J. David Velleman, Matthew H. Kramer, Michele M. Moody‐Adams & Martha C. Nussbaum (1999). 10. Lucius T. Outlaw, Jr., On Race and Philosophy Lucius T. Outlaw, Jr., On Race and Philosophy (Pp. 454-456). Ethics 109 (2).score: 189.0
     
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  28. John Martin Fischer (2008). Responsibility and the Kinds of Freedom. Journal of Ethics 12 (3/4):203 - 228.score: 175.5
    In this paper I seek to identify different sorts of freedom putatively linked to moral responsibility; I then explore the relationship between such notions of freedom and the Consequence Argument, on the one hand, and the Frankfurt-examples, on the other. I focus (in part) on a dilemma: if a compatibilist adopts a broadly speaking "conditional" understanding of freedom in reply to the Consequence Argument, such a theorist becomes vulnerable in a salient way to the Frankfurt-examples.
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  29. Pamela Bjorklund (2004). 'There but for the Grace of God': Moral Responsibility and Mental Illness. Nursing Philosophy 5 (3):188-200.score: 175.5
  30. J. van Oosterhout, Ben Wempe & Theo van Willigenburg (2004). Rethinking Organizational Ethics: A Plea for Pluralism. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 55 (4):385-393.score: 175.5
    This paper challenges a pervasive, if not always explicit assumption of the present state of theorising in business ethics. This is the idea that a workable theory of organizational ethics must provide a unified perspective on its subject matter. In this paper we will sketch the broad outlines of an alternative understanding of business ethics, which focuses on constraints on corporate conduct that cannot reasonably be rejected. These constraints stem from at least three different levels or spheres of social reality, (...)
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  31. T. M. Scanlon (2000). Intention and Permissibility, I. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):301–317.score: 173.3
    [T. M. Scanlon] It is clearly impermissible to kill one person (or refrain from giving him treatment that he needs in order to survive) because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, (...)
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  32. T. M. Scanlon (2013). Responsibility and the Value of Choice. Think 12 (33):9-16.score: 173.3
    Research Articles T. M. Scanlon, Think , FirstView Article(s).
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  33. T. M. Scanlon (2014). Being Realistic About Reasons. Oxford University Press.score: 173.3
    Is what we have reason to do a matter of fact? If so, what kind of truth is involved, how can we know it, and how do reasons motivate and explain action? In this concise and lucid book T. M. Scanlon offers answers, with a qualified defense of normative cognitivism--the view that there are normative truths about reasons for action.
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  34. Ralph Wedgwood (2011). Scanlon on Double Effect. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):464-472.score: 150.8
    In this new book Moral Dimensions, T. M. Scanlon (2008) explores the ethical significance of the intentions and motives with which people act. According to Scanlon, these intentions and motives do not have any direct bearing on the permissibility of the act. Thus, Scanlon claims that the traditional Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) is mistaken. However, the way in which someone is motivated to act has a direct bearing on what Scanlon calls the act's "meaning". One (...)
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  35. Jakob Elster (2012). Scanlon on Permissibility and Double Effect. Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (1):75-102.score: 150.8
    In his book Moral Dimensions. Permissibility, Meaning, Blame , T.M. Scanlon proposes a new account of permissibility, and argues, against the doctrine of double effect (DDE), that intentions do not matter for permissibility. I argue that Scanlon's account of permissibility as based on what the agent should have known at the time of action does not sufficiently take into account Scanlon's own emphasis on permissibility as a question for the deliberating agent. A proper account of permissibility, based (...)
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  36. Joshua Stuchlik (2012). A Critique of Scanlon on Double Effect. Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):178-199.score: 150.8
    According to the Principle of Double Effect (PDE), there are conditions under which it would be morally justifiable to cause some harm as a foreseen side-effect of one's action even though it would not be justifiable to form and execute the intention of causing the same harm. If we take the kind of justification in question to be that of moral permissibility, this principle correctly maps common intuitions about when it would be permissible to act in certain ways. T.M. (...) argues that the PDE so interpreted is problematic, as it returns implausible verdicts in other scenarios. Scanlon is unable to account for the common pattern of moral reasoning that we employ in the relevant cases. I argue that we can account for this pattern while avoiding implausible verdicts if we interpret the PDE as a principle about when it is licit to inflict harm rather than when it is permissible to do so, and if we connect the concept of the licit with that of the permissible in the right way. (shrink)
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  37. Roderick M. Chisholm & Keith Lehrer (eds.) (1975). Analysis and Metaphysics: Essays in Honor of R. M. Chisholm. D. Reidel Pub. Co..score: 139.5
    Taylor, R. A tribute.--Epistemology: Cornman, J. W. Chisholm on sensing and perceiving. Ross, J. F. Testimonial evidence. Lehrer, K. Reason and consistency. Keim, R. Epistemic values and epistemic viewpoints. Hanen, M. Confirmation, explanation, and acceptance. Canfield, J. V. "I know that I am in pain" is senseless. Steel, T. J. Knowledge and the self-presenting.--Metaphysics: Cartwright, R. Scattered objects. Duggan, T. J. Hume on causation. Arnaud, R. B. Brentanist relations. Johnson, M. L., Jr. Events as recurrables.--Ethics: Stevenson, J. T. On doxastic (...)
     
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  38. R. Jay Wallace (2002). Scanlon's Contractualism. Ethics 112 (3):429-470.score: 132.8
    T. M. Scanlon's magisterial book What We Owe to Each Other is surely one of the most sophisticated and important works of moral philosophy to have appeared for many years. It raises fundamental questions about all the main aspects of the subject, and I hope and expect that it will have a decisive influence on the shape and direction of moral philosophy in the years to come. In this essay I shall focus on four sets of issues raised by (...)
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  39. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2010). Scanlon on the Doctrine of Double Effect. Social Theory and Practice 36 (4):541-564.score: 132.8
    In recent work, T.M. Scanlon has unsuccessfully challenged the doctrine of double effect (DDE). First, comparing actions reflecting faulty moral deliberations and involving merely foreseen harm with actions reflecting less faulty moral deliberations involving intended harm suggests that proponents of DDE do not confuse the critical and the deliberative uses of moral principles. Second, Scanlon submits that it is odd to say to a deliberating agent that the permissibility of the actions she ponders depends on the intention with (...)
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  40. Richard Parkhill (2008). Assurance and Scanlon's Theory of Promises. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):385-392.score: 132.8
    I offer a reading of the first clause of T. M. Scanlon's principle of fidelity to assurances. A circularity problem is created by his way of differentiating promises from other assurances which comply with this principle. When the clause is read in the way here proposed, all assurances complying with the principle are promises, and so this problem no longer arises.
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  41. Mark van Roojen (2013). Scanlon's Promising Proposal and the Righ Kind of Reasons to Believe. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 3. 59-78.score: 132.8
    T. M. Scanlon suggests that the binding nature of promises itself plays a role in allowing a promisee rationally to expect follow through even while that binding nature itself depends on the promisee’s rational expectation of follow through. Kolodny and Wallace object that this makes the account viciously circular. The chapter defends Scanlon’s theory from this objection. It argues that the basic complaint is a form of wrong kinds of reason objection. The thought is that the promisee’s reason (...)
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  42. Richard J. Arneson (2002). The End of Welfare As We Know It? Scanlon Versus Welfarist Consequentialism. Social Theory and Practice 28 (2):315-336.score: 132.8
    A notable achievement of T.M. Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other is its sustained critique of welfarist consequentialism. Consequentialism is the doctrine that one morally ought always to do an act, of the alternatives, that brings about a state of affairs that is no less good than any other one could bring about. Welfarism is the view that what makes a state of affairs better or worse is some increasing function of the welfare for persons realized in it. (...)
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  43. V. N. Mosesso Jr, L. H. Brown, H. L. Greene, T. A. Schmidt, T. P. Aufderheide & M. R. Sayre (2005). Woolhead G, Calnan M, Dieppe P, Tadd. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 14:240-242.score: 126.0
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  44. Ronnie Littlejohn & Marthe Chandler (eds.) (2008). Polishing the Chinese Mirror: Essays in Honor of Henry Rosemont, Jr. Global Scholarly Publications.score: 126.0
    Edited by Marthe Chandler and Ronnie Littlejohn, this work is a collection of expository and critical essays on the work of Henry Rosemont, Jr., a prominent and influential contemporary philosopher, activist, translator, and educator in the field of Asian and Comparative Philosophy. The essays in this collection take up three major themes in Rosemont's work: his work in Chinese linguistics, his contribution to the theory of human rights, and his interest in East Asian religion. Contributions include works by the leading (...)
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  45. Daniel Friedrich & Nicholas Southwood (2011). Promises and Trust. In Hanoch Sheinman (ed.), Promises and Agreement: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.score: 105.8
    In this article we develop and defend what we call the “Trust View” of promissory obligation, according to which making a promise involves inviting another individual to trust one to do something. In inviting her trust, and having the invitation accepted (or at least not rejected), one incurs an obligation to her not to betray the trust that one has invited. The distinctive wrong involved in breaking a promise is a matter of violating this obligation. We begin by explicating the (...)
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  46. David Alm (2008). Contractualism, Reciprocity, Compensation. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2 (3):1-23.score: 105.8
    Two generally recognized moral duties are to reciprocate benefits one has received from others and to compensate harms one has done to others. In this paper I want to show that it is not possible to give an adequate account of either duty – or at least one that corresponds to our actual practices – within a contractualist moral theory of the type developed by T. M. Scanlon (1982, 1998). This fact is interesting in its own right, as contractualism (...)
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  47. Michelle Mason (2011). Blame: Taking It Seriously. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):473-481.score: 105.8
    Philosophers writing on moral responsibility inherit from P.F. Strawson a particular problem space. On one side, it is shaped by consequentialist accounts of moral criticism on which blame is justified, if at all, by its efficacy in influencing future behavior in socially desirable ways. It is by now a common criticism of such views that they suffer a "wrong kind of reason" problem. When blame is warranted in the proper way, it is natural to suppose this is because the target (...)
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  48. Michael Cholbi (2002). A Contractualist Account of Promising. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):475-91.score: 105.8
    T.M. Scanlon (1998) proposes that promise breaking is wrong because it shows manipulative disregard for the expectations for future behavior created by promising. I argue that this account of promissory obligation is mistaken in it own right, as well as being at odds with Scanlon's contractualism. I begin by placing Scanlon's account of promising within a tradition that treats the creation of expectations in promise recipients as central to promissory obligation. However, a counterexample to Scanlon's account, (...)
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  49. Graham Hubbs (2013). Answerability Without Answers. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (3):1-15.score: 105.8
    The classical ethical questions of whether and to what extent moral criticism is a sort of rational criticism have received renewed interest in recent years. According to the approach that I refer to as rationalist, accounts of moral responsibility are grounded by explanations of the conditions under which an agent is rationally answerable for her actions and attitudes. In the sense that is relevant here, to answer for an attitude or action is to give reasons that at least purport to (...)
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