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Thomas Metzinger [62]T. Metzinger [5]Thomas K. Metzinger [2]
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Profile: Thomas Metzinger (Johannes Gutenberg Universität, Mainz)
  1. Thomas Metzinger, Faster Than Thought.
    In this speculative paper I would like to show how important the integration of mental content is for a theory of phenomenal consciousness. I will draw the reader's attention to two manifestations of this problem which already play a role in the empirical sciences concerned with consciousness: The binding problem and the superposition problem. In doing so I hope to be able to leave the welltrodden paths of the debate over consciousness. My main concern is to gain a fresh access (...)
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  2. Thomas Metzinger, La Soggettività Dell'esperienza Soggettiva: Un'analisi Rappresentazionale Della Prospettiva in Prima Persona.
    Sommario. Prima che di definire un modello della coscienza e comprendere che cosa sia un fenomeno soggettivo, è necessario sviluppare una teoria della prospettiva in prima persona. Questa teoria deve essere concettualmente con- vincente, empiricamente plausibile e, soprattutto, aperta a nuovi sviluppi. Il quadro di riferimento concettuale deve essere coerente con il progresso scienti- fico. Le sue ipotesi fondamentali devono essere adattabili in modo da permette- re a nuovi risultati sperimentali di essere inseriti nel modello teorico. Questo ar- ticolo tenta (...)
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  3. Thomas Metzinger, Self Models.
  4. Thomas Metzinger, Spiritualität und intellektuelle Redlichkeit.
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  5. Wanja Wiese & Thomas Metzinger (2012). Desiderata for a Mereotopological Theory of Consciousness. In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. John Benjamins Pub. Co.. 88--185.
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  6. Thomas Metzinger & Elisabeth Hildt (2011). Cognitive Enhancement. In Judy Illes & Barbara J. Sahakian (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics. Oxford University Press.
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  7. Thomas Metzinger (2010). The No-Self Alternative. In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.
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  8. Thomas Metzinger (2010). The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity: A Brief Summary with Examples. Humanta Mente 14:1-28.
  9. Thomas Metzinger (2009). The Ego Tunnel. Basic Books.
    Philosopher and scientist Thomas Metzinger argues that neuroscience's picture of the "self" as an emergent phenomenon of our biology and the attendant fact that the "self" can be manipulated--and even controlled--raises novel and serious ...
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  10. Thomas Metzinger & Olaf Blanke (2009). Full-Body Illusions and Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13 (1):7-13.
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  11. Aleksandra Mroczko, Thomas Metzinger, Wolf Singer & Danko Nikolić (2009). Immediate Transfer of Synesthesia to a Novel Inducer. Journal of Vision 9 (12):1-8.
  12. Aleksandra Mroczko, Thomas Metzinger, Wolf Singer & Danko Nikolić (2009). Immediate Transfer of Synesthesia to a Novel Inducer. Journal of Vision 9 (25):1-8.
     
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  13. Thomas Metzinger (2008). Empirical Perspectives From the Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity: A Brief Summary with Examples. In Rahul Banerjee & B. K. Chakrabarti (eds.), Models of Brain and Mind: Physical, Computational, and Psychological Approaches. Elsevier.
  14. Bigna Lenggenhager, Tej Tadi, Thomas Metzinger & Olaf Blanke (2007). Video Ergo Sum: Manipulating Bodily Self-Consciousness. Science 317 (5841):1096-1099.
    Genes adjacent to species-specific loci are 6.2% older than genes adjacent to other dynamic loci (P < 10−2 by randomization; gray bars in Fig. 3); thus, species-specific genes are not randomly distributed but are found preferentially in the older regions, indicating that the incipient Escherichia and Salmonella lineages continued to participate in recombination at loci unlinked to lineage-specific genes.
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  15. Thomas Metzinger & Jennifer Michelle Windt (2007). Dreams. In D. Barrett & P. McNamara (eds.), The New Science of Dreaming. Praeger Publishers.
    differences between dreaming and waking consciousness as well. In this chapter, we will argue that these differences mainly concern the subjective quality of the dreaming experience. The interesting question, from a philosophical point of view, is not so much whether or not dreams are conscious experiences at all. Rather, one must ask in what sense dreams can be considered as conscious experiences, and what happens to the experiential subject during the dream state. Finally, in order to arrive at a more (...)
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  16. Jennifer Michelle Windt & Thomas Metzinger (2007). The Philosophy of Dreaming and Self-Consciousness: What Happens to the Experiential Subject During the Dream State? In Deirdre Barrett & Patrick McNamara (eds.), The New Science of Dreaming Vol 3: Cultural and Theoretical Perspectives. Praeger Publishers/Greenwood Publishing Group. 193-247.
  17. Thomas Metzinger (2006). Conscious Volition and Mental Representation: Toward a More Fine-Grained Analysis. In Natalie Sebanz & Wolfgang Prinz (eds.), Disorders of Volition. MIT Press.
    A Bradford Book The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England.
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  18. Thomas Metzinger (2006). Reply to Ghin: Self-Sustainment on the Level of Global Availability. Psyche 12 (4).
    Of all the current philosophical attempts to rescue the concept of “self” by working out a weaker version, one that does not imply an ontological substance or an individual in the metaphysical sense, Marcello Ghin’s is clearly my favorite. His reconstruction of the original theory is absolutely accurate and without any major misunderstandings. Enriching the concept of a “SMT-system” with the notions of “autocatalysis” and “self- sustainment,” and adding the intriguing idea that we are systems reflecting these processes on a (...)
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  19. Thomas Metzinger (2006). Reply to Gallagher: Different Conceptions of Embodiment. Psyche 12 (4).
    Gallagher is right in pointing out that scientific realism is an implicit background assumption of BNO, and that I did not give an independent argument for it. He is also right in saying that science does not _demonstrate_ the existence of certain entities, but that it assumes those entities in a process of explanation and theory formation. However, it is not true that science, as Gallagher writes (p.2), “simply” assumes the reality of certain things: such assumptions are embedded in the (...)
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  20. Thomas Metzinger (2006). Reply to Hobson: Can There Be a First-Person Science of Consciousness? Psyche 12.
    Allan Hobson praises and accuses me. He praises me for being empirically informed. And he accuses me of being a “third-person half-some-one” . Specifically, he encourages me to come out of the closet, share some of my own first-person phenomenological experiences, and stop hiding behind neurophenomenological case studies taken from the existing scientific literature. Which I will do, below. But let us first begin with a matter of conceptual controversy.
     
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  21. Thomas Metzinger (2006). Reply to Himma: Personal Identity and Cartesian Intuitions. Psyche 12.
    In Kenneth Einar Himma’s substantial commentary, there are a number of conceptual misunderstandings I want to get out of the way first. This will allow us to see the core of his contribution much clearer. On page 2, Himma writes about the problem of “explaining how it is that a particular phenomenal self is associated with a set of neurophysiological processes.” This philosophical question is ill posed: no one is identical to a particular phenomenal self. “Phenomenal self” must not be (...)
     
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  22. Thomas Metzinger (2006). Reply to Livet: Meta-Abeyance? Psyche 12.
    Let me begin by pointing out a number of potential misunderstandings in Pierre Livet’s densely written commentary. In the first paragraph, Pierre Livet writes, “phenomenal transparency involves an implication of the existence of the entities represented” . This is what I call the “extensionality equivocation” . As explained at length in BNO, “phenomenal transparency” has been a technical term in philosophy at least since G. E. Moore’s paper The Refutation of Idealism. In BNO, I offered a refined notion of the (...)
     
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  23. Thomas Metzinger (2006). Reply to Legrand: Content From the Inside Out. Psyche 12.
    In the current debate, very few people have penetrated as deeply into the self-model theory of subjectivity and have developed such a scholarly expertise on the project as a whole as Dorothée Legrand has done. In the last sentence of her commentary, Legrand alludes to the ugly consequences I have to face after calling the book Being No One: I am suddenly confronted with people from all over the world who are stomping their feet on the ground like stubborn children, (...)
     
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  24. Thomas Metzinger (2006). Reply to Weisberg: No Direction Home—Searching for Neutral Ground. Psyche 12.
    I have learned a lot from Josh Weisberg’s substantial criticism in his well-crafted and systematic commentary . Unfortunately, I have to concede many of the points he intelligently makes. But I am also flattered by the way he ultimately uses his criticism to emphasize some of those aspects of the theory that can perhaps possibly count as exactly the core of my own genuine contribution to the problem—and nicely turns them back against myself. And I am certainly grateful for a (...)
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  25. Thomas Metzinger (2006). Reply to Zahavi: The Value of Historical Scholarship. Psyche 12.
    Let me begin by focusing on the long list of agreements between the Dan Zahavi and me. As he is such a careful and scholarly author, there are almost no misunderstandings to get out of the way first. At the beginning of section 2, there is a conflation of different concepts of possibility. If we grant that imaginability is conceivability , if we pass over “practical” possibility as a non-defined term, and grant that by “physically” possible Zahavi very likely means (...)
     
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  26. T. MeTzinger (2005). The Evolution of Evolvability. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (7):318-319.
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  27. Thomas Metzinger (2005). Out-of-Body Experiences as the Origin of the Concept of a 'Soul '. Mind and Matter 3 (1):57-84.
    Contemporary philosophical and scienti .c discussions of mind developed from a 'proto-concept of mind ',a mythical,tradition- alistic,animistic and quasi-sensory theory about what it means to have a mind. It can be found in many di .erent cultures and has a semantic core corresponding to the folk-phenomenological notion of a 'soul '.It will be argued that this notion originates in accurate and truthful .rst-person reports about the experiential content of a special neurophenomenological state-class called 'out-of-body experiences '.They can be undergone by (...)
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  28. Thomas Metzinger (2005). Precis: Being No-One. Psyche 11 (5):1-30.
    This is a short sketch of some central ideas developed in my recent book _Being No One_ (BNO hereafter). A more systematic summary, which focuses on short answers to a set of specific, individual questions is already contained _in _the book, namely as BNO section 8.2. Here, I deliberately and completely exclude all work related to semantically differentiating and empirically constraining the philosophical concept of a "quale" (mostly Chapter 2, 3 & 8), all proposals regarding conceptual foundations for the overall (...)
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  29. Thomas Metzinger (2004). Appearance is Not Knowledge: The Incoherent Straw Man, Content-Content Confusions and Mindless Conscious Subjects. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):67-71.
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  30. Thomas Metzinger (2004). Inferences Are Just Folk Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):670-670.
    To speak of “inferences,” “interpretations,” and so forth is just folk psychology. It creates new homunculi, and it is also implausible from a purely phenomenological perspective. Phenomenal volition must be described in the conceptual framework of an empirically plausible theory of mental representation. It is a non sequitur to conclude from dissociability that the functional properties determining phenomenal volition never make a causal contribution.
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  31. Thomas Metzinger (2004). Peer Commentary on "Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness": Appearance is Not Knowledge: The Incoherent Straw Man, Content-Content Confusions and Mindless Conscious Subjects. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):67-72.
  32. Thomas Metzinger (2004). The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationalist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective. Networks:285--306.
    Before one can even begin to model consciousness and what exactly it means that it is a subjective phenomenon one needs a theory about what a first-person perspective really is. This theory has to be conceptually convincing, empirically plausible and, most of all, open to new developments. The chosen conceptual framework must be able to accommodate scientific progress. Its ba- sic assumptions have to be plastic as it were, so that new details and empirical data can continuously be fed into (...)
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  33. Vittorio Gallese & Thomas Metzinger (2003). Motor Ontology: The Representational Reality of Goals, Actions and Selves. Philosophical Psychology 16 (3):365 – 388.
    The representational dynamics of the brain is a subsymbolic process, and it has to be conceived as an "agent-free" type of dynamical self-organization. However, in generating a coherent internal world-model, the brain decomposes target space in a certain way. In doing so, it defines an "ontology": to have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting the world, possesses an ontology too. It decomposes target space (...)
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  34. G. Knoblich, B. Elsner, G. Aschersleben & T. Metzinger (2003). Grounding the Self in Action. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):487-494.
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  35. Thomas Metzinger (2003). Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. MIT Press.
    " In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of...
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  36. Thomas Metzinger (2003). Der Begriff Einer „Bewusstseinskultur“. In G. Kaiser (ed.), E-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie. Wissenschaftszentrum Nordrhein-Westfalen.
    Dies ist kein wissenschaftlicher Text im engeren Sinne. Im Gegenteil: Das erste Ziel dieses Beitrags besteht zuerst darin, auf möglichst kurze und allgemeinverständliche Weise eine neue Problemlage zu skizzieren, die mit zunehmender Geschwindigkeit an Bedeutung gewinnt. Zweitens möchte ich einen vorläufigen Arbeitsbegriff anbieten, den Begriff einer „Bewusstseinskultur“. Dieser neue Begriff soll dazu dienen, eine Reihe von ganz unterschiedlichen theoretischen und praktischen Strategien zusammenzufassen, die wir meiner Meinung nach benötigen werden, um der fraglichen Herausforderung gerecht zu werden. Der Begriff „Bewusstseinskultur“ soll (...)
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  37. Thomas Metzinger (2003). Motor Ontology: The Representational Reality of Goals, Actions and Selves. Philosophical Psychology 16 (3):365-388.
    The representational dynamics of the brain is a subsymbolic process, and it has to be_.
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  38. Thomas Metzinger (2003). Phenomenal Transparency and Cognitive Self-Reference. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):353-393.
    A representationalist analysis of strong first-person phenomena is developed (Baker 1998), and it is argued that conscious, cognitive self-reference can be naturalized under this representationalist analysis. According to this view, the phenomenal first-person perspective is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a cognitive first-person perspective. Cognitive self-reference always is reference to the phenomenal content of a transparent self-model. The concepts of phenomenal transparency and introspection are clarified. More generally, I suggest that the concepts of phenomenal opacity and phenomenal (...)
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  39. Thomas Metzinger, The Pre-Scientific Concept of a "Soul": A Neurophenomenological Hypothesis About its Origin.
    In this contribution I will argue that our traditional, folk-phenomenological concept of a "soul� may have its origins in accurate and truthful first-person reports about the experiential content of a specific neurophenomenological state-class. This class of phenomenal states is called the "Out-of-body experience� (OBE hereafter), and I will offer a detailed description in section 3 of this paper. The relevant type of conscious experience seems to possess a culturally invariant cluster of functional and phenomenal core properties: it is (...)
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  40. Thomas Metzinger (2003). Why Are Identity Disorders Interesting for Philosophers? In T Schramme & J Thome (eds.), Philosophy and Psychiatry. De Gruyter.
    “Identity disorders” constitute a large class of psychiatric disturbances that, due to deviant forms of self-modeling, result in dramatic changes in the patients’ phenomenal experience of their own personal identity. The phenomenal experience of selfhood and transtemporal identity can vary along an extremely large number of dimensions: There are simple losses of content (for example, complete losses of proprioception, resulting in a “bodiless” state of self-consciousness, see Cole 1995, Gallagher and Cole 1995, Sacks 1998). There are also various typologies of (...)
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  41. Thomas Metzinger & Vittorio Gallese (2003). Of Course They Do. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):574-576.
  42. Thomas Metzinger & Vittorio Gallese (2003). The Emergence of a Shared Action Ontology: Building Blocks for a Theory. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):549-571.
    To have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting our world, possesses an ontology too. It creates primitives and makes existence assumptions. It decomposes target space in a way that exhibits a certain invariance, which in turn is functionally significant. We will investigate which are the functional regularities guiding this decomposition process, by answering to the following questions: What are the explicit and implicit assumptions (...)
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  43. T. Metzinger (ed.) (2000). Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.
    This book brings together an international group of neuroscientists and philosophers who are investigating how the content of subjective experience is ...
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  44. T. Metzinger & A. Engel (2000). Constraining Consciousness: Towards a Systematic Catalogue of Explananda. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):S10 - S12.
     
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  45. Thomas Metzinger (2000). Commentary on Jakab's Ineffability of Qualia. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (3):352-362.
    Zoltan Jakab has presented an interesting conceptual analysis of the ineffability of qualia in a functionalist and classical cognitivist framework. But he does not want to commit himself to a certain metaphysical thesis on the ontology of consciousness or qualia. We believe that his strategy has yielded a number of highly relevant and interesting insights, but still suffers from some minor inconsistencies and a certain lack of phenomenological and empirical plausibility. This may be due to some background assumptions (...)
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  46. Thomas Metzinger (2000). Introduction: Consciousness Research at the End of the Twentieth Century. In T. Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.
    conscious content like ``the self in the act of In 1989 the philosopher Colin McGinn asked the knowing'' (see, e.g., chapters 7 and 20 in this following question: ``How can technicolor phe- volume) or high-level phenomenal properties like nomenology arise from soggy gray matter?'' ``coherence'' or ``holism'' (e.g., chapters 8 and 9 (1989: 349). Since then many authors in the ®eld in this volume). But what, precisely, does it mean of consciousness research have quoted this ques- that conscious experience has (...)
     
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  47. Thomas Metzinger (2000). Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. MIT Press.
  48. Thomas Metzinger (2000). The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective. In , Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. 285--306.
    This is a brief and accessible English summary of the "Self-model Theory of Subjectivity" (SMT), which is only available as German book in this archive. It introduces two new theoretical entities, the "phenomenal self-model" (PSM) and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality-relation" PMIR. A representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person persepctive is offered. This is a revised version, including two pictures.
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  49. Thomas Metzinger (1999). The Hint Half Guessed. [REVIEW] Scientific American.
    jects on itself, thereby making them your involved in attention, emotion and the new means of achieving homeostasis.” own experiences. It is here that the au-.
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