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Timothy Schroeder [43]Theodore Schroeder [2]T. Schroeder [1]
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Profile: Timothy Schroeder (Ohio State University)
  1. Timothy Schroeder, Moravcsik and the Contents of Consciousness.
    There is a doctrine in the theory of consciousness known as representationalism, or intentionalism. According to this doctrine, what it feels like to be in a particular state of consciousness — the qualitative character of that state — is identical to the content of some mental representation(s) For instance, the state of consciousness I am enjoying just now as I see a pattern of sunlight and shadow falling on my wall is, in part, a state of consciousness that presents to (...)
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  2. Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder (2014). In Praise of Desire. Oup Usa.
    Joining the debate over the roles of reason and appetite in the moral mind, In Praise of Desire takes the side of appetite. Acting for moral reasons, acting in a praiseworthy manner, and acting out of virtue are simply acting out of intrinsic desires for the right or the good.
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  3. Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder (2014). Précis of In Praise of Desire. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):490-495.
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  4. Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder (2014). Replies to Critics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):509-515.
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  5. N. Arpaly & T. Schroeder (2012). Deliberation and Acting for Reasons. Philosophical Review 121 (2):209-239.
    Theoretical and practical deliberation are voluntary activities, and like all voluntary activities, they are performed for reasons. To hold that all voluntary activities are performed for reasons in virtue of their relations to past, present, or even merely possible acts of deliberation thus leads to infinite regresses and related problems. As a consequence, there must be processes that are nondeliberative and nonvoluntary but that nonetheless allow us to think and act for reasons, and these processes must be the ones that (...)
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  6. Timothy Schroeder (2012). Kelly , Daniel . Yuck! The Nature and Moral Significance of Disgust . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011. Pp. 194. $30.00 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Ethics 122 (2):430-434.
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  7. Timothy Schroeder (2011). Review of Bruno Mölder, Mind Ascribed: An Elaboration and Defence of Interpretivism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (2).
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  8. Timothy Schroeder (2010). Desire and Pleasure in John Pollock's Thinking About Acting. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 148 (3):447–454.
    The first third of John Pollock’s Thinking about Acting is on the topics of pleasure, desire, and preference, and these topics are the ones on which this paper focuses. I review Pollock’s position and argue that it has at least one substantial strength (it elegantly demonstrates that desires must be more fundamental than preferences, and embraces this conclusion wholeheartedly) and at least one substantial weakness (it holds to a form of psychological hedonism without convincingly answering the philosophical or empirical objections (...)
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  9. Timothy Schroeder (2010). Practical Rationality is a Problem in the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):394-409.
    The philosophy of mind encompasses a familiar set of topics: consciousness, intentionality, mental causation, emotion, whatever topics in psychology happen to capture our interest (concepts, mindreading . . .), and so on. There is a topic deserving of addition to this list, a topic that should be receiving regular attention from philosophers of mind but is not: practical rationality. The philosophy of mind bears directly upon what can be called the ‘meta-theory’ of practical rationality, and meta-theories of rationality likewise impose (...)
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  10. Timothy Schroeder, Adina L. Roskies & Shaun Nichols (2010). Moral Motivation. In John Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press.
    In this chapter, we begin with a discussion of motivation itself, and use that discussion to sketch four possible theories of distinctively moral motivation: caricature versions of familiar instrumentalist, cognitivist, sentimentalist, and personalist theories about morally worthy motivation. To test these theories, we turn to a wealth of scientific, particularly neuroscientific, evidence. Our conclusions are that (1) although the scientific evidence does not at present mandate a unique philosophical conclusion, it does present formidable obstacles to a number of popular philosophical (...)
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  11. Timothy Schroeder (2009). Desire. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 (6):631-639.
    To desire is to be in a particular state of mind. It is a state of mind familiar to everyone who has ever wanted to drink water or desired to know what has happened to an old friend, but its familiarity does not make it easy to give a theory of desire. Controversy immediately breaks out when asking whether wanting water and desiring knowledge are, at bottom, the same state of mind as others that seem somewhat similar: wishing never to (...)
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  12. Timothy Schroeder (2008). Unexpected Pleasure. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press. 255-272.
    As topics in the philosophy of emotion, pleasure and displeasure get less than their fair share of attention. On the one hand, there is the fact that pleasure and displeasure are given no role at all in many theories of the emotions, and secondary roles in many others.1 On the other, there is the centrality of pleasure and displeasure to being emotional. A woman who tears up because of a blustery wind, while an ill-advised burrito weighs heavily upon her digestive (...)
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  13. Timothy Schroeder (2007). A Recipe for Concept Similarity. Mind and Language 22 (1):68-91.
    Sometimes your concept and mine have exactly the same content. When this is so, it is comparatively easy for me to understand what you say when you deploy your concept, for us to disagree, agree, and so on. But what if your concept and mine do not have exactly the same content? This question has occupied a number of philosophers, including Paul Churchland, Jerry Fodor, and Ernie Lepore. This paper develops a novel and rigorous measure of concept similarity, Proportion, such (...)
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  14. Timothy Schroeder (2007). Review of Graham MacDonald, David Papineau (Eds.), Teleosemantics: New Philosophical Essays. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (4).
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  15. Timothy Schroeder (2007). Reflection, Reason, and Free Will. Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):77 – 84.
    Ju¨rgen Habermas has a familiar style of compatibilism to offer, according to which a person has free will insofar as that person responds appropriately to her reasons. But because of the ways in which Habermas understands reasons and causes, he sees a special objection to his style of compatibilism: it is not clear that our reasons can suitably cause our responses. This objection, however, takes us out of the realm of free will and into the realm of mental causation. In (...)
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  16. Timothy Schroeder (2007). Two Ways of Seeing Ways of Seeing. Dialogue 46 (2):341-345.
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  17. Timothy Schroeder (2007). Unexpected Pleasure. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press. 255-272.
    As topics in the philosophy of emotion, pleasure and displeasure get less than their fair share of attention. On the one hand, there is the fact that pleasure and displeasure are given no role at all in many theories of the emotions, and secondary roles in many others.1 On the other, there is the centrality of pleasure and displeasure to being emotional. A woman who tears up because of a blustery wind, while an ill-advised burrito weighs heavily upon her digestive (...)
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  18. Timothy Schroeder & Ben Caplan (2007). On the Content of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):590–611.
    The intentionalist about consciousness holds that the qualitative character of experience.
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  19. Timothy Schroeder (2006). Colin McGinn, Mindsight: Image, Dream, Meaning Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 26 (3):213-216.
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  20. Timothy Schroeder (2006). Desire. Philosophy Compass 1 (6):631–639.
    Desires move us to action, give us urges, incline us to joy at their satisfaction, and incline us to sorrow at their frustration. Naturalistic work on desire has focused on distinguishing which of these phenomena are part of the nature of desire, and which are merely normal consequences of desiring. Three main answers have been proposed. The first holds that the central necessary fact about desires is that they lead to action. The second makes pleasure the essence of desire. And (...)
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  21. Timothy Schroeder (2006). Propositional Attitudes. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):65-73.
    The propositional attitudes are attitudes such as believing and desiring, taken toward propositions such as the proposition that snow flurries are expected, or that the Prime Minister likes poutine. Collectively, our views about the propositional attitudes make up much of folk psychology, our everyday theory of how the mind works.
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  22. Timothy Schroeder (2006). Précis of Three Faces of Desire. Dialogue 45 (1):125-130.
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  23. Timothy Schroeder (2006). Precis of Three Faces of Desire. Dialogue 45 (1):125-130.
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  24. Timothy Schroeder (2006). Review of Shaun Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (3).
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  25. Timothy Schroeder (2006). Reply to Critics. Dialogue 45 (1):165-174.
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  26. Timothy Schroeder (2005). Blindsight and the Nature of Consciousness. Dialogue 44 (1):196-198.
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  27. Timothy Schroeder (2005). Blindsight and the Nature of Consciousness Jason Holt Peterborough, ON: Broadview, 2003, 153 Pp., $24.95 Paper. [REVIEW] Dialogue 44 (01):196-.
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  28. Timothy Schroeder (2005). Moral Responsibility and Tourette Syndrome. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):106–123.
    Philosophers generally assume that individuals with Tourette syndrome are not responsible for their Tourettic tics, and so not blameworthy for any harm their tics might cause. Yet this assumption is based largely on ignorance of the lived experience of Tourette syndrome. Individuals with Tourette syndrome often experience their tics as freely chosen and reason-responsive. Yet it still seems wrong to treat a Tourettic individual’s tic as on a moral par with others’ actions. In this paper, I examine the options and (...)
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  29. Donovan Hulse, Cynthia Read & Timothy Schroeder (2004). The Impossibility of Conscious Desire. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1):73 - 80.
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  30. Timothy Schroeder (2004). Functions From Regulation. The Monist 87 (1):115-135.
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  31. Timothy Schroeder (2004). Michael Tye, Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 24 (4):303-305.
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  32. Timothy Schroeder (2004). New Norms for Teleosemantics. In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind. Elsevier. 1--91.
  33. Timothy Schroeder (2004). Review of Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, Michael Smith, Mind, Morality, and Explanation: Selected Collaborations. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (11).
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  34. Timothy Schroeder (2004). Three Faces of Desire. Oxford University Press.
    To desire something is a condition familiar to everyone. It is uncontroversial that desiring has something to do with motivation, something to do with pleasure, and something to do with reward. Call these "the three faces of desire." The standard philosophical theory at present holds that the motivational face of desire presents its unique essence--to desire a state of affairs is to be disposed to act so as to bring it about. A familiar but less standard account holds the hedonic (...)
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  35. Timothy Schroeder (2003). Donald Davidson's Theory of Mind is Non-Normative. Philosophers' Imprint 3 (1):1-14.
    Donald Davidson's theory of mind is widely regarded as a normative theory. This is a something of a confusion. Once a distinction has been made between the categorisation scheme of a norm and the norm's force-maker, it becomes clear that a Davidsonian theory of mind is not a normative theory after all. Making clear the distinction, applying it to Davidson's theory of mind, and showing its significance are the main purposes of this paper. In the concluding paragraphs, a sketch is (...)
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  36. Timothy Schroeder (2003). Lawlor, Krista. New Thoughts About Old Things: Cognitive Policies as the Ground of Singular Concepts. Review of Metaphysics 56 (3):661-662.
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  37. Timothy Schroeder (2003). On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay About Substance Concepts Ruth Garrett Millikan New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, Xiii + 258 Pp., $92.25, $35.50 Paper. [REVIEW] Dialogue 42 (01):148-.
  38. Timothy Schroeder (2003). On Clear and Confused Ideas. Dialogue 42 (1):148-149.
     
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  39. Timothy Schroeder (2001). Monsters Among Us. In J. S. McIntosh (ed.), Naturalism, Evolution, and Intentionality (Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 27). University of Calgary Press. 167-184.
  40. Timothy Schroeder (2001). Pleasure, Displeasure, and Representation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):507-530.
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  41. Timothy Schroeder (2001). Robert Brandom, Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 21 (4):235-237.
  42. Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder (1999). Praise, Blame and the Whole Self. Philosophical Studies 93 (2):161-188.
    What is that makes an act subject to either praise or blame? The question has often been taken to depend entirely on the free will debate for an answer, since it is widely agreed that an agent’s act is subject to praise or blame only if it was freely willed, but moral theory, action theory, and moral psychology are at least equally relevant to it. In the last quarter-century, following the lead of Harry Frankfurt’s (1971) seminal article “Freedom of the (...)
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  43. Timothy Schroeder & Nomy Arpaly (1999). Alienation and Externality. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):371-387.
    Harry Frankfurt introduces the concept of externality. Externality is supposed to be a fact about the structure of an agent's will. We argue that the pre-theorethical basis of externality has a lot more to do with feelings of alienation than it does with the will. Once we realize that intuitions about externality are guided by intuitions about feelings of alienation surprising conclusions follow regarding the structure of our will.
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  44. Theodore Schroeder (1918). A Psychological View of the Pragmatic Issue. The Monist 28 (2):273-281.
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  45. Theodore Schroeder (1916). Intellectual Evolution and Pragmatism. The Monist 26 (1):86-112.
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