27 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
Tomoji Shogenji [20]T. Shogenji [6]Toinoji Shogenji [1]
See also:
Profile: Tomoji Shogenji (Rhode Island College)
  1. Tomoji Shogenji, An Externalist Guide to Epistemic Practice.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Tomoji Shogenji, My Way or Her Way: A Conundrum in Bayesian Epistemology of Disagreement.
    The proportional weight view in epistemology of disagreement generalizes the equal weight view and proposes that we assign to judgments of different people weights that are proportional to their epistemic qualifications. It is shown that if the resulting degrees of confidence are to constitute a probability function, they must be the weighted arithmetic means of individual degrees of confidence, while if the resulting degrees of confidence are to obey the Bayesian rule of conditionalization, they must be the weighted geometric means (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Tomoji Shogenji, The Epistemic Status of Reflective Beliefs.
    This paper examines the epistemic status of the reflective belief about the content of one’s own conscious mental state, with emphasis on perceptual experience. I propose that the process that gives a special epistemic status to a reflective belief is not observation, inference, or conceptual articulation, but semantic ascent similar to the transition from a sentence in the object language to a sentence in the meta-language that affirms the truth of the original sentence. This account of the process of reflection (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji (forthcoming). Dwindling Confirmation. .
    We show that as a chain of confirmation becomes longer, confirmation dwindles under screening-off. For example, if E confirms H1, H1 confirms H2, and H1 screens off E from H2, then the degree to which E confirms H2 is less than the degree to which E confirms H1. Although there are many measures of confirmation, our result holds on any measure that satisfies the Weak Law of Likelihood. We apply our result to testimony cases, relate it to the Data-Processing Inequality (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji (2013). Confirmation, Transitivity, and Moore: The Screening-Off Approach. Philosophical Studies (3):1-21.
    It is well known that the probabilistic relation of confirmation is not transitive in that even if E confirms H1 and H1 confirms H2, E may not confirm H2. In this paper we distinguish four senses of confirmation and examine additional conditions under which confirmation in different senses becomes transitive. We conduct this examination both in the general case where H1 confirms H2 and in the special case where H1 also logically entails H2. Based on these analyses, we argue that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Tomoji Shogenji (2013). Coherence of the Contents and the Transmission of Probabilistic Support. Synthese 190 (13):2525-2545.
    This paper examines how coherence of the contents of evidence affects the transmission of probabilistic support from the evidence to the hypothesis. It is argued that coherence of the contents in the sense of the ratio of the positive intersection reduces the transmission of probabilistic support, though this negative impact of coherence may be offset by other aspects of the relations among the contents. It is argued further that there is no broader conception of coherence whose impact on the transmission (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Tomoji Shogenji (2012). Internalism and Externalism in Meliorative Epistemology. Erkenntnis 76 (1):59-72.
    This paper addresses the meta-epistemological dispute over the basis of epistemic evaluation from the standpoint of meliorative epistemology. Meliorative epistemology aims at guiding our epistemic practice to better results, and it comprises two levels of epistemic evaluation. At the social level (meliorative social epistemology) appropriate experts conduct evaluation for the community, so that epistemic evaluation is externalist since each epistemic subject in the community need not have access to the basis of the experts' evaluation. While at the personal level (meliorative (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Tomoji Shogenji (2012). The Degree of Epistemic Justification and the Conjunction Fallacy. Synthese 184 (1):29-48.
    This paper describes a formal measure of epistemic justification motivated by the dual goal of cognition, which is to increase true beliefs and reduce false beliefs. From this perspective the degree of epistemic justification should not be the conditional probability of the proposition given the evidence, as it is commonly thought. It should be determined instead by the combination of the conditional probability and the prior probability. This is also true of the degree of incremental confirmation, and I argue that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Tomoji Shogenji (2008). Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, Justification. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):292-296.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Tomoji Shogenji (2007). Why Does Coherence Appear Truth-Conducive? Synthese 157 (3):361 - 372.
    This paper aims to reconcile (i) the intuitively plausible view that a higher degree of coherence among independent pieces of evidence makes the hypothesis they support more probable, and (ii) the negative results in Bayesian epistemology to the effect that there is no probabilistic measure of coherence such that a higher degree of coherence among independent pieces of evidence makes the hypothesis they support more probable. I consider a simple model in which the negative result appears in a stark form: (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Toinoji Shogenji (2006). Luc Bovens and Stephan Hartmann, Bayesian Epistemology Oxford University Press, 2004, Pp. IX+ 159.Isbn 0-19-926975-0 (Hardback), Isbn 0-19-927040-6 (Paperback). [REVIEW] Theoria 72 (2):166-171.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Tomoji Shogenji (2006). A Defense of Reductionism About Testimonial Justification of Beliefs. Noûs 40 (2):331–346.
    This paper defends reductionism about testimonial justification of beliefs against two influential arguments. One is the empirical argument to the effect that the reductionist justification of our trust in testimony is either circular since it relies on testimonial evidence or else there is scarce evidence in support of our trust in testimony. The other is the transcendental argument to the effect that trust in testimony is a prerequisite for the very existence of testimonial evidence since without the presumption of people’s (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Tomoji Shogenji (2005). Justification by Coherence From Scratch. Philosophical Studies 125 (3):305 - 325.
    In this paper we make three points about justification of propositions by coherence “from scratch”, where pieces of evidence that are coherent have no individual credibility. First, we argue that no matter how many pieces of evidence are coherent, and no matter what relation we take coherence to be, coherence does not make independent pieces of evidence with no individual credibility credible. Second, we show that an intuitively plausible informal reasoning for justification by coherence from scratch is deficient since it (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Tomoji Shogenji (2005). The Role of Coherence of Evidence in the Non-Dynamic Model of Confirmation. Erkenntnis 63 (3):317 - 333.
    This paper examines the role of coherence of evidence in what I call the non-dynamic model of confirmation. It appears that other things being equal, a higher degree of coherence among pieces of evidence raises to a higher degree the probability of the proposition they support. I argue against this view on the basis of three related observations. First, we should be able to assess the impact of coherence on any hypothesis of interest the evidence supports. Second, the impact of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. T. Shogenji (2004). Can We Trust Our Memories? C. I. Lewis's Coherence Argument. Synthese 142 (1):21 - 41.
    In this paper we examine C. I. Lewis''s view on the roleof coherence – what he calls ''''congruence'''' – in thejustification of beliefs based on memory ortestimony. Lewis has two main theses on the subject. His negativethesis states that coherence of independent items ofevidence has no impact on the probability of a conclusionunless each item has some credibility of its own. Thepositive thesis says, roughly speaking, that coherenceof independently obtained items of evidence – such asconverging memories or testimonies – raises (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Tomoji Shogenji (2003). A Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (4):613-616.
    It is well known that probabilistic support is not transitive. But it can be shown that probabilistic support is transitive provided the intermediary proposition screens off the original evidence with respect to the hypothesis in question. This has the consequence that probabilistic support is transitive when the original evidence is testimonial, memorial or perceptual (i.e., to the effect that such and such was testified to, remembered, or perceived), and the intermediary proposition is its representational content (i.e., to the effect that (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. T. Shogenji (2001). The Role of Coherence in Epistemic Justification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (1):90 – 106.
    Among many reasons for which contemporary philosophers take coherentism in epistemology seriously, the most important is probably the perceived inadequacy of alternative accounts, most notably misgivings about foundationalism. But coherentism also receives straightforward support from cases in which beliefs are apparently justified by their coherence. From the perspective of those against coherentism, this means that an explanation is needed as to why in these cases coherence apparently justifies beliefs. Curiously, this task has not been carried out in a serious way (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Tomoji Shogenji (2001). Reply to Akiba on the Probabilistic Measure of Coherence. Analysis 61 (2):147–150.
    No categories
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. T. Shogenji (2000). Self-Dependent Justification Without Circularity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (2):287-298.
    This paper disputes the widely held view that one cannot establish the reliability of a belief-forming process with the use of belief's that are obtained by that very process since such self-dependent justification is circular. Harold Brown ([1993]) argued in this journal that some cases of self-dependent justification are legitimate despite their circularity. I argue instead that under appropriate construal many cases of self-dependent justification are not truly circular but are instances of ordinary Bayesian confirmation, and hence they can raise (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Tomoji Shogenji (2000). The Problem of the Criterion in Rule-Following. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):501-525.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Tomoji Shogenji (1999). Is Coherence Truth Conducive? Analysis 59 (4):338–345.
    No categories
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Tomoji Shogenji (1997). The Consistency of Global Relativism. Mind 106 (424):745-747.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Tomoji Shogenji (1997). The Consistency of Global Relativism-Response to Steven D. Hales, Mind, Vol. 106, P. 33, 1997. Mind 106:33.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. T. Shogenji (1995). The Problem of Rule-Following in Compositional Semantics. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):97-108.
    One of the central issues in the recent discussion of rule-following has been the apparent gap between the finitude of any facts about the rule-follower and the infinitude of possible applications of rules. In this paper the author argues that the combination of the rule-follower's disposition and explicit directions can fill this gap with respect to the interpretation of individual words, but that the problem of finitude remains a serious threat to compositional semantics for natural language because there are no (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. T. Shogenji (1993). Modest Scepticism About Rule-Following. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (4):486-500.
  26. T. Shogenji (1992). Boomerang Defense of Rule Following. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):115-122.
    Can there be a good argument for the total denial of rule following? The question concerns the "total" denial, where the targeted rules include those meta-rules presumably required for philosophical argumentation. In this paper the author contends that such a self-undermining argument can never be a good argument even in a "reductio ad absurdum" form, but that the defender of rule following cannot dismiss a challenge on this ground when the opponent adopts "the virus strategy".
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation