34 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
Tom Stoneham [31]T. Stoneham [2]T. W. C. Stoneham [1]
See also:
Profile: Tom Stoneham (University of York)
  1. Ron Mallon & Tom Stoneham, The Substraction Argument for the Possibility of Free Mass.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Paul Lodge & T. W. C. Stoneham (eds.) (forthcoming). Locke and Leibniz on Substance and Identity. Routledge.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Tom Stoneham (forthcoming). Berkeley's" Esse is Percipi" and Collier's" Simple" Argument. History of Philosophy Quarterly 23 (3):211 - 224.
  4. Paul Lodge & Tom Stoneham (eds.) (2014). Locke and Leibniz on Substance. Routledge.
    Locke and Leibniz on Substance gathers together papers by an international group of academic experts, examining the metaphysical concept of substance in the writings of these two towering philosophers of the early modern period. Each of these newly-commissioned essays considers important interpretative issues concerning the role that the notion of substance plays in the work of Locke and Leibniz, and its intersection with other key issues, such as personal identity. Contributors also consider the relationship between the two philosophers and contemporaries (...)
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Tom Stoneham (2013). Response to Atherton: No Atheism Without Skepticism. In Stewart Duncan & Antonia LoLordo (eds.), Debates in Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses. Routledge. 216.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Keith Allen & Tom Stoneham (eds.) (2011). Causation and Modern Philosophy. Routledge.
    A collection of new essays on causation in the period from Galileo to Lady Mary Shepherd (roughly 1600-1850). Contributors: David Wootton, Tad Schmaltz, William Eaton and Robert Higgerson, Eric Schliesser, Pauline Phemister, Timothy Stanton, Peter Millican, Constantine Sandis, Boris Hennig, Angela Breitenbach, Stathis Psillos, and Martha Brandt Bolton.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Tom Stoneham (2011). Catching Berkeley's Shadow. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):116-136.
    Berkeley thinks that we only see the size, shape, location, and orientation of objects in virtue of the correlation between sight and touch. Shadows have all of these spatial properties and yet are intangible. In Seeing Dark Things (2008), Roy Sorensen argues that shadows provide a counterexample to Berkeley's theory of vision and, consequently, to his idealism. This paper shows that Berkeley can accept both that shadows are intangible and that they have spatial properties.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Tom Stoneham, Berkeley.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. David Efird & Tom Stoneham (2009). Is Metaphysical Nihilism Interesting? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):210-231.
    Suppose nothing exists. Then it is true that nothing exists. What makes that true? Nothing! So it seems that if nothing existed, then the principle that every truth is made true by something (the truthmaker principle) would be false. So if it is possible that nothing exists, a claim often called 'metaphysical nihilism', then the truthmaker principle is not necessary. This paper explores various ways to resolve this conflict without restricting metaphysical nihilism in such a way that it would become (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. David Efird & Tom Stoneham (2009). Justifying Metaphysical Nihilism: A Response to Cameron. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):132-137.
    Ross Cameron charges the subtraction argument for metaphysical nihilism with equivocation: each premise is plausible only under different interpretations of 'concrete'. This charge is ungrounded; the argument is both valid and supported by basic modal intuitions.
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Tom Stoneham (2009). Berkeley : Arguments for Idealism. In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Tom Stoneham (2009). Time and Truth: The Presentism-Eternalism Debate. Philosophy 84 (2):201-218.
    There are many questions we can ask about time, but perhaps the most fundamental is whether there are metaphysically interesting differences between past, present and future events. An eternalist believes in a block universe: past, present and future events are all on an equal footing. A gradualist believes in a growing block: he agress with the eternalist about the past and the present but not about the future. A presentist believes that what is present has a special status. My first (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Tom Stoneham & Angelo Cei (2009). “Let the Occult Quality Go”: Interpreting Berkley's Metaphysics of Science. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (1):73 - 91.
  14. Tom Stoneham (2008). A Neglected Account of Perception. Dialectica 62 (3):307-322.
    I aim to draw the reader's attention to an easily overlooked account of perception, namely that there are no perceptual experiences, that to perceive something is to stand in an external, purely non-Leibnizian relation to it. I introduce the Purely Relational account of perception by discussing a case of it being overlooked in the writings of G.E. Moore, though we also find the same move in J. Cook Wilson, so it has nothing to do with an affection for sense-data. I (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Tom Stoneham (2007). A Reductio of Coherentism. Analysis 67 (295):254–257.
    An argument is presented which shows that coherence theories of justification are committed to a conception of epistemic support which conflicts with an axiom of probability theory.
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Tom Stoneham (2007). When Did Collier Read Berkeley? British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (2):361 – 364.
  17. David Efird & Tom Stoneham (2006). Combinatorialism and the Possibility of Nothing. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):269 – 280.
    We argue that Armstrong's Combinatorialism allows for the possibility of nothing by giving a Combinatorial account of the empty world and show that such an account is consistent with the ontological and conceptual aims of the theory. We then suggest that the Combinatorialist should allow for this possibility given some methodological considerations. Consequently, rather than being 'spoils for the victor', as Armstrong maintains, deciding whether there might have been nothing helps to determine which metaphysics of modality is to be preferred.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. D. Efird & T. Stoneham (2005). Genuine Modal Realism and the Empty World. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1 (1):21-37.
    We argue that genuine modal realism can be extended, rather than modified, so as to allow for the possibility of nothing concrete, a possibility we term ‘metaphysical nihilism’. The issue should be important to the genuine modal realist because, not only is metaphysical nihilism itself intuitively plausible, but also it is supported by an argument with pre-theoretically credible premises, namely, the subtraction argument. Given the soundness of the subtraction argument, we show that there are two ways that the genuine modal (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. D. Efird & T. Stoneham (2005). The Subtraction Argument for Metaphysical Nihilism. Journal of Philosophy 102 (6):303 - 325.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. David Efird & Tom Stoneham (2005). Truthmakers and Possible Worlds. Analysis 65 (288):290–294.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Alexander Miller, Tom Stoneham & Sophie Gibb (2005). Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Books 46 (3):278-284.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Tom Stoneham, Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Tom Stoneham (2005). The Subtraction Argument for Metaphysical Nihilism. Journal of Philosophy 102 (6):303 - 325.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Tom Stoneham (2004). Self-Knowledge. In Ilkka Niiniluoto, Matti Sintonen & Jan Wolenski (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub. 647--672.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Tom Stoneham (2003). Conditionals and Biconditionals in Constitutive Theories of Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Papers 32 (2):149-55.
    Philosophical Papers Vol.32(2) 2003: 149-155.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Tom Stoneham (2003). On Equivocation. Philosophy 78 (4):515-519.
    Equivocation is often described as a fallacy. In this short note I argue that it is not a logical concept but an epistemic one. The argument of one who equivocates is not logically flawed, but it is unpersuasive in a very distinctive way.
    No categories
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Tom Stoneham (2003). Review: Berkeley and the Principles of Human Knowledge. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (445):126-130.
  28. Tom Stoneham (2003). Temporal Externalism. Philosophical Papers 32 (1):97-107.
    Abstract Temporal Externalism is the view that future events can contribute to determining the present content of our thoughts and utterances. Two objections to Temporal Externalism are discussed and rejected. The first is that Temporal Externalism has implausible consequences for the epistemology of biology and other taxonomic sciences (Brown, 2000). The second is that it is committed to implausible claims about dispositions.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Tom Stoneham (2002). Berkeley's World: An Examination of the Three Dialogues. Oxford University Press.
    Tom Stoneham offers a clear and detailed study of Berkeley's metaphysics and epistemology, as presented in his classic work Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, originally published in 1713 and still widely studied. Stoneham shows that Berkeley is an important and systematic philosopher whose work is still of relevance to philosophers today.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Tom Stoneham (1999). Boghossian on Empty Natural Kind Concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):119-22.
    Paul Boghossian has argued that Externalism is incompatible with privileged self-knowledge because (i) the Externalist can cite no property to be the reference of an empty natural kind concept such as the ether; (ii) without reference there is no content; hence (iii) either we do know on the basis of introspection alone whether an apparent natural kind thought has content or not, in which case we can infer from self-knowledge and a priori knowledge of Externalism alone to the existence in (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Tom Stoneham (1999). Logical Form and Thought Content. Analysis 59 (3):183–185.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Tom Stoneham (1998). On Believing That I Am Thinking. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):125-44.
    It is argued that a second-order belief to the effect that I now have some particular propositional attitude is always true (Incorrigibility). This is not because we possess an infallible cognitive faculty of introspection, but because that x believes that he himself now has attitude A to proposition P entails that x has A to P. Incorrigibility applies only to second-order beliefs and not to mere linguistic avowals of attitudes. This view combines a necessary asymmetry between 1st and 3rd person (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Tom Stoneham (1995). Transparency, Sense and Self-Knowledge. In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later. Kluwer. 103--112.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Tom Stoneham (1992). Comment on Davies: A General Dilemma? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92:225-231.