The smartness of simple heuristics depends upon their fit to the structure of task environments. Being fast and frugal becomes psychologically demanding when a decision goal is bounded by the risk distribution in a task environment. The lack of clear goals and prioritized cues in a decision problem may lead to the use of simple but irrational heuristics. Future research should focus more on how people use and integrate simple heuristics in the face of goal conflict under risk.
Campbell's target article is a stimulating attempt to extend our understanding of sex differences in risk-taking behaviors. However, Campbell does not succeed in demonstrating that her account adds explanatory power to those (e.g., Daly & Wilson 1994) previously proposed. In particular, little effort was made to explore the causal links between survival (staying alive) and reproduction.
Violations and biases relative to normative principles of rationality tend to occur when the structure of task environments is novel or the decision goals are in conflict. The two blades of bounded rationality, the structure of task environments and the computational capacities of the actor, can sharpen the conceptual distinctions between the sources of the normative and descriptive gap.
We agree with Ainslie's general approach to intertemporal choices and self-control. However, we argue that a concept of “will” is superfluous in explaining tradeoffs between SS (smaller and sooner) and LL (larger and later) rewards in a framework of temporal goal setting and goal aggregation. We provide an alternative framework of reference point-dependent tradeoffs between SS and LL options.
An investigation into what kind of knowledge is necessary for interpretation is an important research project for the two fields of the theory of meaning and epistemology, through which they are combined. By examining the two basic requirements for a theory on the interpretation of language drafted by Donald Davidson, this paper analyzes several kinds of knowledge which are necessary for interpretation. The goal is to explore the knowledge of radical interpretation and the distinctions and connections between this knowledge and (...) radical translation and Convention-T, thus revealing its characteristics and possibility to interpretation. (shrink)
Stochastic forecasts in complex environments can beneﬁt from combining the estimates of large groups of forecasters (“judges”). But aggregating multiple opinions faces several challenges. First, human judges are notoriously incoherent when their forecasts involve logically complex events. Second, individual judges may have specialized knowledge, so diﬀerent judges may produce forecasts for diﬀerent events. Third, the credibility of individual judges might vary, and one would like to pay greater attention to more trustworthy forecasts. These considerations limit the value of simple aggregation (...) methods like linear averaging. In this paper, a new algorithm is proposed for combining probabilistic assessments from a large pool of judges. Two measures of a judge’s likely credibility are introduced and used in the algorithm to determine the judge’s weight in aggregation. The algorithm was tested on a data set of nearly half a million probability estimates of events related to the 2008 U.S. presidential election (∼ 16000 judges). (shrink)
This paper responds to the four critiques of my book Experiments in Ethics published in this issue. The main theme I take up is how we should understand the relation between psychology and philosophy. Young and Saxe believe that “bottom line” evaluative judgments don’t depend on facts. I argue for a different view, according to which our evaluative and non-evaluative judgments must cohere in a way that makes it rational, sometimes, to abandon even what looks like a basic evaluative judgment (...) because we have changed our minds about the facts. This leads me to qualify Tiberius’s claim that our moral judgments always derive, in part, from fundamental evaluative “justificatory stopping points,” arguing that even these can themselves be adjusted in the light of scientific understanding. Weinberg and Wang object to my use of Kant’s distinction between the perspective of the senses and the perspective of the understanding, because they identify it with a distinction between scientific and philosophical worlds. I argue that a distinction of perspectives isn’t a distinction between worlds and that, in any case, the distinction is not between science and ethics. Finally, in responding to Machery’s objections to a couple of my proposals, I return to the suggestion that a coherentist epistemology is required to deal with the relations between science and ethics. (shrink)
Despite the scathing criticisms leveled at Han philosophy by orthodox Neo-Confucians and their latter-day scholastic followers, the most accurate characterization of many extant pieces of Han philosophical writing would be "critical" (rather than "superstitious") and "probing" (rather than "derivative"). In defense of this statement, three major Han philosophical works are examined, with particular emphasis on the treatment in these works of classical tradition and classical learning. The three works are the "Fa yen" (ca. A.D. 9) by Yang Hsiung, the "Lun (...) heng" (ca. A.D. 80) by Wang Ch'ung, and the "Feng su t'ung yi" (ca. A.D. 200) by Ying Shao. All three works are profoundly critical of beliefs and practices endemic to mainstream state-sponsored Confucianism in the Han. Good reasons lead Yang Hsiung, Wang Ch'ung, and Ying Shao to employ the dialogue, rather than the expository essay. Also, the particular styles of dialogue chosen by Yang, Wang, and Ying directly relate to the specific content of their varying critiques of contemporary forms of Confucian theorizing and practice. (shrink)
Let g E(m, n)=o mean that n is the Gödel-number of the shortest derivation from E of an equation of the form (m)=k. Hao Wang suggests that the condition for general recursiveness mn(g E(m, n)=o) can be proved constructively if one can find a speedfunction s s, with s(m) bounding the number of steps for getting a value of (m), such that mn s(m) s.t. g E(m, n)=o. This idea, he thinks, yields a constructivist notion of an effectively computable (...) function, one that doesn't get us into a vicious circle since we intuitively know, to begin with, that certain proofs are constructive and certain functions effectively computable. This paper gives a broad possibility proof for the existence of such classes of effectively computable functions, with Wang's idea of effective computability generalized along a number of dimensions. (shrink)
Bibliography of A. A. Fraenkel (p. ix-x)--Axiomatic set theory. Zur Frage der Unendlichkeitsschemata in der axiomatischen Mengenlehre, von P. Bernays.--On some problems involving inaccessible cardinals, by P. Erdös and A. Tarski.--Comparing the axioms of local and universal choice, by A. Lévy.--Frankel's addition to the axioms of Zermelo, by R. Mantague.--More on the axiom of extensionality, by D. Scott.--The problem of predicativity, by J. R. Shoenfield.--Mathematical logic. Grundgedanken einer typenfreien Logik, von W. Ackermann.--On the use of Hilbert's [epsilon]-operator in scientific theories, (...) by R. Carnap.--Basic verifiability in the combinatory theory of restricted generality, by H. B. Curry.--Uniqueness ordinals in constructive number classes, by H. Putnam.--On the construction of models, by A. Robinson.--Interpretation of mathematical theories in the first order predicate calculus, by T. Skolem.--The elementary character of two notions from general algebra, by R. Vaught.--Foundations of arithmetic and analysis. Axiomatic method and intuitionism, by A. Heyting.--On rank-decreasing functions, by G. Kurepa.--On non-standard models for number theory, by E. Mendelson.--Concerning the problem of axiomatizability of the field of real numbers in the weak second order logic, by A. Mostowski.--Non-standard models and independence of the induction axiom, by M. O. Rabin.--Sur les ensembles raréfiés de nombres naturels, par W. Sierpinski.--Philosophy of logic and mathematics. Remarks on the paradoxes of logic and set theory, by E. W. Beth.--Logique formalisée et raisonnement juridique, par R. Feys.--Im Umkreis der sogenannten Raumprobleme, von H. Freudenthal.--Process and existence in mathematics, by H. Wang. (shrink)
In the history of ethical thoughts of China and the West, ethical relations are always regarded as social relations among people, and the objects to which ethical norms apply are targeted for social business or man’s behavior. What traditional ethics concerns is ethical relationship among people or ethical feature of socialbusiness or man’s behavior. By comparison with it, environmental ethics has a good reputation for its research on ethical relationship between human being and natural environment. It has been discussing and (...) reconstructing ethical relationship between man and nature from the very beginning, and requires ethical solicitude or moral concern for natural environment. As a result, environmental ethics has to answer the question how it is possible. However, the mainstream views in environmental ethics, based on the position of moral expansion and non-anthropocentrism, can't and won't explain how environmental ethics is possible. What environmental ethics deals with is no other than the ethical relationship between man and man represented by the relationship between man and nature, what it confirms is no other than our obligations and duties to others and next generations when dealing with the relationship between man and nature, and finally, the criterion of evaluation it pursues in dealing with the man-nature relationship is no other than the integrated and long-run interest of all human beings. All these are the ground on which the contemporary environmental ethics stands possibly. (shrink)