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  1. Timothy Williamson, Reply to John Hawthorne and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio.
    1. As John Hawthorne and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio appreciate, some of the central issues raised in their ‘Knowledge and Objective Chance’ arise for all but the most extreme theories of knowledge. In a wide range of cases, according to very plausible everyday judgments, we know something about the future, even though, according to quantum mechanics, our belief has a small but nonzero chance (objective probability) of being untrue. In easily constructed examples, we are in that position simultaneously with respect to many (...)
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  2. Timothy Williamson, Scepticism and Sensitivity.
     
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  3. Julia Lukewich, Renée Corbin, Elizabeth G. VanDenKerkhof, Dana S. Edge, Tyler Williamson & Joan E. Tranmer (forthcoming). Identification, Summary and Comparison of Tools Used to Measure Organizational Attributes Associated with Chronic Disease Management Within Primary Care Settings. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice:n/a-n/a.
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  4. Thad Williamson (forthcoming). A Fair Stake and a Fair Shake: John Rawls's Idea of a Property-Owning Democracy and Its Political Plausibility. Forthcoming In. Journal of Social Philosophy.
     
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  5. Timothy Williamson (forthcoming). Objects, Properties and Contingent Existence. In W. K. Essler (ed.), Themes from Barcan Marcus.
    Second-order logic and modal logic are both, separately, major topics of philosophical discussion. Although both have been criticized by Quine and others, increasingly many philosophers find their strictures uncompelling, and regard both branches of logic as valuable resources for the articulation and investigation of significant issues in logical metaphysics and elsewhere. One might therefore expect some combination of the two sorts of logic to constitute a natural and more comprehensive background logic for metaphysics. So it is somewhat surprising to find (...)
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  6. Timothy Williamson (forthcoming). In Memoriam: Ruth Barcan Marcus 1921-2012. Association for Symbolic Logic: The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic.
    Timothy Williamson The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Volume 19, Issue 1, Page 123-126, March 2013.
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  7. Timothy Williamson (forthcoming). Review of Joshua Alexander, Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction. Philosophy.
  8. Timothy Williamson (forthcoming). Themes From Barcan Marcus. Lauener Library of Analytical Philosophy, Vol. 3.
  9. Timothy Williamson (forthcoming). Very Improbable Knowing. Erkenntnis.
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  10. Thad Williamson (2015). How to Criticise Property‐Owning Democracy: A Response to Schemmel. Journal of Applied Philosophy 32 (2).
    Christian Schemmel makes a strong case that John Rawls underplayed the capacity of robust ‘universal welfare states’ to realise in practice liberal egalitarian principles of justice, and that improvements upon the best existing welfare states will more plausibly take the form of movement in the direction of democratic socialism rather than the more individualist regime that Rawls called a property-owning democracy. Nonetheless, I do not believe it follows from these arguments that highly unjust, deeply flawed welfare states such as the (...)
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  11. Timothy Williamson (2015). A Note on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic. Philosophical Studies 172 (1):129-140.
    The paper explains how Gettier’s conclusion can be reached on general theoretical grounds within the framework of epistemic logic, without reliance on thought experiments. It extends the argument to permissive conceptions of justification that invalidate principles of multi-premise closure and require neighbourhood semantics rather than semantics of a more standard type. The paper concludes by recommending a robust methodology that aims at convergence in results between thought experimentation and more formal methods. It also warns against conjunctive definitions as sharing several (...)
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  12. Timothy Williamson (2015). Tetralogue: I'm Right, You're Wrong. Oup Oxford.
    Four people with radically different views meet on a train and talk about what they believe. Each starts off convinced that he or she is right; then doubts creep in. Timothy Williamson uses a fictional conversation to explore the philosophical debate over whether one point of view can be right and the other wrong. He invites the reader to decide.
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  13. Timothy Williamson (2014). Précis of Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):713-716.
  14. Timothy Williamson (2014). Replies to Bricker, Divers, and Sullivan. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):744-764.
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  15. Timothy Williamson (2013). Anti-Exceptionalism About Philosophy. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):1-3.
    I briefly rehearse the positive conception of philosophy in my book The Philosophy of Philosophy, as an introduction to the symposium on it that follows.
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  16. Timothy Williamson (2013). Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction. By Joshua Alexander. Polity Press, 2012, Pp. Vi+154, £15.99. ISBN-13: 978-0745649184. [REVIEW] Philosophy 88 (3):467-474.
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  17. Timothy Williamson (2013). Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic. Inquiry 56 (1):1-14.
    The possibility of justified true belief without knowledge is normally motivated by informally classified examples. This paper shows that it can also be motivated more formally, by a natural class of epistemic models in which both knowledge and justified belief (in the relevant sense) are represented. The models involve a distinction between appearance and reality. Gettier cases arise because the agent's ignorance increases as the gap between appearance and reality widens. The models also exhibit an epistemic asymmetry between good and (...)
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  18. Timothy Williamson (2013). How Deep is the Distinction Between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge? In Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The A Priori in Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 291-312.
    The paper argues that, although a distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge (or justification) can be drawn, it is a superficial one, of little theoretical significance. The point is not that the distinction has borderline cases, for virtually all useful distinctions have such cases. Rather, it is argued by means of an example, the differences even between a clear case of a priori knowledge and a clear case of a posteriori knowledge may be superficial ones. In both cases, (...)
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  19. Timothy Williamson (2013). I What is Naturalism? In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge. 29.
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  20. Timothy Williamson (2013). Knowledge First. In Matthias Steup John Turri (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 1-10.
  21. Timothy Williamson (2013). Knowledge Still First. In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 22.
  22. Timothy Williamson (2013). Logic, Metalogic and Neutrality. Erkenntnis:1-21.
    The paper is a critique of the widespread conception of logic as a neutral arbiter between metaphysical theories, one that makes no `substantive’ claims of its own (David Kaplan and John Etchemendy are two recent examples). A familiar observation is that virtually every putatively fundamental principle of logic has been challenged over the last century on broadly metaphysical grounds (however mistaken), with a consequent proliferation of alternative logics. However, this apparent contentiousness of logic is often treated as though it were (...)
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  23. Timothy Williamson (2013). Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oup Oxford.
    Timothy Williamson gives an original and provocative treatment of deep metaphysical questions about existence, contingency, and change, using the latest resources of quantified modal logic. Contrary to the widespread assumption that logic and metaphysics are disjoint, he argues that modal logic provides a structural core for metaphysics.
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  24. Timothy Williamson (2013). No Title Available: Reviews. Philosophy 88 (3):467-474.
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  25. Timothy Williamson (2013). Response to Cohen, Comesaña, Goodman, Nagel, and Weatherson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic. Inquiry 56 (1):77-96.
    The five commentators on my paper ‘Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic’ (GCEL) demonstrate how fruitful the topic can be. Especially in Brian Weatherson's contribution, and to some extent in those of Jennifer Nagel and Jeremy Goodman, much of the material constitutes valuable development and refinement of ideas in GCEL, rather than criticism. In response, I draw some threads together, and answer objections, mainly those in the papers by Stewart Cohen and Juan Comesaña and by Goodman.
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  26. Timothy Williamson (2013). Replies to Trobok, Smokrović, and Miščević on the Philosophy of Philosophy. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):49-64.
    I reply to critical discussions by Majda Trobok, Nenad Smokrović, and Nenad Miščević on theses and arguments from my book The Philosophy of Philosophy. I take issue with them on matters such as the following. Should philosophical questions apparently about the world be taken at face value, or are they implicitly metalinguistic or metaconceptual? Are there ‘epistemologically analytic’ sentences that one can understand only if one has a disposition to accept them? Can ‘philosophical intuitions’ be explained as the products of (...)
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  27. Timothy Williamson (2013). 3 The Unclarity of Naturalism. In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge. 36.
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  28. Timothy Williamson (2013). Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy – By Paul Horwich. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 21 (S2):e7-e10.
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  29. Timothy Williamson (2013). Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy, by Paul Horwich. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012, Xv + 225 Pp. ISBN 978‐0‐1996‐6112‐1 Pb £16.99. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 21:e7-e10.
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  30. Martin O'Neill & Thad Williamson (eds.) (2012). Property-Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond. Wiley-Blackwell.
  31. Martin O'Neill & Thad Williamson (eds.) (2012). Property-Owning Democracy. Wiley.
     
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  32. M. Williamson, T., O'Neill (ed.) (2012). Property-Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond. Wiley-Blackwell.
  33. Thad Williamson (2012). A Politically Viable Aspiration? In T. Williamson (ed.), Property-Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond. Wiley-Blackwell. 287.
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  34. Thad Williamson (2012). A 20-Year Strategy to Create an Egalitarian Distribution of Assets in the United States. In T. Williamson (ed.), Property-Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond. Wiley-Blackwell. 225.
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  35. Thad Williamson (2012). Is Property‐Owning Democracy a Politically Viable Aspiration? In T. Williamson (ed.), Property-Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond. Wiley-Blackwell. 287--306.
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  36. Timothy Williamson (2012). Boghossian and Casalegno on Understanding and Inference. Dialectica 66 (2):237-247.
    In response to Paul Boghossian's objections in ‘Inferentialism and the epistemology of logic’, this paper defends counterexamples offered by Paolo Casalegno and the author to an inferentialist account of what it is to understand a logical constant, on which Boghossian had relied in his explanation of our entitlement to reason according to basic logical principles. The importance for understanding is stressed of non-inferential aspects of the use of logical constants. Boghossian's criteria for individuating concepts are also queried.
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  37. Timothy Williamson (2012). Wright and Casalegno on Meaning and Assertibility. Dialectica 66 (2):267-271.
    In Crispin Wright's ‘Meaning and Assertibility’, the main point of disagreement with Paolo Casalegno's critique of verificationist semantics in ‘The Problem of Non-conclusiveness’ concerns Wright's diagnosis of one of Casalegno's arguments as depending on an over-estimation of the proper explanatory task of a semantic theory. The present note argues that there is no such dependence.
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  38. Timothy Williamson (2011). Felsefe Felsefesi Nedir? Felsefe Tartismalari 46:1-17.
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  39. Timothy Williamson (2011). Improbable Knowing. In T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
    Can we turn the screw on counter-examples to the KK principle (that if one knows that P, one knows that one knows that P)? The idea is to construct cases in which one knows that P, but the epistemic status for one of the proposition that one knows that P is much worse than just one’s not knowing it. Of course, since knowledge is factive, there can’t be cases in which one knows that P and knows that one doesn’t know (...)
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  40. Timothy Williamson (2011). Knowledge First Epistemology. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge. 208-218.
     
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  41. Timothy Williamson (2011). Philosophical Expertise and the Burden of Proof. Metaphilosophy 42 (3):215-229.
    Abstract: Some proponents of “experimental philosophy” criticize philosophers' use of thought experiments on the basis of evidence that the verdicts vary with truth-independent factors. However, their data concern the verdicts of philosophically untrained subjects. According to the expertise defence, what matters are the verdicts of trained philosophers, who are more likely to pay careful attention to the details of the scenario and track their relevance. In a recent article, Jonathan M. Weinberg and others reply to the expertise defence that there (...)
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  42. Timothy Williamson (2011). Précis of The Philosophy of Philosophy. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):470-471.
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  43. Timothy Williamson (2011). Reply to Boghossian. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):498-506.
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  44. Timothy Williamson (2011). Reply to Horwich. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):534-542.
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  45. Timothy Williamson (2011). Reply to Peacocke. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):481-487.
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  46. Timothy Williamson (2011). Reply to Stalnaker. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):515-523.
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  47. Timothy Williamson (2011). The Metaphysical Conception of Analyticity Reply. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):515-523.
     
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  48. Timothy Williamson (2011). Understanding, Modality, Logical Operators Reply. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):481-487.
     
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  49. Timothy Williamson (2011). Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic Reply. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):498-506.
     
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  50. Timothy Williamson (2011). Williamson's Philosophy of Philosophy Reply. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):534-542.
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