This paper describes a decision model for an autonomous agent that provides an inhabitant with comfort based on information network technologies that connect home electric appliances with household equipment. The inhabitant enjoys the benefit of comfort, while he pays the cost for keeping that comfort. The autonomous agent should decide and control household equipment considering that cost from the inhabitant’s viewpoint. Thus, we utilized a representation scheme called an “influence diagram” that enabled us to model the decision-making process of the (...) agent from the inhabitant’s point of view. First, decision modeling using the influence diagram is presented via an example. The presented model consists of three information-processing modules: a module for estimating the situation of an inhabitant based on information from home networks, a module for evaluating comfort of the inhabitant, and a module for making decisions that maximize the utility of the inhabitant from both the viewpoints of comfort and the cost paid for that comfort. Next, an experiment for verifying whether the presented model is effective or not, and its results are described. Finally, our model of the agent is discussed in relation to social intelligence design by investigating the interactive processes between the agent and the inhabitant. (shrink)
The Japanese marker -te-i- can have progressive, resultative, and existential perfect readings and has often been regarded as ambiguous. This paper shows that there is no clear evidence that -te-i- is ambiguous. It proposes a monosemous analysis of -te-i- that unifies its multiple readings and shows how progressives and perfects can form a natural semantic class. Within the context of a Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp and Reyle 1993, de Swart 1998), I propose that -te-i- consists of an imperfective operator -te- (...) and a stativizer -i-. The imperfective operator -te- takes an eventuality as its argument and outputs a (non-necessarily proper) subpart of the eventuality, which precedes a reference time interval. Secondly, a stativizer -i- maps the subpart of the eventuality, i.e. -te-'s output, onto a state which overlaps with reference time and whose category is semantically underspecified and is determined via pragmatic inferences. The vague output of the imperfective operator, i.e. whether it is a proper subpart or nonproper subpart of an eventuality, leads to the contrast between progressive readings and perfect readings of -te-i-. (shrink)
This paper examines the increasingly popular chisan-chisho movement that has promoted the localization of food consumption in Japan since the late-1990s. Chisan-chisho emerged in the context of a perceived crisis in the Japanese food system, particularly the long-term decline of agriculture and rural community and more recent episodes of food scandals. Although initially started as a grassroots movement, many chisan-chisho initiatives are now organized by governments and farmers’ cooperatives. Acknowledging that the chisan-chisho movement has added some important resources and a (...) conceptual framework, we nonetheless point out that chisan-chisho has been refashioned as a producer movement by government as well as the Japan Agricultural Cooperative, capitalizing on local food’s marketing appeal. Chisan-chisho to date has not been able to become a full-fledged citizen-based political mobilization nor address the issue of marginality in the food system. (shrink)
Jacques Derrida est l’un des philosophes qui a continué à remettre en cause sérieusement les rapports théoriques et pratiques entre la philosophie et l’éducation, tout en restant hors des institutions universitaires traditionnelles en France. Dans les années 1970, il organise le GREPH (Groupe de recherches surl’enseignement philosophique) avec des enseignants et des étudiants contre la réduction de l’enseignment philosophique au lycée par le gouvernement français, et pour faire les recherches théoriques sur le lien essentiel de la philosophie à l’enseignement en (...) général. Puis, en 1983, Derrida a déployé tous ses efforts pour créer le Collège internatinal de Philosophie, institution tendant à ouvrir la nouvelle possibilité de la philosophie. Enfin, dans ses dernières années, ilintérroge l’avenir de l’université ou des Humanités à cette époque de mondialisation dans les textes comme L’Université sans condition, etc. Pour Derrida qui n’a cessé de donner ses séminaires depuis 1964, la question de l’éducation est important pour l’élaboration de sa propre philosophie. Selon lui, « je n’imagine pas de philosophie ni de recherche dissociée de son enseignement. J’ai essayé d’introduire dans cet enseignemtn de nouvelles pédagogie, de nouvelles mises en scènes, de changer la politique de l’enseignement et son rapport à la société » (Sur parole : instantanés philosophiques, Aube, 1999, p. 36). L’enseignement n’est pas un thème secondaire, mais plutôt un des questions centrales pour ses recherches philosophiques. Dans cette communication, nous allons mettre en lumière la théorie et la pratique de Derrida sur la philosphie et l’éducation, comme l’exemple le plus effectif et concret de sa conception de déconstruction. (shrink)
In his book Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise (2010), Takashi Yagisawa presents and argues for a novel and imaginative version of modal realism. It differs both from Lewis’s modal realism (Lewis 1986) and from actualists’ ersatz accounts (Adams 1974; Sider 2002). In this paper, I’ll present two arguments, each of which shows that Yagisawa’s metaphysics is incoherent. The first argument shows that the combination of Yagisawa’s metaphysics with impossibilia leads to triviality: every sentence whatsoever comes out true. This (...) is so even if Yagisawa accepts a paraconsistent notion of logical consequence, on which contradictions do not entail arbitrary conclusions. The second argument is independent of Yagisawa’s acceptance of impossibilia. It shows that Yagisawa’s metaphysics of possible worlds is incoherent. Using ordinary modal reasoning, I derive a contradiction from Yagisawa’s account of possible worlds. (shrink)
Modal realism -- Time, space, world -- Existence -- Actuality -- Modal realism and modal tense -- Transworld individuals and their identity -- Existensionalism -- Impossibility -- Proposition and relief -- Fictional worlds -- Epistemology.
Modal realists should fashion their theory by postulating\nand taking seriously the modal equivalent of tense, or\n_modal tense_. This will give them a uniform way to\nrespond to five different objections, one each by Skyrms,\nQuine, and Peacocke, and two by van Inwagen, and suggest a\nnon-Lewisian path to modal realism.
Sherlock Holmes is a fictional individual. So is his favorite pipe. Our pre-theoretical intuition says that neither of them is real. It says that neither of them really, or actually, exists. It also says that there is a sense in which they do exist, namely, a sense in which they exist “in the world of” the Sherlock Holmes stories. Our pre-theoretical intuition says in general of any fictional individual that it does not actually exist but exists “in the world of” (...) the relevant fiction. I wish to defend this pretheoretical intuition. To do so, I need to defend two claims: that fictional individuals do not actually exist, and that they exist “in the world of” the relevant fiction. The aim of this paper is to defend the first claim. (shrink)
In this paper, I examine Takashi Yagisawa’s response to van Inwagen’s ontic objection against David Lewis. Van Inwagen criticizes Lewis’s commitment to the absolutely unrestricted sense of ‘there is,’ and Yagisawa claims that by adopting modal tenses he avoids commitment to absolutely unrestricted quantification. I argue that Yagisawa faces a problem parallel to the one Lewis faces. Although Yagisawa officially rejects the absolutely unrestricted sense of a quantifying expression, he is still committed to the absolutely unrestricted sense of ‘is (...) a real.’. (shrink)
Deep theorizing about possibility requires theorizing about possible objects. One popular approach regards the notion of a possible object as intertwined with the notion of a possible world. There are two widely discussed types of theory concerning the nature of possible worlds: actualist representationism and possibilist realism. They support two opposing views about possible objects. Examination of the ways in which they do so reveals difficulties on both sides. There is another popular approach, which has been influenced by the philosophy (...) of Alexius Meinong. The Meinongian approach is relevant to theorizing about possible objects because it attempts to construct a general theory of objects other than ordinary concrete existing objects. Independently of the debate about the nature of possible worlds or about Meinongianism, it is not always as straightforward as it may at first appear to determine whether putative possible objects are indeed possible. Another category of object similar to that of a possible object is the category of a fictional object. Although initially attractive, the idea that fictional objects are possible objects should not be accepted blindly. An important instance of theoretical usefulness of possible objects is their central role in the validation of two controversial theorems of a simple quantified modal logic. (shrink)
Creationism is the view that fictional individuals such as Sherlock Holmes are contingently existing abstracta that come about due to the intentional activities of authors. Author-essentialism is the stronger thesis that the author responsible for bringing a fictional individual into existence at a time is essential to the existence of that individual. Takashi Yagisawa has recently attacked this view on the following grounds: author-essentialists rely on an ontological parallelism between fictional individuals and whole works of fiction, but this parallelism (...) fails to obtain. I here argue that Yagisawa’s grounds are weak. (shrink)
Contents: Preface. Johannes BRANDL: Semantic Holism Is Here To Stay. Michael DEVITT: A Critique of the Case for Semantic Holism. Georges REY: The Unavailability of What We Mean: A Reply to Quine, Fodor and LePore. Joseph LEVINE: Intentional Chemistry. Louise ANTHONY: Conceptual Connection and the Observation/Theory Distinction. Gilbert HARMAN: Meaning Holism Defended. Kirk A. LUDWIG: Is Content Holism Incoherent? Anne BEZUIDENHOUT: The Impossibility of Punctate Mental Representations. Takashi YAGISAWA: The Cost of Meaning Solipsism. Alberto PERUZZI: Holism: The Polarized Spectrum. (...) Jonathan BERG: Inferential Roles, Quine, and Mad Holism. Jerry FODOR & Ernest LEPORE: Replies. (shrink)
Modal Dimensionalism is a metaphysical theory about possible worlds that is naturally suggested by the often-noted parallelism between modal logic and tense logic. It says that the universe spreads out not only in spatiotemporal dimensions but also in a modal dimension. It regards worlds as nothing more or less than indices in the modal dimension in the way analogous to the way in which Temporal Dimensionalism regards temporal points and intervals as indices in the temporal dimension. Despite its naturalness and (...) intuitive appeal. Modal Dimensionalism has been largely ignored while the debates between David Lewis and his critics have dominated the discourse on the nature of possible worlds. It is high time that we took Modal Dimensionalism seriously as a viable alternative. (shrink)
We propose that the restrictive/non restrictive distinction found in relative clauses corresponds to the Inalienable vs Alienable distinction of the Nominal Possessive constructions. We propose to extend this distinction to adjectives suggesting that is not construction specific.
I discuss two independent topics concerning Michael Devitt's Coming To Our Senses. My discussion of the first topic, naturalism, is brief. My discussion of the second topic, analyticity, is divided into four subsections, the first of which examines the definition of analyticity and is by far the longest.
On the first day of the class for Introduction to Philosophy, your professor tells you that if you keep perfect attendance, complete every homework satisfactorily, participate in class discussion actively, and score 100% in every examination, you will certainly get an A+ for the course. You work hard and by the end of the semester, you think you have accomplished all these things. You are pleased. Why? Because you think as follows: “I have kept perfect attendance, completed every homework satisfactorily, (...) participated in class discussion actively, and scored 100% in every exam. This means I get an A+ for the course because, as the professor said, if I keep perfect attendance, complete every homework satisfactorily, participate in class discussion actively, and score 100% in every exam, I get an A+ for the course.”. (shrink)
In my book, Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise , I use the novel idea of modal tense to respond to a number of arguments against modal realism. Peter van Inwagen’s million-carat-diamond objection is one of them. It targets the version of modal realism by David Lewis and exploits the fact that Lewis accepts absolutely unrestricted quantification. The crux of my response is to use modal tense to neutralize absolutely unrestricted quantification. Seahwa Kim says that even when equipped with modal (...) tense, I am unsuccessful, given my view of reality and the proper use of modal tense in speaking of reality. I counter her attempt at resurrecting van Inwagen’s objection and clarify how we should use modal tense and how we should talk about reality. (shrink)
The recent renewed interest in the foundation of quantum statistical mechanics and in the dynamics of isolated quantum systems has led to a revival of the old approach by von Neumann to investigate the problem of thermalization only in terms of quantum dynamics in an isolated system [1, 2]. It has been demonstrated in some general or concrete settings that a pure initial state evolving under quantum dynamics indeed approaches an equilibrium state [3–9]. The underlying idea that a single pure (...) quantum state can fully describe thermal equilibrium has also become much more concrete [10–12]. (shrink)
Those who object to David Lewis' modal realism express qualms about philosophical respectability of the Lewisian notion of a possible world and its correlate notion of an inhabitant of a possible world. The resulting impression is that these two notions either stand together or fall together. I argue that the Lewisian notion of a possible world is otiose even for a good Lewisian modal realist, and that one can carry out a good Lewisian semantics for modal discourse without Lewisian possible (...) worls. I do so by generalizing Lewis' own idea that restrictions on quantification come and go with the pragmatic wind and relativizing possible worlds as shifting domains of discourse. I then suggest a way to soften the infamous incredulous stare. (shrink)
Approximately thirty years ago, Barbara H. Partee tried to think of counterexamples to David Lewis’s observation that no intransitive verbs appeared to have intensional subject positions. She came up with such verbs as ‘rise,’ ‘change,’ and ‘increase.’ Lewis agreed that they were indeed counterexamples to his observation. He mentioned it to Richard Montague, who incorporated these verbs into his now famous grammatical theory for English.
It may appear that in order to be any way at all, a thing must exist. A possible – worlds version of this claim goes as follows: (E) For every x, for every possible world w, Fx at w only if x exists at w. Here and later in (R), the letter ‘F’ is used as a schematic letter to be replaced with a one – place predicate. There are two arguments against (E). The first is by analogy. Socrates is (...) widely admired now but he does not exist now. So, it is not the case that for every x, for every time t, Fx at t only if x exists at t. Possible worlds are analogous to times. Therefore, (E) is false (cf., Kaplan 1973: 503 – 05 and Salmon 1981: 36 – 40). For the second argument, replace ‘F’ with ‘does not exist’. (E) then says that for every x, for every possible world w, x does not exist at w only if x exists at w. This is obviously false. Therefore (E) is false (cf., Kaplan 1977: 498). Despite their considerable appeal, these arguments are not unassailable. The first argument suffers from the weakness inherent in any argument from analogy; the analogy it rests on may not.. (shrink)
When I assertively utter the sentence `Spot is a cat', the sentence I utter expresses a proposition. The truth condition of the proposition so expressed is determined by the semantic values of the singular term, `Spot', and the predicate, `is a cat'. If `Spot' refers to a certain particular entity E and `is a cat' expresses a certain particular property P, then the proposition in question is true if and only if E has P. Such is the theoretical cash value (...) of reference. The referent of a given singular term generally figures in this manner in the truth condition of the proposition expressed by any sentence containing the singular term outside direct quotations and other referentially opaque contexts.1 Given this understanding of the notion of reference, I wish to address an important question: How is the reference of a proper name determined? (shrink)
We explore the understanding of conscious states in terms of spatio-temporal dynamics through modelling a mobile agent. Conscious states are associated with an agent's spontaneous and deterministic fluctuation between attachment to and detachment from the surroundings. It is because of this fluctuating nature, we argue, that an agent can perceive structure in the world. Perception requires a conscious state in physical devices. This is a central concern of this paper, and we examine it by simulating a mobile agent equipped with (...) an interconnected Fitz-Hugh-Nagumo (FHN) neuron network with delayed signal transmissions. The agent can move around a space by sensing the environment pattern through the input neurons and computing the motor outputs via the FHN network. The agent shows a variety of motion styles and a spontaneous selection of motion styles responding to the surroundings. Such a phenomenon is named embodied chaotic itinerancy (ECI), as an extension of chaotic itinerant dynamics, which is known to be a typical dynamic with a high degree of freedom. We take this selective mode of response to be significant, particularly those interacting with spatial pattern, as an inevitable property of conscious states. (shrink)
The dynamical category uses the sensory-motor coordination to do categorization. If categories are inevitably grounded in sensory-motor coordination, sharing categories may also share the same sensory-motor coordination. Concerning this aspect, we discuss the color category as a dynamical categorization. Additional to the converging effect of a category by communication, we discuss the diverging effect of communication that creates new categories.
The article deals with the differences of the notion of 'object' or 'thing' in natural languages, concluding that some languages are by their structure more object-biased while others are more event-biased and proceeds to analyse how two common Japanese words, mono and koto , both meaning 'thing', have been treated in 20th-century Japanese thought, notably in the philosophical works of Watsuji Tetsurô, Ide Takashi, Hiromatsu Wataru and Kimura Bin. All of these thinkers represent different schools and trends (Watsuji could (...) be called a cultural particularist, Ide was an Aristotle scholar, Hiromatsu a Marxist and Kimura is a psychiatrist), but come to similar conclusions in this respect, allowing us to regard event-biased and object-biased linguistic constructions as manifestations of two different, but equally necessary cognitive faculties. (shrink)
The eleven original essays in this collection competently cover a wide range of Robert Stalnaker’s philosophical work, and Stalnaker’s replies to them are clear, well-thought out, and informative. Anyone interested in Stalnaker’s philosophy or the areas covered in this volume is well advised to read it.
Let us call a sentential context semantically transparent if and only if all synonymous expressions are substitutable for one another in it salva veritate. A sentential context is semantically opaque if and only if it is not semantically transparent. Nathan Salmon has boldly advanced a refreshingly crisp theory according to which belief contexts are semantically transparent.1 If he is right, belief contexts are much better behaved than widely suspected.2 Impressive as it is, I do not believe that Salmon's theory is (...) completely satisfactory. I shall not try to refute his theory, however. My aim is more modest. It is to show that his theory, in conjunction with a number of auxiliary but important claims he makes to buttress the theory, seems to lead to semantic opacity of belief contexts. (shrink)
Memory dynamics need both stable and unstable properties simultaneously. Hence memory dynamics cannot be simulated by chaotic itinerant dynamics alone, with no real world correspondence. Memory dynamics are constrained by both semantics and causalities in the embodied cognition.