Predicates of personal taste (fun, tasty) and epistemic modals (might, must) share a similar analytical difficulty in determining whose taste or knowledge is being expressed. Accordingly, they have parallel behavior in attitude reports and in a certain kind of disagreement. On the other hand, they differ in how freely they can be linked to a contextually salient individual, with epistemic modals being much more restricted in this respect. I propose an account of both classes using Lasersohn’s (Linguistics and Philosophy 28: (...) 643–686, 2005) “judge” parameter, at the same time arguing for crucial changes to Lasersohn’s view in order to allow the extension to epistemic modals and address empirical problems faced by his account. (shrink)

The aim of the Analytic of Concepts is to derive and deduce a set of pure concepts of the understanding, the categories, which play a central role in Kant’s explanation of the possibility of synthetic a priori cognition and judgment. This chapter is structured around two questions. First, what is a pure concept of the understanding? Second, what is involved in a deduction of a pure concept of the understanding? In answering the first, we focus on how the categories differ (...) from the pure forms of sensibility and examine whether they are known only to be the pure forms of human thinking or rather the forms of discursive cognition as such. In answering the second, we draw a distinction between the application and the exemplification of the categories and use it to identify different ways of understanding Kant’s project in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. These questions connect because the answer to the first determines how we should understand the kind of entitlement which is to be established in the Deduction. (shrink)

Our aim in this chapter is to shed light on Kant’s account of the pure forms of sensibility by focusing on a somewhat neglected issue: Kant’s restriction of his claims about space and time to the case of human sensibility. Kant argues that space and time are the pure forms of sensibility for human cognizers. But he also says that we cannot know whether space and time are likewise the pure forms of sensibility for all discursive cognizers. A great deal (...) of attention has focused on the first of these claims, both on how Kant argues for it and how it relates to transcendental idealism. But a satisfactory interpretation must also account for the second claim, and it must account for the fact that Kant endorses both of them. What we need is an explanation of why Kant thinks our knowledge that space and time are the pure forms of sensibility extends to all human beings but no further. (shrink)

Chasing the fading contours if the past. Pursuing points of intersection. Encounters with aging literary figures and surviving witnesses to history. Excavating printed artifacts in the back rooms of used book shops. Locating of equipment lost or discarded. Conversations with Paul Bowles & Mohammed Mrabet, Brion Gysin, "Pauline Réage, Robert Graves, Maurice Girodias, Berthe Cleyrergue, Edouard Roditi, Allen Ginsberg & Peter Orlovsky." --Back cover.

For Kant, the human cognitive faculty has two sub-faculties: sensibility and the understanding. Each has pure forms which are necessary to us as humans: space and time for sensibility; the categories for the understanding. But Kant is careful to leave open the possibility of there being creatures like us, with both sensibility and understanding, who nevertheless have different pure forms of sensibility. They would be finite rational beings and discursive cognizers. But they would not be human. And this raises a (...) question about the pure forms of the understanding. Does Kant leave open the possibility of discursive cognizers who have different categories? Even if other discursive cognizers might not sense like us, must they at least think like us? We argue that textual and systematic considerations do not determine the answers to these questions and examine whether Kant thinks that the issue cannot be decided. Consideration of his wider views on the nature and limits of our knowledge of mind shows that Kant could indeed remain neutral on the issue but that the exact form his neutrality can take is subject to unexpected constraints. The result would be an important difference between what Kant says about discursive cognizers with other forms of sensibility and what he is in a position to say about discursive cognizers with other forms of understanding. Kantian humility here takes on a distinctive character. (shrink)

Summary Background Self-binding directives instruct clinicians to overrule treatment refusal during future severe episodes of illness. These directives are promoted as having potential to increase autonomy for individuals with severe episodic mental illness. Although lived experience is central to their creation, service users’ views on self-binding directives have not been investigated substantially. This study aimed to explore whether reasons for endorsement, ambivalence, or rejection given by service users with bipolar disorder can address concerns regarding self-binding directives, decision-making capacity, and human (...) rights. Methods This study used qualitative data from an internet-based survey distributed to the mailing list of the UK charity Bipolar UK, which contained multiple closed and open questions on advance decision-making in bipolar disorder. Quantitative analysis of a closed question about self-binding directives had already demonstrated endorsement amongst a very high proportion of participants with bipolar disorder who completed the survey. We conducted thematic analysis of responses from those participants who answered a subsequent open question about reasons for their view. Research was co-produced within a multi-disciplinary team, with clinical, legal, and ethical expertise, and lived experience of bipolar disorder. Ideas and methodologies associated with all these areas of expertise were used in the analysis of these reasons and to gain insight into the thoughts of individuals with bipolar disorder about self-binding directives and associated issues. Findings Between Oct 23 and Dec 5, 2017, 932 individuals with a self-reported clinical diagnosis of bipolar disorder completed the internet survey, with 565 (154 men; 400 women; 11 transgender or other) providing free text answers to the open question. A large majority of respondents endorsed self-binding directives, nearly all describing a determinate shift to types of distorted thinking and decision-making when unwell as their key justification. Responses indicating ambivalence were dominated by logistical concerns about the drafting and implementation of self-binding directives, while those who rejected self-binding directives also cited logistical concerns, validity of their thinking when unwell, and potential contravention of human rights. Interpretation This study is, to our knowledge, the first large study of reasons why mental health service users might endorse or reject the use of self-binding directives. The findings provide empirical support for introducing self-binding directives into mental health advance decision-making practice and policy and may help to address enduring ethical concerns surrounding possible implementation of the directive while a person retains decision-making capacity. The opinions expressed here in responses given by multiple service users with bipolar disorder challenge a prominent view within international disability rights debates that involuntary treatment and recognition of impaired mental capacity constitute inherent human rights violations. Funding The Wellcome Trust . (shrink)

The essays from the conference have been substantially rev. and new material has been added.

This book explores the new performativity in art theory and practice, examining ways of rethinking interpretive processes in visual culture. Since the 1960s, visual art practices - from body art to minimalism - have taken contemporary art outside the museum and gallery; by embracing theatricality and performance and exploding the boundaries set by traditional art criticism. The contributors argue that interpretation needs to be recognised as much more dynamic and contingent. Offering its own performance script, and embracing both canonical fine (...) artists such as Manet, De Kooning and Jasper Johns, and performance artists such as Vito Acconci and Gunter Brus, this book offers radical re-readings of art works and points confidently towards new models for understanding art. (shrink)

This book is perfect for anyone wondering where hope fits into our lives during these troubling times.

This work introduces the English-speaking reader to the theoretical foundations of Kng's popular works; an indispensable prolegomena for every future Christology.

Recent trends in the understanding of culture contact, with concepts such as hybridization, cosmopolitanism, and cultural innovation, open up the possibility of a new understanding of human interaction. While the social imaginary is rich with images of conflict resulting from culture contact, images of creativity are far rarer. We propose the creation of an extensive research project to document cultural creativity, starting with obvious examples in the arts, and expanding into all areas of life in order to counteract the present (...) conflictual images and develop a social imaginary with positive “attractor” images that can guide to greater creativity. (shrink)

This paper formalizes part of the cognitive architecture that Kant develops in the Critique of Pure Reason. The central Kantian notion that we formalize is the rule. As we interpret Kant, a rule is not a declarative conditional stating what would be true if such and such conditions hold. Rather, a Kantian rule is a general procedure, represented by a conditional imperative or permissive, indicating which acts must or may be performed, given certain acts that are already being performed. These (...) acts are not propositions; they do not have truth-values. Our formalization is related to the input/ output logics, a family of logics designed to capture relations between elements that need not have truth-values. In this paper, we introduce KL3 as a formalization of Kant’s conception of rules as conditional imperatives and permissives. We explain how it differs from standard input/output logics, geometric logic, and first-order logic, as well as how it translates natural language sentences not well captured by first-order logic. Finally, we show how the various distinctions in Kant’s much-maligned Table of Judgements emerge as the most natural way of dividing up the various types and sub-types of rule in KL3. Our analysis sheds new light on the way in which normative notions play a fundamental role in the conception of logic at the heart of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. (shrink)

We examine pregnant women's experiences with routinised obstetric ultrasound as entailed in their antenatal care during planned pregnancies. This paper highlights the ambiguity of ultrasound technology in the constitution of maternal–foetal connections. Our analysis focusses on Australian women's experiences of the ontological, aesthetic and epistemological ambiguities afforded by ultrasound. We argue that these ambiguities offer possibilities for connecting to the foetus in ways that maintain a kind of unknowability; they afford an openness and ethical responsiveness irrespective of the future of (...) the foetus. This suggests that elucidating women's experience has implications for theorising ethics across maternal–foetal relations and, more specifically, for the ‘moral pioneering’ (Rapp, 2000) that reproductive technologies can demand of women. Moral pioneering cannot be reduced to moments or processes of decision-making; it must allow for greater recognition of the affective commitments entailed in and incited by ultrasound. Furthermore, focussing on experiences of the ambiguity of ultrasound allows for understanding the ways in which affectivity circulates across domains commonly understood as medical or social, public or private. In doing so, it contributes to undermining a series of tensions that currently shape feminist analysis of obstetric ultrasound, often at the expense of the experience of women. (shrink)

Against a view currently popular in the literature, it is argued that Kant was not a niıve realist about perceptual experience. Naive realism entails that perceptual experience is object-dependent in a very strong sense. In the first half of the paper, I explain what this claim amounts to and I undermine the evidence that has been marshalled in support of attributing it to Kant. In the second half of the paper, I explore in some detail Kant’s account of hallucination and (...) argue that no such account is available to someone who thinks that veridical perceptual experience is object-dependent in the naive realist sense. Kant’s theory provides for a remarkably sophisticated, bottom-up explanation of the phenomenal character of hallucinatory episodes and is crucial for gaining a proper understanding of his model of the mind and its place in nature. (shrink)

This essay considers Kant’s theory of modality in light of a debate in contemporary modal metaphysics and modal logic concerning the Barcan formulas. The comparison provides a new and fruitful perspective on Kant’s complex and sometimes confusing claims about possibility and necessity. Two central Kantian principles provide the starting point for the comparison: that the possible must be grounded in the actual and that existence is not a real predicate. Both are shown to be intimately connected to the Barcan formulas, (...) and Kant’s views on what he distinguishes as three different kinds of modality are then considered in light of this connection. (shrink)

This study was conducted to corroborate findings that females invoke a decision rule that is significantly different from that of their male counterparts when making ethical value judgements. In addition, the study examines whether the same decision rule is used by men and women for all types of ethical situations. The results show that males and females use different decision rules when making ethical evaluations, although there are types of situations where there are no significant differences in decision rules used (...) by men and women. The results do not suggest that any one particular decision rule is used by the majority of either males or females in different types of ethical judgements. There is a greater diversity in decision rules used by females than by males. (shrink)

The application of artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies in healthcare have immense potential to improve the care of patients. While there are some emerging practices surro...

Monotheism of reason & heart, polytheism of imagination and art: That is what we need!Even today aesthetics is not considered among Edmund Husserl’s main interests. It is true, however, that there are many other phenomenological approaches to aesthetics among his “heretic” disciples, as Ricoeur calls them. I am thinking here especially of Sartre’s L’Imagination and L’imaginaire, Roman Ingarden’s Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Kunst and Das literarische Kunstwerk, and Mikel Dufrenne’s Phénoménologie de l’expérience esthétique. Nevertheless, it may be objected that in (...) regard to Husserl’s work in aesthetics, research has been, at times, limited or simplified. Though... (shrink)

A novel solution to the knowability paradox is proposed based on Kant’s transcendental epistemology. The ‘paradox’ refers to a simple argument from the moderate claim that all truths are knowable to the extreme claim that all truths are known. It is significant because anti-realists have wanted to maintain knowability but reject omniscience. The core of the proposed solution is to concede realism about epistemic statements while maintaining anti-realism about non-epistemic statements. Transcendental epistemology supports such a view by providing for a (...) sharp distinction between how we come to understand and apply epistemic versus non-epistemic concepts, the former through our capacity for a special kind of reflective self-knowledge Kant calls ‘transcendental apperception’. The proposal is a version of restriction strategy: it solves the paradox by restricting the anti-realist’s knowability principle. Restriction strategies have been a common response to the paradox but previous versions face serious difficulties: either they result in a knowability principle too weak to do the work anti-realists want it to, or they succumb to modified forms of the paradox, or they are ad hoc. It is argued that restricting knowability to non-epistemic statements by conceding realism about epistemic statements avoids all versions of the paradox, leaves enough for the anti-realist attack on classical logic, and, with the help of transcendental epistemology, is principled in a way that remains compatible with a thoroughly anti-realist outlook. (shrink)

This paper draws out and connects two neglected issues in Kant’s conception of a priori knowledge. Both concern topics that have been important to contemporary epistemology and to formal epistemology in particular: knowability and luminosity. Does Kant commit to some form of knowability principle according to which certain necessary truths are in principle knowable to beings like us? Does Kant commit to some form of luminosity principle according to which, if a subject knows a priori, then they can know that (...) they know a priori? I defend affirmative answers to both of these questions, and by considering the special kind of modality involved in Kant’s conceptions of possible experience and the essential completability of metaphysics, I argue that his combination of knowability and luminosity principles leads Kant into difficulty. (shrink)

In this paper I return to the question of whether intuition is object-dependent. Kant’s account of the imagination appears to suggest that intuition is not object-dependent. On a recent proposal, however, the imagination is a faculty of merely inner intuition, the inner objects of which exist and are present in the way demanded by object-dependence views, such as Lucy Allais’s relational account. I argue against this proposal on both textual and philosophical grounds. It is inconsistent with what Kant says about (...) how the imagination functions and is ultimately incompatible with the relational account it is supposed to support. Kant’s account of the imagination remains a serious obstacle for the view that intuition is object-dependent. (shrink)

This essay reassesses the relation between Kant and Kripke on the relation between necessity and the a priori. Kripke famously argues against what he takes to be the traditional view that a statement is necessary only if it is a priori, where, very roughly, what it means for a statement to be necessary is that it is true and could not have been false and what it means for a statement to be a priori is that it is knowable independently (...) of experience. Call such a view the Entailment Thesis. Along with many Kant scholars, Kripke thinks that Kant endorses the Entailment Thesis. Thus Kripke and many others take his arguments against the Entailment Thesis to tell against Kant and to mark an important point of disagreement with him. I will argue that this is a mistake. Kant does not endorse the Entailment Thesis that Kripke and many others attribute to him. He does endorse two quite different theses concerning the relation between necessity and the a priori, as he conceives them. One is a matter of definition and the other is a very substantial philosophical thesis indeed—to establish it is the aim of the entire Critique of Pure Reason. But Kripke’s arguments against the Entailment Thesis tell against neither of Kant’s theses, as they involve crucially different conceptions of necessity and the a priori. This superficial lack of disagreement masks deep disagreements, but these result from divergent views regarding matters such as realism, modal epistemology, and philosophical methodology; views which Kant does a lot, and Kripke very little, to argue for. (shrink)

Husserl analiza progresivamente a la fantasía por oposición a la originariedad de la percepción -cuyo modelo constitutivo es la aprehensión de contenidos presentes-, a la mediatez de la conciencia de imagen -especie de representación indirecta-, y a la posicionalidad de la rememoración -para la cual se desarrolla el modelo de la modificación reproductiva-. El presente trabajo muestra cómo, a partir de este análisis por contraste con otras vivencias intencionales, la fantasía llega a ser caracterizada como un tipo inactual de modificación (...) reproductiva, más precisamente, como la “modificación de neutralidad de la presentificación ponente” (Ideas I, § 111). Luego de objetar que esta definición asimila a la fantasía a una suerte de recuerdo indeterminado en detrimento de su especificidad productiva y libre, propone que una caracterización más adecuada debe ir más allá de la cuestión, desde luego fundamental, de si creer o no creer, y afirmar su carácter a la vez inactual y quasi-productivo. (shrink)

El presente trabajo busca restituir los problemas que condujeron a Husserl a capturar la esencia morfológica de la fantasía y sus modalidades y a fijar cada una de sus características esenciales. Pese a la temprana estabilización de la definición de la fantasía como un tipo de presentificación intuitiva, simple y no posicional, la literatura sobre el tema aún presenta opacidades relativas al modo como este tipo de vivencia se constituye en la conciencia interna y a los criterios que permiten distinguirla (...) de otros fenómenos más o menos próximos, como la percepción, la rememoración, la conciencia de imagen o imaginación, entre otras. Establecer la génesis y la evolución de este concepto permitirá no solo despejar dichas opacidades, sino también echar luz sobre aquellas otras esferas de experiencia en las cuales la fantasía cumple alguna función, como en la intuición de esencias, la empatía, o la contemplación estética. (shrink)

Teaching Joe Kincheloe is one of a handful of important recent books posthumously pushing Kincheloe's work further into the twenty-first century. Written and edited by former students and colleagues, the book underscores the depth and breath of his extraordinarily productive career. The text offers students and educators alike invaluable insights into transformative ways of seeing conducive to challenging the technocratic, imperialistic purpose of dominant forms education in an era marked by ruling elite desperation as U.S. power wanes globally. Through this (...) and other projects, Kincheloe would surely have been pleased to see his many postformal contributions counter-hegemonically providing critical pedagogy the theoretical and practical strength to contribute to the global uprising currently challenging the imperialist project of wealth extraction and cultural domination from Cuba; Venezuela; Peru; Chiapas, Mexico; Tunisia; Libya; Egypt; Yemen; and Iran, to regions in the United States. Teaching Joe L. Kincheloe will surely gain relevancy as the global movement against authoritarianism and domination intensifies and citizens begin to search for new ways to better understand their worlds and how those contexts interrelate with the historical development of their own identities. (shrink)

Si bien es cierto que Husserl no ha escrito sistemáticamente sobre estética, consideramos no sólo posible y legítimo, sino también establecer las condiciones de posibilidad para una conciencia estética desde el punto de vista de la fenomenología trascendental de Husserl. Motivados por esta idea, en el presente trabajo examinamos, en primer lugar, el tipo de estética que puede deducirse de aquellos pasajes en los que Husserl considera explícitamente experiencias artísticas, para arribar a la idea de que, analizado desde la perspectiva (...) de la conciencia de imagen, el fenómeno estético del que se puede dar cuenta es limitado. Así, en segundo lugar, intentamos mostrar que esta pobreza no es esencial al fenómeno y, por tanto, que dichas limitaciones pueden ser superadas, o al menos trascendidas, si en vez de considerar la estética desde el punto de vista de la conciencia de imagen, se la considera desde la perspectiva de la fantasía.While it is true that Husserl has not written systematically about Aesthetics, we believe it is possible and legitimate to study how Aesthetic Consciousness works from Husserl's point of view of transcendental Phenomenology. Hence, in this paper we consider, in the first place, the virtues and limitations of the Aesthetic that can be deduced from the passages in which Husserl explicitly refers to artistic experiences, to arrive to the idea that, analyzed from the perspective of image-consciousness, the aesthetic phenomenon that can be described is limited. So, secondly, we try to show that this poverty is not essential to the phenomenon and, therefore, such a limitation can be overcome, or almost transcended, if we contemplate the Aesthetic considerations taken by Husserl not from the point of view of image-consciousness but from the perspective of phantasy. (shrink)

Se busca establecer las condiciones de posibilidad de la invención a través del análisis de los distintos modelos con los cuales Husserl da cuenta de la constitución de las vivencias intencionales. En el primer apartado, se analiza el modelo hilemórfico perceptivo o esquema aprehensión-contenido de aprehensión que explica la constitución de la experiencia nueva en sentido originario. En el segundo apartado, se muestra cómo Husserl inicialmente desentraña la estructura de la imaginación y la posibilidad de sumergirse en mundos ficticios exhibidos (...) en imágenes con una variación del modelo perceptivo, al cual denominamos hilemorfismo analógico. Sin embargo, al profundizar en el análisis de la conciencia de imagen, se revela que la posibilidad de inventar mundos ficticios depende de otro tipo de vivencia, la libre fantasía, que, por su parte, se resiste a ser explicada con una variación del esquema forma-contenido porque puede obrar sin ninguna base sensible. Ello conduce a presentar, en el tercer apartado, el modelo de la modificación reproductiva, desarrollado por Husserl en respuesta a las paradojas que surgen de aplicar el esquema hilemórfico a presentificaciones como la fantasía y la rememoración. Sin embargo, dado que una variación del modelo reproductivo tampoco alcanza para dar genuina cuenta del carácter productivo de la fantasía, por último, la cuarta sección define la invención como el exceso de sentido que introducen los actos de fantasía de acuerdo con tres condiciones: la _autoneutralización_ del curso de vivencias; una _duplicación_ de la conciencia; y la _asociación_ no habitual de intenciones parciales en una configuración fantaseada. (shrink)

In this paper I offer an interpretation of Kant’s theory of perceptual error based on his remarks in the Anthropology. Both hallucination and illusion, I argue, are for Kant species of experience and therefore require the standard co-operation of sensibility and understanding. I develop my account in a conceptualist framework according to which the two canonical classes of non-veridical experience involve error in the basic sense that how they represent the world as being is not how the world is. In (...) hallucination this is due to the misapplication of categories and in illusion to the misapplication of empirical concepts. Yet there is also room in this framework for a distinction in terms of cognitive functionality between the level of experience, which is merely judgementally structured, and that of judgement proper, which involves the free action of a conscious agent. This distinction enables Kant to allow for the otherwise problematic phenomenon of self-aware non-veridicality. (shrink)

It is often claimed that anti-realism is a form of transcendental idealism or that Kant is an anti-realist. It is also often claimed that anti-realists are committed to some form of knowability principle and that such principles have problematic consequences. It is therefore natural to ask whether Kant is so committed, and if he is, whether this leads him into difficulties. I argue that a standard reading of Kant does indeed have him committed to the claim that all empirical truths (...) are knowable and that this claim entails that there is no empirical truth that is never known. I extend the result to a priori truths and draw some general philosophical lessons from this extension. However, I then propose a re-examination of Kant’s notion of experience according to which he carefully eschews any commitment to empirical knowability. Finally I respond to a remaining problem that stems from a weaker, justified believability principle. (shrink)