Continuing Franz Boas' work to establish anthropology as an academic discipline in the US at the turn of the twentieth century, Alfred L. Kroeber re-defined culture as a phenomenon sui generis. To achieve this he asked geneticists to enter into a coalition against hereditarian thoughts prevalent at that time in the US. The goal was to create space for anthropology as a separate discipline within academia, distinct from other disciplines. To this end he crossed the boundary separating anthropology from biology (...) in order to secure the boundary. His notion of culture, closely bound to the concept of heredity, saw it as independent of biological heredity (culture as superorganic) but at the same time as a heredity of another sort. The paper intends to summarise the shifting boundaries of anthropology at the beginning of the twentieth century, and to present Kroeber?s ideas on culture, with a focus on how the changing landscape of concepts of heredity influenced his views. The historical case serves to illustrate two general conclusions: that the concept of culture played and plays different roles in explaining human existence; that genetics and the concept of Weismannian hard inheritance did not have an unambiguous unidirectional historical effect on the vogue for hereditarianism at that time; on the contrary, it helped to establish culture in Kroeber's sense, culture as independent of heredity. (shrink)
These are for entries for the forthcoming _Rawls Lexicon_, edited by Jon Mandle and David Reidy, on H.L.A. Hart, Charles Beitz, Sovereignty, and Citizen.
Le conflit social autour de la réforme du régime d'assurance chômage des intermittents du spectacle a été marqué par son intensité et par sa durée. La thèse défendue ici est que la maîtrise du temps constitue l’un des enjeux majeurs de ce conflit. L'affrontement sur le terrain économique de la régulation de l'emploi et de l'industrie culturelle s'est doublé de l'affrontement sur le temps. La question du temps ne se limite pas à la régulation du temps de travail, elle concerne (...) la maîtrise du temps et les « formes de vie » auxquelles les individus aspirent. Les deux plans de l'emploi et du temps ne sont pas exclusifs l’un de l’autre, ils coexistent, mais le conflit autour de la maîtrise du temps est relativement imperceptible. L'objectif de cet article est de lui donner de la visibilité et d'en questionner le sens. (shrink)
L'invention de nouvelles figures de l'art est un fait polémique. Absconses selon les schèmes de la définition de l'art suscitée par les précédentes, elles forcent l'esthéticien à forger de nouveaux concepts, plus idoines, à inventer un nouveau style, plus juste, à prendre de nouveaux masques, à muter dans un nouveau corps, plus sensible à ces nouveaux charmes. L'histoire de la création artistique est la raison de l'histoire de l'esthétique.C'est cette vie critique de l'esthétique, que cet article s'attache à mettre en (...) évidence en prenant l'exemple paradigmatique du pop art. (shrink)
"Aranguren: filosofía en la vida y vida en la filosofía" llevó por nombre la exposición sobre la figura y el legado de José Luis L. Aranguren (Ávila 1909- Madrid 1996) que pudo verse desde el 4 de junio al 26 de julio de 2009 en el Pabellón Transatlántico de la Residencia de Estudiantes de Madrid con ocasión del centenario del nacimiento del filósofo abulense.
The radical nub of Byrne & Russon's argument is that passive priming effects can produce much of the evidence of higher-order cognition in nonhuman primates. In support of their position we review evidence of similar behavioral priming effects n humans. However, that evidence further suggests that even program-level imitative behavior can be produced through priming.
Schools located in underpriviledged areas have to deal with different factors, like the dropout rate among students and teachers; the culture of action, the culture of oral and a «carpe diem» culture; the low literacy rates; the type of children's knowledges — sometimes different from those promoted at school — and the learning difficulties of pupils... In light of these factors, few states have decided to adopt measures to support pupils and teachers in these communities. In this sense, several studies (...) examine the potential role of philosophy for children (P4C), but none examines, in this kind of environment, the integration of P4C in the context of a teaching field experience program. Insofar several novice teachers start their career in these environments, it could be helpful to enrich our comprenhension on this subject. This paper presents results from an exploratory study on this issue, which led to raise questions about the bachelor of education program, at least in our university. (shrink)
This is a collection of essays on themes of legal philosophy which have all been generated or affected by Hart's work. The topics covered include legal theory, responsibility, and enforcement of morals, with contributions from Ronald Dworkin, Rolf Sartorius, Neil MacCormach, David Lyons, Kent Greenawalt, Michael Moore, Joseph Raz, and C.L. Ten, among others.
Hacker, P. M. S. Hart's philosophy of law.--Baker, G. P. Defeasibility and meaning.--Dworkin, R. M. No right answer?-Lucas, J. R. The phenomenon of law.--Honoré, A. M. Real laws.--Summers, R. S. Naïve instrumentalism and the law.--Marshall, G. Positivism, adjudication, and democracy.--Cross, R. The House of Lords and the rules of precedent.--Kenny, A. J. P. Intention and mens rea in murder.--Mackie, J. L. The grounds of responsibility.--MacCormick, D. N. Rights in legislation.--Raz, J. Promises and obligations.--Foot, P. R. Approval and disapproval.--Finnis, J. M. (...) Scepticism, self-refutation, and the good of truth.--Barry, B. M. Justice between generations.--Feinberg, J. Harm and self-interest. (shrink)
The essays in this volume were written to celebrate the sixtieth birthday of G. E. L. Owen, who by his essays and seminars on ancient Greek philosophy has made a contribution to its study that is second to none. The authors, from both sides of the Atlantic, include not only scholars whose main research interests lie in Greek philosophy, but others best known for their work in general philosophy. All are pupils or younger colleagues of Professor Owen who are indebted (...) to his practice of philosophical scholarship as a first-order philosophical activity. At the heart of G. E. L. Owen’s work has been a preoccupation with the role of philosophical reflection on language in the metaphysics and epistemology of Plato, Aristotle and other ancient Greek thinkers. This is accordingly the general topic of the present volume, which includes five papers on Plato’s critical dialogues and seven on Aristotle, prefaced by two on Heraclitus and followed by a study of the debate in Hellenistic philosophy on the sorites. This is a book for specialists in Greek philosophy and philosophers of language which will also be of interest to some linguists. (shrink)
H. L. A. Hart and the "Open Texture" of Language tries to clarify the writings of both Hart and Friedrich Waismann on "open texture". In Waismann's work, "open texture" referred to the potential vagueness of words under extreme (hypothetical) circumstances. Hart's use of the term was quite different, and his work has been misunderstood because those differences were underestimated. Hart should not be read as basing his argument for judicial discretion on the nature of language; primarily, he was putting forward (...) a policy argument for why rules should be applied in a way which would require that discretion. (shrink)
This article aims to disrupt received views about the significance of J. L. Austin's contribution to philosophy of language. Its focus is Austin's 1955 lectures How To Do Things With Words . Commentators on the lectures in both philosophical and literary-theoretical circles, despite conspicuous differences, tend to agree in attributing to Austin an assumption about the relation between literal meaning and truth, which is in fact his central critical target. The goal of the article is to correct this misunderstanding and (...) to show that Austin is deeply critical of a picture of correspondence between language and the world which nearly half a century after he delivered his lectures continues to structure philosophical discussions of language. (shrink)
Alice Crary has recently developed a radical reading of J. L. Austin's philosophy of language. The central contention of Crary's reading is that Austin gives convincing reasons to reject the idea that sentences have context-invariant literal meaning. While I am in sympathy with Crary about the continuing importance of Austin's work, and I think Crary's reading is deep and interesting, I do not think literal sentence meaning is one of Austin's targets, and the arguments that Crary attributes to Austin or (...) finds Austinian in spirit do not provide convincing reasons to reject literal sentence meaning. In this paper, I challenge Crary's reading of Austin and defend the idea of literal sentence meaning. (shrink)
In a recent issue of Philosophy East and West Douglas Berger defends a new reading of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XXIV : 18, arguing that most contemporary translators mistranslate the important term prajñaptir upādāya, misreading it as a compound indicating "dependent designation" or something of the sort, instead of taking it simply to mean "this notion, once acquired." He attributes this alleged error, pervasive in modern scholarship, to Candrakīrti, who, Berger correctly notes, argues for the interpretation he rejects.Berger's analysis, and the reading of (...) the text he suggests is grounded on that analysis, is insightful and fascinating, and certainly generates an understanding of Nāgārjuna's enterprise that is welcome .. (shrink)
Les philosophes du siècle des Lumières ont conçu le Progrès comme manifestation de la perfectibilité naturelle de l'humanité. Le XIXe siècle a vu se ternir cette image d'avenir sous l'effet de ruptures épistémologiques et de surprises techniques. Conséquences imprévisibles de l'invention et de l'emploi de la machine à vapeur, les principes de dégradation énergétique en physique, les analyses révolutionnaires des rapports d'inégalité socioéconomique dans les sociétés industrielles ont entraîné la dislocation d'une idée qui avait joué le rôle d'un principe de (...) conservation des valeurs. Chez Freud et chez Lévi-Strauss le principe de Carnot est devenu principe de jugement de l'histoire. The philosophers of Enlightenment conceived Progress as evidence of mankind's natural perfectibility. In the 19 th C. this image of the future was tarnished by abrupt epistemological changes and technical surprises. An unforeseen consequence of the invention and use of the steam engine was the breaking up of an idea that had acted as a principle for preserving values, caused by the principles of the dissipation of energy in physics and the revolutionary analyses of the relations of socioeconomic inequality in industrial societies. With Freud and Lévi-Strauss, Carnot's principle became the principle for judging history. (shrink)
Thomas L. Carson: Lying and Deception. Theory and Practice, Oxford Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s10677-011-9320-9 Authors Norbert Anwander, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Institut für Philosophie, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, Germany Journal Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Online ISSN 1572-8447 Print ISSN 1386-2820.
‘William L. Rowe on Philosophy of Religion’ edited by Nick Trakakis, collects 30 papers of William Rowe's important work in the philosophy of religion. I review this collection, and offer an objection of one of Rowe's arguments.
Insieme a John McDowell, Robert Brandom è uno dei filosofi emergenti della reazione al naturalismo filosofico; seguace Wilfrid Sellars, è l'autore americano che più si avvicina al dialogo con la filosofia continentale e propone una rivalutazione di Kant e Hegel nella filosofia analitica. Già allievo di Richard Rorty, Brandom è diventuo famoso con la pubblicazione di Making it Explicit. Questo ponderoso volume di 900 pagine non ha avuto però ancora una sufficiente attenzione nel dibattito filosofico italiano (a parte alcuni inteventi (...) pubblicati su Iride). Forse questo dipende in parte dalla peculiarità e difficoltà del suo approccio, in parte dalla mole stessa del citato volume. Anche per questo motivo Brandom ha presentato una serie di lezioni2 ove riprende i temi del libro maggiore e ne approfondisce alcune parti. In quanto segue si presentano i temi fondamentale di Making it Explicit, arricchiti con elementi presi dal nuovo approfondimento. (shrink)
Alison L. LaCroix is Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School, where she specializes in legal history, federalism, constitutional law and questions of jurisdiction. She has written a fine, scholarly volume on the intellectual origins of American federalism. LaCroix holds the JD degree (Yale, 1999) and a Ph.D. in history (Harvard, 2007). According to the author, to fully understand the origins of American federalism, we must look beyond the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and range over the (...) colonial, revolutionary, and founding periods including developments in the early republic. LaCroix questions both the idea that American federalism originated, all at once, at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and the idea that republican ideology (with its strong emphasis on legislative power) was the single dominant framework of eighteenth-century American political thought. Versions and elements of federalist or con-federative ideas were also long present and in a process of development. (shrink)
If philosophy and poetry are to illuminate each other, we should first understand their tendencies to mutual antipathy. Examining (and, where possible, correcting) mutual misapprehension is part of this task. J. L. Austin's remarks on poetry offer one such point of entry: they are often cited by poets and critics as an example of philosophy's blindness to poetry (I). These remarks are complex and their purpose obscure—more so than those who take exception to them usually allow or admit (II). But (...) it is reasonable to think that, for all his levity at their expense, what Austin offers poets is exemption from forms of commitment. Since such exemption is precisely what poets and critics have sought, this diagnosis is eirenic (III). This exemption has a price, but it may be affordable (IV). (shrink)
This paper aims at introducing a French audience to the Intelligent Design debate. It starts by reviewing recent attacks on any possibility of a rational account of theism in light of the contemporary theory of evolution. A section is devoted to outlining the genesis of the "wedge" strategy, to distinguish it from young earth creationism, and to highlight the questioning of evolution as our meta-narrative bearing on overall conceptions of the scientific endeavor. The arguments propounded by Behe are reviewed in (...) detail, as the example of blood coagulation as a purported irreducibly complex mechanism is contrasted to the question of system boundaries. Counter-arguments by Miller are reviewed, and a few bottom-line questions are directed to invite a further consideration of the type of engineering this could testify to. The concept of complex specified information is then presented, and contrasted to traditional and lingering axiomatic problems in the theory of probabilities. The problem of the recognition of an intrinsic pattern is also brought together with some work in recent philosophy of causation and explanation. The two opposing strategies, naturalistic evolutionism and intelligent design, are seen as caught in each other's rhetoric, and some probing is offered in the direction of a theory that could surpass those stalling factors. (shrink)
In Derrida's last book (posthumously published in 2006), L'animal que donc je suis, there is a kind of refrain: “il ne suffit pas de …” (it is not sufficient or enough to . . . ). Derrida utters this refrain in relation to all the discourses on animality and animal suffering found in the Western philosophical tradition. None of these discourses are sufficient. This last book revolves then around the idea of an insufficient (not enough) response. The idea of an (...) insufficient response is not restricted to the problem of animal suffering; it extends to what we must call, following Derrida, “the problem of the worst.” The worst is the end, in the sense of total violence or total suicide: apocalypse. In this essay, I have tried to construct the beginnings of a more sufficient response that urges us to move toward the least amount of violence towards all living beings, while recognizing nevertheless that even this response is not sufficient. The more sufficient response is based on Derrida's transformation of the concept of waiting into being late found in Aporias. This transformation is at the heart of Derrida's thought of the messianic. We are so late in relation to the problem of the apocalypse that we can no longer wait for someone else to come and save us. We are so late that we—there's no one else coming—must take action now. (shrink)
The thesis presents a development of J. L. Austin's analysis of truth and its accompanying analysis of sentence structure. This involves a discussion and refinement of Austin's notions of the demonstrative and descriptive conventions of language and of the demonstrative and descriptive devices of sentences. The main point of the thesis is that ordinary language must be treated as an historical phenomenon: one that has evolved its more complex features through a long series of variations upon a small number of (...) rudimentary conventions and locutions. The utility of Austin's analysis is shown to lie in the description that it provides of the functions of these rudimentary conventions and locutions. The analysis is used to illuminate a number of problematic sentences and expressions of ordinary language, including identity sentences, definite descriptions, existential sentences, and conditionals. (shrink)
This collection of articles pays homage to the creativity and scientific rigor Jerome Singer has brought to the study of consciousness and play. It will interest personality, social, clinical and developmental psychologists alike.
L. Albertazzi, G. J. van Tonder, and D. Vishwanath (eds): Perception Beyond Inference: The Information Content of Visual Processes Content Type Journal Article Pages 53-55 DOI 10.1007/s11023-011-9253-z Authors Lorenzo Magnani, Department of Philosophy and Computational Philosophy Laboratory, University of Pavia, Pavia, Italy Journal Minds and Machines Online ISSN 1572-8641 Print ISSN 0924-6495 Journal Volume Volume 22 Journal Issue Volume 22, Number 1.
John Searle défend l’idée d’un «Arrière-plan» de l’intentionnalité, c’est-à-dire le point de vue selon lequel il existe un ensemble de capacités mentales non représentationnelles (ou non intentionnelles) qui rendent possible toute forme d’intentionnalité (donc sans lesquelles il n’y aurait pas de croyances, de désirs, d’intentions, etc.). J’examine d’une part dans cet article ses raisons de croire qu’il existe des capacités non représentationnelles et, de l’autre, ses arguments à l’appui de la thèse — la plus importante à ses yeux — selon (...) laquelle un état intentionnel ne peut être l’état qu’il est qu’à la condition qu’un tel Arrière-plan existe.John Searle upholds the idea of a “background” of intentionality. In his view there is an ensemble of non-representational (or non-intentional) mental capacities that make every form of intentionality possible (that is to say, without these mental capacities there would not be any beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.). I examine both his reasons to believe that there are non-representational mental capacities and the arguments he gives in support of the most important claim (according to him) that an intentional state cannot be this particular state unless the said “background” exists. (shrink)
RÉSUMÉ: Cet article part des réflexions sur l'économie politique que Michel Foucault a présentées lors de ses cours au Collège de France dans les années 1977-1979 pour mettre en évidence l'originalité de sa réflexion sur le marché, entendu comme dispositif social de gouvernement des individus en vue d'assurer la sécurité des populations. Dans la deuxième partie, l'article propose un rapprochement de cette réflexion foucaldienne sur l'économie et celle de Max Weber en montrant que les techniques de soí développées par Foucault (...) sont des «méthodiques» et des formes de conduites de vie proches de cellesque Weber a étudiées, notamment dans ses travaux de sociologie de la religion. L'ensemble permet de dégager les pistes d'une histoire, encore inachevée, du comportement économique entendu comme une forme d'ascèse.ABSTRACT: This article deals with Michel Foucault's 1977-79 lectures on political economy. In the first part, we highlight his views on the market, which is equated to a social device instrumental in governing individuals so that they are induced to allow the ruler to reach his goal, which is providing security to the population. In the second part, we consider together Foucault's and Weber's views on the economy, since Foucault's concept of technique of the self is similar to Weber's concept of life conduct, which is central in his sociology of religion. This opens the way to a history of the modern economic behaviour considered as a form of ascetism. (shrink)
F. Bailey Norwood and Jayson L. Lusk: Compassion by the Pound: The Economics of Farm Animal Welfare Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-5 DOI 10.1007/s10806-012-9377-z Authors Paul B. Thompson, WK Kellogg Professor of Agricultural, Food and Community Ethics, Department of Philosophy, Michigan State University, 503 South Kedzie Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824-1032, USA Journal Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics Online ISSN 1573-322X Print ISSN 1187-7863.
Remodel[l]ing Reality is an inquiry into Wittgenstein's notion of uebersichtliche Darstellung and the phenomenon of installation in visual art. In a sense, both provide a perspicuous overview of a particular part of our complex world, but the nature of the overview differs. Although both generate knowledge, philosophy via the uebersichtliche Darstellung gives us a view of how things stand for us, while the installation shows an unexpected, exiting point of view. The obvious we tend to forget and the ambiguity of (...) reality are related to each other in a dynamic way. It is in this reflexive dynamics that we constantly remodel our reality. Tools we use are our creative abilities and our powers of imagination. In our choices and solutions we show which aspects of reality we find important and how we communicate these values. The outcome of this investigation is a new perspective on the art of installation and a new insight in Wittgenstein's notion of uebersichtliche Darstellung. Because of this combination, the book is itself an artwork: an InstallationPackage. The book is distributed by Ideabooks, Amsterdam. Isbn 978 90 804240 3 6. (shrink)
On assiste à un « surplace » de la recherche philosophique en Occident. L'importance de l'histoire, le caractère décisif de la culture, la dimension sociale de l'esprit, ne suscitent plus qu'un intérêt épisodique. On a oublié les apories de Kuhn. Américains et Occidentaux sont des solipsiste s qui font mine d'ignorer la formation historique de l'esprit, renouvelant l'oubli de Kant et Husserl qui n'avaient pas su prendre en compte le caractère contingent, changeant, collectif, fortement historicisé des compétences intellectuelles et cognitives. (...) Séparée des pratiques consensuelles, la science perd son sens. Il faut revenir au problème de l'individuation et reposer la question de l'acquisition de qualités uniques et pourtant générales qui font l'individualité. There is a general stagnation in western philosophical research. The importance of History, of Culture, the social nature of the Spirit, is of secondary interest, nowadays the meanest interest. What about the hard and sharp questions raised by Kuhn ? Americans or western nations are but solipsits, who get rid of the historical making of the spirit. To a certain extent, they keep on with Kant's or Husserl's tradition. None of them was in fact able to take care of historicism in the contingent and moving constitution of our intellectual capacities. In these conditions, no sense at all can be found in science. So, we must come back to the question of individuation and to these unique qualities of individuality, that is, at the same time, singularity and universality. (shrink)
In this paper, I present a new reading of Simone de Beauvoir’s first major work, L’Invitée ( She Came to Stay ), in order to reveal the text as a vital place of origin for feminist phenomenological philosophy. My reading of L’Invitée departs from most scholarly interpretations of the text in three notable respects: (1) it is inclusive of the “two unpublished chapters” that were excised from the original manuscript at the publisher’s request, (2) it takes seriously Beauvoir’s claim that (...) phenomenological philosophy is often better expressed in novels than essays or treatises, and (3) it views the novel’s main characters, Françoise and Xavière, as one woman who has multiple, contradictory, excessive selves. Thus approached, L’Invitée provides us with a thick description of one woman’s embodied consciousness and thereby shows us with specificity what a consciousness whose underlying structures reflect sexual difference looks like. This consciousness not only experiences itself as being both gendered, categorized, disciplined, and defined and in excess of these genders, categories, disciplines, and definitions at the same time, but also experiences its own self-relation through the presence of multiple selves who are each simultaneously attracted to and negating of the other. As such, the defining features of this consciousness involve experiences that I have respectively labeled “ontological multiplicity” and “auto-jealousy.”. (shrink)
Until recently, little was known of H.L.A. Hart’s private life. That has now changed with the publication of Nicola Lacey’s A Life of H.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream. Drawing on Hart’s notebooks and correspondence, Lacey paints an illuminating portrait of Hart, which reveals that despite his public success he struggled with internal perplexities, including his sexual orientation, Jewish identity, intellectual insecurity, and unconventional marriage. Yet, as critics have noted, the connection between these revelations and the development of (...) Hart’s ideas is unclear. Moreover, one cannot help but wonder whether by focusing on these aspects of Hart’s personal life, Lacey has missed an opportunity to explore certain basic questions about his jurisprudence and its link to wider intellectual currents. For example, linguistics, psychology, and the philosophy of language and mind are much different today than they were in the 1940s and 1950s, yet Lacey does not discuss how such familiar events as the overthrow of logical positivism, the demise of behaviorism, the rise of generative linguistics, or the broader cognitive revolution of which they were a part actually impacted Hart or should influence our understanding of his legacy. Surprisingly, none of these developments are taken up in this book, leading one to ponder the significance of their absence. (shrink)
Secondo un recente bilancio della filosofia del Novecento di Rossi e Viano, nel nostro secolo «il successo maggiore è toccato alle dottrine filosofiche che si sono proposte di offrire alternative alla conoscenza tecnico-scientifica e che sostengono la possibilità di alleggerire i vincoli che il sapere positivo porrebbe al modo di pensare e ai progetti di azione»2. Tali dottrine prospettano un ritorno all’antica metafisica, a cui «si ricorre non come a una forma di sapere sistematico, bensì come alla testimonianza di una (...) possibilità di pensare qualcosa che vada al di là del sapere positivo»3. Perciò il Novecento si è concluso con la vittoria, se non del «duro conservatorismo di Heidegger», almeno di «un più blando tradizionalismo, che si limita a sostenere il primato della cultura umanistica tradizionale rispetto alla cultura tecnico-scientifica»4. Per Rossi e Viano la filosofia del Novecento ha avuto questo esito poiché è risultata insostenibile la convinzione, diffusa nella filosofia analitica all’inizio degli anni Trenta, «che la filosofia avesse imboccato la strada giusta per inserirsi nel mondo del sapere scientifico specializzato»5. Dopo «che si era affermata la specializzazione del sapere, la filosofia aveva cercato di stabilire una posizione di dominio legandosi a quelle che erano sembrate le discipline titolari di un qualche primato: ora a quelle matematiche, ora a quelle naturalistiche, ora a quelle storiche»6. Essa, inoltre, aveva cercato di accreditare l’idea che l’analisi logica delle teorie scientifiche fosse comunque lo strumento più attendibile per fare filosofia. Questo tentativo della filosofia analitica, però, è fallito, e così nella cultura contemporanea è diventato chiaro che non «ci sono legami particolarmente stretti tra la filosofia e qualche scienza particolare»7. Insieme all’idea che esistesse un legame privilegiato tra la filosofia e qualche scienza particolare, «la cultura filosofica del Novecento respingeva anche l’idea che l’analisi logica delle teorie scientifiche fosse comunque lo strumento più attendibile per fare filosofia»8.. (shrink)
Au cours des années 1970 (qui furent, dans plusieurs pays, celles de la libéralisation de Vavortement), la question du statut de Vembryon humain fut surtout débattue en termes de libertés individuelles : droit des femmes à disposer d'elles-mêmes, vs. ‘droit à la vie' du fœtus caché dans le corps de sa mère. Dans les années 1980, avec l'application des techniques de procréation ‘artificielle' au traitement de la stérilité humaine, l'accent est mis sur une responsabilité collective à l'égard de l'embryon séparé, (...) conçu en éprouvette, mis au congélateur, convoité par la recherche lorsqu'il n'est pas rendu à un utérus maternel. « Il est urgent de déterminer le degré de sa protection juridique », dit l'Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe (Recommandation 1046, 1986). Mais il n'existe pas de consensus sur les fondements philosophiques d'une telle protection. Le but du présent article n'est pas d'ajouter une thèse de plus à une littérature internationale déjà considérable, mais de situer les positions et arguments en présence, pour éclairer un débat qui touche, entre autres, aux sources du respect dû à la personne humaine. The European Parliament has recently expressed the view that human embryos and fetuses are endowed with human dignity, and that a definition of the degree to which they should be protected by law is urgently needed (Recommendation 1046, 1986). There is however no consensus on the philosophical grounds for such a protection, or on the degree to which embryos and fetuses should be treated as persons. This paper contrasts the biological (natural) and ethical (cultural) criteria of person hood and their underlying ontologies, examines the arguments in favor of taking a pragmatic line rather trying to decide when human beings become persons, and suggests that the pragmatic attitude in fact implies a developmental ontology. (shrink)
This book presents a selection of essays by the Indian philosopher J.L. Mehta on the topics of hermeneutics and phenomenology containing many original ...
Dans les Recherches Logiques, Husserl a recours à un concept d'analyticité qui s'écarte des définitions kantiennes. En fait, pour le comprendre, il faut se plonger dans la tradition d'analyse logique autrichienne qui remonte à Bolzano. L'analyticité est ici une propriété formelle, qui s'illustre par la possibilité de la mise en variables de propositions, leur vérité étant maintenue. Husserl ne laisse toutefois pas la question dans l'état dans lequel Bolzano l'avait laissée : surgit la question propre aux Recherches Logiques, qui est (...) celle du sens et du statut du logique comme tel. In his Logical Investigations, Husserl uses a concept of « analyticity » that seems quite different from the Kantian one. Analyticity is defined as formal and by the possibility of regular variations, so as in mathematical equations which determine relations between variables. In that matter, Husserl is influenced by Bolzano and is much deeply connected with the Austrian tradition of logical studies than with the transcendental tradition of the German Idealism. But he deals also with the problem that Bolzano left unsolved : if analyticity in the « strict » sense means the logical rule, what does « logical » mean? (shrink)
In a message posted to one of the cognitive science discussion groups the author asked, to paraphrase roughly, what should be read to get an up-to-date account of research into color naming? My advice is (and was) to consider the two books under review here: C. L. Hardin and Luisa Maffis excellent collection of essays on color language research; Robert MacLaurys magnum opus on color naming and cognition.
Cette communication explorera la nature deleuzienne de l'ontologie présupposée par Foucault dans ses cours Sécurité, Territoire, Population et Naissance de la Biopolitique. L'objectif sera d'identifier certaines formules de Foucault qui font écho à un concept clé de Différence et Répétition: l'individuation comme intégration d'une multiplicité. Dans ces textes se trouveront pas mal d'éléments de l'ontologie deleuzienne: par exemple, le couple différentiation / différenciation; l'anti-essentialisme; et le champ différentiel, pré-individuel, problématique, ou virtuel d'où émergent, par l'auto-organisation, des individus actuels. Mais, on (...) verra aussi des difficultés conceptuelles, surtout dans sa notion de "possibilité," que subit Foucault dans quelques-unes de ses réflexions méthodologiques, difficultés qui émergent pour lui en faisant ses propres analyses de "la mise en intelligibilité en histoire" pendant qu'il présuppose l'ontologie deleuzienne. (shrink)
w a y s h a v e b e e n . W e a l l r e m e m b e r M a r x ' s p o l e m i c a g a i n s t P r o u d h o n , t h e Manifesto's critique of "historical action [yielding] to personal inventive action, historically created conditions of emancipation to fantastic ones, and the gradual spontaneous class (...) organizations of the proletariat to an organization of society specially contrived by these inventors" (Marx and Engels, 1986, 64), and the numerous other occasions when the fathers of "scientific socialism" went a f t e r t h e " u t o p i a n s . " I n general this Marxian aversion to drawing up blueprints has been healthy, fueled at least in part by a respect for the concrete specificity of the revolutionary situation and for the agents engaged in revolutionary activity: it is not the business of Marxist intellectuals to tell the agents of revolution how they are to construct their postrevolutionary economy. (shrink)
Changing the Wor(l)d draws on feminist publishing, postmodern theory and feminist autobiography to powerfully critique both liberal feminism and scholarship on the women's movement, arguing that both ignore feminism's unique contributions to social analysis and politics. These contributions recognize the power of discourse, the diversity of women's experiences, and the importance of changing the world through changing consciousness. Young critiques social movement theory and five key studies of the women's movement, arguing that gender oppression can be understood only in relation (...) to race, sexuality, class and ethnicity; and that feminist activism has always gone beyond the realm of public policy to emphasize improving women's circumstances through transforming discourse and consciousness. Young examines feminist discursive politics, critiques social science methodology, and proposes an alternative approach to understanding the women's movement. This approach explores feminist publishing and feminist autobiographical writing as examples of discursive activism with broadly subversive potential. (shrink)
Dans cet article, j’entreprends de clarifier le projet (frégéen) d’une logique de l’arithmétique -- tel qu’il a été discuté par Natorp et Rickert -- en distinguant trois questions directrices. Le nombre est-il un objet logique? L’arithmétique est-elle réductible à la logique? Est-il possible de déduire les opérations arithmétiques de lois purement logiques? Ma thèse est que la distinction rigoureuse de ces trois questions permet de lever une grande partie des obscurités qui affectent en généralle programme d’une logique de l’arithmétique. La (...) contribution néo-kantienne à ce programme se trouve du même coup éclairée d’une lumière nouvelle.In this article, I try to shed light on the (Fregean) project of a logic of arithmelic-as discussed by Natorp and Rickert-by outlining three main questions. Is the number a logical object? Is arithmetic reducible to logic? Is it possible to deduce the arithmetical operations from purely logical laws? I argue that rigorous distinction between these three questions makes it possible to elucidate many problems affecting the program of a logic of arithmetic. The Neo-Kantian contribution to this program is at the same time considered in a new light. (shrink)
Le but de l'article est de proposer de suivre en métaphysique la voie de l'analyse conceptuelle par intuition de cas possibles. Pour une part empirique et a posteriori, reposant sur des intuitions dont elle exploite autant les contradictions que les points communs, avant de les tester dans une perspective faillibiliste, l'analyse conceptuelle comporte aussi une partie a priori qu'elle élabore en recourant à la méthode des cas possibles, permettant ainsi de repenser les liens entre nécessité conceptuelle et nécessité métaphysique. Ainsi (...) entendue, la démarche renoue avec l'inspiration propre à la méthode scotiste des possibles-réels qui fut à l'origine de la constitution de la métaphysique comme science. The aim of the article is to propose to follow in metaphysics the view of conceptual analysis by intuition of possible cases. Partly empirical and a posteriori, based on intuitions whose contradictions it exploits as much as what they have in common, conceptual analysis also involves an a priori part, which it elaborates through the method of possible cases, thus bringing into a new light the links between conceptual necessity and metaphysical necessity. In that respect, it renews the Scotistic method of the real-possible, which was at the origin of the constitution of metaphysics as a science. (shrink)
: T. L. Short's Peirce's Theory of Signs offers a strong interpretation of semeiotic, advocating a developmental and naturalistic position. This commentary examines some of the main features of Short's approach, raising a number of critical questions concerning the growth of Peirce's thought and the problem of anthropomorphism. First, two possible weaknesses in Short's account of the development of semeiotic, connected to the treatment of the "New List of Categories" and the role of the index, are noted. Next, the menace (...) of anthropomorphism is placed in the context of Peirce's startling affirmation of this point of view. Finally, the article draws attention to Short's bold claim that Peirce's theory of signs needs to be modified in order to accommodate a plurality of final interpretants in view of varying purposes. (shrink)
Plusieurs auteurs se sont inspirés des thèses du deuxième Wittgenstein pour proposer une nouvelle approche en sciences sociales qui viserait la justification plutôt que l'explication de l'action. Sur la base d'une étude de trois types d'énoncés formulés grâce au langage de l'action (factuels, normatifs et attributifs d'états mentaux), cet article évalue les difficultés et possibilités d'une telle suggestion.
As a development of his former researches on speech – that he distinguishes from instituted language and that he identifies to thought – the author points out a special kind of fantasy, already observed by Husserl himself: the perceptive Phantasie. Analysed here as a form of transition from perception (Perzeption) to what is impossible to be represented (l’infigurable), this form of fantasy aims at what Winnicot understood as a transitional object. Preceding any intentional and even imaginary foundation (Stiftung), the perceptive (...) Phantasie is the very core of speech, that poetry allows us to see as the living form of transcendental interfacticity. The perceptive Phantasie is thus the concrete condition of the “reflexivity” of meaning, which is accomplished in speech by a mutual affectivity, perception nourishing itself from the virtual. (shrink)
Le rapport entre « conscience » et « identité » forme l'un des deux versants de la conception lockienne du sujet (l'autre étant constitué par la « propriété de soi-même »). La théorie lockienne repose sur la distinction du « mental » et du « verbal », et l'isolement du premier comme élément de la vérité. Elle suppose une reformulation du principe d'identité sous la forme d'une double négation inhérente à l'esprit (Mind) : il est impossible que l'homme ne sache (...) pas qu'il pense, ou pense sans penser. Enfin elle caractérise comme « intériorité » la différentielle de perception et de réflexion qui opère tout au long de l'expérience. Dès lors le temps intérieur peut être intellectuellement et moralement ressaisi dans l'unité de la « conscience de soi ». Consciousness and Personal Identity form together one half of Locke's theory of the Subject (the other half being « self-ownership »). First of all, « mental » and « verbal » propositions (viz. truths) must be clearly distinguished. The principle of identity has to be reformulated in logico-psychological terms, as a double negation: it is impossible for the Mind to think, without knowing that it thinks. Finally the difference of perception and reflexion, which operates throughout « experience », is called an « internal sense » or interiority. As a consequence, Locke was able to call « self-consciousness » the typical unity of morality and understanding which forms the internal « duration » of the Mind. (shrink)
Le jeune Heidegger, dont la lecture principale demeura pendant de longues années les Recherches logiques de Husserl, a consacré ses premiers travaux aux problèmes logiques. Sa Dissertation de 1914 analyse les théories du jugement de cinq logiciens contemporains, Wundt, Maier, Brentano, Marty et Lipps qui ont en commun de demeurer à l'intérieur du psychologisme, c'est-à-dire de considérer le jugement comme un acte psychique au lieu de le situer, comme le fait Husserl, dans la sphère logique du sens. C'est sur (...) cette notion de sens que le jeune Heidegger fait porter ses questions et c'est l'analyse de sa structure relationnelle qui lui permet, en s'appuyant sur la théorie de la validité de Lotze et à la suite de Lask et de sa Théorie du jugement de 1912, d'éclairer décisivement la nature proprement logique du jugement. The young Heidegger, whose main reading remained during many years Husserl's Logical Investigations, dedicated his first works to logical problems. His Dissertation (1914) analyses the theories of judgement of five contemporary logicians, Wundt, Maier, Brentano, Marty, and Lipps, who share the same psychologist attitude, which means that they consider judgment as a psychological act instead of situating it in the logical sphere of sense, as does Husserl. The young Heidegger concentrates his questions on this notion of sense and through the analysis of its relational structure, with the help of Lotze's theory of validity and in following the indications given by Lask in his book of 1912 on The Theory of Judgment, he undertakes a decisive elucidation of the properly logical nature of judgment. (shrink)
Cet article prend pour objet l'injonction à la commémoration collective dont les monuments dédiés aux soldats morts au combat portent témoignage. l'article retrace la manière dont cette injonction a pu revêtir une historicité caractéristique des Temps modernes. Ce travail vise à dégager l'arrière-plan duquel émerge la volonté de commémoration politique qu'affichent les monuments aux morts. Selon son argument principal, la fonctionnalisation politique et la démocratisation croissantes de la commémoration dont témoigne l'extension des monuments aux morts depuis la Révolution française n'ont (...) été rendues possibles que par un long processus de sécularisation. The theme of this article is the injunction to collective commemoration presented by monuments raised in honor soldiers killed in combat. This article examines the way in which this injunction displays an historical movement characteristic of Modern Times. It attempts to identity the historical basis from which emerged the will to political commemoration that the war monuments express. According to the argument adopted here, the growing political functionalization and democratization of commemoration, to which the great extension of war monuments since the French Revolution attests, become possible through a long process of secularization. (shrink)
Cet article poursuit un double objectif: premièrement, de montrer que, dans I’Hippias majeur de Platon, Hippias défend une ontologie matérialiste, et, deuxièmement, de définir la critique de cette ontologie matérialiste. Cette démonstration repose sur l’interprétation du passage qui se trouve en 300b4-301e3. Nous présenterons d’abord les limites des interprétations qu’en font P. Woodruff et I. Ludiam, pour ensuite définir le concept de matérialisme dans le contexte de la pensée ancienne (Démocrite) afin de dégager les traits spécifiques du matérialisme que Platon (...) prête aHippias. L’opposition entre Hippias et Socrate est enfait une opposition ontologique entre deux conceptions de l’unité : les unités corporelles élémentaires (Hippias) et l’«unité formelle» (Socrate).The aim of this article is twofold: first, to show that, in Plato’s Hippias Major, Hippias is the mouthpiece of a materialist ontology; second, to discuss the critique of this ontology. My argument is based on an interpretation of Hippias Major 300b4-301e3. I begin by revealing the shortcomings of P. Woodruff’s and I. Ludlam’s interpretations. Next, I define the concept of materialism as it was understood in ancient Greece (Democritus) in order to outline the specificity of Hippias’ materialism. Finally, I argue that the opposition between the two characters of the Hippias Major represents in fact an ontological opposition between two conceptions of what a unity is, i. e., Hippias’ elementary corporal unities and Socrates’ “formal unity.”. (shrink)
Une question commune à la sixième Recherche logique de Husserl et au Tractatus de Wittgenstein est la question du statut des équations mathématiques, et plus largement des jugements d’identité. Elle est de savoir si le mathématicien énonce des propositions, pourvues comme telles d’un caractère de vérité possible, ou au contraire de simples règles de substitution destinées au calcul. Telle que l’a formulée Frege, cette question peut se résumer ainsi: existe-t- il une connaissance mathématique? Sur ce point, la position de Husserl (...) peut être interprétée comme un moyen terme entre celle de Kant et celle de Wittgenstein. A question common to the sixth Logical Research of Husserl and to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is the question of the status of mathematical equations, and more broadly of judgements of identity. It is that of whether the mathematician expresses propositions, which as such bear a character of possible truth, or, on the contrary, simple rules of substitution useful for calculations. As formulated by Frege, this question can be summarized as follows: does mathematical knowledge exist? In reply to this question Husserl’s position may be interpreted as being midway between that of Kant and that of Wittgenstein. (Transl. by J. Dudley). (shrink)
Montaigne, no "De l'art de conferer", discute critérios que permitem distinguir os homens segundo suas capacidades (suffisances). A "maneira" de discursar ocupa o centro desta questão e entre suas qualidades se destaca a "ordem", que nos é apresentada, sobretudo, a partir dos desvios da "tolice" (sottise) e "obstinação" (opiniastreté), símbolos do dogmatismo e de uma errônea lide com os saberes que se apoiam na memória. Procura-se mostrar que a ordem se funda na assimilação e penetração do julgamento nas matérias que (...) garantem o nexo necessário para o desenvolvimento adequado da conversação (conference). Montaigne, in "De l'art de conferer", discusses the criteria to distinguish men according to their capabilities (suffisances). The "manner" of discussing is central to this issue and among its qualities "order" distinguishes itself. The "order" is presented to us by the exposition of its deviations: foolishness ("sottise") and obstinacy ("opiniastreté"). These inadequacies represent both dogmatism and an erroneous way of using knowledge based on memory. We intend to show how order is founded on a kind of judgment which assimilates and penetrates matters and subjects - being it the only way to assure the necessary connection to adequately develop the conversation ("conference"). (shrink)
RÉSUMÉ: Cet article examine la thèse, soutenue récemment par Terry Nardin, Kok-Chor Tan et Carla Bagnoli, selon laquelle l'intervention humanitaire devrait être considérée, non plus comme un devoir imparfait (un devoir d'assistance aux victimes de crimes contre l'humanite laissé à la discrétion des membres de la communauté internationale), mais, les conditions de permissivité étant satisfaites, comme un devoir parfait, c'est-à-dire une obligation inconditionnelle réclamée par la justice. Après avoir exposé les raisons pour lesquelles il convient de supporter une teIle position, (...) il met néanmoins en évidence certaines des difficultés qui s'y rattachent et tente de leur apporter des éléments de réponse.ABSTRACT: This article examines the claim recently put forward by Terry Nardin, Kok-Chor Tan, and Carla Bagnoli that humanitarian intervention ought to be conceived, not as an imperfect duty (a duty of assistance to the victims of crimes against humanity left to the discretion of the members of the international community), but-assuming that the permissibility conditions have been satisfied-as a perject duty (an unconditional obligation demanded by justice). After explaining why such a position can be considered as legitimate, it underlines some of its difficulties and provides the elements of a response in order to overcome them. (shrink)
Attribué à Brandon Carter, l' argument de l'Apocalypse Doomsday Argument , soit DA, dans ce qui suit) a été décrit par John Leslie (1992). On peut formuler ainsi cet argument. Soit A l'événement: l'Apocalypse se produira avant l'an 2150 ; et B l'événement: l'Apocalypse ne se produira pas avant 2150 . Soit également Z l'événement: j'ai connu les années 1990 . On peut par ailleurs estimer à 40 milliards le nombre d'humains ayant existé depuis la naissance de l'humanité, jusqu'à notre (...) époque: soit H1996 un tel nombre. On peut ainsi admettre, de manière raisonnable, qu'un humain sur dix, dans le cas de l'événement.. (shrink)
Cet article propose une nouvelle interprétation de la seconde partie du Parménide de Platon. L'opposition entre l'un et les plusieurs, qui constitue l'objet de l'exercice dialectique suggéré par Parménide, reproduit et illustre l'opposition ontologique entre les idées et les choses empiriques à laquelle était consacrée l'analyse de la première partie du dialogue. L'un (τò Є˵v) représente en effet chaque idée (et le monde des idées dans son ensemble), tandis que les plusieurs (xà πολλά) représentent l'infinie multiplicité des choses empiriques en (...) devenir qui participent des idées. This article advances a new interpretation of the second part of Plato's Parmenides. The opposition between the one and the many, which is the object of the dialectical exercise suggested by Parmenides, reproduces and develops the ontological opposition between the ideas and the empirical things to which the analysis carried out in the first part of the dialogue was dedicated. In fact, the one (xò εν) represents every idea (and the world of ideas in its totality), while the many (xà πολλά) represent the infinite multiplicity of the empirical things of the world of becoming which participate in ideas. (shrink)
The release of Stéphane Madelrieux's William James, L'attitude empiriste (William James, The Empiricist Stance) is excellent news indeed for French James studies: it is the first comprehensive study of James's works in French. It will certainly prove to be a reference for James studies and empiricist studies in general.James was introduced quite early in France, and although there are a number of translations at hand,1 as well as two books by David Lapoujade,2 a comprehensive monograph was still lacking. Madelrieux's book (...) is, from this standpoint, a remarkable achievement. Massive problems, such as the relationship between James's philosophy and his psychology, between his naturalist approach to action and his .. (shrink)
Michel Morange: La vie, l’évolution et l’histoire Content Type Journal Article Category Book Notice Pages 1-2 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9595-4 Authors Mathias Grote, Institut für Philosophie, Literatur- Wissenschafts- und Technikgeschichte, Technische Universität Berlin, Straße des 17. Juni 135, 10623 Berlin, Germany Pierre-Olivier Méthot, ESRC Centre for Genomics and Society (Egenis), University of Exeter, Byrne House, St German’s Road, Exeter, EX4 4PJ UK Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
Le projet d'E. Lévinas — manifester l'intelligibilité de la transcendance — le conduit à rencontrer, comme une figure exemplaire, l'expression cartésienne de l'extérionté, le thème de l'idée de l'infini. Jusqu'où va cette similitude ? Selon Lévinas, la responsabilité — pour autrui — inscrit déjà la transcendance, comme relation avec un au-delà, dans l'immanence à soi de la conscience, en tant que son en deçà, sa condition. « Par suite, l'idée de l'infini est le mode d'être, l'infinition même de l'infini ». (...) Ici apparaît la divergence : le substantialisme cartésien ne permet pas d'affirmer avec Lévinas que : « Il n'y a pas d'idée de Dieu ou Dieu est sa propre idée ». E. Lévinas' philosophical attempt to make clear the intelligibility of transcendence leads him to Descartes' version of the concept of metaphysical exteriority, i.e. to his theme of the idea of the infinite. How far does this resemblance reach ? According to Lévinas, the responsibility — for — others already places transcendence, as a relation with a beyond, within the immanence in oneself which characterizes consciousness, as its condition. Consequently, « the idea of infinite is the mode, of existence, the infinition itself of the infinite ». Here, the difference points out : cartesian substantialism does not allow to assert, as Lévinas does, that « either there is no idea of God, or God is the idea of himself ». (shrink)
: According to T.L. Short, Peirce's early thought-sign account of semeiotic engenders fatal flaws. On the one hand, it entails an infinite regressus of representation that cannot feasibly explain the connection between signs and objects and, on the other, an infinite progressus, leaving Peirce's theory without the wherewithal to account for the sign's meaning and significance. According to Short, Peirce overcomes the first flaw through the robust development of the notion of the index and the concept of collateral experience. The (...) second flaw is overcome through the pragmatic theory of meaning, connected as it is to the notion of purpose and, ultimately, a complex theory of teleology. My commentary focuses primarily on Short's important analysis of Peirce's teleology. I argue that he is successful in giving a plausible, naturalistic account of Peirce's theory without straying from the spirit of Peirce's systematic thought. Although, in my view, the book is the best account of Peirce's semiotic grammar in print, it fails to give a sufficient systematic analysis of the other two branches of Peirce's semeiotic—critical logic and formal rhetoric. (shrink)
A play's text is nearly all talk, and in the performance of a play the physical activity is sparse and exceedingly limited. Used of a play, the term ‘action’ does not mean what it normally means. Its true meaning is illuminated by reference to J. L. Austin and his doctrine of speech-acts. Dramatic action is, for the most part, speech-action. And a skilful manipulation of speech-acts enables the gifted dramatist not only to tell a story but to communicate what is (...) going on below the surface. (shrink)
T. L. S. Sprigge produced an eclectic yet highly original system of metaphysics and ethics, a synthesis of panpsychism, absolute idealism, and utilitarianism, at a time in which orthodox analytical philosophy could only view this system as an anachronism of the nineteenth century. His critics claim that his philosophy has only historical interest to a small group of specialists in the relatively dormant tradition of British Idealism, that an attempt to defend his view of consciousness is a hopeless nonstarter, and (...) that his Spinozistic monism can have no relevance in our intellectual culture.1 Yet others have defended Sprigge as the "most independent of thinkers within the field of metaphysics" and salute him as "a .. (shrink)
Nous distinguons deux types d'anaphores en montrant que la comprehension des relations à longue distance met en jeu plusieurs propriétés de la grammaire comme l'association, ou non, avec un rôle thématique, ou à une position argumentale, et montrons comment les mécanismes mis en jeu sont universels - et ont des conséquences sur l'architecture de la grammaire (sur la définition de la notion de c-commande par exemple). L'article montre en particulier qu'il ne peut y avoir de réciproque ou de clitique lié (...) a longue distance. (shrink)
Si la modernité consiste à trouver le nouveau radical, la fin de la postmodernité ç' est pas la sortie de l'art, dans la culture de masse, le kitsch ou le silence mais bien le moment où la modernité trouve ses marges, repère la lisière de ses différences. La tâche de la pensée ne consiste pas à désespérer de l'art ou de la nouveauté mais à identifier les lieux et les fins de la différence dans ce que l'on peut nommer une (...) « en-différence » (in-difference) qui n'a rien de négatif. Ce que montre une série d'exemples artistiques tirés de la production contemporaine, y compris télévisée. If modernity can be said to be an attempt at discovering a radical new thing in art, the end (the ends) of post-modernity is by no means to absorb art into mass culture, kitsch or silence, but the moment when modernity can lay out its margins, and identify its differences. Modernity is in the process of achieving its postmodern ends when it manages to overcome hopelessness and looks upon a non-negative in-difference. Some examples, particularly chosen in contemporary productions for the cinema or television, can make such a doctrine convincing. (shrink)
Capitolo I Il rispetto e l'ideale morale 1.1. Angeli, bruti e agenti 1.2. Il rispetto dell'altro 1.3. Il rispetto di sé 1.4. Auto−riflessione e auto−legislazione 1.5. Autonomia e individualità 1.6. Il rispetto e l'attenzione 1.7. Il rispetto e l'amore..
L'étude entend montrer que, si le temps est finalement unique, l'espace, lui, est originellement (et non du fait de la constitution de l'être-au-monde) multiple. Une analyse d'un passage du Timée où la Chôra est dite tithênê (nourrice) permet d'asseoir une interprétation de la différence foncière entre espace et lieu. Le lieu a progressivement disparu pour s'absorber dans l'espace neutre qui traduit homologiquement l'infinité divine ou pour s'atténuer dans le site. Il est difficile de trouver une analyse adéquate du lieu depuis (...) la mort de Leibniz (1916) jusqu'à la thèse de Bergson en latin sur la notion aristotélicienne de lieu. This study aims at making clear that, if, on the one hand, time is finally unique, while, on the other hand, we can say that space is in itself, and not for transcendantal reasons (the constitution of human subjectivity), a many-fold entity. By considering with great accuracy Plato's Timæus, where topos as chôra appears as tithênê (a nurse), we are able to interpret the very real distinction between space and place. Place has progressively disappeared, being absorbed in this homology of God's infinite, which is indeed Newton's neutral space, or at least being weakened in « site » (Ort). We will hardly find, between Leibniz' death and Bergson's latin thesis on aristotelician conception of topos, one correct study about place. (shrink)
Le but de cet article est de décrire le point de vue d?Henri Poincaré sur l'axiome du choix, dont 1?explication par Zermelo en 1904, déclencha une vive polémique. Agitant le monde mathématique de l'époque, cette polémique avait ses racines dans la diversité des conceptions philosophiques que les mathématiciens avaient sur les mathématiques. Poincaré avait une position originale; quelques lettres qu?il écrivit à Zermelo (1906?1907), ainsi que les articles publiés à la même époques dans la Revue de métaphysique et morale, éclairent (...) ce point de vue. The aim of this paper is to describe the views of Henri Poincaré concerning axiom of choice, of which the statement by Zermelo in 1904 launched a sharp polemic. Shaking the mathematical society of the time, this controversy had its roots into the diversity of philosophical conceptions that mathematicians held about mathematics. Poincaré had a particular point of view; a few letters from him to Zermelo (1906?1907), together with papers published in Revue de métaphysique et morale at the same time, throw light on this view. (shrink)
Descartes ne joue pas, dans la pensée de Heidegger, un rôle limité à l'interprétation de l'histoire de la philosophie. Lorsque Sein und Zeit entreprend de déterminer le mode d'être propre et irréductible du Dasein, Heidegger doit entrer en confrontation avec certes Husserl, mais surtout, par-delà la « conscience » husserlienne, avec Descartes lui-même. Car l'ennemi mortel du Dasein, cest l'ego du cogito. Dans quelle mesure cette rivalité n'induit-elle pas aussi une similitude? Die Rolle, die Descartes in dem Denken von Heidegger (...) spielt, darf nicht in dem Feld seiner Deutung der Geschichte der Philosophie eng begrenztwerden. Denn, als Sein und Zeit eine Bestimmung der eigentümlicheigentlichen Seinsweise des Daseins hervorzubringen unternimmt, setzt die « Destruktion der Geschichte der Ontologie » eine Auseinanderstzung nicht nur mit Husserl, sondern auch, über Husserl hinaus, gerade mit Descartes vor. Der Todfeind des Daseins ist das ego, das aus dem cogito stammt. Inwiefern aber diese ständige Gegenüberstellung eine tiefe Nachahmung hinweise ? (shrink)
La discussion sur l'authenticité du deuxième livre de la Métaphysique d'Aristote (Petit Alpha), qui dure depuis un millénaire, a pour origine une scholie qui se trouve dans le Parisinus gr. 1853 (Xe siècle) à la jonction du premier et du deuxième livre. Or, cette scholie a été copiée par la même main que celle qui a ajouté une scholie d'un contenu comparable à la fin de la Métaphysique de Théophraste. Ce fait était passé inaperçu, parce que ce scribe a utilisé (...) différentes écritures: droite ou penchée, calligraphique ou cursive. L'ensemble des témoignages et indices déjà examinés par Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem, d'une part, et par Enrico Berti, d'autre part, est analysé et réinterprété à la lumière de cette nouvelle information, qui permet d'établir que c'est le premier livre de la Métaphysique, et non le deuxième, qui était attribué par certains à Pasiclès de Rhodes, comme en témoignait déjà Asclépios. Le contenu et la formulation très proches des deux scholies permettent de penser qu'elles viennent d'un même érudit: à l'aide, notamment, des commentaires d'Alexandre et d'Asclépios à la Métaphysique d'Aristote, de l'étude de Nicolas de Damas ou des catalogues d'Hermippe et d'Andronicos, il a préparé une 'édition' d'Aristote destinée à devenir un modèle de référence. Dans la tradition latine, Grand Alpha a été accidentellement attribué à Théophraste à cause de la seconde scholie. Mais la discussion dont témoigne la première scholie a pu également être provoquée dès l'origine par celle que rapporte la seconde scholie: la Métaphysique de Théophraste avait probablement été transmise comme un traité aristotélicien, jusqu'à ce que Nicolas de Damas en restitue la paternité à Théophraste; par suite, l'authenticité d'autres livres du corpus aristotélicien a pu également être mise en doute, mais parce qu'ils posaient des problèmes d'ordre éditorial, il y a deux millénaires déjà. (shrink)
