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  1. Teed Rockwell, A Defense of Emergent Downward Causation.
    At least one of my professors told me that in order to write a good philosophy paper, one should always try to defend as little territory as possible. The danger of this advice is that although it may make one's points defensible, it may also make them not worth defending. In order to avoid both of these extremes, I am going to defend a relatively modest claim, which appears to be necessary but not sufficient for another more ambitious claim, which (...)
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  2. Teed Rockwell, Commentary by Bernard J. Baars.
    It is remarkable how similar today's mind-body debates are to the philosophical critiques of biological science, such as Henri Bergson's Vitalism at the turn of the last century. Philosophers like Bergson became famous arguing that science could never account for life. One reason was that living creatures could not be decomposed into fundamental units, in spite of the empirical finding that all animate things consist of basic cells with remarkably general properties in a bewildering profusion of variation. Today we know (...)
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  3. Teed Rockwell, Commentary on a Hard Problem Thought Experiment.
    In the seventh paragraph of the post, you say "This question [which machine, if any or both, is conscious/] seems to be in principle unfalsifiable, and yet genuinely meaningful." (I'm assuming that you mean that any answer to it is unfalsifiable.) My neo-Carnapian intuitions diagnoses the problem right at this point. Forget about attributions of meaningless and all that stuff. Replace it in your statement with more pragmatically-oriented evaluative notions: theoretically fruitless, arbitray without even being helpful for any theoretical, experimental, (...)
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  4. Teed Rockwell, Commentary on "the Modularity of Dynamic Systems".
    1. Throughout the paper, and especially in the section called "LISP vs. DST", I worried that there was not enough focus on EXPLANATION. For the real question, it seems to me, is not whether some dynamical system can implement human cognition, but whether the dynamical description of the system is more explanatorily potent than a computational/representational one. Thus we know, for example, that a purely physical specification can fix a system capable of computing any LISP function. But from this it (...)
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  5. Teed Rockwell, From: Elizabeth Minnich.
    I should say, before beginning, that I am hearing what you say about Rorty now from the perspective on his work I have (for the time being, at least) as a result of having heard a working paper he presented to the scholars’ workshop of which I was a member at The Getty this winter, and then participating with him in a 4-hour discussion (and following small dinner gathering). I have also recently read his curious rather autobiographical essay, "Trotsky and (...)
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  6. Teed Rockwell, Reply to Baars.
    My claim that Skinner believed in psychological atoms is actually strengthened by Baars' remark that Skinner's behaviorist atoms could take a variety of physical forms. ( "A rat in a box could depress the bar by sitting on it, by using its paws, or biting it: these physically different responses were functionally equivalent operant behaviors.") Baars is correct that Pavlov, unlike Skinner, thought that psychological atoms were identical to certain physiological items. But Skinner, as a non-reductive (...)
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  7. Teed Rockwell, Reply to Clark and Van Gelder.
    Clark ends his appendix with a description of what he calls "dynamic computationalism", which he describes as an interesting hybrid between DST and GOFAI. My 'horseLISP" example could be described as an example of dynamic computationalism. It is clearly not as eliminativist as Van Gelder's computational governor example, for I am trying to come up with something like identities between computational entities and dynamic ones. Thus unlike other dynamicists, I am not doing what Clark calls "embracing a different vocabulary for (...)
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  8. Teed Rockwell, Reply to Commentaries on Thought Experiment.
    He describes his position as "neo-Carnapian", i.e. he is claiming that even if the question is meaningful, that doesn't mean it's worth looking into. He's probably right, in the sense that anyone can be right about a personal evaluative choice. And until I started questioning the belief that there is only one kind of physical process that could embody consciousness, I felt the same way myself. But the point about this thought experiment is that the current state of cognitive science (...)
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  9. Teed Rockwell, Some Different Ways to Think.
    Daniel Dennett has offered a helpful framework in which to consider the evolution of mind, calling it "the tower of generate and test" (1995, 1996). On the bottom of the tower there are "Darwinian creatures," whose patterns of behavior result from the effects of natural selection alone. Next come "Skinnerian creatures," whose behaviors continue to be modified during their individual lifetimes by trial, reward and punishment. Third are "Popperian creatures," capable of learning, as well, by trying things out in their (...)
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  10. Teed Rockwell, The Effects of Atomistic Ontology on the History of Psychology.
    _This article articulates the presuppositions that psychology inherited from logical positivism, and how_ _those presuppositions effected the interpretation of data and research procedures. Despite the efforts of_ _Wundt, his most well known disciples, Titchener and Külpe, embraced an atomistic view of experience which_ _was at_ _least partly responsible for many of their failures. When the behaviorists rejected the_ _introspectionism of Titchener and Külpe, they kept their atomism, using the reflex_.
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  11. Teed Rockwell, The Hard Problem is Dead: Long Live the Hard Problem.
    I have assumed that consciousness exists, and that to redefine the problem as that of explaining how certain cognitive and behavioral functions are performed is unacceptable. . . .Like many people (materialists and dualists alike), I find this premise obvious, although I can no more "prove" it than I can prove that I am conscious. . . .there is no denying that such arguments - on either side - ultimately come down to a bedrock of intuition at some point. (Chalmers (...)
     
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  12. Teed Rockwell, The Varieties of Cognitive Experience.
    I am grateful to Markate Daly for forcing me to clarify my concept of the relationship between experience and know-how. She may be correct in saying that "None of the passive endurings and sufferings, loves, enjoyments and imaginings of Dewey's conception can be characterized as a part of 'knowing how' as it is currently understood." But I think that there is a similarity between passive experience and active coping that distinguishes them both from the allegedly "objective" sense data that Dewey (...)
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  13. Teed Rockwell, Unknown.
    After reading this paper, Richard Rorty sent the following comment: Doubtless in some sense I am doing "epistemology" and for all I know the name will survive as that of something which has little to do with Kant. But I am not convinced that philosophers are making themselves as useful to cognitive science as they claim, or that cognitive science is more than an awkward place-holder for neurology. My hunch is that when neurology comes into its own, notions like "cognition" (...)
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  14. Teed Rockwell (2013). Mind or Mechanism: Which Came First? In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. 243--258.
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  15. Teed Rockwell (2012). Rorty, Putnam, and the Pragmatist View of Epistemology and Metaphysics. Education and Culture 19 (1):3.
  16. Teed Rockwell (2011). Beyond Eliminative Materialism: Some Unnoticed Implications of Churchland's Pragmatic Pluralism. Contemporary Pragmatism 8 (1):173-189.
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  17. Teed Rockwell (2010). Extended Cognition and Intrinsic Properties. Philosophical Psychology 23 (6):741-757.
    The hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) has been criticized as committing what is called the coupling?constitution fallacy, but it is the critic's use of this concept which is fallacious. It is true that there is no reason to deny that the line between the self and the world should be drawn at the skull and/or the skin. But the data used to support HEC reveal that there was never a good enough reason to draw the line there in the first (...)
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  18. Teed Rockwell (2009). Minds, Intrinsic Properties, and Madhyamaka Buddhism. Zygon 44 (3):659-674.
    Certain philosophers and scientists have noticed that there are data that do not seem to fit with the traditional view known as the Mind/Brain Identity theory (MBI). This has inspired a new theory about the mind known as the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC). Now there is a growing controversy over whether these data actually require extending the mind out beyond the brain. Such arguments, despite their empirical diversity, have an underlying form. They all are disputes over where to draw (...)
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  19. Teed Rockwell (2009). No Gaps, No God? Philosophy and Theology 21 (1/2):129-153.
    Darwinian atheists ridicule the “God of the Gaps” argument, claiming that it is theology and/or metaphysics masquerading as science.This is true as far as it goes, but Darwinian atheism relies on an argument which is equally metaphysical, which I call the “No Gaps,No God” argument. This atheist argument is metaphysical because it relies on a kind of conceptual necessity, rather than scientificobservations or experiments. “No Gaps No God” is a much better metaphysical argument than “God of the Gaps,” because the (...)
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  20. Teed Rockwell (2008). Processes and Particles. Philosophical Topics 36 (1):239-258.
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  21. Teed Rockwell (2005). Attractor Spaces as Modules: A Semi-Eliminative Reduction of Symbolic AI to Dynamic Systems Theory. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 15 (1):23-55.
    I propose a semi-eliminative reduction of Fodors concept of module to the concept of attractor basin which is used in Cognitive Dynamic Systems Theory (DST). I show how attractor basins perform the same explanatory function as modules in several DST based research program. Attractor basins in some organic dynamic systems have even been able to perform cognitive functions which are equivalent to the If/Then/Else loop in the computer language LISP. I suggest directions for future research programs which could find similar (...)
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  22. Axel Dietrich, Christopher Gauker, Noel Hendrickson, Jon Kass, Kenneth Livingston, Dan Lloyd, Peter Mandik, Katie McGovern, Thomas Polger & Teed Rockwell (2003). In Addition to Editorial Board Members, the Editors of Brain and Mind Often Call on External Reviewers to Referee Submitted Manuscripts. For Volume 4, the Following Philosophers and Scientists Lent Their Expertise and Time to Referee Papers: Anthony Chemero. Brain and Mind 4 (399).
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  23. Teed Rockwell (2001). Experience and Sensation: Sellars and Dewey on the Non-Cognitive Aspects of Mental Life. Education and Culture (Winter) 17 (1):3.
    Sellars and Dewey each isolated and critiqued different aspects of the atomistic epistemology of the logical positivists: Dewey labeled his target "Sensationalistic Empiricism", and Sellars labeled his "the Myth of the Given." The main theme of this paper will be the similarity and differences in their responses to this kind of philosophy, and how both responses can be clarified and strengthened by considering recent discoveries in Cognitive Neuroscience. What we have recently learned about neural architecture accounts for a distinction between (...)
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  24. Teed Rockwell (1998). The Modularity of Dynamic Systems. Colloquia Manilana 6.
    To some degree, Fodor's claim that Cognitive science divides the mind into modules tells us more about the minds doing the studying than the mind being studied. The knowledge game is played by analyzing an object of study into parts, and then figuring out how those parts are related to each other. This is the method regardless of whether the object being studied is a mind or a solar system. If a module is just another name for a part, then (...)
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  25. Teed Rockwell (1997). Global Workspace or Pandemonium? Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4):334-337.
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  26. Teed Rockwell (1996). Awareness, Mental Phenomena, and Consciousness: A Synthesis of Dennett and Rosenthal. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):463-76.
  27. Teed Rockwell, Beyond Eliminative Materialism: Some Unnoticed Implications of Paul Churchland's Pragmatic Pluralism.
    Paul Churchland's epistemology contains a tension between two positions, which I will call pragmatic pluralism and eliminative materialism. Pragmatic pluralism became predominant as Churchland's epistemology became more neurocomputationally inspired, which saved him from the skepticism implicit in certain passages of the theory of reduction he outlined in Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. However, once he replaces eliminativism with a neurologically inspired pragmatic pluralism, Churchland 1) cannot claim that folk psychology might be a false theory, in any significant sense (...)
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