Search results for 'Teleosemantics' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Neil Sinclair (2012). Metaethics, Teleosemantics and the Function of Moral Judgements. Biology and Philosophy 27 (5):639-662.score: 24.0
    This paper applies the theory of teleosemantics to the issue of moral content. Two versions of teleosemantics are distinguished: input-based and output-based. It is argued that applying either to the case of moral judgements generates the conclusion that such judgements have both descriptive (belief-like) and directive (desire-like) content, intimately entwined. This conclusion directly validates neither descriptivism nor expressivism, but the application of teleosemantics to moral content does leave the descriptivist with explanatory challenges which the expressivist does not (...)
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  2. Peter Schulte (2012). How Frogs See the World: Putting Millikan's Teleosemantics to the Test. Philosophia 40 (3):483-496.score: 24.0
    How do frogs represent their prey? This question has been the focus of many debates among proponents of naturalistic theories of content, especially among proponents of teleosemantics. This is because alternative versions of the teleosemantic approach have different implications for the content of frog representations, and it is still controversial which of these content ascriptions (if any) is the most adequate. Theorists often appeal to intuitions here, but this is a dubious strategy. In this paper, I suggest an alternative, (...)
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  3. Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.) (2006). Teleosemantics: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Clarendon Press.score: 24.0
    Teleosemantics seeks to explain meaning and other intentional phenomena in terms of their function in the life of the species. This volume of new essays from an impressive line-up of well-known contributors offers a valuable summary of the current state of the teleosemantics debate.
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  4. Brian Leahy (2013). Can Teleosemantics Deflect the EAAN? Philosophia 41 (1):221-238.score: 24.0
    Alvin Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism aims to show that the conjunction of contemporary evolutionary theory (E) with the claim that there is no God (N) cannot be rationally accepted. Where R is the claim that our cognitive faculties are reliable, the argument is: The probability of R given N and E is low or inscrutable.Anyone who sees (1) and accepts (N&E) has a defeater for R, and this defeater cannot be defeated or deflected.Anyone who has an undefeated, undeflected defeater (...)
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  5. Bence Nanay (forthcoming). Teleosemantics Without Etiology. Philosophy of Science.score: 24.0
    The aim of teleosemantics is to give a scientifically respectable, or ‘naturalistic’ theory of mental content. In the debates surrounding the scope and merits of teleosemantics a lot has been said about the concept of indication (or carrying information). The aim of this paper is to focus on the other key concept of teleosemantics: biological function. It has been universally accepted in the teleosemantics literature that the account of biological function one should use to flesh out (...)
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  6. Manolo Martinez (2013). Teleosemantics and Productivity. Philosophical Psychology 26 (1):47-68.score: 22.0
    There has been much discussion of so-called teleosemantic approaches to the naturalization of content. Such discussion, though, has been largely confined to simple, innate mental states with contents such as ?There is a fly here.? Even assuming we can solve the issues that crop up at this stage, an account of the content of human mental states will not get too far without an account of productivity: the ability to entertain indefinitely many thoughts. The best-known teleosemantic theory, Millikan's biosemantics, offers (...)
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  7. Marshall Abrams (2005). Teleosemantics Without Natural Selection. Biology and Philosophy 20 (1):97-116.score: 21.0
    Ruth Millikan and others advocate theories which attempt to naturalize wide mental content (e.g. beliefs.
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  8. Richard Joyce (2002). Moral Realism and Teleosemantics. Biology and Philosophy 16 (5):723-31.score: 21.0
    In a recent article, William F. Harms (2000) argues in a novel way for a form of moral realism. He does not actually argue that moral realism is true, but rather that if morality is the product of natural selection.
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  9. Peter Godfrey-Smith (2004). Mental Representation, Naturalism, and Teleosemantics. In David Papineau & Graham MacDonald (eds.), Teleosemantics: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.score: 21.0
    The "teleosemantic" program is part of the attempt to give a naturalistic explanation of the semantic properties of mental representations. The aim is to show how the internal states of a wholly physical agent could, as a matter of objective fact, represent the world beyond them. The most popular approach to solving this problem has been to use concepts of physical correlation with some kinship to those employed in information theory (Dretske 1981, 1988; Fodor 1987, 1990). Teleosemantics, which tries (...)
     
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  10. Carolyn Price (2014). Teleosemantics Re-Examined: Content, Explanation and Norms. Biology and Philosophy 29 (4):587-596.score: 21.0
    This essay reviews a collection of thirteen critical essays on the work of Ruth Millikan. The collection covers a broad range of her work, focusing in particular on her account of simple intentionality, her theory of concepts and her metaphysical views. I highlight and briefly discuss three issues that crop up repeatedly though the collection: (1) Millikan’s externalism (and in particular, her emphasis on how intentional states are used, rather than how they are produced); (2) the nature of intentional explanation; (...)
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  11. Fred Dretske (2006). Representation, Teleosemantics, and the Problem of Self-Knowledge. In Graham F. Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
  12. Ruth G. Millikan (2007). An Input Condition for Teleosemantics? Reply to Shea (and Godfrey-Smith). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):436-455.score: 18.0
    In his essay "Consumers Need Information: Supplementing Teleosemantics with an Input Condition" (this issue) Nicholas Shea argues, with support from the work of Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996), that teleosemantics, as David Papinau and I have articulated it, cannot explain why "content attribution can be used to explain successful behavior." This failure is said to result from defining the intentional contents of representations by reference merely to historically normal conditions for success of their "outputs," that is, of their uses by (...)
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  13. Nicholas Shea (2007). Consumers Need Information: Supplementing Teleosemantics with an Input Condition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):404-435.score: 18.0
    The success of a piece of behaviour is often explained by its being caused by a true representation (similarly, failure falsity). In some simple organisms, success is just survival and reproduction. Scientists explain why a piece of behaviour helped the organism to survive and reproduce by adverting to the behaviour’s having been caused by a true representation. That usage should, if possible, be vindicated by an adequate naturalistic theory of content. Teleosemantics cannot do so, when it is applied to (...)
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  14. Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (2006). Introduction: Prospects and Problems for Teleosemantics. In Graham Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
  15. Ulrich E. Stegmann (2009). A Consumer‐Based Teleosemantics for Animal Signals. Philosophy of Science 76 (5):864-875.score: 18.0
    Ethological theory standardly attributes representational content to animal signals. In this article I first assess whether Ruth Millikan’s teleosemantic theory accounts for the content of animal signals. I conclude that it does not, because many signals do not exhibit the required sort of cooperation between signal‐producing and signal‐consuming devices. It is then argued that Kim Sterelny’s proposal, while not requiring cooperation, sometimes yields the wrong content. Finally, I outline an alternative view, according to which consumers alone are responsible for conferring (...)
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  16. Mohan P. Matthen (2006). Teleosemantics and the Consumer. In Graham F. Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics. Oxford University Press. 146--166.score: 18.0
    Argues that the meaning of perceptual states depends on certain simple "actions" of conditioning and habituation innately associated with them. A game theoretic account of the meaning of perceptual states is offered.
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  17. Joe Cruz, On Teleosemantics and Natural Maps (Comments on Work by Rob Cummins Et Al.).score: 18.0
    Let me begin by signaling my enthusiasm both for the specific case offered by Cummins et al. against teleosemantics and for the overall framework from which this work derives. If the first approximation of the idea is that there will be material implicit in a representation that can be exploited by a cognitive agent that later acquires the right abilities to extract this material, and if this material looks a great deal like content, then the teleosemanticist will find accommodating (...)
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  18. Marc Artiga (2013). Reliable Misrepresentation and Teleosemantics. Disputatio (37).score: 18.0
    Mendelovici (forthcoming) has recently argued that (1) tracking theories of mental representation (including teleosemantics) are incompatible with the possibility of reliable misrepresentation and that (2) this is an important difficulty for them. Furthermore, she argues that this problem commits teleosemantics to an unjustified a priori rejection of color eliminativism. In this paper I argue that (1) teleosemantics can accommodate most cases of reliable misrepresentation, (2) those cases the theory fails to account for are not objectionable and (3) (...)
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  19. Marc Artiga (2013). Teleosemantics and Pushmi-Pullyu Representations. Erkenntnis:1-22.score: 18.0
    One of the main tenets of current teleosemantic theories is that simple representations are Pushmi-Pullyu states, i.e. they carry descriptive and imperative content at the same time. In the paper I present an argument that shows that if we add this claim to the core tenets of teleosemantics, then (1) it entails that, necessarily, all representations are Pushmi-Pullyu states and (2) it undermines one of the main motivations for the Pushmi-Pullyu account.
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  20. Marc Artiga (forthcoming). Teleosemantics, Info-Telsemantics and Circularity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-21.score: 18.0
    Peter Godfrey-Smith and Nicholas Shea have argued that standard versions of teleosemantics render explanations of successful behavior by appealing to true beliefs circular and, consequently, non-explanatory. As an alternative, Shea has recently suggested an original teleosemantic account (that he calls ‘Infotel-semantics’), which is supposed to be immune to the problem of circularity. The paper argues that the standard version of teleosemantics has a satisfactory reply to the circularity objection and that, in any case, Infotel-semantics is not better off (...)
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  21. Manolo Martínez (2013). Teleosemantics and Indeterminacy. Dialectica 67 (4):427-453.score: 16.0
    In the first part of the paper, I present a framework for the description and evaluation of teleosemantic theories of intentionality, and use it to argue that several different objections to these theories (the various indeterminacy and adequacy problems) are, in a certain precise sense, manifestations of the same underlying issue. I then use the framework to show that Millikan's biosemantics, her own recent declarations to the contrary notwithtanding, presents indeterminacy. In the second part, I develop a novel teleosemantic proposal (...)
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  22. Andrés L. Jaume (2008). Teleosemantics and Useless Content. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:85-90.score: 16.0
    Teleosemantic theories of content constitute a mixed family of different proposals and accounts about what consists mental content. In the present paper, I would like examine the scope and limits of a particular and well defined teleosemantic theory such as Millikan’s account. My aim entails presenting arguments in order to show how her theory of mental content is unnable of giving a complete account of the whole mental life almost for adult human agents without commiting certain adaptationist assumptions. I am (...)
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  23. Brian Leahy (2014). Teleosemantics: Intentionality, Productivity, and the Theory of Meaning. Language and Linguistics Compass 8 (5).score: 16.0
    Since the publication of Ruth Millikan's Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories in 1984, a great deal of literature has discussed her so-called teleosemantic or biosemantic solution to the problem of intentionality. Only recently, though, has much attention been paid to her co-ordinated solution to the problem of productivity. This article, first, clearly describes the problems of intentionality, productivity, and compositionality, and describes their relationships and their relevance for the theory of meaning. It then describes Millikan's proposal with respect to (...)
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  24. Ruth G. Millikan (1990). Compare and Contrast Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan on Teleosemantics. Philosophical Topics 18 (2):151-61.score: 15.0
  25. David Papineau (2001). The Status of Teleosemantics, or How to Stop Worrying About Swampman. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):279-89.score: 15.0
  26. David Papineau (1998). Teleosemantics and Indeterminacy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):1-14.score: 15.0
    The aim of this paper is to defend the teleological theory of representation against an objection by Jerry Fodor. I shall argue that previous attempts to answer this objection fail to recognize the importance of belief-desire structure for the teleological theory of representation.
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  27. Mark Rowlands, Teleosemantics. A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.score: 15.0
  28. Cory F. Juhl (2000). Teleosemantics, Kripkenstein and Paradox. In N. Shanks & R. Gardner (eds.), Logic, Probability and Science. Atlanta: Rodopi. 168-181.score: 15.0
  29. Steven J. Wagner (1996). Teleosemantics and the Troubles of Naturalism. Philosophical Studies 82 (1):81-110.score: 15.0
  30. Tadeusz W. Zawidzki (2003). Mythological Content: A Problem for Milikan's Teleosemantics. Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):535-538.score: 15.0
    I pose the following dilemma for Millikan's teleological theory of mental content. There is only one way that her theory can avoid Gauker's [(1995) Review of Millikan's White queen psychology and other essays for Alice, Philosophical Psychology, 8, 305-309] charge that it relies on an unexplained notion of mapping or isomorphism between mental state and world. Mental content must be explained in terms of the mapping relation that is required for mental state producing and consuming mechanisms to perform their biologically (...)
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  31. Timothy Schroeder (2004). New Norms for Teleosemantics. In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind. Elsevier. 1--91.score: 15.0
  32. Sören Häggqvist (2013). Teleosemantics: Etiological Foundations. Philosophy Compass 8 (1):73-83.score: 15.0
  33. Joseph Mendola (2006). Papineau on Etiological Teleosemantics for Beliefs. Ratio 19 (3):305-320.score: 15.0
  34. Don Ross & Tadeusz W. Zawidzki (1994). Information and Teleosemantics. Southern Journal of Philosophy 32 (4):393-419.score: 15.0
  35. Karen Neander (2013). Toward an Informational Teleosemantics. In Dan Ryder, Justine Kingsbury & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Millikan and Her Critics. John Wiley & Sons. 21--40.score: 15.0
  36. Timothy Schroeder (2007). Review of Graham MacDonald, David Papineau (Eds.), Teleosemantics: New Philosophical Essays. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (4).score: 15.0
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  37. Paul S. Davies (2001). The Excesses of Teleosemantics. In J. S. McIntosh (ed.), Naturalism, Evolution, and Intentionality (Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 27). University of Calgary Press. 117-137.score: 15.0
  38. James Maclaurin (2008). Review: Graham MacDonald and David Papineau (Eds): Teleosemantics: New Philosophical Essays. [REVIEW] Mind 117 (468):1102-1105.score: 15.0
  39. Eric Saidel (2001). Teleosemantics and the Epiphenomenality of Content. In J. S. McIntosh (ed.), Naturalism, Evolution, and Intentionality (Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 27). University of Calgary Press. 139-166.score: 15.0
  40. Don Ross & Tad Zawidzki (1994). Information and Teleosemantics. Southern Journal of Philosophy 32 (4):393-419.score: 15.0
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  41. D. Bonevac (2000). Teleosemantics, Kripkenstein and Paradox Commentary. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 71:168-181.score: 15.0
     
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  42. Sally Ferguson (2001). Lockian teleosemantics. Locke Studies 1:105-122.score: 15.0
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  43. A. L. Jaume (2013). From Natural History to History. The Scope and Limits of Evolutionary Epistemology and Teleosemantics as Naturalist Research Programs. Ludus Vitalis 21 (39).score: 15.0
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  44. Davies Paul Sheldon (2001). The Excesses of Teleosemantics. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27.score: 15.0
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  45. Peter Schulte (forthcoming). Perceptual Representations: A Teleosemantic Answer to the Breadth-of-Application Problem. Biology and Philosophy:1-18.score: 14.0
    Teleosemantic theories of representation are often criticized as being “too liberal”, i.e. as categorizing states as representations which are not representational at all. Recently, a powerful version of this objection has been put forth by Tyler Burge. Focusing on perception, Burge defends the claim that all teleosemantic theories apply too broadly, thereby missing what is distinctive about representation. Contra Burge, I will argue in this paper that there is a teleosemantic account of perceptual states that does not fall prey to (...)
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  46. Ulrich E. Stegmann (2005). John Maynard Smith's Notion of Animal Signals. Biology and Philosophy 20 (5):1011-1025.score: 9.0
    This paper explores John Maynard Smith’s conceptual work on animal signals. Maynard Smith defined animal signals as traits that (1) change another organism’s behaviour while benefiting the sender, that (2) are evolved for this function, and that (3) have their effects through the evolved response of the receiver. Like many ethologists, Maynard Smith assumed that animal signals convey semantic information. Yet his definition of animal signals remains silent on the nature of semantic information and on the conditions determining its content. (...)
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  47. Marc Artiga (2014). Signaling Without Cooperation. Biology and Philosophy 29 (3):357-378.score: 9.0
    Ethological theories usually attribute semantic content to animal signals. To account for this fact, many biologists and philosophers appeal to some version of teleosemantics. However, this picture has recently came under attack: while mainstream teleosemantics assumes that representational systems must cooperate, some biologists and philosophers argue that in certain cases signaling can evolve within systems lacking common interest. In this paper I defend the standard view from this objection.
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