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Terence E. Horgan [64]Terence Edward Horgan [1]
  1. Terence E. Horgan & David Sosa (eds.) (forthcoming). Collection on the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim.
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  2. Terence E. Horgan & Matjaž Potrc (2008). Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology. The Mit Press.
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  3. George Graham, Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2007). Consciousness and Intentionality. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 468--484.
  4. David Henderson & Terence Edward Horgan (2006). Transglobal Reliabilism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17:171-195.
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  5. Terence E. Horgan (2006). Materialism: Matters of Definition, Defense, and Deconstruction. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):157-83.
    How should the metaphysical hypothesis of materialism be formulated? What strategies look promising for defending this hypothesis? How good are the prospects for its successful defense, especially in light of the infamous “hard problem” of phenomenal consciousness? I will say something about each of these questions.
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  6. Terence E. Horgan (2006). Review of Levine's Purple Haze. [REVIEW] Noûs 40 (3).
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  7. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2006). Cognition Needs Syntax but Not Rules. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing. 147--158.
    Human cognition is rich, varied, and complex. In this Chapter we argue that because of the richness of human cognition (and human mental life generally), there must be a syntax of cognitive states, but because of this very richness, cognitive processes cannot be describable by exceptionless rules. The argument for syntax, in Section 1, has to do with being able to get around in any number of possible environments in a complex world. Since nature did not know where in the (...)
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  8. Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2006). Internal-World Skepticism and Mental Self-Presentation. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. 41-61.
  9. George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (2005). Mary Mary au Contraire: Reply to Raffman. Philosophical Studies 122 (2):203-12.
               Diana Raffman (in press) emphasizes a useful and important distinction that deserves heed in discussions of phenomenal consciousness: the distinction between what it’s like to see red and how red things look. (Two alternative locutions that also can express the latter idea, we take it, are ‘what red looks like’ and ‘what red is like’.) Raffman plausibly argues that this distinction should be incorporated into theories of phenomenal consciousness, including (...)
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  10. Terence E. Horgan & David K. Henderson (2005). What Does It Take to Be a True Believer? Against the Opulent Ideology of Eliminative Materialism. In Mind as a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.
               Eliminative materialism, as William Lycan (this volume) tells us, is materialism plus the claim that no creature has ever had a belief, desire, intention, hope, wish, or other “folk-psychological†state. Some contemporary philosophers claim that eliminative materialism is very likely true. They sketch certain potential scenarios, for the way theory might develop in cognitive science and neuroscience, that they claim are fairly likely; and they maintain that if such scenarios (...)
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  11. Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2004). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. Walter De Gruyter.
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  12. Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2003). The Phenomenology of First-Person Agency. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. 323.
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  13. George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (2002). Sensations and Grain Processes. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.
    This paper celebrates an anniversary, or near anniversary. As we write it is just more than 40 years since U. T. Place's “Is consciousness a brain process?†appeared in the British Journal of Psychology, and just less than 40 since J. J. C. Smart's “Sensations and brain processes†appeared, in its first version, in The Philosophical Review (Place 1962/1956, Smart 1962/1959).  These two papers arguably founded contemporary philosophy of mind. They defined its central preoccupation (the ontology of consciousness), introduced (...)
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  14. Terence E. Horgan (2002). Themes in My Philosophical Work. In Johannes L. Brandl (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan. Atlanta: Rodopi. 1-26.
    I invoked the notion of supervenience in my doctoral disseration, Microreduction and the Mind-Body Problem, completed at the University of Michigan in 1974 under the direction of Jaegwon Kim. I had been struck by the appeal to supervenience in Hare (1952), a classic work in twentieth century metaethics that I studied at Michigan in a course on metaethics taught by William Frankena; and I also had been struck by the brief appeal to supervenience in Davidson (1970). Kim was already, in (...)
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  15. David Henderson & Terence E. Horgan (2001). Practicing Safe Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):227 - 258.
    Reliablists have argued that the important evaluative epistemic concept of being justified in holding a belief, at least to the extent that that concept is associated with knowledge, is best understood as concerned with the objective appropriateness of the processes by which a given belief is generated and sustained. In particular, they hold that a belief is justified only when it is fostered by processes that are reliable (at least minimally so) in the believer’s actual world.[1] Of course, reliablists typically (...)
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  16. Terence E. Horgan (2001). Causal Compatibilism and the Exclusion Problem. Theoria 16 (40):95-116.
    Terry Horgan University of Memphis In this paper I address the problem of causal exclusion, specifically as it arises for mental properties (although the scope of the discussion is more general, being applicable to other kinds of putatively causal properties that are not identical to narrowly physical causal properties, i.e., causal properties posited by physics). I summarize my own current position on the matter, and I offer a defense of this position. I draw upon and synthesize relevant discussions in various (...)
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  17. Terence E. Horgan (2001). Multiple Reference, Multiple Realization, and the Reduction of Mind. In Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
  18. Terence E. Horgan (2001). Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.
  19. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2001). Deconstructing New Wave Materialism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. 307--318.
    In the first post World War II identity theories (e.g., Place 1956, Smart 1962), mind brain identities were held to be contingent. However, in work beginning in the late 1960's, Saul Kripke (1971, 1980) convinced the philosophical community that true identity statements involving names and natural kind terms are necessarily true and furthermore, that many such necessary identities can only be known a posteriori. Kripke also offered an explanation of the a posteriori nature of ordinary theoretical identities such as that (...)
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  20. George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (2000). Mary Mary, Quite Contrary. Philosophical Studies 99 (1):59-87.
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  21. David K. Henderson & Terence E. Horgan (2000). Simulation and Epistemic Competence. In H. Kobler & K. Steuber (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Social Sciences. Westview.
    Epistemology has recently come to more and more take the articulate form of an investigation into how we do, and perhaps might better, manage the cognitive chores of producing, modifying, and generally maintaining belief-sets with a view to having a true and systematic understanding of the world. While this approach has continuities with earlier philosophy, it admittedly makes a departure from the tradition of epistemology as first philosophy.
     
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  22. Terence E. Horgan (1999). Short Prcis of Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. Acta Analytica 22 (22):9-21.
  23. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1999). Authors' Replies. Acta Analytica 22 (22):275-287.
     
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  24. George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (1998). Sensations and Grain Processes. In Gregory R. Mulhauser (ed.), Evolving Consciousness. John Benjamins.
    This paper celebrates an anniversary, or near anniversary. As we write it is just more than 40 years since U. T. Place's “Is consciousness a brain process?†appeared in the British Journal of Psychology, and just less than 40 since J. J. C. Smart's “Sensations and brain processes†appeared, in its first version, in The Philosophical Review (Place 1962/1956, Smart 1962/1959).  These two papers arguably founded contemporary philosophy of mind. They defined its central preoccupation (the ontology of consciousness), introduced (...)
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  25. Terence E. Horgan (1998). Recognitional Concepts and the Compositionality of Concept Possession. Philosophical Issues 9:27-33.
  26. Terence E. Horgan (1997). Connectionism and the Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Science. Metaphilosophy 28 (1-2):1-30.
    This is an overview of recent philosophical discussion about connectionism and the foundations of cognitive science. Connectionist modeling in cognitive science is described. Three broad conceptions of the mind are characterized, and their comparative strengths and weaknesses are discussed: (1) the classical computational conception in cognitive science; (2) a popular foundational interpretation of connectionism that John Tienson and I call “non-sentential computationalism”; and (3) an alternative interpretation of connectionism we call “dynamical cognition.” Also discussed are two recent philosophical attempts to (...)
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  27. Terence E. Horgan (1997). Kim on Mental Causation and Causal Exclusion. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):165-84.
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  28. Terence E. Horgan (1997). Modelling the Noncomputational Mind: Reply to Litch. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):365-371.
    I explain why, within the nonclassical framework for cognitive science we describe in the book, cognitive-state transitions can fail to be tractably computable even if they are subserved by a discrete dynamical system whose mathematical-state transitions are tractably computable. I distinguish two ways that cognitive processing might conform to programmable rules in which all operations that apply to representation-level structure are primitive, and two corresponding constraints on models of cognition. Although Litch is correct in maintaining that classical cognitive science is (...)
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  29. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1996). Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. MIT Press.
    In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson articulate and defend a new view of cognition.
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  30. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1995). Connectionism and the Commitments of Folk Psychology. Philosophical Perspectives 9:127-52.
  31. George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (1994). Southern Fundamentalism and the End of Philosophy. Philosophical Issues 5:219-247.
  32. Terence E. Horgan (1994). Naturalism and Intentionality. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):301-26.
    I argue for three principle claims. First, philosophers who seek to integrate the semantic and the intentional into a naturalistic metaphysical worldview need to address a task that they have thus far largely failed even to notice: explaining into- level connections between the physical and the intentional in a naturalistically acceptable way. Second, there are serious reasons to think that this task cannot be carried out in a way that would vindicate realism about intentionality. Third, there is much to be (...)
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  33. Terence E. Horgan (1994). Nonreductive Materialism. In Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell.
     
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  34. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1994). A Nonclassical Framework for Cognitive Science. Synthese 101 (3):305-45.
    David Marr provided a useful framework for theorizing about cognition within classical, AI-style cognitive science, in terms of three levels of description: the levels of (i) cognitive function, (ii) algorithm and (iii) physical implementation. We generalize this framework: (i) cognitive state transitions, (ii) mathematical/functional design and (iii) physical implementation or realization. Specifying the middle, design level to be the theory of dynamical systems yields a nonclassical, alternative framework that suits (but is not committed to) connectionism. We consider how a brain's (...)
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  35. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1994). Representations Don't Need Rules: Reply to James Garson. Mind and Language 9 (1):1-24.
  36. Terence E. Horgan (1993). From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World. Mind 102 (408):555-86.
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  37. Terence E. Horgan (1993). Nonreductive Materialism and the Explanatory Autonomy of Psychology. In Steven J. Wagner & Richard Warner (eds.), Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal. University of Notre Dame Press.
     
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  38. Terence E. Horgan (1993). The Austere Ideology of Folk Psychology. Mind and Language 8 (2):282-297.
  39. Terence E. Horgan & Mark Timmons (1993). Metaphysical Naturalism, Semantic Normativity, and Meta-Semantic Irrealism. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues. Atascadero: Ridgeview. 180-204.
  40. Terence E. Horgan (1992). From Cognitive Science to Folk Psychology: Computation, Mental Representation, and Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):449-484.
  41. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1992). Cognitive Systems as Dynamic Systems. Topoi 11 (1):27-43.
  42. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1992). Levels of Description in Nonclassical Cognitive Science. Philosophy 34:159-188.
  43. Terence E. Horgan (1991). Actions, Reasons, and the Explanatory Role of Content. In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell.
     
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  44. Terence E. Horgan & George Graham (1991). In Defense of Southern Fundamentalism. Philosophical Studies 62 (May):107-134.
  45. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.) (1991). Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Kluwer.
    "A third of the papers in this volume originated at the 1987 Spindel Conference ... at Memphis State University"--Pref.
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  46. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1991). Structured Representations in Connectionist Systems? In S. Davis (ed.), Connectionism: Theorye and Practice. Oup.
     
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  47. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1990). Soft Laws. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):256-279.
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  48. Terence E. Horgan (1989). Mental Quausation. Philosophical Perspectives 3:47-74.
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  49. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1989). Representation Without Rules. Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):147-74.
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