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  1. Terence Horgan, Replies to Corbi and Barker.
    Josep Corbi raises several worries about the metaethical position that Mark Timmons and I have articulated and defended, which we call “nondescriptivist cognitivism.â€â€¦ His remarks prompt some points of clarification…. Timmons and I characterize descriptive content as “way-the-world-might-be†content. We maintain that “base case†beliefs—roughly, those non-evaluative and evaluative beliefs whose contents have the simplest kinds of logical form—are of two types: a non-evaluative belief is an is-commitment with respect to a core descriptive content, and an evaluative belief is an (...)
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  2. Terence E. Horgan & David Sosa (eds.) (forthcoming). Collection on the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim.
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  3. Terence Horgan, Marcelo Sabates & David Sosa (eds.) (forthcoming). Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes From the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim,. Cambridge University Press.
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  4. David Henderson & Terence Horgan (2014). Relies to Our Critics. Philosophical Studies 169 (3):549-564.
    We respond to the central concerns raised by our commentators to our book, The Epistemological Spectrum. Casullo believes that our account of what we term “low-grade a priori” justification provides important clarification of a kind of philosophical reflection. However he objects to calling such reflection a priori. We explain what we think is at stake. Along the way, we comment on his idea of that there may be an epistemic payoff to making a distinction between assumptions and presumptions. In the (...)
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  5. Robert Barnard & Terence Horgan (2013). The Synthetic Unity of Truth. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. 180.
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  6. Terence Horgan (2013). Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality. The Monist 96 (2):232-251.
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  7. David K. Henderson & Terence Horgan (2011). The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis. OUP Oxford.
    David Henderson and Terence Horgan set out a broad new approach to epistemology, which they see as a mixed discipline, having both a priori and empirical elements. They defend the roles of a priori reflection and conceptual analysis in philosophy, but their revisionary account of these philosophical methods allows them a subtle but essential empirical dimension. They espouse a dual-perspective position which they call iceberg epistemology, respecting the important differences between epistemic processes that are consciously accessible and those that are (...)
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  8. George Graham, Terence Horgan & John Tienson (2009). Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of Mind. In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. 512--537.
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  9. George Graham, Terence Horgan & John Tienson (2009). Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oup Oxford.
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  10. Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons (2009). Analytical Moral Functionalism Meets Moral Twin Earth. In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press. 221--236.
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  11. George Graham & Terence Horgan (2008). Qualia Realism, Its Phenomenal Contents and Discontents. In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. The Mit Press. 89--107.
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  12. Terence M. Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind. The Monist 91 (2):347-373.
    We argue that the letter of the Extended Mind hypothesis can be accommodated by a strongly internalist, broadly Cartesian conception of mind. The argument turns centrally on an unusual but (we argue) highly plausible view on the mark of the mental.
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  13. Uriah Kriegel & Terence Horgan (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind. The Monist 91 (2):347-373.
  14. George Graham, Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2007). Consciousness and Intentionality. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 468--484.
  15. Robert Barnard & Terence Horgan (2006). Truth as Mediated Correspondence. The Monist 89 (1):28-49.
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  16. David Henderson & Terence Edward Horgan (2006). Transglobal Reliabilism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17:171-195.
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  17. Terence Horgan (2006). Truth as Mediated Correspondence. The Monist 89 (1):28-49.
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  18. Terence E. Horgan (2006). Materialism: Matters of Definition, Defense, and Deconstruction. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):157-83.
    How should the metaphysical hypothesis of materialism be formulated? What strategies look promising for defending this hypothesis? How good are the prospects for its successful defense, especially in light of the infamous “hard problem” of phenomenal consciousness? I will say something about each of these questions.
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  19. Terence E. Horgan (2006). Review of Levine's Purple Haze. [REVIEW] Noûs 40 (3).
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  20. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2006). Cognition Needs Syntax but Not Rules. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing. 147--158.
    Human cognition is rich, varied, and complex. In this Chapter we argue that because of the richness of human cognition (and human mental life generally), there must be a syntax of cognitive states, but because of this very richness, cognitive processes cannot be describable by exceptionless rules. The argument for syntax, in Section 1, has to do with being able to get around in any number of possible environments in a complex world. Since nature did not know where in the (...)
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  21. Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2006). Internal-World Skepticism and Mental Self-Presentation. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. 41-61.
  22. Terence Horgan & Matjaz Potrc (2006). Abundant Truth in an Austere World. In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Clarendon Press.
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  23. Terence Horgan, John Tienson & Graham George (2006). Internal-World Skepticism and the Self-Presentational Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness. In Kriegel Uriah & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-representational Approaches to Consciousness. Bradford.
  24. Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons (2006). Expressivism, Yes! Relativism, No! In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1. Clarendon Press.
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  25. George Graham & Terence Horgan (2005). Mary Mary, Au Contraire: Reply to Raffman. Philosophical Studies 122 (2):203-212.
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  26. George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (2005). Mary Mary au Contraire: Reply to Raffman. Philosophical Studies 122 (2):203-12.
               Diana Raffman (in press) emphasizes a useful and important distinction that deserves heed in discussions of phenomenal consciousness: the distinction between what it’s like to see red and how red things look. (Two alternative locutions that also can express the latter idea, we take it, are ‘what red looks like’ and ‘what red is like’.) Raffman plausibly argues that this distinction should be incorporated into theories of phenomenal consciousness, including (...)
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  27. Terence E. Horgan & David K. Henderson (2005). What Does It Take to Be a True Believer? Against the Opulent Ideology of Eliminative Materialism. In Mind as a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.
               Eliminative materialism, as William Lycan (this volume) tells us, is materialism plus the claim that no creature has ever had a belief, desire, intention, hope, wish, or other “folk-psychological†state. Some contemporary philosophers claim that eliminative materialism is very likely true. They sketch certain potential scenarios, for the way theory might develop in cognitive science and neuroscience, that they claim are fairly likely; and they maintain that if such scenarios (...)
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  28. Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2004). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. Walter De Gruyter.
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  29. Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2003). The Phenomenology of First-Person Agency. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. 323.
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  30. George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (2002). Sensations and Grain Processes. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.
    This paper celebrates an anniversary, or near anniversary. As we write it is just more than 40 years since U. T. Place's “Is consciousness a brain process?†appeared in the British Journal of Psychology, and just less than 40 since J. J. C. Smart's “Sensations and brain processes†appeared, in its first version, in The Philosophical Review (Place 1962/1956, Smart 1962/1959).  These two papers arguably founded contemporary philosophy of mind. They defined its central preoccupation (the ontology of consciousness), introduced (...)
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  31. Terence Horgan (2002). From Supervenience to Superdupervenience. In Jaegwon Kim (ed.), Supervenience. Ashgate. 113--144.
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  32. Terence E. Horgan (2002). Themes in My Philosophical Work. In Johannes L. Brandl (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan. Atlanta: Rodopi. 1-26.
    I invoked the notion of supervenience in my doctoral disseration, Microreduction and the Mind-Body Problem, completed at the University of Michigan in 1974 under the direction of Jaegwon Kim. I had been struck by the appeal to supervenience in Hare (1952), a classic work in twentieth century metaethics that I studied at Michigan in a course on metaethics taught by William Frankena; and I also had been struck by the brief appeal to supervenience in Davidson (1970). Kim was already, in (...)
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  33. Terence Horgan & John Tienson (2002). The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oup Usa. 520--533.
    What is the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality? A common picture in recent philosophy of mind has been that the phenomenal aspects and the intentional aspects of mentality are independent of one another. According to this view, the phenomenal character of certain mental states or processes”states for which there is "something it is like" to undergo them—is not intentional. Examples that are typically given of states with inherent phenomenal character are sensations, such as pains, itches, and color sensations. This view (...)
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  34. David Henderson & Terence E. Horgan (2001). Practicing Safe Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):227 - 258.
    Reliablists have argued that the important evaluative epistemic concept of being justified in holding a belief, at least to the extent that that concept is associated with knowledge, is best understood as concerned with the objective appropriateness of the processes by which a given belief is generated and sustained. In particular, they hold that a belief is justified only when it is fostered by processes that are reliable (at least minimally so) in the believer’s actual world.[1] Of course, reliablists typically (...)
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  35. Terence E. Horgan (2001). Causal Compatibilism and the Exclusion Problem. Theoria 16 (40):95-116.
    Terry Horgan University of Memphis In this paper I address the problem of causal exclusion, specifically as it arises for mental properties (although the scope of the discussion is more general, being applicable to other kinds of putatively causal properties that are not identical to narrowly physical causal properties, i.e., causal properties posited by physics). I summarize my own current position on the matter, and I offer a defense of this position. I draw upon and synthesize relevant discussions in various (...)
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  36. Terence E. Horgan (2001). Multiple Reference, Multiple Realization, and the Reduction of Mind. In Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
  37. Terence E. Horgan (2001). Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.
  38. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2001). Deconstructing New Wave Materialism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. 307--318.
    In the first post World War II identity theories (e.g., Place 1956, Smart 1962), mind brain identities were held to be contingent. However, in work beginning in the late 1960's, Saul Kripke (1971, 1980) convinced the philosophical community that true identity statements involving names and natural kind terms are necessarily true and furthermore, that many such necessary identities can only be known a posteriori. Kripke also offered an explanation of the a posteriori nature of ordinary theoretical identities such as that (...)
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  39. George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (2000). Mary Mary, Quite Contrary. Philosophical Studies 99 (1):59-87.
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  40. George Graham, Terence Horgan, Mary Mary & Quite Contrary (2000). Editorial 1 Knowing One's Own Actions George Wilson/Proximal Practical Foresight 3–19 Kevin Falvey/Knowledge in Intention 21–44 Nomy Arpaly/Hamlet and the Utilitarians 45–57. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 99:373-374.
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  41. David K. Henderson & Terence E. Horgan (2000). Simulation and Epistemic Competence. In H. Kobler & K. Steuber (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Social Sciences. Westview.
    Epistemology has recently come to more and more take the articulate form of an investigation into how we do, and perhaps might better, manage the cognitive chores of producing, modifying, and generally maintaining belief-sets with a view to having a true and systematic understanding of the world. While this approach has continuities with earlier philosophy, it admittedly makes a departure from the tradition of epistemology as first philosophy.
     
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  42. David Henderson & Terence Horgan (2000). Iceberg Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):497-535.
    Accounts of what it is for an agent to be justified in holding a belief commonly carry commitments concerning what cognitive processes can and should be like. A concern for the plausibility of such commitments leads to a multi-faceted epistemology in which elements of traditionally conflicting epistemologies are vindicated within a single epistemological account. The accessible and articulable states that have been the exclusive focus of much epistemology must constitute only a proper subset of epistemologically relevant processing. The interaction of (...)
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  43. Terence Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2000). Blobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence. Facta Philosophica 2 (2):249-270.
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  44. Terence E. Horgan (1999). Short Prcis of Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. Acta Analytica 22 (22):9-21.
  45. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1999). Authors' Replies. Acta Analytica 22 (22):275-287.
     
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  46. Terence Horgan & Matjaz Potrc (1999). Vagueness and Meaning. Acta Analytica 14 (1).
  47. George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (1998). Sensations and Grain Processes. In Gregory R. Mulhauser (ed.), Evolving Consciousness. John Benjamins.
    This paper celebrates an anniversary, or near anniversary. As we write it is just more than 40 years since U. T. Place's “Is consciousness a brain process?†appeared in the British Journal of Psychology, and just less than 40 since J. J. C. Smart's “Sensations and brain processes†appeared, in its first version, in The Philosophical Review (Place 1962/1956, Smart 1962/1959).  These two papers arguably founded contemporary philosophy of mind. They defined its central preoccupation (the ontology of consciousness), introduced (...)
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  48. Terence Horgan (1998). Actualism, Quantification, and Contextual Semantics. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):503-509.
  49. Terence Horgan (1998). The Transvaluationist Conception of Vagueness. The Monist 81 (2):313-330.
    Transvaluationism makes two fundamental claims concerning vagueness. First, vagueness is logically incoherent in a certain way: vague discourse is governed by semantic standards that are mutually unsatisfiable. But second, vagueness is viable and legitimate nonetheless; its logical incoherence is benign.
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