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  1. Terence Horgan & John Tienson (2002). The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. OUP Usa 520--533.
  2. Terence E. Horgan (1993). From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World. Mind 102 (408):555-86.
  3.  30
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1996). Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. MIT Press.
    In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson articulate and defend a new view of cognition.
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  4. Terence E. Horgan & James F. Woodward (1985). Folk Psychology is Here to Stay. Philosophical Review 94 (April):197-225.
  5. Terence Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind. The Monist 91 (2):347-373.
    We argue that the letter of the Extended Mind hypothesis can be accommodated by a strongly internalist, broadly Cartesian conception of mind. The argument turns centrally on an unusual but highly plausible view on the mark of the mental.
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  6. Terence E. Horgan (1982). Supervenience and Microphysics. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (January):29-43.
     
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  7. Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons (1991). New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:447-465.
    There have been times in the history of ethical theory, especially in this century, when moral realism was down, but it was never out. The appeal of this doctrine for many moral philosophers is apparently so strong that there are always supporters in its corner who seek to resuscitate the view. The attraction is obvious: moral realism purports to provide a precious philosophical good, viz., objectivity and all that this involves, including right answers to moral questions, and the possibility of (...)
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  8. Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons (1992). Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived. Synthese 92 (2):221 - 260.
    J. L. Mackie argued that if there were objective moral properties or facts, then the supervenience relation linking the nonmoral to the moral would be metaphysically queer. Moral realists reply that objective supervenience relations are ubiquitous according to contemporary versions of metaphysical naturalism and, hence, that there is nothing especially queer about moral supervenience. In this paper we revive Mackie's challenge to moral realism. We argue: (i) that objective supervenience relations of any kind, moral or otherwise, should be explainable rather (...)
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  9.  28
    David K. Henderson & Terence Horgan (2011). The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis. OUP Oxford.
    Henderson and Horgan set out a broad new approach to epistemology. They defend the roles of the a priori and conceptual analysis, but with an essential empirical dimension. 'Transglobal reliability' is the key to epistemic justification. The question of which cognitive processes are reliable depends on contingent facts about human capacities.
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  10. Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons (1992). Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The 'Open Question Argument' Revived. Philosophical Papers 21 (3):153-175.
    (1992). TROUBLES FOR NEW WAVE MORAL SEMANTICS: THE ‘OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT’ REVIVED. Philosophical Papers: Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 153-175. doi: 10.1080/05568649209506380.
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  11. Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2004). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. Walter De Gruyter
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  12.  14
    Terence Horgan (forthcoming). Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem, II. Erkenntnis.
    In “Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem,” Anna Mahtani and I offer a new argument for thirdism that relies on what we call “generalized conditionalization.” Generalized conditionalization goes beyond conventional conditionalization in two respects: first, by sometimes deploying a space of synchronic, essentially temporal, candidate-possibilities that are not “prior” possibilities; and second, by allowing for the use of preliminary probabilities that arise by first bracketing, and then conditionalizing upon, “old evidence.” In “Beauty and Conditionalization: Reply to Horgan and Mahtani,” (...)
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  13.  46
    Terence E. Horgan (1989). Mental Quausation. Philosophical Perspectives 3:47-74.
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  14. Terence E. Horgan (1997). Kim on Mental Causation and Causal Exclusion. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):165-84.
  15.  66
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2001). Deconstructing New Wave Materialism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press 307--318.
    In the first post World War II identity theories (e.g., Place 1956, Smart 1962), mind brain identities were held to be contingent. However, in work beginning in the late 1960's, Saul Kripke (1971, 1980) convinced the philosophical community that true identity statements involving names and natural kind terms are necessarily true and furthermore, that many such necessary identities can only be known a posteriori. Kripke also offered an explanation of the a posteriori nature of ordinary theoretical identities such as that (...)
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  16.  47
    Terence Horgan (1994). Robust Vagueness and the Forced-March Sorites Paradox. Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):159-188.
    I distinguish two broad approaches to vagueness that I call "robust" and "wimpy". Wimpy construals explain vagueness as robust (i.e., does not manifest arbitrary precision); that standard approaches to vagueness, like supervaluationism or appeals to degrees of truth, wrongly treat vagueness as wimpy; that vagueness harbors an underlying logical incoherence; that vagueness in the world is therefore impossible; and that the kind of logical incoherence nascent in vague terms and concepts is benign rather than malignant. I describe some implications for (...)
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  17.  43
    George Graham, Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2007). Consciousness and Intentionality. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell 468--484.
  18. Terence Horgan, John Tienson & Graham George (2006). Internal-World Skepticism and the Self-Presentational Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness. In Kriegel Uriah & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-representational Approaches to Consciousness. Bradford
  19.  2
    Terence E. Horgan & Matjaž Potrc (2008). Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology. The MIT Press.
    The authors of Austere Realism describe and defend a provocative ontological-cum-semantic position, asserting that the right ontology is minimal or austere, in that it excludes numerous common-sense posits, and that statements employing such posits are nonetheless true, when truth is understood to be semantic correctness under contextually operative semantic standards. Terence Horgan and Matjaz [hacek over z] Potrc [hacek over c] argue that austere realism emerges naturally from consideration of the deep problems within the naive common-sense approach to truth and (...)
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  20. Terence E. Horgan (2001). Causal Compatibilism and the Exclusion Problem. Theoria 16 (40):95-116.
    Terry Horgan University of Memphis In this paper I address the problem of causal exclusion, specifically as it arises for mental properties (although the scope of the discussion is more general, being applicable to other kinds of putatively causal properties that are not identical to narrowly physical causal properties, i.e., causal properties posited by physics). I summarize my own current position on the matter, and I offer a defense of this position. I draw upon and synthesize relevant discussions in various (...)
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  21. Terence Horgan (2013). Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality. The Monist 96 (2):232-251.
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  22.  30
    Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2003). The Phenomenology of First-Person Agency. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic 323.
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  23. Terence E. Horgan (1984). Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (April):147-83.
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  24. Terence E. Horgan (1984). Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (June):453-69.
  25.  22
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.) (1991). Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Kluwer.
    "A third of the papers in this volume originated at the 1987 Spindel Conference ... at Memphis State University"--Pref.
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  26. George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (2000). Mary Mary, Quite Contrary. Philosophical Studies 99 (1):59-87.
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  27.  41
    David Henderson & Terence Horgan (2000). Iceberg Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):497-535.
    Accounts of what it is for an agent to be justified in holding a belief commonly carry commitments concerning what cognitive processes can and should be like. A concern for the plausibility of such commitments leads to a multi-faceted epistemology in which elements of traditionally conflicting epistemologies are vindicated within a single epistemological account. The accessible and articulable states that have been the exclusive focus of much epistemology must constitute only a proper subset of epistemologically relevant processing. The interaction of (...)
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  28.  5
    Robert Barnard & Terence Horgan (2013). The Synthetic Unity of Truth. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press 180.
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  29.  45
    Terence Horgan (1991). Metaphysical Realism and Psychologistic Semantics. Erkenntnis 34 (3):297--322.
    I propose a metaphysical position I call 'limited metaphysical realism', and I link it to a position in the philosophy of language I call 'psychologistic semantics'. Limited metaphysical realism asserts that there is a mind-independent, discourse-independent world, but posits a sparse ontology. Psychologistic semantics construes truth not as direct word/world correspondence, and not as warranted assertibility (or Putnam's "ideal" warranted assertibility), but rather as 'correct assertibility'. I argue that virtues of this package deal over each of the two broad positions (...)
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  30. Terence Horgan (1981). Counterfactuals and Newcomb's Problem. Journal of Philosophy 78 (6):331-356.
  31.  46
    Terence Horgan (1998). The Transvaluationist Conception of Vagueness. The Monist 81 (2):313-330.
    Transvaluationism makes two fundamental claims concerning vagueness. First, vagueness is logically incoherent in a certain way: vague discourse is governed by semantic standards that are mutually unsatisfiable. But second, vagueness is viable and legitimate nonetheless; its logical incoherence is benign.
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  32.  15
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1990). Soft Laws. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):256-279.
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  33.  54
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1994). A Nonclassical Framework for Cognitive Science. Synthese 101 (3):305-45.
    David Marr provided a useful framework for theorizing about cognition within classical, AI-style cognitive science, in terms of three levels of description: the levels of (i) cognitive function, (ii) algorithm and (iii) physical implementation. We generalize this framework: (i) cognitive state transitions, (ii) mathematical/functional design and (iii) physical implementation or realization. Specifying the middle, design level to be the theory of dynamical systems yields a nonclassical, alternative framework that suits (but is not committed to) connectionism. We consider how a brain's (...)
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  34. Terence E. Horgan (1993). Nonreductive Materialism and the Explanatory Autonomy of Psychology. In Steven J. Wagner & Richard Warner (eds.), Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal. University of Notre Dame Press
  35.  84
    Terence E. Horgan (1987). Supervenient Qualia. Philosophical Review 96 (October):491-520.
  36.  29
    Robert Barnard & Terence Horgan (2006). Truth as Mediated Correspondence. The Monist 89 (1):28-49.
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  37.  12
    David Henderson & Terence Edward Horgan (2006). Transglobal Reliabilism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17:171-195.
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  38.  44
    Terence E. Horgan (1984). Supervenience and Cosmic Hermeneutics. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22 (S1):19-38.
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  39.  42
    David Henderson & Terence E. Horgan (2001). Practicing Safe Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):227 - 258.
    Reliablists have argued that the important evaluative epistemic concept of being justified in holding a belief, at least to the extent that that concept is associated with knowledge, is best understood as concerned with the objective appropriateness of the processes by which a given belief is generated and sustained. In particular, they hold that a belief is justified only when it is fostered by processes that are reliable (at least minimally so) in the believer’s actual world.[1] Of course, reliablists typically (...)
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  40.  53
    Terence E. Horgan & George Graham (1991). In Defense of Southern Fundamentalism. Philosophical Studies 62 (May):107-134.
  41. Terence Horgan (1987). Science Nominalized Properly. Philosophy of Science 54 (2):281-282.
    Although Hale and Resnik are correct in their specific objection to my proposal for nominalizing science, the proposal can be saved by means of a simple and plausible modification.
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  42.  20
    Terence Horgan (1986). Truth and Ontology. Philosophical Papers 15 (1):1-21.
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  43.  35
    Terence Horgan (1979). 'Could', Possible Worlds, and Moral Responsibility. Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):345-358.
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  44.  23
    Terence Horgan & John Tienson (1989). Representations Without Rules. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):147-174.
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  45.  44
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1992). Cognitive Systems as Dynamic Systems. Topoi 11 (1):27-43.
  46. Terence E. Horgan (1991). Actions, Reasons, and the Explanatory Role of Content. In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell
  47.  98
    Terence E. Horgan (2006). Materialism: Matters of Definition, Defense, and Deconstruction. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):157-83.
    How should the metaphysical hypothesis of materialism be formulated? What strategies look promising for defending this hypothesis? How good are the prospects for its successful defense, especially in light of the infamous “hard problem” of phenomenal consciousness? I will say something about each of these questions.
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  48.  83
    Terence E. Horgan (1985). Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument. Philosophical Studies 47 (May):339-56.
  49.  55
    George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (1994). Southern Fundamentalism and the End of Philosophy. Philosophical Issues 5:219-247.
  50.  22
    Terence Horgan (1986). Psychologism, Semantics, and Ontology. Noûs 20 (1):21-31.
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