Search results for 'Terence M. Horgan' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Terence M. Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind. The Monist 91 (2):347-373.score: 870.0
    We argue that the letter of the Extended Mind hypothesis can be accommodated by a strongly internalist, broadly Cartesian conception of mind. The argument turns centrally on an unusual but (we argue) highly plausible view on the mark of the mental.
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  2. Terence Horgan (1996). Book Review:The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey Into the Brain Paul M. Churchland. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 63 (3):476-.score: 810.0
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  3. Terence E. Horgan (2002). Themes in My Philosophical Work. In Johannes L. Brandl (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan. Atlanta: Rodopi. 1-26.score: 600.0
    I invoked the notion of supervenience in my doctoral disseration, Microreduction and the Mind-Body Problem, completed at the University of Michigan in 1974 under the direction of Jaegwon Kim. I had been struck by the appeal to supervenience in Hare (1952), a classic work in twentieth century metaethics that I studied at Michigan in a course on metaethics taught by William Frankena; and I also had been struck by the brief appeal to supervenience in Davidson (1970). Kim was already, in (...)
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  4. Terence E. Horgan (1997). Modelling the Noncomputational Mind: Reply to Litch. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):365-371.score: 540.0
    I explain why, within the nonclassical framework for cognitive science we describe in the book, cognitive-state transitions can fail to be tractably computable even if they are subserved by a discrete dynamical system whose mathematical-state transitions are tractably computable. I distinguish two ways that cognitive processing might conform to programmable rules in which all operations that apply to representation-level structure are primitive, and two corresponding constraints on models of cognition. Although Litch is correct in maintaining that classical cognitive science is (...)
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  5. David K. Henderson & Terence Horgan (2011). The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis. OUP Oxford.score: 480.0
    David Henderson and Terence Horgan set out a broad new approach to epistemology, which they see as a mixed discipline, having both a priori and empirical elements. They defend the roles of a priori reflection and conceptual analysis in philosophy, but their revisionary account of these philosophical methods allows them a subtle but essential empirical dimension. They espouse a dual-perspective position which they call iceberg epistemology, respecting the important differences between epistemic processes that are consciously accessible and those (...)
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  6. Terence E. Horgan (2001). Causal Compatibilism and the Exclusion Problem. Theoria 16 (40):95-116.score: 300.0
    Terry Horgan University of Memphis In this paper I address the problem of causal exclusion, specifically as it arises for mental properties (although the scope of the discussion is more general, being applicable to other kinds of putatively causal properties that are not identical to narrowly physical causal properties, i.e., causal properties posited by physics). I summarize my own current position on the matter, and I offer a defense of this position. I draw upon and synthesize relevant discussions in (...)
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  7. George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (2005). Mary Mary au Contraire: Reply to Raffman. Philosophical Studies 122 (2):203-12.score: 300.0
               Diana Raffman (in press) emphasizes a useful and important distinction that deserves heed in discussions of phenomenal consciousness: the distinction between what it’s like to see red and how red things look. (Two alternative locutions that also can express the latter idea, we take it, are ‘what red looks like’ and ‘what red is like’.) Raffman plausibly argues that this distinction should be incorporated into theories of phenomenal consciousness, including (...)
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  8. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1996). Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. MIT Press.score: 300.0
    In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson articulate and defend a new view of cognition.
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  9. Terence Horgan (forthcoming). Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem, II. Erkenntnis.score: 300.0
    In “Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem,” Anna Mahtani and I offer a new argument for thirdism that relies on what we call “generalized conditionalization.” Generalized conditionalization goes beyond conventional conditionalization in two respects: first, by sometimes deploying a space of synchronic, essentially temporal, candidate-possibilities that are not “prior” possibilities; and second, by allowing for the use of preliminary probabilities that arise by first bracketing, and then conditionalizing upon, “old evidence.” In “Beauty and Conditionalization: Reply to Horgan and (...)
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  10. Terence Horgan & John Tienson (2002). The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oup Usa. 520--533.score: 240.0
    What is the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality? A common picture in recent philosophy of mind has been that the phenomenal aspects and the intentional aspects of mentality are independent of one another. According to this view, the phenomenal character of certain mental states or processes”states for which there is "something it is like" to undergo them—is not intentional. Examples that are typically given of states with inherent phenomenal character are sensations, such as pains, itches, and color sensations. This view (...)
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  11. Terence E. Horgan (1993). From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World. Mind 102 (408):555-86.score: 240.0
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  12. Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons (1992). Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived. Synthese 92 (2):221 - 260.score: 240.0
    J. L. Mackie argued that if there were objective moral properties or facts, then the supervenience relation linking the nonmoral to the moral would be metaphysically queer. Moral realists reply that objective supervenience relations are ubiquitous according to contemporary versions of metaphysical naturalism and, hence, that there is nothing especially queer about moral supervenience. In this paper we revive Mackie's challenge to moral realism. We argue: (i) that objective supervenience relations of any kind, moral or otherwise, should be explainable rather (...)
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  13. Terence E. Horgan & James F. Woodward (1985). Folk Psychology is Here to Stay. Philosophical Review 94 (April):197-225.score: 240.0
  14. Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2004). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. Walter De Gruyter.score: 240.0
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  15. Terence E. Horgan (1984). Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (April):147-83.score: 240.0
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  16. Terence E. Horgan (1984). Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (June):453-69.score: 240.0
  17. Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons (1991). New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:447-465.score: 240.0
    There have been times in the history of ethical theory, especially in this century, when moral realism was down, but it was never out. The appeal of this doctrine for many moral philosophers is apparently so strong that there are always supporters in its corner who seek to resuscitate the view. The attraction is obvious: moral realism purports to provide a precious philosophical good, viz., objectivity and all that this involves, including right answers to (most) moral questions, and the possibility (...)
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  18. Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons (1992). Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The 'Open Question Argument' Revived. Philosophical Papers 21 (3):153-175.score: 240.0
    (1992). TROUBLES FOR NEW WAVE MORAL SEMANTICS: THE ‘OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT’ REVIVED. Philosophical Papers: Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 153-175. doi: 10.1080/05568649209506380.
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  19. George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (2000). Mary Mary, Quite Contrary. Philosophical Studies 99 (1):59-87.score: 240.0
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  20. Terence E. Horgan (1994). Naturalism and Intentionality. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):301-26.score: 240.0
    I argue for three principle claims. First, philosophers who seek to integrate the semantic and the intentional into a naturalistic metaphysical worldview need to address a task that they have thus far largely failed even to notice: explaining into- level connections between the physical and the intentional in a naturalistically acceptable way. Second, there are serious reasons to think that this task cannot be carried out in a way that would vindicate realism about intentionality. Third, there is much to be (...)
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  21. Terence E. Horgan (1984). Functionalism and Token Physicalism. Synthese 59 (June):321-38.score: 240.0
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  22. Terence E. Horgan (2006). Materialism: Matters of Definition, Defense, and Deconstruction. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):157-83.score: 240.0
    How should the metaphysical hypothesis of materialism be formulated? What strategies look promising for defending this hypothesis? How good are the prospects for its successful defense, especially in light of the infamous “hard problem” of phenomenal consciousness? I will say something about each of these questions.
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  23. Terence Horgan (1981). Counterfactuals and Newcomb's Problem. Journal of Philosophy 78 (6):331-356.score: 240.0
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  24. Terence E. Horgan (1985). Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument. Philosophical Studies 47 (May):339-56.score: 240.0
  25. Terence E. Horgan & David K. Henderson (2005). What Does It Take to Be a True Believer? Against the Opulent Ideology of Eliminative Materialism. In Mind as a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
               Eliminative materialism, as William Lycan (this volume) tells us, is materialism plus the claim that no creature has ever had a belief, desire, intention, hope, wish, or other “folk-psychological†state. Some contemporary philosophers claim that eliminative materialism is very likely true. They sketch certain potential scenarios, for the way theory might develop in cognitive science and neuroscience, that they claim are fairly likely; and they maintain that if such scenarios (...)
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  26. Terence E. Horgan (1987). Supervenient Qualia. Philosophical Review 96 (October):491-520.score: 240.0
  27. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2001). Deconstructing New Wave Materialism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. 307--318.score: 240.0
    In the first post World War II identity theories (e.g., Place 1956, Smart 1962), mind brain identities were held to be contingent. However, in work beginning in the late 1960's, Saul Kripke (1971, 1980) convinced the philosophical community that true identity statements involving names and natural kind terms are necessarily true and furthermore, that many such necessary identities can only be known a posteriori. Kripke also offered an explanation of the a posteriori nature of ordinary theoretical identities such as that (...)
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  28. Terence E. Horgan & Mark Timmons (1993). Metaphysical Naturalism, Semantic Normativity, and Meta-Semantic Irrealism. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues. Atascadero: Ridgeview. 180-204.score: 240.0
  29. Terence E. Horgan (1981). Token Physicalism, Supervenience, and the Generality of Physics. Synthese 49 (December):395-413.score: 240.0
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  30. Terence E. Horgan (1997). Kim on Mental Causation and Causal Exclusion. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):165-84.score: 240.0
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  31. George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (1994). Southern Fundamentalism and the End of Philosophy. Philosophical Issues 5:219-247.score: 240.0
  32. Terence Horgan (2013). Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality. The Monist 96 (2):232-251.score: 240.0
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  33. Terence E. Horgan (1992). From Cognitive Science to Folk Psychology: Computation, Mental Representation, and Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):449-484.score: 240.0
  34. Terence E. Horgan (1998). Recognitional Concepts and the Compositionality of Concept Possession. Philosophical Issues 9:27-33.score: 240.0
  35. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2006). Cognition Needs Syntax but Not Rules. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing. 147--158.score: 240.0
    Human cognition is rich, varied, and complex. In this Chapter we argue that because of the richness of human cognition (and human mental life generally), there must be a syntax of cognitive states, but because of this very richness, cognitive processes cannot be describable by exceptionless rules. The argument for syntax, in Section 1, has to do with being able to get around in any number of possible environments in a complex world. Since nature did not know where in the (...)
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  36. Terence E. Horgan & George Graham (1991). In Defense of Southern Fundamentalism. Philosophical Studies 62 (May):107-134.score: 240.0
  37. Terence E. Horgan (2006). Review of Levine's Purple Haze. [REVIEW] Noûs 40 (3).score: 240.0
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  38. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1994). A Nonclassical Framework for Cognitive Science. Synthese 101 (3):305-45.score: 240.0
    David Marr provided a useful framework for theorizing about cognition within classical, AI-style cognitive science, in terms of three levels of description: the levels of (i) cognitive function, (ii) algorithm and (iii) physical implementation. We generalize this framework: (i) cognitive state transitions, (ii) mathematical/functional design and (iii) physical implementation or realization. Specifying the middle, design level to be the theory of dynamical systems yields a nonclassical, alternative framework that suits (but is not committed to) connectionism. We consider how a brain's (...)
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  39. Terence E. Horgan (1997). Connectionism and the Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Science. Metaphilosophy 28 (1-2):1-30.score: 240.0
    This is an overview of recent philosophical discussion about connectionism and the foundations of cognitive science. Connectionist modeling in cognitive science is described. Three broad conceptions of the mind are characterized, and their comparative strengths and weaknesses are discussed: (1) the classical computational conception in cognitive science; (2) a popular foundational interpretation of connectionism that John Tienson and I call “non-sentential computationalism”; and (3) an alternative interpretation of connectionism we call “dynamical cognition.” Also discussed are two recent philosophical attempts to (...)
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  40. Terence E. Horgan (1984). Supervenience and Cosmic Hermeneutics. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22 (S1):19-38.score: 240.0
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  41. Terence Horgan (1991). Metaphysical Realism and Psychologistic Semantics. Erkenntnis 34 (3):297--322.score: 240.0
    I propose a metaphysical position I call 'limited metaphysical realism', and I link it to a position in the philosophy of language I call 'psychologistic semantics'. Limited metaphysical realism asserts that there is a mind-independent, discourse-independent world, but posits a sparse ontology. Psychologistic semantics construes truth not as direct word/world correspondence, and not as warranted assertibility (or Putnam's "ideal" warranted assertibility), but rather as 'correct assertibility'. I argue that virtues of this package deal over each of the two broad positions (...)
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  42. Terence Horgan (1994). Robust Vagueness and the Forced-March Sorites Paradox. Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):159-188.score: 240.0
    I distinguish two broad approaches to vagueness that I call "robust" and "wimpy". Wimpy construals explain vagueness as robust (i.e., does not manifest arbitrary precision); that standard approaches to vagueness, like supervaluationism or appeals to degrees of truth, wrongly treat vagueness as wimpy; that vagueness harbors an underlying logical incoherence; that vagueness in the world is therefore impossible; and that the kind of logical incoherence nascent in vague terms and concepts is benign rather than malignant. I describe some implications for (...)
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  43. Terence Horgan (1998). The Transvaluationist Conception of Vagueness. The Monist 81 (2):313-330.score: 240.0
    Transvaluationism makes two fundamental claims concerning vagueness. First, vagueness is logically incoherent in a certain way: vague discourse is governed by semantic standards that are mutually unsatisfiable. But second, vagueness is viable and legitimate nonetheless; its logical incoherence is benign.
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  44. Terence E. Horgan (1989). Mental Quausation. Philosophical Perspectives 3:47-74.score: 240.0
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  45. David Henderson & Terence E. Horgan (2001). Practicing Safe Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):227 - 258.score: 240.0
    Reliablists have argued that the important evaluative epistemic concept of being justified in holding a belief, at least to the extent that that concept is associated with knowledge, is best understood as concerned with the objective appropriateness of the processes by which a given belief is generated and sustained. In particular, they hold that a belief is justified only when it is fostered by processes that are reliable (at least minimally so) in the believer’s actual world.[1] Of course, reliablists typically (...)
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  46. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1995). Connectionism and the Commitments of Folk Psychology. Philosophical Perspectives 9:127-52.score: 240.0
  47. Terence Horgan (1979). 'Could', Possible Worlds, and Moral Responsibility. Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):345-358.score: 240.0
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  48. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1992). Cognitive Systems as Dynamic Systems. Topoi 11 (1):27-43.score: 240.0
  49. Terence E. Horgan (1993). The Austere Ideology of Folk Psychology. Mind and Language 8 (2):282-297.score: 240.0
  50. David Henderson & Terence Horgan (2000). Iceberg Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):497-535.score: 240.0
    Accounts of what it is for an agent to be justified in holding a belief commonly carry commitments concerning what cognitive processes can and should be like. A concern for the plausibility of such commitments leads to a multi-faceted epistemology in which elements of traditionally conflicting epistemologies are vindicated within a single epistemological account. The accessible and articulable states that have been the exclusive focus of much epistemology must constitute only a proper subset of epistemologically relevant processing. The interaction of (...)
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