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Profile: Terry Horgan (University of Arizona)
  1. Terry Horgan & John Tienson, The Phenomenology of Embodied Agency.
    For the last 20 years or so, philosophers of mind have been using the term ‘qualia’, which is frequently glossed as standing for the “what-it-is-like” of experience. The examples of what-it-is-like that are typically given are feelings of pain or itches, and color and sound sensations. This suggests an identification of the experiential what-it-islike with such states. More recently, philosophers have begun speaking of the “phenomenology“ of experience, which they have also glossed as “what-it-is-like”. Many say, for example, that any (...)
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  2. Terry Horgan, The Two Envelope Paradox and the Foundations of Rational Decision Theory.
    You are given a choice between two envelopes. You are told, reliably, that each envelope has some money in it—some whole number of dollars, say—and that one envelope contains twice as much money as the other. You don’t know which has the higher amount and which has the lower. You choose one, but are given the opportunity to switch to the other. Here is an argument that it is rationally preferable to switch: Let x be the quantity of money in (...)
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  3. David Henderson & Terry Horgan (2013). Conceptually Grounded Necessary Truths. In Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy. Oup Oxford. 111.
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  4. David Henderson & Terry Horgan (2013). Risk Sensitive Animal Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):599-608.
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  5. Terry Horgan & Anna Mahtani (2013). Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Erkenntnis 78 (2):333-351.
    We present a new argument for the claim that in the Sleeping Beauty problem, the probability that the coin comes up heads is 1/3. Our argument depends on a principle for the updating of probabilities that we call ‘generalized conditionalization’, and on a species of generalized conditionalization we call ‘synchronic conditionalization on old information’. We set forth a rationale for the legitimacy of generalized conditionalization, and we explain why our new argument for thirdism is immune to two attacks that Pust (...)
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  6. Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2013). Epistemological Skepticism, Semantic Blindness, and Competence-Based Performance Errors. Acta Analytica 28 (2):161-177.
    The semantic blindness objection to contextualism challenges the view that there is no incompatibility between (i) denials of external-world knowledge in contexts where radical-deception scenarios are salient, and (ii) affirmations of external-world knowledge in contexts where such scenarios are not salient. Contextualism allegedly attributes a gross and implausible form of semantic incompetence in the use of the concept of knowledge to people who are otherwise quite competent in its use; this blindness supposedly consists in wrongly judging that there is genuine (...)
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  7. Terry Horgan (2012). Introspection About Phenomenal Consciousness: Running the Gamut From Infallibility to Impotence. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
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  8. Terry Horgan & George Graham (2012). Phenomenal Intentionality and Content Determinacy. In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning. De Gruyter.
  9. Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2012). Existence Monism Trumps Priority Monism. In Philip Goff (ed.), Spinoza on Monism. Palgrave Macmillan. 51--76.
     
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  10. Terry Horgan (2011). From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed. In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. 57.
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  11. Terry Horgan (2011). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Evidential Role of Perceptual Experience: Comments on Jack Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 153 (3):447 - 455.
    Phenomenal intentionality and the evidential role of perceptual experience: comments on Jack Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9604-2 Authors Terry Horgan, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  12. Terry Horgan (2011). The Phenomenology of Agency and Freedom: Lessons From Introspection and Lessons From Its Limits. Humana. Mente 15:77-97.
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  13. Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2011). Attention, Morphological Content and Epistemic Justification. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):73-86.
    In the formation of epistemically justified beliefs, what is the role of attention, and what is the role (if any) of non-attentional aspects of cognition? We will here argue that there is an essential role for certain nonattentional aspects. These involve epistemically relevant background information that is implicit in the standing structure of an epistemic agent’s cognitive architecture and that does not get explicitly represented during belief-forming cognitive processing. Since such “morphological content” (as we call it) does not become explicit (...)
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  14. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2011). Introspection and the Phenomenology of Free Will: Problems and Prospects. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1):180-205.
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  15. Terry Horgan (2010). Transvaluationism About Vagueness: A Progress Report. Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):67-94.
    The philosophical account of vagueness I call "transvaluationism" makes three fundamental claims. First, vagueness is logically incoherent in a certain way: it essentially involves mutually unsatisfiable requirements that govern vague language, vague thought-content, and putative vague objects and properties. Second, vagueness in language and thought (i.e., semantic vagueness) is a genuine phenomenon despite possessing this form of incoherence—and is viable, legitimate, and indeed indispensable. Third, vagueness as a feature of objects, properties, or relations (i.e., ontological vagueness) is impossible, because of (...)
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  16. Terry Horgan (2010). The Phenomenology of Agency and the Libet Results. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Lynn Nadel (eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet. Oup Usa. 159.
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  17. Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2010). The Epistemic Relevance of Morphological Content. Acta Analytica 25 (2):155-173.
    Morphological content is information that is implicitly embodied in the standing structure of a cognitive system and is automatically accommodated during cognitive processing without first becoming explicit in consciousness. We maintain that much belief-formation in human cognition is essentially morphological : i.e., it draws heavily on large amounts of morphological content, and must do so in order to tractably accommodate the holistic evidential relevance of background information possessed by the cognitive agent. We also advocate a form of experiential evidentialism concerning (...)
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  18. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2010). Mandelbaum on Moral Phenomenology and Moral Realism. In Ian Verstegen (ed.), Maurice Mandelbaum and American Critical Realism. Routledge. 105.
     
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  19. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2010). Untying a Knot From the Inside Out: Reflections on the “Paradox” of Supererogation. Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):29-63.
    In his 1958 seminal paper “Saints and Heroes”, J. O. Urmson argued that the then dominant tripartite deontic scheme of classifying actions as being exclusively either obligatory, or optional in the sense of being morally indifferent, or wrong, ought to be expanded to include the category of the supererogatory. Colloquially, this category includes actions that are “beyond the call of duty” (beyond what is obligatory) and hence actions that one has no duty or obligation to perform. But it is a (...)
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  20. Terry Horgan (2009). Materialism, Minimal Emergentism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
  21. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2009). Analytical Moral Functionalism Meets Moral Twin Earth. In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press.
    In Chapters 4 and 5 of his 1998 book From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Frank Jackson propounds and defends a form of moral realism that he calls both ‘moral functionalism’ and ‘analytical descriptivism’. Here we argue that this metaethical position, which we will henceforth call ‘analytical moral functionalism’, is untenable. We do so by applying a generic thought-experimental deconstructive recipe that we have used before against other views that posit moral properties and identify them with certain (...)
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  22. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2009). Expressivism and Contrary-Forming Negation. Philosophical Issues 19 (1):92-112.
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  23. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2009). Meets Moral Twin Earth. In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press. 221.
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  24. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2009). What Does the Frame Problem Tell Us About Moral Normativity? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):25 - 51.
    Within cognitive science, mental processing is often construed as computation over mental representations—i.e., as the manipulation and transformation of mental representations in accordance with rules of the kind expressible in the form of a computer program. This foundational approach has encountered a long-standing, persistently recalcitrant, problem often called the frame problem; it is sometimes called the relevance problem. In this paper we describe the frame problem and certain of its apparent morals concerning human cognition, and we argue that these morals (...)
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  25. Cei Maslen, Terry Horgan & Helen Daly (2009). Mental Causation. In Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oup Oxford.
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  26. Terry Horgan (2008). Review of Amie L. Thomasson, Ordinary Objects. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (5).
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  27. Terry Horgan (2008). Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Sleeping Beauty Problem: Reply to Pust. Synthese 160 (2):155 - 159.
    I maintain, in defending “thirdism,” that Sleeping Beauty should do Bayesian updating after assigning the “preliminary probability” 1/4 to the statement S: “Today is Tuesday and the coin flip is heads.” (This preliminary probability obtains relative to a specific proper subset I of her available information.) Pust objects that her preliminary probability for S is really zero, because she could not be in an epistemic situation in which S is true. I reply that the impossibility of being in such an (...)
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  28. Terry Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind. The Monist 91 (2):347-373.
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  29. Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2008). Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology. The Mit Press.
     
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  30. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2008). Prolegomena to a Future Phenomenology of Morals. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):115-131.
    Moral phenomenology is (roughly) the study of those features of occurrent mental states with moral significance which are accessible through direct introspection, whether or not such states possess phenomenal character – a what-it-is-likeness. In this paper, as the title indicates, we introduce and make prefatory remarks about moral phenomenology and its significance for ethics. After providing a brief taxonomy of types of moral experience, we proceed to consider questions about the commonality within and distinctiveness of such experiences, with an eye (...)
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  31. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2008). What Does Moral Phenomenology Tell Us About Moral Objectivity? Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):267-300.
    Moral phenomenology is concerned with the elements of one's moral experiences that are generally available to introspection. Some philosophers argue that one's moral experiences, such as experiencing oneself as being morally obligated to perform some action on some occasion, contain elements that (1) are available to introspection and (2) carry ontological objectivist purportargument from phenomenological introspection.neutrality thesisthe phenomenological data regarding one's moral experiences that is available to introspection is neutral with respect to the issue of whether such experiences carry ontological (...)
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  32. Ian Evans, Don Fallis, Peter Gross, Terry Horgan, Jenann Ismael, John Pollock, Paul D. Thorn, Jacob N. Caton, Adam Arico, Daniel Sanderman, Orlin Vakerelov, Nathan Ballantyne, Matthew S. Bedke, Brian Fiala & Martin Fricke (2007). An Objectivist Argument for Thirdism. Analysis 68.
    Bayesians take “definite” or “single-case” probabilities to be basic. Definite probabilities attach to closed formulas or propositions. We write them here using small caps: PROB(P) and PROB(P/Q). Most objective probability theories begin instead with “indefinite” or “general” probabilities (sometimes called “statistical probabilities”). Indefinite probabilities attach to open formulas or propositions. We write indefinite probabilities using lower case “prob” and free variables: prob(Bx/Ax). The indefinite probability of an A being a B is not about any particular A, but rather about the (...)
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  33. David Henderson & Terry Horgan (2007). Some Ins and Outs of Transglobal Reliabilism. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 100.
     
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  34. David Henderson, Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2007). Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism. Acta Analytica 22 (4):281-300.
    We propose an approach to epistemic justification that incorporates elements of both reliabilism and evidentialism, while also transforming these elements in significant ways. After briefly describing and motivating the non-standard version of reliabilism that Henderson and Horgan call “transglobal” reliabilism, we harness some of Henderson and Horgan’s conceptual machinery to provide a non-reliabilist account of propositional justification (i.e., evidential support). We then invoke this account, together with the notion of a transglobally reliable belief-forming process, to give an account of doxastic (...)
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  35. Terry Horgan (2007). Mental Causation and the Agent-Exclusion Problem. Erkenntnis 67 (2):183 - 200.
    The hypothesis of the mental state-causation of behavior (the MSC hypothesis) asserts that the behaviors we classify as actions are caused by certain mental states. A principal reason often given for trying to secure the truth of the MSC hypothesis is that doing so is allegedly required to vindicate our belief in our own agency. I argue that the project of vindicating agency needs to be seriously reconceived, as does the relation between this project and the MSC hypothesis. Vindication requires (...)
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  36. Terry Horgan (2007). Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Generalized Sleeping Beauty Problem. Analysis 67 (293):50–59.
  37. Terry Horgan & Uriah Kriegel (2007). Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness That We May Know It so Well? Philosophical Issues 17 (1):123-144.
    It has often been thought that our knowledge of ourselves is _different_ from, perhaps in some sense _better_ than, our knowledge of things other than ourselves. Indeed, there is a thriving research area in epistemology dedicated to seeking an account of self-knowledge that would articulate and explain its difference from, and superiority over, other knowledge. Such an account would thus illuminate the descriptive and normative difference between self-knowledge and other knowledge.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, self- knowledge has also encountered its (...)
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  38. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2007). Moorean Moral Phenomenology. In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Clarendon Press.
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  39. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2007). Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):279 - 295.
    According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of gut-level, emotion-driven intuition, and do so without reliance on reasoning and hence without reliance on moral principles. In recent years the intuitionist model has been forcefully defended by Jonathan Haidt. (...)
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  40. David Henderson & Terry Horgan (2006). Transglobal Reliabilism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):171-195.
    We here propose an account of what it is for an agent to be objectively justified in holding some belief. We present in outline this approach, which we call transglobal reliabilism, and we discuss how it is motivated by various thought experiments. While transglobal reliabilism is an externalist epistemology, we think that it accommodates traditional internalist concerns and objections in a uniquely natural and respectful way.
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  41. Terry Horgan (2006). Review of Joseph Levine, Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Noûs 40 (3):579–588.
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  42. Terry Horgan (2006). Materialism: Matters of Definition, Defense, and Deconstruction. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):157 - 183.
    How should the metaphysical hypothesis of materialism be formulated? What strategies look promising for defending this hypothesis? How good are the prospects for its successful defense, especially in light of the infamous "hard problem" of phenomenal consciousness? I will say something about each of these questions.
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  43. Terry Horgan (2006). Retreat From Non-Being. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):615 – 627.
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  44. Terry Horgan (2006). Retreat From Non-Being: Graham Priest, Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005, Pp. Xv+ 190,£ 30. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):615-627.
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  45. Terry Horgan (2006). Transvaluationism. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 14 (1):. 97-125.
    I advocate a two part view concerning vagueness. On one hand I claim that vagueness is logically incoherent; but on the other hand I claim that vagueness is also a benign, beneficial, and indeed essential feature of human language and thought. I will call this view transvaluationism, a name which seems to me appropriate for several reasons. First, the term suggests that we should move beyond the idea that the successive statements in a sorites sequence can be assigned differing truth (...)
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  46. Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2006). Abundant Truth in an Austere World. In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press. 137--167.
    What is real? Less than you might think. We advocate austere metaphysical realism---a form of metaphysical realism claiming that a correct ontological theory will repudiate numerous putative entities and properties that are posited in everyday thought and discourse, and also will even repudiate numerous putative objects and properties that are posited by well confirmed scientific theories. We have lately defended a specific version of austere metaphysical realism which asserts that there is really only one concrete particular, viz., the entire cosmos (...)
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  47. Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2006). Particularist Semantic Normativity. Acta Analytica 21 (1):45-61.
    We sketch the view we call contextual semantics. It asserts that truth is semantically correct affirmability under contextually variable semantic standards, that truth is frequently an indirect form of correspondence between thought/language and the world, and that many Quinean commitments are not genuine ontological commitments. We argue that contextualist semantics fits very naturally with the view that the pertinent semantic standards are particularist rather than being systematizable as exceptionless general principles.
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  48. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2006). Cognitivist Expressivism. In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press. 255--298.
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  49. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2006). Expressivism, Yes! Relativism, No! Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1:73-98.
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