Search results for 'Testimony' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. I. Plato’S. Testimony (2003). A Testimony of Anaximenes in Plato. Classical Quarterly 53:327-337.score: 120.0
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  2. Nicola Mößner (2011). The Concept of Testimony. In Christoph Jäger & Winfried Löffler (eds.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement, Papers of the 34. International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.score: 18.0
    Many contributors of the debate about knowledge by testimony concentrate on the problem of justification. In my paper I will stress a different point – the concept of testimony itself. As a starting point I will use the definitional proposal of Jennifer Lackey. She holds that the concept of testimony should be regarded as entailing two aspects – one corresponding to the speaker, the other one to the hearer. I will adopt the assumption that we need to (...)
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  3. Paulina Sliwa (2012). In Defense of Moral Testimony. Philosophical Studies 158 (2):175-195.score: 18.0
    In defense of moral testimony Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-21 DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9887-6 Authors Paulina Sliwa, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  4. Axel Gelfert (2010). Hume on Testimony Revisited. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 13:60-75.score: 18.0
    Among contemporary epistemologists of testimony, David Hume is standardly regarded as a "global reductionist", where global reductionism requires the hearer to have sufficient first-hand knowledge of the facts in order to individually ascertain the reliability of the testimony in question. In the present paper, I argue that, by construing Hume's reductionism in too individualistic a fashion, the received view of Hume on testimony is inaccurate at best, and misleading at worst. Hume's overall position is more amenable to (...)
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  5. Joachim Horvath (2008). Testimony, Transmission, and Safety. Abstracta 4 (1):27-43.score: 18.0
    Most philosophers believe that testimony is not a fundamental source of knowledge, but merely a way to transmit already existing knowledge. However, Jennifer Lackey has presented some counterexamples which show that one can actually come to know something through testimony that no one ever knew before. Yet, the intuitive idea can be preserved by the weaker claim that someone in a knowledge-constituting testimonial chain has to have access to some non-testimonial source of knowledge with regard to what is (...)
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  6. Philip Nickel (2001). Moral Testimony and its Authority. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (3):253-266.score: 18.0
    A person sometimes forms moral beliefs by relying on another person''s moral testimony. In this paper I advance a cognitivist normative account of this phenomenon. I argue that for a person''s actions to be morally good, they must be based on a recognition of the moral reasons bearing on action. Morality requires people to act from an understanding of moral claims, and consequently to have an understanding of moral claims relevant to action. A person sometimes fails to meet this (...)
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  7. Kourken Michaelian (2010). In Defence of Gullibility: The Epistemology of Testimony and the Psychology of Deception Detection. Synthese 176 (3):399-427.score: 18.0
    Research in the psychology of deception detection implies that Fricker, in making her case for reductionism in the epistemology of testimony, overestimates both the epistemic demerits of the antireductionist policy of trusting speakers blindly and the epistemic merits of the reductionist policy of monitoring speakers for trustworthiness: folk psychological prejudices to the contrary notwithstanding, it turns out that monitoring is on a par (in terms both of the reliability of the process and of the sensitivity of the beliefs that (...)
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  8. Charlie Pelling (2013). Testimony, Testimonial Belief, and Safety. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):205-217.score: 18.0
    Can one gain testimonial knowledge from unsafe testimony? It might seem not, on the grounds that if a piece of testimony is unsafe, then any belief based on it in such a way as to make the belief genuinely testimonial is bound itself to be unsafe: the lack of safety must transmit from the testimony to the testimonial belief. If in addition we accept that knowledge requires safety, the result seems to be that one cannot gain testimonial (...)
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  9. Kjartan Koch Mikalsen (2010). Testimony and Kant's Idea of Public Reason. Res Publica 16 (1):23-40.score: 18.0
    It is common to interpret Kant’s idea of public reason and the Enlightenment motto to ‘think for oneself’ as incompatible with the view that testimony and judgement of credibility is essential to rational public deliberation. Such interpretations have led to criticism of contemporary Kantian approaches to deliberative democracy for being intellectualistic, and for not considering our epistemic dependence on other people adequately. In this article, I argue that such criticism is insufficiently substantiated, and that Kant’s idea of public reason (...)
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  10. Audrey Yap (2013). Ad Hominem Fallacies, Bias, and Testimony. Argumentation 27 (2):97-109.score: 18.0
    An ad hominem fallacy is committed when an individual employs an irrelevant personal attack against an opponent instead of addressing that opponent’s argument. Many discussions of such fallacies discuss judgments of relevance about such personal attacks, and consider how we might distinguish those that are relevant from those that are not. This paper will argue that the literature on bias and testimony can helpfully contribute to that analysis. This will highlight ways in which biases, particularly unconscious biases, can make (...)
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  11. John MacFarlane (2005). Knowledge Laundering: Testimony and Sensitive Invariantism. Analysis 65 (286):132–138.score: 18.0
    According to “sensitive invariantism,” the word “know” expresses the same relation in every context of use, but what it takes to stand in this relation to a proposition can vary with the subject’s circumstances. Sensitive invariantism looks like an attractive reconciliation of invariantism and contextualism. However, it is incompatible with a widely-held view about the way knowledge is transmitted through testimony. If both views were true, someone whose evidence for p fell short of what was required for knowledge in (...)
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  12. Arnon Keren (2012). On the Alleged Perversity of the Evidential View of Testimony. Analysis 72 (4):700-707.score: 18.0
    According to the evidential view of testimony (EVT), the epistemic value of testimony is its value as evidence. Richard Moran has argued that because testimony is deliberately produced with the intention of making audiences form a belief, its value as evidence for the attested proposition is diminished; as a result, EVT cannot explain why we regard testimony as such a significant source of knowledge. I argue that this argument against EVT fails, because there is no reason (...)
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  13. Joseph Shieber (2009). Locke on Testimony: A Reexamination. History of Philosophy Quarterly 26 (1):21 - 41.score: 18.0
    In this paper I focus on John Locke as a representative figure of English Enlightenment theorizing about the legitimacy of cognitive authority and examine the way in which a greater attention to the cultural milieu in which Locke worked can lead to a profound reexamination of his writings on cognitive authority. In particular, I suggest that an inattention to the rise of a culture of reading and the growing availability of books in Early Modern England has led historians of philosophy (...)
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  14. Daniel Groll & Jason Decker (2014). Moral Testimony: One of These Things Is Just Like the Others. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):54-74.score: 18.0
    What, if anything, is wrong with acquiring moral beliefs on the basis of testimony? Most philosophers think that there is something wrong with it, and most point to a special problem that moral testimony is supposed to create for moral agency. Being a good moral agent involves more than bringing about the right outcomes. It also involves acting with "moral understanding" and one cannot have moral understanding of what one is doing via moral testimony. And so, adherents (...)
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  15. Axel Gelfert (2006). Kant on Testimony. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 14 (4):627 – 652.score: 18.0
    Immanuel Kant is often regarded as an exponent of the ‘individualist’ tradition in epistemology, according to which testimony is not a fundamental source of knowledge. The present paper argues that this view is far from accurate. Kant devotes ample space to discussions of testimony and, in his lectures on logic, arrives at a distinct and stable philosophical position regarding testimony. Important elements of this position consist in (a) acknowledging the ineliminability of testimony; (b) realizing that (...) can establish empirical knowledge with certainty; (c) establishing a presumptive principle regarding the acceptance of testimony; (d) arguing for a symmetry between knowledge based on experience and knowledge based on testimony. Rejecting testimony as a fundamental source of knowledge merely on the basis that no theoretically necessary ground for its truth can be given, would, as Kant puts it, indicate ‘a lack of moral interest’. Such ‘incredulity’ would be a form of ‘logical egoism’: it demonstrates an unwillingness or inability to think oneself in the place of others, yet this we must do if we are to trust our own judgements. While Kant strongly endorses testimony as a source of empirical knowledge, he does, however, make one important restriction: ‘Propositions of reason’ (Vernunftwahrheiten), such as universal moral principles, may not be adopted on the basis of testimony. I argue that this distinction, between testimonial knowledge of empirical matters of fact and individual knowledge of propositions of reason, is an important element of Kant’s epistemology of testimony, as it explains how his strong endorsement of testimony as a source of knowledge can be squared with his equally strong demand for intellectual autonomy. Finally, I comment on the overall implications of this account for Kant’s discussion, elsewhere in his work, of the public nature of communication. (shrink)
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  16. Matthew Frise (2014). Speaking Freely: On Free Will and the Epistemology of Testimony. Synthese 191 (7):1587-1603.score: 18.0
    Peter Graham has recently given a dilemma purportedly showing the compatibility of libertarianism about free will and the anti-skeptical epistemology of testimony. In the first part of this paper I criticize his dilemma: the first horn either involves a false premise or makes the dilemma invalid. The second horn relies without argument on an implausible assumption about testimonial knowledge, and even if granted, nothing on this horn shows libertarianism does not entail skepticism about testimonial justification. I then argue for (...)
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  17. Anil Gomes (forthcoming). Testimony and Other Minds. Erkenntnis:1-11.score: 18.0
    In this paper I defend the claim that testimony can serve as a basic source of knowledge of other people’s mental lives against the objection that testimonial knowledge presupposes knowledge of other people’s mental lives and therefore can’t be used to explain it.
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  18. Katie Steele (2012). Testimony as Evidence: More Problems for Linear Pooling. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):983-999.score: 18.0
    This paper considers a special case of belief updating—when an agent learns testimonial data, or in other words, the beliefs of others on some issue. The interest in this case is twofold: (1) the linear averaging method for updating on testimony is somewhat popular in epistemology circles, and it is important to assess its normative acceptability, and (2) this facilitates a more general investigation of what it means/requires for an updating method to have a suitable Bayesian representation (taken here (...)
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  19. Rolfe King (2013). Divine Self-Testimony and the Knowledge of God. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (3):279-295.score: 18.0
    A proof is offered that aims to show that there can be no knowledge of God, excluding knowledge based on natural theology, without divine self-testimony. Both special and general revelation, if they occur, would be forms of divine self-testimony. It is argued that this indicates that the best way to model such knowledge of God is on the basis of an analogy with knowledge gained through testimony, rather than perceptual models of knowledge, such as the prominent model (...)
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  20. Endre Begby (forthcoming). Lexical Norms, Language Comprehension, and the Epistemology of Testimony. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.score: 18.0
    Most testimonial exchange occurs by way of linguistic communication. This suggests that the epistemology of language comprehension is importantly implicated in the epistemology of testimony. But how? This paper takes its departure from a recent argument developed by Sanford Goldberg. According to Goldberg, reflection on the connections between the epistemologies of language comprehension and testimony provides a novel argument for linguistic normativity: without positing public linguistic norms we would be at a loss to account for widely assumed epistemic (...)
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  21. Axel Gelfert (forthcoming). A Critical Introduction to Testimony. Bloomsbury.score: 18.0
    Introduction / 1. What is Testimony? / 2. The Testimonial Conundrum / 3. Testimony, Perception, Memory, and Inference / 4. Testimony and Evidence / 5. Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism / 6. Hybrid Theories of Testimony / 7. Testimonial Knowledge: Transmission and Generation / 8. Trust and Assurance / 9. Expert Testimony / 10. Pathologies of Testimony / 11. Testimony and the Value of Knowledge / Glossary / Bibliography / Index.
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  22. Lydia McGrew (2013). Tall Tales and Testimony to the Miraculous. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (2):39-55.score: 18.0
    In the debate over testimony to miracles, a common Humean move is to emphasize the prior improbability of miracles as the most important epistemic factor. Robert Fogelin uses the example of Henry, who tells multiple tall tales about meeting celebrities, to argue that low prior probabilities alone can render testimony unbelievable, with obvious implications for testimony to miracles. A detailed Bayesian analysis of Henry’s stories shows instead that the fact that Henry tells multiple stories about events that (...)
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  23. Roger W. H. Savage (2012). Aesthetic Experience, Mimesis and Testimony. Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies 3 (1):172-193.score: 18.0
    In this article, I relate the demand that Paul Ricoeur suggests mimesis places on the way we think about truth to the idea that the work of art is a model for thinking about testimony. By attributing a work’s epoché of reality to the work of imagination, I resolve the impasse that arises from attributing music, literature, and art’s distance from the real to their social emancipation. Examining the conjunction, in aesthetic experience, of the communicability and the exemplarity of (...)
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  24. Trudy Govier (1993). When Logic Meets Politics: Testimony, Distrust, and Rhetorical Disadvantage. Informal Logic 15 (2).score: 18.0
    The contested testimony in the Hill-Thomas ease is an illuminating test case for universalistic theories about the reliability of testimony. There is no reasonable alternative to universalistic standards of epistemic appraisal. And yet the charge by feminists and others that such criteria can be applied selectively and used to discredit and silence people is shown to be accurate. The road to a solution is to offer guidelines for the interpretation and application of these norms.
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  25. Paul L. Harris & Jonathan D. Lane (2013). Infants Understand How Testimony Works. Topoi:1-16.score: 18.0
    Children learn about the world from the testimony of other people, often coming to accept what they are told about a variety of unobservable and indeed counter-intuitive phenomena. However, research on children’s learning from testimony has paid limited attention to the foundations of that capacity. We ask whether those foundations can be observed in infancy. We review evidence from two areas of research: infants’ sensitivity to the emotional expressions of other people; and their capacity to understand the exchange (...)
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  26. Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew (2012). The Reliability of Witnesses and Testimony to the Miraculous. In Jake Chandler Victoria S. Harrison (ed.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford.score: 18.0
    The formal representation of the strength of witness testimony has been historically tied to a formula — proposed by Condorcet — that uses a factor representing the reliability of an individual witness. This approach encourages a false dilemma between hyper-scepticism about testimony, especially to extraordinary events such as miracles, and an overly sanguine estimate of reliability based on insufficiently detailed evidence. Because Condorcet’s formula does not have the resources for representing numerous epistemically relevant details in the unique situation (...)
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  27. Nicola Mößner & Markus Seidel (2008). Is the Principle of Testimony Simply Epistemically Fundamental or Simply Not? Swinburne on Knowledge by Testimony. In Nicola Mößner, Sebastian Schmoranzer & Christian Weidemann (eds.), Richard Swinburne. Christian Philosophy in a Modern World. Ontos.score: 18.0
    The recently much discussed phenomenon of testimony as a social source of knowledge plays a crucial justificatory role in Richard Swinburne's philosophy of religion. Although Swinburne officially reduces his principle of testimony to the criterion of simplicity and, therefore, to a derivative epistemic source, we will show that simplicity does not play the crucial role in this epistemological context. We will argue that both Swinburne's philosophical ideas and his formulations allow for a fundamental epistemic principle of testimony, (...)
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  28. Michael J. Shaffer (2007). The Ad Verecundiam Fallacy and Appeals to Expert Testimony. In Proceedings of the 6th ISSA Conference on Argumentation.score: 18.0
    In this paper I argue that Tyler Burge's non-reductive view of testiomonial knowledge cannot adeqautrely discriminate between fallacious ad vericumdium appeals to expet testimony and legitimate appeals to authority.
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  29. J. Adam Carter & Philip J. Nickel (2014). On Testimony and Transmission. Episteme 11 (02):145-155.score: 16.0
    Jennifer Lackey’s case “Creationist Teacher,” in which students acquire knowledge of evolutionary theory from a teacher who does not herself believe the theory, has been discussed widely as a counterexample to so-called transmission theories of testimonial knowledge and justification. The case purports to show that a speaker need not herself have knowledge or justification in order to enable listeners to acquire knowledge or justification from her assertion. The original case has been criticized on the ground that it does not really (...)
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  30. Kourken Michaelian (2013). The Information Effect: Constructive Memory, Testimony, and Epistemic Luck. Synthese 190 (12):2429-2456.score: 16.0
    The incorporation of post-event testimonial information into an agent’s memory representation of the event via constructive memory processes gives rise to the misinformation effect, in which the incorporation of inaccurate testimonial information results in the formation of a false memory belief. While psychological research has focussed primarily on the incorporation of inaccurate information, the incorporation of accurate information raises a particularly interesting epistemological question: do the resulting memory beliefs qualify as knowledge? It is intuitively plausible that they do not, for (...)
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  31. Timothy Perrine (forthcoming). In Defense of Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony. Synthese:1-11.score: 16.0
    Almost everyone agrees that many testimonial beliefs constitute knowledge. According to non-reductionists, some testimonial beliefs possess positive epistemic status independent of that conferred by perception, memory, and induction. Recently, Jennifer Lackey has provided a counterexample to a popular version of this view. Here I argue that her counterexample fails.
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  32. Boaz Miller (forthcoming). Scientific Consensus and Expert Testimony in Courts Lessons From the Bendectin Litigation. Foundations of Science.score: 16.0
    A consensus in a scientific community is often used as a resource for making informed ‎public-policy decisions and deciding between rival expert testimonies in legal trials. This ‎paper contains a social-epistemic analysis of the high-profile Bendectin drug controversy, ‎which was decided in the courtroom inter alia by deference to an emerging scientific ‎consensus about the safety of Bendectin. Drawing on Miller’s theory of knowledge based ‎consensus, I argue that the consensus in this case was not knowledge based, hence courts’ ‎deference (...)
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  33. C. A. J. Coady (1973). Testimony and Observation. American Philosophical Quarterly 108 (2):149-55.score: 15.0
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  34. Peter J. Graham (2000). The Reliability of Testimony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):695-709.score: 15.0
  35. Peter King & Nathan Ballantyne (2009). Augustine on Testimony. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 195-214.score: 15.0
  36. Joseph Shieber (2010). Between Autonomy and Authority: Kant on the Epistemic Status of Testimony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):327-348.score: 15.0
  37. Paul Dicken (2011). On Some Limitations of Humean Disagreement: Miraculous Testimony and Contrary Religions. Sophia 50 (3):345-355.score: 15.0
  38. Joel P. Eigen (2006). The Case of the Missing Defendant: Medical Testimony in Trials of the Unconscious. Harvard Review of Psychiatry 14 (3):177-181.score: 15.0
  39. Jim Davies & David Matheson (2012). The Cognitive Importance of Testimony. Principia 16 (2):297-318.score: 15.0
    http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p297 Os teóricos da mente têm sustentado por longo tempo que o testemunho, como fonte de crença, desempenha um papel fundamentalmente importante na cognição humana. Não está claro, contudo, exatamente por que o testemunho recebeu tal importância cognitiva. Distinguimos três sugestões sobre essa questão: a asserção do número , que considera que a importância cognitiva do testemunho é função do número de crenças que ele geralmente produz relativamente a outras fontes de crença; a afirmação de confiabilidade , que liga a (...)
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  40. Francine Wynn (2002). Nursing and the Concept of Life: Towards an Ethics of Testimony. Nursing Philosophy 3 (2):120-132.score: 15.0
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  41. I. Testimony-Based Belief (2006). Testimony, Credulity, and Veracity. In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press. 25.score: 15.0
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  42. Carolyn J. Dean (2010). Minimalism and Victim Testimony. History and Theory 49 (4):85-99.score: 15.0
    This essay renews a discussion of how historians do, and should, represent atrocity. It argues that the problems of representing extreme violence remain under-conceptualized; in this context it discusses the strengths and weaknesses of minimalism, a style prevalent both in historiography and in an intellectual culture that values understatement in approaches to violence. The essay traces the general cultural preference for minimalist narratives of suffering, which, it claims, is driven by the widespread conviction that experimental and exuberant narratives convert victims' (...)
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  43. Charles Pigden (1995). Review of Testimony by C.A.J. Coady. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1).score: 15.0
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  44. Douglas Walton (2005). Begging the Question in Arguments Based on Testimony. Argumentation 19 (1):85-113.score: 15.0
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  45. Catherine Mills (2005). Linguistic Survival and Ethicality: Biopolitics, Subjectivation, and Testimony in Remnants of Auschwitz. In Andrew Norris (ed.), Politics, Metaphysics, and Death: Essays on Giorgio Agamben's Homo Sacer. Duke University Press.score: 15.0
  46. Jennifer Lackey (2010). Testimony: Acquiring Knowledge From Others. In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press.score: 12.0
    Virtually everything we know depends in some way or other on the testimony of others—what we eat, how things work, where we go, even who we are. We do not, after all, perceive firsthand the preparation of the ingredients in many of our meals, or the construction of the devices we use to get around the world, or the layout of our planet, or our own births and familial histories. These are all things we are told. Indeed, subtracting from (...)
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  47. Robert Audi (2013). Testimony as a Social Foundation of Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):507-531.score: 12.0
    Testimony is the mainstay of human communication and essential for the spread of knowledge. But testimony may also spread error. Under what conditions does it yield knowledge in the person addressed? Must the recipient trust the attester? And does the attester have to know what is affirmed? A related question is what is required for the recipient to be justified in believing testimony. Is testimony-based justification acquired in the same way as testimony-based knowledge? This paper (...)
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  48. C. A. J. Coady (1992). Testimony: A Philosophical Study. Oxford University Press.score: 12.0
    Our trust in the word of others is often dismissed as unworthy, because the illusory ideal of "autonomous knowledge" has prevailed in the debate about the nature of knowledge. Yet we are profoundly dependent on others for a vast amount of what any of us claim to know. Coady explores the nature of testimony in order to show how it might be justified as a source of knowledge, and uses the insights that he has developed to challenge certain widespread (...)
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  49. Rodney D. Holder (1998). Hume on Miracles: Bayesian Interpretation, Multiple Testimony, and the Existence of God. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):49-65.score: 12.0
    Hume's argument concerning miracles is interpreted by making approximations to terms in Bayes's theorem. This formulation is then used to analyse the impact of multiple testimony. Individual testimonies which are ‘non-miraculous’ in Hume's sense can in principle be accumulated to yield a high probability both for the occurrence of a single <span class='Hi'>miracle</span> and for the occurrence of at least one of a set of miracles. Conditions are given under which testimony for miracles may provide support for the (...)
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  50. Jennifer Lackey (2006). The Nature of Testimony. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):177–197.score: 12.0
    I discuss several views of the nature of testimony and show how each proposal has importantly different problems. I then offer a diagnosis of the widespread disagreement regarding this topic; specifically, I argue that our concept of testimony has two different aspects to it. Inadequate views of testimony, I claim, result either from collapsing these two aspects into a single account or from a failure to recognize one of them. Finally, I develop an alternative view of (...) that captures both aspects of the nature of testimony and thereby provides the basis for an illuminating theory of testimony's epistemological significance. (shrink)
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