Search results for 'The Senses' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Mohan Matthen (2015). The Individuation of the Senses. In Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press 567-586.
    How many senses do humans possess? Five external senses, as most cultures have it—sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste? Should proprioception, kinaesthesia, thirst, and pain be included, under the rubric bodily sense? What about the perception of time and the sense of number? Such questions reduce to two. 1. How do we distinguish a sense from other sorts of information-receiving faculties? 2. By what principle do we distinguish the senses? Aristotle discussed these questions in the De Anima. (...)
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  2. Stephen Biggs, Mohan Matthen & Dustin Stokes (2014). Sorting the Senses. In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and its Modalities. Oxford University Press 1-19.
    We perceive in many ways. But several dubious presuppositions about the senses mask this diversity of perception. Philosophers, scientists, and engineers alike too often presuppose that the senses (vision, audition, etc.) are independent sources of information, perception being a sum of these independent contributions. We too often presuppose that we can generalize from vision to other senses. We too often presuppose that vision itself is best understood as a passive receptacle for an image thrown by a lens. (...)
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  3. Richard Gray (2011). On the Nature of the Senses. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press
    The failure to resolve satisfactorily epistemological issues surrounding the identification of different senses has led to questions being asked of the nature of the senses. This issue has been thrown into sharp focus by two starkly contrasting positions. The first is a realist position that draws on science and is based on the application of criteria. The second is an anti-realist position that adheres to commonsense conceptions and is partly motivated by the apparent failure of criterial approaches. In (...)
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  4.  22
    Peter W. Ross (2001). Qualia and the Senses. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):495-511.
    How should we characterize the nature of perceptual experience? Some theorists claim that colour experiences, to take an example of perceptual experiences, have both intentional properties and properties called 'colour qualia', namely, mental qualitative properties which are what it is like to be conscious of colour. Since proponents of colour qualia hold that these mental properties cannot be explained in terms of causal relations, this position is in opposition to a functionalist characterization of colour experience.
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  5. John O'Dea (2011). A Proprioceptive Account of the Senses. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classical and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press
    Representationalist theories of sensory experience are often thought to be vulnerable to the existence of apparently non-representational differences between experiences in different sensory modalities. Seeing and hearing seem to differ in their qualia, quite apart from what they represent. The origin of this idea is perhaps Grice’s argument, in “Some Remarks on the Senses,” that the senses are distinguished by “introspectible character.” In this chapter I take the Representationalist side by putting forward an account of sense modalities which (...)
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  6. Charles S. Travis (2004). The Silence of the Senses. Mind 113 (449):57-94.
    There is a view abroad on which perceptual experience has representational content in this sense: in it something is represented to the perceiver as so. On the view, a perceptual experience has a face value at which it may be taken, or which may be rejected. This paper argues that that view is mistaken: there is nothing in perceptual experience which makes it so that in it anything is represented as so. In that sense, the senses are silent, or, (...)
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  7. James J. Gibson (1968). The Senses Considered As Perceptual Systems. Allen & Unwin.
  8. Matthew Nudds (2011). The Senses as Psychological Kinds. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford
    The distinction we make between five different senses is a universal one.<sup>1</sup> Rather than speaking of generically perceiving something, we talk of perceiving in one of five determinate ways: we see, hear, touch, smell, and taste things. In distinguishing determinate ways of perceiving things what are we distinguishing between? What, in other words, is a sense modality?<sup>2</sup> An answer to this question must tell us what constitutes a sense modality and so needs to do more than simply describe differences (...)
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  9.  71
    Gary Hatfield (1986). The Senses and the Fleshless Eye: The Meditations as Cognitive Exercises. In Amelie Rorty (ed.), Essays on Descartes' Meditations. University of California Press 45–76.
    According to the reading offered here, Descartes' use of the meditative mode of writing was not a mere rhetorical device to win an audience accustomed to the spiritual retreat. His choice of the literary form of the spiritual exercise was consonant with, if not determined by, his theory of the mind and of the basis of human knowledge. Since Descartes' conception of knowledge implied the priority of the intellect over the senses, and indeed the priority of an intellect operating (...)
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  10. Fiona Macpherson (2011). Taxonomising the Senses. Philosophical Studies 153 (1):123-142.
    I argue that we should reject the sparse view that there are or could be only a small number of rather distinct senses. When one appreciates this then one can see that there is no need to choose between the standard criteria that have been proposed as ways of individuating the senses—representation, phenomenal character, proximal stimulus and sense organ—or any other criteria that one may deem important. Rather, one can use these criteria in conjunction to form a fine-grained (...)
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  11.  71
    Fiona Macpherson (ed.) (2011). The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    This volume is the first on the philosophy of the non-visual senses. It includes in equal measure both "classic" articles (from Aristotle to Paul Grice) which are unavailable or otherwise difficult to access, as well as new essays by well-known philosophers. It also includes an introduction by Macpherson, which draws together the centuries of philosophical thought on the senses and points to likely new directions.
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  12. Fiona Macpherson (2011). Individuating the Senses. In The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press
  13.  24
    Keith A. Wilson, Are the Senses Silent? Travis’s Argument From Looks.
    Many philosophers and scientists take perceptual experience, whatever else it involves, to be representational. That is, to perceive an object via one or more of our senses is to represent it as being some particular way: that tomato is red, round, sweet, and so on. In ‘The Silence of the Senses’, Charles Travis argues that this view involves a kind of category mistake, and consequently that perceptual experiences are non-representational. However, the details of this argument are somewhat obscure, (...)
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  14. P. Ross (2001). Qualia and the Senses. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):495-511.
    In his classic paper, "Some Remarks about the Senses," H. P. Grice argues that our intuitive distinction among perceptual modalities requires that the modalities be characterized in terms of the introspectible character of experience. I first show that Grice's argument provides support for the claim that perceptual experiences have qualia, namely, mental qualitative properties of experience which are what it's like to be conscious of perceived properties such as color. I then defend intentionalism about experience, which rejects qualia, by (...)
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  15.  8
    Diana F. Ackerman (1990). A Natural History of the Senses. Random House.
    A. NATURAL. HISTORY. OF. THE. SENSES. “This is one of the best books of the year—by any measure you want to apply. It is interesting, informative, very well written. This book can be opened on any page and read with relish.... thoroughly  ...
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  16. C. E. Emmer (2001). The Senses of the Sublime: Possibilities for a Non-Ocular Sublime in Kant's Critique of Judgment. In Volker Gerhardt, Rolf Horstmann & Ralph Schumacher (eds.), Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung: Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Vol. 3. Walter de Gruyter
    It might at first seem that the senses (the five traditionally recognized conduits of outer sense) would have very little to contribute to an investigation of Kant's aesthetics. Is not Kant's aesthetic theory based on a relation of the higher cognitive faculties? Much however can be revealed by asking to what degree sight is essential to aesthetic judgment (of beauty and the sublime) as Kant describes it in the 'Critique of Judgment.' Here the sublime receives particular attention.
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  17.  40
    Brian Bruya (2003). Review of Geaney's On the Epistemology of the Senses in Early Chinese Thought. [REVIEW] China Review International 10 (1):157-164.
    This is a full length review in which I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of Jane Geaney's On the Epistemology of the Senses in Early Chinese Thought. Geaney's strengths lie in her refusal to import Western epistemological presuppositions into depictions of Early Chinese philosophy, her meticulous canvassing of key Warring States texts, and her insightful reconstruction of Early Chinese epistemology as based on perception rather than abstract concepts. Her weaknesses are the limited range of her representative texts and her (...)
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  18. Matthew Nudds (2004). The Significance of the Senses. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):31-51.
    Standard accounts of the senses attempt to answer the question how and why we count five senses (the counting question); none of the standard accounts is satisfactory. Any adequate account of the senses must explain the significance of the senses, that is, why distinguishing different senses matters. I provide such an explanation, and then use it as the basis for providing an account of the senses and answering (...)
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  19.  32
    Robert Jütte (2005). A History of the Senses: From Antiquity to Cyberspace. Polity.
    This path-breaking book examines our attitudes to the senses from antiquity through to the present day.
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  20.  58
    Stephen C. Levinson & Asifa Majid (2014). Differential Ineffability and the Senses. Mind and Language 29 (4):407-427.
    Ineffability, the degree to which percepts or concepts resist linguistic coding, is a fairly unexplored nook of cognitive science. Although philosophical preoccupations with qualia or nonconceptual content certainly touch upon the area, there has been little systematic thought and hardly any empirical work in recent years on the subject. We argue that ineffability is an important domain for the cognitive sciences. For examining differential ineffability across the senses may be able to tell us important things about how the mind (...)
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  21.  58
    Julian Kiverstein, Mirko Farina & Andy Clark (forthcoming). Substituting the Senses. In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press
    Sensory substitution devices are a type of sensory prosthesis that (typically) convert visual stimuli transduced by a camera into tactile or auditory stimulation. They are designed to be used by people with impaired vision so that they can recover some of the functions normally subserved by vision. In this chapter we will consider what philosophers might learn about the nature of the senses from the neuroscience of sensory substitution. We will show how sensory substitution devices work by exploiting the (...)
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  22.  9
    B. Keeley (2009). The Role of Neurobiology in Differentiating the Senses. In John Bickle (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press 226--250.
    It is common to account for our senses on the basis of our sensory organs. One way of glossing why Aristotle famously counted five senses—and why his count became common sense in the West and elsewhere—is because there are five rather obvious organs of sense. In more modern accounts, this organ criterion of the senses has transformed into a neurobiological criterion; that is to say, part of what it means to be a sense is to have an (...)
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  23. Brian L. Keeley (2002). Making Sense of the Senses: Individuating Modalities in Humans and Other Animals. Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):5-28.
    How ought we differentiate the senses? What, say, distinguishes vision from audition? The question comes in two versions. First, there is the traditional problem of individuating the senses in humans. Second, there is also an important question about what sensory modalities we ought to attribute to non-human animals, a version of the question that has been virtually ignored by philosophers. Modality ought to be construed as an “avenue into” an organism for information external to the central nervous system. (...)
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  24. Stefanie Rocknak (2007). The Vulgar Conception of Objects in 'Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses. Hume Studies 33 (1):67-90.
    In this paper, we see that contrary to most readings of T 1.4.2 in the Treatise (“Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses”), Hume does not think that objects are sense impressions. This means that Hume’s position on objects (whatever that may be) is not to be conflated with the vulgar perspective. Moreover, the vulgar perspective undergoes a marked transition in T 1.4.2, evolving from what we may call vulgar perspective I into vulgar perspective II. This paper presents (...)
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  25.  8
    Brian L. Keeley, What Kinds of Kind Are the Senses?
    In Western common sense, one speaks of there being five human senses, a claim apparently challenged by the biological and psychological sciences. Part of this challenge comes in the form of claiming the existence of additional senses. Part of the challenge comes from positing multiple senses where common sense only speaks of one, such as with the fractionation of “touch” into pressure and temperature senses. One conceptual difficulty in thinking about the number and division of (...) is that it's not clear whether the different senses constitute natural kinds and, if not, what kind of kind they are. Should we favor antirealism with respect to the senses, akin to the arguments of some concerning the nature of species or race? I will argue that this first problem is compounded by another: that we ought to be pluralists with respect to the senses—what is meant by the term “sense” varies from context to context, varying even between scientific contexts. (shrink)
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  26.  85
    Michael Scott (2007). Distinguishing the Senses. Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):257 – 262.
    Seeing, hearing and touching are phenomenally different, even if we are detecting the same spatial properties with each sense. This presents a prima facie problem for intentionalism, the theory that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. The paper reviews some attempts to resolve this problem, and then looks in detail at Peter Carruthers' recent proposal that the senses can be individuated by the way in which they represent spatial properties and incorporate time. This proposal is shown to be ineffective (...)
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  27.  41
    Kc Klement (2010). The Senses of Functions in the Logic of Sense and Denotation. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 16 (2):153-188.
    This paper discusses certain problems arising within the treatment of the senses of functions in Alonzo Church's Logic of Sense and Denotation. Church understands such senses themselves to be "sense-functions," functions from sense to sense. However, the conditions he lays out under which a sense-function is to be regarded as a sense presenting another function as denotation allow for certain undesirable results given certain unusual or "deviant" sense-functions. Certain absurdities result, e.g., an argument can be found for equating (...)
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  28.  28
    Louise Richardson (2014). Non Sense-Specific Perception and the Distinction Between the Senses. Res Philosophica 91 (2):215-239.
    How should interaction between the senses affect thought about them? I try to capture some ways in which non sense-specific perception might be thought to make it impossible or pointless or explanatorily idle to distinguish between senses. This task is complicated by there being more than one view of the nature of the senses, and more than one kind of non sense-specific perception. I argue, in particular, that provided we are willing to forgo certain assumptions about, for (...)
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  29.  26
    Bryson Brown (2003). Notes on Hume and Skepticism of the Senses. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):289-303.
    In A Treatise of Human Nature Hume wrote a long section titled “Of skepticism with regard to the senses.” The discussion examines two key features of our beliefs about the objects making up the external world: 1. They continue to exist, even when unperceived. 2. They are distinct from the mind and its perceptions. The upshot of the discussion is a graceful sort of intellectual despair:I cannot conceive how such trivial qualities of the fancy, conducted by such false suppositions, (...)
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  30.  15
    John Heil (2011). The Senses, Excerpt From Perception and Cognition. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press 136.
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  31.  13
    Brian L. Keeley (2011). Making Sense of the Senses: Individuating Modalities in Humans and Other Animals. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press 220.
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  32.  6
    Ann W. Astell (2009). A Discerning Smell: Olfaction Among the Senses in St. Bonaventure's Long Life of St. Francis. Franciscan Studies 67 (1):91-131.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The fifth chapter of Saint Bonaventure's Long Life of Saint Francis, the Legenda maior , is a veritable blazon of the body of Francis and its senses, physical and spiritual. The first chapter in the so-called "Inner Life" – the sequence of eight chapters on the virtues of St. Francis – Chapter Five is notable for its insistent focus on sensory experience, due both to Francis's physical mortifications (...)
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  33.  20
    Magni Martens & H. Martens (2008). The Senses Linking Mind and Matter. Mind and Matter 6 (1):51-86.
    The present paper suggests how, from a scientific perspective, the senses establish a link between mind and matter. Ongoing research in sensory science and data analysis is related to the ongoing debate about a non-reductive theory of consciousness based on psychophysical principles. Sensory science is interdisciplinary and deals with the human perception of objects by the senses of sight, smell, taste, touch, hearing etc. Perception as information pro- cessing is here understood in terms of interactions between external physical (...)
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  34.  14
    Kipp McMichael & Geoffrey Bingham (2001). Functional Separation of the Senses is a Requirement of Perception/Action Research. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (2):227-228.
    Stoffregen & Bardy's arguments against separation of the senses fail to consider the functional differences between the kinds of information potentially available in the structured energy arrays that correspond to the traditional senses. Since most perception/action research pursues a strategy of information perturbation presupposing differential contributions from the various ambient arrays, the global array hypothesis can only be extended and tested by analyses that consider the functional aspects along which the senses can, in fact, be separated.
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  35.  1
    Melanie Swalwell (2002). The Senses and Memory in Intercultural Cinema. Film-Philosophy 6 (3).
    Laura U. Marks _The Skin of the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and the Senses_ Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000 ISBN 0-8223-2391-5 298 pp.
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  36. Bouscaren (1927). How Are the Senses True. Modern Schoolman 3 (8):127-128.
    Father Bouscaren, professor of Logic and Ontology in the St. Louis Unversity School of Philosophy, has made a penetrating study of the knotty problem of the veracity of the senses. This is the first article in an important series. The Editor.
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  37. Kevin Teo Kia-Choong (2006). Joan Mellen (2004) In the Realm of the Senses. Film-Philosophy 10 (1):78-82.
    Joan Mellen In the Realm of the Senses London: British Film Institute ISBN: 1 8445 7034 7.
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  38. Fiona Macpherson (ed.) (2011). The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press Usa.
    The senses, or sensory modalities, constitute the different ways we have of perceiving the world, such as seeing, hearing, touching, tasting and smelling. But how many senses are there? How many could there be? What makes the senses different? What interaction takes place between the senses? This book is a guide to thinking about these questions. Together with an extensive introduction to the topic, the book contains the key classic papers on this subject together with nine (...)
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  39.  4
    Cretien van Campen (2014). The Proust Effect: The Senses as Doorways to Lost Memories. OUP Oxford.
    The senses can be powerful triggers for memories of our past, eliciting a range of both positive and negative emotions. In this book we explore what is so special about sense memories, how they work in the brain, how they can enrich our daily life, and even how they can help those suffering from problems involving memory.
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  40. Bernhard Waldenfels (2002). On the Rhythm of the Senses. Phainomena 39.
    Acknowledging sensuous worlds, which bestow sensual qualities on life-world, we are facing the age-old problem of how to think the intra- and intermodal unity of the senses and how to explain the corresponding phenomenon of synaesthesia. In tackling this problem, we will first pay our attention to the rhythmical quality of the senses. It is situated on the very threshold of the formation of the senses. The question about the natural or artificial nature of sensory rhythms begs (...)
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  41. Kathy Behrendt (2015). The Senses of and Ending. In Patrick Stokes (ed.), Narrative, Identity, and the Kierkegaardian Self. 186-202.
    Many philosophical discussions of the narrative self touch upon the end of life. End-related terms and concepts that occur in these discussions include finitude, completion, closure, telos, retroactive meaning-conferral, life shape, and a closed beginning-middle-and-end structure. Those who emphasise life’s end in non-philosophical narrative contexts are perhaps clearer on its significance. The end is thought to play a key role in the story of a life, securing or enhancing the life narrative’s meaning or value, and thereby warranting special treatment and (...)
     
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  42.  20
    Thomas A. Stoffregen & Benoît G. Bardy (2001). On Specification and the Senses. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (2):195-213.
    In this target article we question the assumption that perception is divided into separate domains of vision, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. We review implications of this assumption for theories of perception and for our understanding of ambient energy arrays (e.g., the optic and acoustic arrays) that are available to perceptual systems. We analyze three hypotheses about relations between ambient arrays and physical reality: (1) that there is an ambiguous relation between ambient energy arrays and physical reality, (2) that there (...)
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  43.  51
    Stephen Menn (2008). Al-Fārābī's Kitāb Al-Urūf and His Analysis of the Senses of Being. Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 18 (1):59-97.
    Al-Fbb al-f, is apparently the first person to maintain that existence, in one of its senses, is a second-order concept [mal th]. As he interprets Metaphysics d] has two meanings, second-order being as truth'' (including existence as well as propositional truth), and first-order being as divided into the categories.'' The paronymous form of the Arabic word mawjd] distinct from their essences: for al-Kindd of all things. Against this, al-Fburr thinks that Greek more appropriately expressed many such concepts, including being, (...)
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  44.  35
    Hans Moravec, The Senses Have No Future.
    Senses evolved to when the world was wild, enabling our ancestors to detect subtle passing opportunities and dangers. Senses are less useful in a tamer world, where our interactions become more and more simple information exchanges. Senses, and the instincts using them, are increasingly liabilities, demanding entertainment rather than providing useful services. The anachronism will become more apparent as virtual realities, prosthetic sense organs and brain to computer interfaces become common. Imagine reading a computer screen if your (...)
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  45.  1
    Gerald Vision (1970). Essentialism and the Senses of Proper Names. American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (4):321 - 330.
    Some philosophers believe that the doctrine that individuals have (nominal) essences is supported by arguments designed to show that proper names have senses. Three such arguments are extracted from recent pieces of philosophy: one from the absurdity of bare particulars, A second from the necessary conditions for identifying bearers of proper names, And a third from the ability to replace proper names in discourse with the help of sortal terms. All three arguments are rejected upon examination. The bearing this (...)
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    Nicholas J. Wade (2001). Abolition of the Senses. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (2):243-244.
    In advocating an extreme form of specification requiring the abolition of separate senses, Stoffregen & Bardy run the risk of diverting attention from the multisensory integration of perception and action they wish to champion.
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  47. Raja Bahlul (1992). Ash'ari's Theological Determinisma and the Senses of 'Can'. Hamdard Islamicus 15 (1):39-57.
    In this paper I argue that al Ash'ari was a Theological Determinist whose position on free will and human responsibility was marred by his failure to distinguish between two senses of the word 'can' (yastati'u ). I also compare al Ash'ari's position with that of the Mu'tazilite thinker al Qadi 'Abd al Jabbar. I conclude that their positions may not have been so much opposed to each other as merely different. This, I suggest, should invite us to re evaluate (...)
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  48. G. E. R. Lloyd & G. E. L. Owen (eds.) (1978). Aristotle on Mind and the Senses: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Aristotelicum. Cambridge University Press.
    The Symposia Aristotelica were inaugurated at Oxford in 1957. They are conferences of select groups of Aristotelian scholars from the UK, USA and Europe, and are held every three years. In 1975 the meeting was held in Cambridge and was devoted to Aristotle's psychological treatises, the De anima and the Parva uaturalia. The members of the conference discussed some of the much debated problems of Aristotle's psychology and broached important new topics such as his ideas on imagination. Dr Lloyd and (...)
     
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  49. Jonathan Rée (1999). I See a Voice: Deafness, Language, and the Senses--A Philosophical History. Metropolitan Books, H. Holt and Co..
    A groundbreaking study of deafness, by a philosopher who combines the scientific erudition of Oliver Sacks with the historical flair of Simon Schama. There is nothing more personal than the human voice, traditionally considered the expression of the innermost self. But what of those who have no voice of their own and cannot hear the voices of others? In this tour de force of historical narrative, Jonathan Ree tells the astonishing story of the deaf, from the sixteenth century to the (...)
     
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  50. Jane Geaney (2002). On the Epistemology of the Senses in Early Chinese Thought. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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