7 found
Sort by:
  1. Theo C. Meyering (2001). The Causal Powers of Belief: A Critique From Practical Realism. In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Theo C. Meyering (2000). Physicalism and Downward Causation in Psychology and the Special Sciences. Inquiry 43 (2):181-202.
    Physicalism ? or roughly the view that the stuff that physics talks about is all the stuff there is ? has had a popular press in philosophical circles during the twentieth century. And yet, at the same time, it has become quite fashionable lately to believe that the mind matters in this world after all and that psychology is an autonomous science irreducible to physics. However, if (true, downward) mental causation implies non-reducibility and Physicalism implies the converse, it is hard (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Theo C. Meyering (1999). Mind Matters: Physicalism and the Autonomy of the Person. In Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. Notre Dame: University Notre Dame Press.
  4. Theo C. Meyering (1999). Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. Notre Dame: University Notre Dame Press.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Theo C. Meyering (1997). Fodor's Information Semantics Between Naturalism and Mentalism. Inquiry 40 (2):187-207.
  6. Theo C. Meyering (1994). Fodor's Modularity: A New Name for an Old Dilemma. Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):39-62.
    This paper critically examines the argument structure of Fodor's theory of modularity. Fodor claims computational autonomy as the essential properly of modular processing. This property has profound consequences, burdening modularity theory with corollaries of rigidity, non-plasticity, nativism, and the old Cartesian dualism of sensing and thinking. However, it is argued that Fodor's argument for computational autonomy is crucially dependent on yet another postulate of Fodor's theory, viz. his thesis of strong modularity, ie. the view that functionally distinct modules must also (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Theo C. Meyering & Gary Hatfield (1993). Historical Roots of Cognitive Science: The Rise of a Cognitive Theory of Perception From Antiquity to the Nineteenth Century. Philosophy of Science 60 (4):659.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation