9 found
Sort by:
  1. Theodore Guleserian (2008). Ontological Determination and the Grounding Objection to Counterfactuals of Freedom. Faith and Philosophy 25 (4):394-415.
    Alvin Plantinga’s reply to the grounding objection to propositions now called counterfactuals of freedom, originally made by Robert Adams, can be interpretedas follows: if, for the sake of argument, we require counterfactuals of freedom to be grounded in something that makes them true, we can simply say that there are corresponding counterfactual facts that ground them. I argue that such facts, together with the facts about the situations in which moral agents find themselves, would ontologically determine that the agents perform (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Theodore Guleserian (2007). Gregory W. Fitch, 1948-2007. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 81 (2):172 -.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Theodore Guleserian (2000). Divine Freedom and the Problem of Evil. Faith and Philosophy 17 (3):348-366.
    The traditional theistic philosopher is committed to hold that God has a perfect will essentially, and that this is better than having a free will. It will be argued that God, being omnipotent, would have the power to create creatures who also have a perfect will essentially. This creates a problem for the traditional theist in solving the problem of moral evil. The problem of actual moral evil will not then be solvable by reference to the value of our moral (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Theodore Guleserian (1985). Can Moral Perfection Be an Essential Attribute? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (2):219-241.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Theodore Guleserian (1983). God and Possible Worlds: The Modal Problem of Evil. Noûs 17 (2):221-238.
    Using four principles common to several theories about possible worlds, It is argued that the necessary existence of a divine being that is essentially omnipotent, Omniscient, And morally perfect is impossible. The central argument employs the premise that there are possible worlds that any divine being ought not to actualize (because of their evil contents). This premise is then defended on the grounds that the same sort of justification that we give for other modal statements that we accept can be (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Theodore Guleserian (1971). Contemporary Materialism and Epistemological Values. International Philosophical Quarterly 11 (September):403-426.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Theodore Guleserian (1971). Factual Necessity and the Libertarian. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 32 (2):188-204.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Theodore Guleserian (1971). On Two Aspects of Eliminative Materialism. Philosophy of Science 38 (2):282-289.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation