8 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Ted Everett (SUNY Geneseo)
  1. Theodore J. Everett & Bruce M. Everett (forthcoming). Justice and Gini Coefficients. Politics, Philosophy and Economics:1470594-14528653.
    Gini coefficients, which measure gross inequalities rather than their unfair components, are often used as proxy measures of absolute or relative distributive injustice in Western societies. This presupposes that the fair inequalities in these societies are small and stable enough to be ignored. This article presents a model for a series of ideal, perfectly just societies, where comfortable lives are equally available to everyone, and calculates the Gini coefficients for each. According to this model, inequalities produced by age and other (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Theodore J. Everett (2014). Peer Disagreement and Two Principles of Rational Belief. :1-14.
    Peer Disagreement and Two Principles of Rational Belief. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2014.968176.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Theodore J. Everett (2010). Observation and Induction. Logos and Episteme 1 (2):303-324.
    This article offers a simple technical resolution to the problem of induction, which is to say that general facts are not always inferred from observations of particular facts, but are themselves sometimes defeasibly observed. The article suggests a holistic account of observation that allows for general statements in empirical theories to be interpreted as observation reports, in place of the common but arguably obsolete idea that observations are exclusively particular. Predictions and other particular statements about unobservable facts can then appear (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Theodore J. Everett (2006). Antiskeptical Conditionals. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):505–536.
    Empirical knowledge exists in the form of antiskeptical conditionals, which are propositions like [if I am not undetectably deceived, then I am holding a pen]. Such conditionals, despite their trivial appearance, have the same essential content as the categorical propositions that we usually discuss, and can serve the same functions in science and practical reasoning. This paper sketches out two versions of a general response to skepticism that employs these conditionals. The first says that our ordinary knowledge attributions can safely (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Theodore J. Everett (2002). Analyticity Without Synonymy in Simple Comparative Logic. Synthese 130 (2):303 - 315.
    In this paper I provide some formal schemas for the analysis of vague predicates in terms of a set of semantic relations other than classical synonymy, including weak synonymy (as between "large" and "huge"), antonymy (as between "large" and "small"), relativity (as between "large" and "large for a dog"), and a kind of supervenience (as between "large" and "wide" or "long"). All of these relations are representable in the simple comparative logic CL, in accordance with the basic formula: the more (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Theodore J. Everett (2001). The Rationality of Science and the Rationality of Faith. Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):19-42.
    Why is science so rare and faith so common in human history? Traditional cultures persist because it is subjectively rational for each maturing child to defer to the unanimous beliefs of his elders, regardless of any personal doubts. Science is possible only when individuals promote new theories (which will probably be proven false) and forgo the epistemic advantages of accepting established views (which are more likely to be true). Hence, progressive science progress must rely upon the epistemic altruism of experimental (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Theodore J. Everett (2000). A Simple Logic for Comparisons and Vagueness. Synthese 123 (2):263-278.
    I provide an intuitive, semantic account of a new logic forcomparisons (CL), in which atomic statements are assigned both aclassical truth-value and a ``how much'''' value or extension in the range [0, 1]. The truth-value of each comparison is determinedby the extensions of its component sentences; the truth-value ofeach atomic depends on whether its extension matches a separatestandard for its predicate; everything else is computed classically. CL is less radical than Casari''s comparative logics, in that it does not allow for (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Theodore J. Everett (2000). Other Voices, Other Minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):213-222.
    Solipsism can be refuted along fairly traditional, internalist lines, by means of a second-order induction. We are justified in believing in other minds, because other people tell us that they have minds, and we have good inductive reason to believe that whatever certain others say is likely to be true. This simple argument is sound, the author argues, even though we are in no prior position to believe that other thinking people exist as such, or that the sounds they make (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation