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Theodore M. Drange [26]Theodore Michael Drange [1]
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Profile: Theodore Drange (West Virginia University)
  1. Theodore M. Drange (2000). The Fine-Tuning Argument Revisited. Philo 3 (2):38 - 49.
    A version of the fine-tuning argument (FTA) considered in a previous essay is replaced by an improved version, which is then refuted. Advocates of FTA must proclaim that there is no world ensemble, that a great many alternatives to the physical constants of our universe are physically possible and roughly equal in probability to them, and that alternate hypothetical worlds are all, or almost all, uninteresting in comparison to our universe. But no reason has been produced to believe ’any’ of (...)
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  2.  7
    Theodore M. Drange (1993). The Argument From Non-Belief. Religious Studies 29 (4):417 - 432.
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  3. Theodore M. Drange, Atheism, Agnosticism, Noncognitivism (1998).
    This online essay puts forth and defends precise definitions of the terms "atheism," "agnosticism." and "[theological] noncognitivism.".
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  4.  71
    Theodore M. Drange (2000). The Fine-Tuning Argument Revisited. Philo 3 (2):38-49.
    A version of the Fine-tuning Argument (FTA) considered in a previous essay is replaced by an improved version, which is then refuted.Advocates of FTA must proclaim that there is no world ensemble, that a great many alternatives to the physical constants of our universe are physically possible and roughly equal in probability to them, and that alternate hypothetical worlds are all, or almost all, uninteresting in comparison to our universe. But no reason has been produced to believe any of these (...)
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  5.  3
    Theodore M. Drange (1993). The Argument From Non-Belief: THEODORE M. DRANGE. Religious Studies 29 (4):417-432.
    Attempts have been made to prove God's non-existence. Often this takes the form of an appeal to the so-called Argument from Evil: if God were to exist, then he would not permit as much suffering in the world as there actually is. Hence the fact that there is so much suffering constitutes evidence for God's non-existence. In this essay I propose a variation which I shall call ‘The Argument from Non-belief’. Its basic idea is that if God were to exist, (...)
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  6.  90
    Theodore M. Drange, The Fine Tuning Argument (1998).
    Let us consider that version of the Argument from Design which appeals to the so called "fine tuning" of the physical constants of the universe. Call it "the Fine tuning Argument." It has many advocates, both on the Internet and in print. For some of the Internet articles, see the following web site: http://www.reasons.org/resources/papers/>. One of the argument's "print" advocates is George Schlesinger, who says the following: In the last few decades a tantalizingly great number of exceedingly rare coincidences, vital (...)
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  7.  60
    Theodore M. Drange (1994). Slater on Self-Referential Arguments. Analysis 54 (1):61 - 64.
    This is a reply to B. H. Slater's article "Liar Syllogisms and Related Paradoxes" (Analysis 51, 146-153), which raised an objection to one of the arguments considered in my article "Liar Syllogisms" (Analysis 50, 1-7). Slater's objection is shown to be a failure. In effect, the paradoxicality of liar syllogisms is vindicated.
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  8.  11
    Theodore M. Drange (1990). Liar Syllogisms. Analysis 50 (1):1 - 7.
    This article is about self-referential arguments that are akin to the paradox of the liar. They make reference to their own validity, invalidity, soundness, unsoundness, or to the truth or falsity of their own premises or conclusions. Several very puzzling examples of such arguments are considered and their paradoxicality is defended against objections.
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  9.  61
    Theodore M. Drange, On Defending Atheism (2005).
    This essay addresses the definition of "atheism" and what it means to "defend atheism." It also shows why defending atheism is preferable to defending the separation of church and state.
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  10.  36
    Theodore M. Drange (1998). Nonbelief Vs. Lack of Evidence. Philo 1 (1):105-114.
    After a presentation of the problem of God's hiddenness, there is discussion of two arguments for God's nonexistence related to that problem. One is the Lack-of-evidence Argument (LEA), according to which there would have been good objective evidence of God's existence if he were to exist. The other is the Argument from Nonbelief (ANB), according to which there would not be as many nonbelievers as there actually are if God were to exist. Reasons are given for assessing ANB as a (...)
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  11. Theodore M. Drange (2015). The Pluralizability Objection to a New-Body Afterlife. In Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.), The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death. Rowman & Littlefield 405-408.
    This paper presents and defends that an afterlife in which a person receives a new body after his or her old body is destroyed (as it is on some notions of bodily resurrection) is conceptually impossible. The main idea behind this argument is that such an afterlife would conceptually require that a person be a kind of thing that could be rendered plural. But since persons are not that type of thing, such an afterlife is not conceptually possible.
     
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  12.  36
    Theodore M. Drange (2005). Is “God Exists” Cognitive? Philo 8 (2):137-150.
    The title question is approached by distinguishing two senses of “God” and two senses of “cognitive” (or “cognitively meaningful”), producing four separate questions. Each is given an affirmative or negative answer, which is defended against possible objections. At the end, the debate between atheism and theological non-cognitivism is addressed, with the atheist side argued to have the preferable outlook.
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  13.  49
    Theodore M. Drange, Science and Miracles (1998).
    This online essay explores how the term "miracle" is best defined and whether it is possible for scientists, as scientists, to believe in miracles.
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  14.  14
    Theodore M. Drange (1998). Nonbelief Vs. Lack of Evidence. Philo 1 (1):105-114.
    After a presentation of the problem of God's hiddenness, there is discussion of two arguments for God's nonexistence related to that problem. One is the Lack-of-evidence Argument (LEA), according to which there would have been good objective evidence of God's existence if he were to exist. The other is the Argument from Nonbelief (ANB), according to which there would not be as many nonbelievers as there actually are if God were to exist. Reasons are given for assessing ANB as a (...)
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  15.  2
    Theodore M. Drange (1998). Nonbelief Vs. Lack of Evidence: Two Atheologlcal Arguments. Philo 1 (1):105-114.
    Here are two atheological arguments, called the “Lack-of-evidence Argument” and “the Argument from Nonbelief” . LEA: Probably, if God were to exist then there would be good objective evidence for that. But there is no good objective evidence for God’s existence. Therefore, probably God does not exist. ANB: Probably, if God were to exist then there would not be many nonbelievers in the world. But there are many nonbelievers in the world. Therefore, probably God does not exist. Reasons are given (...)
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  16.  37
    Theodore M. Drange, Why Be Moral? (1998).
    It is shown how the title question ("Why Be Moral?") can be interpreted in six different ways. Each of the six ways is analyzed and discussed, and, for each of them, an answer to the question is proposed and defended.
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  17.  26
    Theodore M. Drange, The Argument From the Bible (1996).
    Almost all evangelical Christians believe that the writing of the Bible was divinely inspired and represents God's main revelation to humanity. They also believe that the Bible contains special features which constitute evidence of its divine inspiration. This would be a use of the Bible to prove God's existence within natural theology rather than within revealed theology, since the book's features are supposed to be evident even to (open-minded) skeptics. Furthermore, since a divinely inspired work must be true, those features (...)
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  18.  22
    Theodore M. Drange (2002). McHugh's Expectations Dashed. Philo 5 (2):242-248.
    In “A Refutation of Drange’s Arguments from Evil and Nonbelief” (Philo, vol. 5, no. 1), Christopher McHugh posed his so-calledExpectations Defense against versions of the Argument from Evil and Argument from Nonbelief that appear in my book Nonbelief & Evil. I here raise objections to his defense.
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  19.  29
    Theodore M. Drange (1998). Incompatible-Properties Arguments: A Survey. Philo 1 (2):49-60.
    Ten arguments for the nonexistence of God are formulated and discussed briefly. Each of them ascribes to God a pair of properties from the following list of divine attributes: perfect, immutable, transcendent, nonphysical, omniscient, omnipresent, personal, free, all-loving, all-just, all-merciful, and the creator of the universe. Each argument aims to demonstrate an incompatibility between the two properties ascribed. The pairs considered are: 1. , 2. , 3. , 4. , 5, , 6. , 7. , 8. , 9. , and (...)
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  20. Theodore M. Drange (2000). A Response to Parrish on the Fine-Tuning Argument. Philosophia Christi 2 (1):61 - 67.
    This is response to Stephen Parrish’s article "Theodore Drange on the Fine-Tuning Argument: A Critique," ’Philosophia Christi’, Series 2, 1 (No. 2, 1999), which attacked a section of my book ’Nonbelief and Evil: Two Arguments for God’s Nonexistence’ (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1998). The Fine-Tuning Argument (FTA) maintains that the physical constants of our universe exhibit evidence of "fine-tuning" by an intelligent designer. In opposition, I suggest alternate explanations which are at least as good. Here I defend my objections to (...)
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  21.  27
    Theodore M. Drange, Can Creationism Be Scientific? (1998).
    My answer to the title question is a qualified "Yes." A certain rare form of creationism is in principle testable and compatible with natural law, and therefore scientific, however, this is a moot point. I arrive at my conclusions purely through thought experiments. But before getting to that, let us first consider the issues of what creationism is and what it means for a theory to be scientific.
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  22.  18
    Theodore M. Drange (2003). Gale on Omnipotence. Philo 6 (1):23-26.
    This is a brief critical assessment of Richard Gale’s treatment of arguments for God’s non-existence which make appeal to the concept of omnipotence. I mostly agree with what Gale says, but have found some additional issues worth exploring.
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  23.  16
    Theodore M. Drange (1998). Incompatible-Properties Arguments. Philo 1 (2):49-60.
    Ten arguments for the nonexistence of God are formulated and discussed briefly. Each of them ascribes to God a pair of properties from the following list of divine attributes: (a) perfect, (b) immutable, (c) transcendent, (d) nonphysical, (e) omniscient, (f) omnipresent, (g) personal, (h) free, (i) all-loving, (j) all-just, (k) all-merciful, and (1) the creator of the universe. Each argument aims to demonstrate an incompatibility between the two properties ascribed. The pairs considered are: 1. (a-1), 2. (b-1), 3. (b-e), 4. (...)
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  24.  11
    Theodore M. Drange (2005). Reply to Critics. Philo 8 (2):169-182.
    In this essay I respond to comments on my work by Stephen T. Davis and Keith Parsons.
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  25.  7
    Theodore M. Drange, Review of Jordan Howard Sobel's Logic and Theism (2006). [REVIEW]
    The book is long, abstruse, technical (making ample use of symbolic logic and Bayesian notation), and written in a rather difficult style. Nevertheless, for those up to reading it who have an interest in its topics, it is a most valuable work. It is directed mainly at professional analytical philosophers with a background in both deductive and inductive logic. For such readers, I recommend this book most highly.
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  26. Theodore M. Drange (2015). Conceptual Problems Confronting a Totally Disembodied Afterlife. In Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.), The Myth of an Afterlife. Rowman & Littlefield 329-333.
    This paper presents and defends an argument for the conclusion that a personal afterlife in the absence of any sort of body at all is not conceptually possible. The main idea behind the argument is that there would be no way for the identities of people in a bodiless state to be established, either by others or by themselves. The argument raises a significant challenge to explaining just how someone in a totally disembodied afterlife could ever be identified—a challenge that (...)
     
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