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Theodore W. Schick [5]Theodore W. Schick Jr [4]
  1. Theodore W. Schick, Analysis And Analyticity.
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  2. Theodore W. Schick Jr (1992). The Epistemic Role of Qualitative Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):383-393.
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  3. Theodore W. Schick (1992). The Epistemic Role of Qualitative Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):383-93.
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  4. Theodore W. Schick Jr (1991). How is Philosophy Possible? International Philosophical Quarterly 31 (2):203-212.
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  5. Theodore W. Schick Jr (1989). The Idealistic Implications of Bell's Theorem. Idealistic Studies 19 (2):131-140.
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  6. Theodore W. Schick (1989). Computers and Self-Knowledge. Thought 64 (2):137-145.
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  7. Theodore W. Schick (1989). The Semantic Role of Qualitative Content. Southern Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):125-133.
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  8. Theodore W. Schick (1987). Rorty and Davidson on Alternate Conceptual Schemes. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 1 (4):291 - 303.
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  9. Theodore W. Schick Jr (1985). In Defense of the Correspondence Theory. Philosophy Research Archives 11:319-334.
    The correspondence theory of truth has often been attacked on the grounds that the notion of correspondence is too vague to do any serious philosophical work. More recently it has been attacked on the grounds that the sort of correspondence required by the theory does not exist.I argue, on the contrary, that there are no compelling reasons for believing that the requisite sort of correspondence does not exist and that the notion of correspondence can be made clear enough to yield (...)
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