Search results for 'Thinking thing' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Larry Hauser (1993). Why Isn't My Pocket Calculator a Thinking Thing? Minds and Machines 3 (1):3-10.score: 120.0
    My pocket calculator (Cal) has certain arithmetical abilities: it seems Cal calculates. That calculating is thinking seems equally untendentious. Yet these two claims together provide premises for a seemingly valid syllogism whose conclusion -- Cal thinks -- most would deny. I consider several ways to avoid this conclusion, and find them mostly wanting. Either we ourselves can't be said to think or calculate if our calculation-like performances are judged by the standards proposed to rule out Cal; or the standards (...)
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  2. Stefan Gruner (2008). Comments on 'How Would You Know If You Synthesized a Thinking Thing'. Minds and Machines 18 (1):107-120.score: 120.0
    In their Minds and Machines essay How would you know if you synthesized a Thinking Thing? (Kary & Mahner, Minds and Machines, 12(1), 61–86, 2002), Kary and Mahner have chosen to occupy a high ground of materialism and empiricism from which to attack the philosophical and methodological positions of believers in artificial intelligence (AI) and artificial life (AL). In this review I discuss some of their main arguments as well as their philosophical foundations. Their central argument: ‘AI is (...)
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  3. Michael Kary & Martin Mahner (2002). How Would You Know If You Synthesized a Thinking Thing? Minds and Machines 12 (1):61-86.score: 102.0
    We confront the following popular views: that mind or life are algorithms; that thinking, or more generally any process other than computation, is computation; that anything other than a working brain can have thoughts; that anything other than a biological organism can be alive; that form and function are independent of matter; that sufficiently accurate simulations are just as genuine as the real things they imitate; and that the Turing test is either a necessary or sufficient or scientific (...)
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  4. William J. Rapaport (1993). Because Mere Calculating Isn't Thinking: Comments on Hauser's Why Isn't My Pocket Calculator a Thinking Thing?. Minds and Machines 3 (1):11-20.score: 90.0
  5. Nuno P. Monteiro (2012). We Can Never Study Merely One Thing: Reflections on Systems Thinking and IR. Critical Review 24 (3):343-366.score: 78.0
    Robert Jervis's System Effects was published just as systems thinking began to decline among political scientists, who were adopting increasingly strict standards of causal identification, privileging experimental and large-N studies. Many politically consequential system effects are not amenable to research designs that meet these standards, yet they must nonetheless be studied if the most important questions of international politics are to be answered. For example, if nuclear weapons are considered in light of their effect on the international system as (...)
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  6. Cora Kaplan (1996). 'A Heterogeneous Thing': Female Childhood and the Rise of Racial Thinking in Victorian Britain. In Diana Fuss (ed.), Human, All Too Human. Routledge. 169--202.score: 72.0
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  7. Marie-Eve Morin (2010). Thinking Things: Heidegger, Sartre, Nancy. Sartre Studies International 15 (2):35-53.score: 66.0
    This paper compares Sartre's and Nancy's experience of the plurality of beings. After briefly discussing why Heidegger cannot provide such an experience, it analyzes the relation between the in-itself and for-itself in Sartre and between bodies and sense in Nancy in order to ask how this experience can be nauseating for Sartre, but meaningful for Nancy. First, it shows that the articulation of Being into beings is only a coat of veneer for Sartre while for Nancy Being is necessarily plural. (...)
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  8. Felipe De Brigard (2013). Is Memory for Remembering? Recollection as a Form of Episodic Hypothetical Thinking. Synthese 191 (2):1-31.score: 54.0
    Misremembering is a systematic and ordinary occurrence in our daily lives. Since it is commonly assumed that the function of memory is to remember the past, misremembering is typically thought to happen because our memory system malfunctions. In this paper I argue that not all cases of misremembering are due to failures in our memory system. In particular, I argue that many ordinary cases of misremembering should not be seen as instances of memory’s malfunction, but rather as the normal result (...)
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  9. Shane Mackinlay (2013). Thinking Things Through: Essays in Philosophy and Christian Faith [Book Review]. Australasian Catholic Record, The 90 (4):500.score: 48.0
    Mackinlay, Shane Review(s) of: Thinking things through: Essays in philosophy and Christian faith, by Andrew Murray SM, (Adelaide: ATF Theology, 2012), pp. 228 + xvi, $34.95 (Electronic: $15.95).
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  10. Gregory R. Peterson (2003). Being Conscious of Marc Bekoff: Thinking of Animal Self-Consciousness. Zygon 38 (2):247-256.score: 42.0
    The preceding article by Marc Bekoff reveals much about our current understanding of animal self-consciousness and its implications. It also reveals how much more there is to be said and considered. This response briefly examines animal self-consciousness from scientific, moral, and theological perspectives. As Bekoff emphasizes, self-consciousness is not one thing but many. Consequently, our moral relationship to animals is not simply one based on a graded hierarchy of abilities. Furthermore, the complexity of animal self-awareness can serve as stimulus (...)
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  11. Robert A. Wilson, Review of Derek Melser, The Act of Thinking. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.score: 42.0
    This is a book that challenges the current orthodoxy, both in the philosophy of mind and in the cognitive sciences, that thinking (construed broadly to include perceiving, imagining, remembering, etc.) is a mental process in the head. Such a view has been largely taken for granted since the demise of behaviorism in the 1960s, and it underpins both the representational and computational theories of mind, including their connectionist and dynamicist variants. While the orthodoxy has been rejected in recent years (...)
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  12. David Cole, Images and Thinking: Critique of Arguments Against Images as a Medium of Thought.score: 42.0
    The Way of Ideas died an ignoble death, committed to the flames by behaviorist empiricists. Ideas, pictures in the head, perished with the Way. By the time those empiricists were supplanted at the helm by functionalists and causal theorists, a revolution had taken place in linguistics and the last thing anyone wanted to do was revive images as the medium of thought. Currently, some but not all cognitive scientists think that there probably are mental images - experiments in cognitive (...)
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  13. Brayton Polka (2012). The Metaphysics of Thinking Necessary Existence: Kant and the Ontological Argument. The European Legacy 17 (5):583 - 591.score: 42.0
    I argue in my paper that, when the ?twofold standpoint,? in terms of which Kant undertakes to set metaphysics upon the revolutionary path of critical reason, is truly assessed, we discover that the fundamental distinction that he makes between subject and object, between thinking (together with desiring and willing) and knowing, between thinking the thing in itself and knowing objects of possible experience, or between freedom and nature, recapitulates the ontological argument demonstrating the necessary relationship between thought (...)
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  14. James H. Fetzer (1997). Thinking and Computing: Computers as Special Kinds of Signs. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 7 (3):345-364.score: 42.0
    Cognitive science has been dominated by the computational conception that cognition is computation across representations. To the extent to which cognition as computation across representations is supposed to be a purposive, meaningful, algorithmic, problem-solving activity, however, computers appear to be incapable of cognition. They are devices that can facilitate computations on the basis of semantic grounding relations as special kinds of signs. Even their algorithmic, problem-solving character arises from their interpretation by human users. Strictly speaking, computers as such — apart (...)
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  15. Michael Neu (2011). Why There is No Such Thing as Just War Pacifism and Why Just War Theorists and Pacifists Can Talk Nonetheless. Social Theory and Practice 37 (3):413-433.score: 42.0
    Can just war theory and pacifism be substantially reconciled in theory and practice? In this paper I argue that James Sterba is mistaken in thinking that they can. There is no such thing as just war pacifism. However, this does not mean that just war theorists and pacifists cannot have a reasonable conversation about the justifiability of war. They can have such a conversation if they overcome their exclusive concern with the question of action-guidingness, that is, the binary (...)
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  16. Isaac Linder (2013). Stage Notes and/as/or Track Changes: Introductory Remarks and Magical Thinking on Printing: An Election and a Provocation. Continent 2 (4):244-247.score: 42.0
    In this issue we include contributions from the individuals presiding at the panel All in a Jurnal's Work: A BABEL Wayzgoose, convened at the second Biennial Meeting of the BABEL Working Group. Sadly, the contributions of Daniel Remein, chief rogue at the Organism for Poetic Research as well as editor at Whiskey & Fox , were not able to appear in this version of the proceedings. From the program : 2ND BIENNUAL MEETING OF THE BABEL WORKING GROUP CONFERENCE “CRUISING IN (...)
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  17. Catherine A. Adams (2010). Teachers Building Dwelling Thinking with Slideware. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology 10 (1).score: 42.0
    Teacher-student discourse is increasingly mediated through, by and with information and communication technologies: in-class discussions have found new, textually-rich venues online; chalk and whiteboard lectures are rapidly giving way to PowerPoint presentations. Yet, what does this mean experientially for teachers? This paper reports on a phenomenological study investigating teachers’ lived experiences of PowerPoint in post-secondary classrooms. As teachers become more informed about the affordances of information and communication technology like PowerPoint and consequently take up and use these tools in their (...)
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  18. Greg Moses & Gail Presbey (eds.) (2014). Peace Philosophy and Public Life: Commitments, Crises, and Concepts for Engaged Thinking. Editions Rodopi.score: 42.0
    To a world assaulted by private interests, this book argues that peace must be a public thing. Distinguished philosophers of peace have always worked publicly for public results. Opposing nuclear proliferation, organizing communities of the disinherited, challenging violence within status quo establishments, such are the legacies of truly engaged philosophers of peace. This volume remembers those legacies, reviews the promise of critical thinking for crises today, and expands the free range of thinking needed to create more mindful (...)
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  19. Katharine V. Smith & Nelda S. Godfrey (2002). Being a Good Nurse and Doing the Right Thing: A Qualitative Study. Nursing Ethics 9 (3):301-312.score: 42.0
    Despite an abundance of theoretical literature on virtue ethics in nursing and health care, very little research has been carried out to support or refute the claims made. One such claim is that ethical nursing is what happens when a good nurse does the right thing. The purpose of this descriptive, qualitative study was therefore to examine nurses’ perceptions of what it means to be a good nurse and to do the right thing. Fifty-three nurses responded to two (...)
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  20. Roger Säljö (2002). My Brain's Running Slow Today €“ The Preference for €œThings Ontologies” in Research and Everyday Discourse on Human Thinking. Studies in Philosophy and Education 21 (4/5):389-405.score: 38.0
    The focus of the article is toreflect on the tendency of research traditionsin the areas of human learning, development,and communication, to use metaphors andanalogies that construe human mental activitiesand resources in terms of physical objects.This is evident, for instance, in moderncognitive science where computer metaphors(information processing and informationstorage) have been foundational for thediscipline. However, this tendency to reifyhuman activities can be found in many othertraditions, and it goes back to ancient Greekthinking. It is argued that the consequences ofthis tradition of (...)
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  21. Theodore Schick (2010). How to Think About Weird Things: Critical Thinking for a New Age. Mcgraw-Hill.score: 38.0
     
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  22. Stevan Harnad (2005). Distributed Processes, Distributed Cognizers and Collaborative Cognition. [Journal (Paginated)] (in Press) 13 (3):01-514.score: 36.0
    Cognition is thinking; it feels like something to think, and only those who can feel can think. There are also things that thinkers can do. We know neither how thinkers can think nor how they are able do what they can do. We are waiting for cognitive science to discover how. Cognitive science does this by testing hypotheses about what processes can generate what doing (“know-how”) This is called the Turing Test. It cannot test whether a process can generate (...)
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  23. R. M. Sainsbury & Michael Tye (2012). Seven Puzzles of Thought: And How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts. OUP Oxford.score: 36.0
    How can one think about the same thing twice without knowing that it's the same thing? How can one think about nothing at all (for example Pegasus, the mythical flying horse)? Is thinking about oneself special? One could mistake one's car for someone else's, but it seems one could not mistake one's own headache for someone else's. Why not? -/- R. M. Sainsbury and Michael Tye provide an entirely new theory--called 'originalism'-- which provides simple and natural solutions (...)
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  24. Patrick J. Reider, Sellars on Perception, Science, and Realism: A Critical Response. Normative Functionalism and the Pittsburgh School.score: 36.0
    DeVries’ article “Sellars, Realism, and Kantian Thinking” misinterprets my argument that Sellars cannot show a sufficient degree of perceptual access for science to produce knowledge of “things-in-themselves” as involving a Cartesian characterization of Sellars. In correcting this misinterpretation (among many others), I will show that there are aspects of Sellars’ views on sensory receptivity, analogies, and representation that are at odds with the epistemic claim Sellars makes in regard to knowing the thing-in-itself, which deVries fails to acknowledge. In (...)
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  25. Daniel M. Wegner, How to Think, Say, or Do Precisely the Worst Thing for Any Occasion.score: 34.0
    In slapstick comedy, the worst thing that could happen usually does: The person with a sore toe manages to stub it, sometimes twice. Such errors also arise in daily life, and research traces the tendency to do precisely the worst thing to ironic processes of mental control. These monitoring processes keep us watchful for errors of thought, speech, and action and enable us to avoid the worst thing in most situations, but they also increase the likelihood of (...)
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  26. Willem A. deVries, Sellars, Realism, and Kantian Thinking. Normative Functionalism and the Pittsburgh School.score: 32.0
    This essay is a response to Patrick Reider’s essay “Sellars on Perception, Science and Realism: A Critical Response.” Reider is correct that Sellars’s realism is in tension with his generally Kantian approach to issues of knowledge and mind, but I do not think Reider’s analysis correctly locates the sources of that tension or how Sellars himself hoped to be able to resolve it. Reider’s own account of idealism and the reasons supporting it are rooted in the epistemological tradition that informed (...)
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  27. Peter King, Thinking About Things: Singular Thought in the Middle Ages.score: 32.0
    In one corner Socrates; in the other, on the mat, his cat Felix. Socrates, of course, thinks (correctly) that Felix the Cat is on the mat. But there’s the rub. For Socrates to think that Felix is on the mat, he has to be able to think about Felix, that is, he has to have some sort of cognitive grasp of an individual — and not just any individual, but Felix himself. How is that possible? What is going on when (...)
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  28. Mark Phelan, Adam Arico & Shaun Nichols (2013). Thinking Things and Feeling Things: On an Alleged Discontinuity in Folk Metaphysics of Mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):703-725.score: 32.0
    According to the discontinuity view, people recognize a deep discontinuity between phenomenal and intentional states, such that they refrain from attributing feelings and experiences to entities that do not have the right kind of body, though they may attribute thoughts to entities that lack a biological body, like corporations, robots, and disembodied souls. We examine some of the research that has been used to motivate the discontinuity view. Specifically, we focus on experiments that examine people's aptness judgments for various mental (...)
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  29. Barry F. Dainton & Timothy J. Bayne (2005). Consciousness as a Guide to Personal Persistence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):549-571.score: 30.0
    Mentalistic (or Lockean) accounts of personal identity are normally formulated in terms of causal relations between psychological states such as beliefs, memories, and intentions. In this paper we develop an alternative (but still Lockean) account of personal identity, based on phenomenal relations between experiences. We begin by examining a notorious puzzle case due to Bernard Williams, and extract two lessons from it: first, that Williams's puzzle can be defused by distinguishing between the psychological and phenomenal approaches, second, that so far (...)
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  30. Gregg H. Rosenberg & Michael L. Anderson, A Brief Introduction to the Guidance Theory of Representation.score: 30.0
    Recent trends in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science can be fruitfully characterized as part of the ongoing attempt to come to grips with the very idea of homo sapiens--an intelligent, evolved, biological agent--and its signature contribution is the emergence of a philosophical anthropology which, contra Descartes and his thinking thing, instead puts doing at the center of human being. Applying this agency-oriented line of thinking to the problem of representation, this paper introduces the Guidance Theory, (...)
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  31. John Locke, The Lockean Theory.score: 30.0
    ... a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it only does by the consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking ... [Essay II, xxvii, '9].
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  32. Kenny Siu Sing Huen (2011). Critical Thinking as a Normative Practice in Life: A Wittgensteinian Groundwork. Educational Philosophy and Theory 43 (10):1065-1087.score: 30.0
    On the point that, in practices of critical thinking, we respond spontaneously in concrete situations, this paper presents an account on behalf of Wittgenstein. I argue that the ‘seeing-things-aright’ model of Luntley's Wittgenstein is not adequate, since it pays insufficient attention to radically new circumstances, in which the content of norms is updated. While endorsing Bailin's emphasis on criteria of critical thinking, Wittgenstein would agree with Papastephanou and Angeli's demand to look behind criteriology. He maintains the primacy of (...)
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  33. David R. Mandel, Denis J. Hilton & Patrizia Catellani (eds.) (2005). The Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking. Routledge.score: 30.0
    It is human nature to wonder how things might have turned out differently--either for the better or for the worse. For the past two decades psychologists have been intrigued by this phenomenon, which they call counterfactual thinking. Specifically, researchers have sought to answer the "big" questions: Why do people have such a strong propensity to generate counterfactuals, and what functions does counterfactual thinking serve? What are the determinants of counterfactual thinking, and what are its adaptive and psychological (...)
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  34. Marianna Papastephanou & Charoula Angeli (2007). Critical Thinking Beyond Skill. Educational Philosophy and Theory 39 (6):604–621.score: 30.0
    The aim of this article is to investigate possibilities for conceptions of critical thinking beyond the established educational framework that emphasizes skills. Distancing ourselves from the older rationalist framework, we explain that what we think wrong with the skills perspective is, amongst other things, its absolutization of performativity and outcomes. In reviewing the relevant discourse, we accept that it is possible for the skills paradigm to be change?friendly and context?sensitive but we argue that it is oblivious to other, non?purposive (...)
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  35. Eric T. Olson, The Nature of People.score: 30.0
    Or maybe the formula should be 'Necessarily, x is a person at time t if and only if...x...t...', so as not to prejudge the issue of whether something could be a person at one time and a nonperson at another." Call this the ersonhood uestion. The most common answer is that to be a person (at a time) is to have certain special mental properties (at that time). Locke, for instance, said that a person is "a thinking intelligent being, (...)
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  36. Peter Westmoreland (2013). Rousseau's Descartes: The Rejection of Theoretical Philosophy as First Philosophy. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (3):529 - 548.score: 30.0
    Rousseau's Savoyard Vicar makes creative use of Descartes's meditative method by applying it to practical life. This ?misuse? of the Cartesian method highlights the limits of the thinking thing as a ground for morality. Taking practical philosophy as first philosophy, the Vicar finds bedrock certainty of the self as an agent in the world and of moral truths while distancing himself from Cartesian positions on the distinction, union and interaction of mind and body. Rousseau's Moral Letters harmonize with (...)
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  37. Paul Lodge, Page 720 I.score: 30.0
    It is well known that Leibniz believes that the motion of bodies is caused by an internal force.1 Moreover, he distinguishes between two kinds of force that are associated with bodies, which he calls primitive and derivative forces respectively. My aim is to explain Leibniz’s account of the relation between these two kinds of force, and to address a puzzle that arises in connection with this relation. In fact Leibniz speaks of two different kinds of derivative force. The first, and (...)
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  38. James H. Fetzer (2000). Computing is at Best a Special Kind of Thinking. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 9: Philosophy of Mind. Charlottesville: Philosophy Doc Ctr. 103-113.score: 30.0
    When computing is defined as the causal implementation of algorithms and algorithms are defined as effective decision procedures, human thought is mental computation only if it is governed by mental algorithms. An examination of ordinary thinking, however, suggests that most human thought processes are non-algorithmic. Digital machines, moreover, are mark-manipulating or string-processing systems whose marks or strings do not stand for anything for those systems, while minds are semiotic (or “signusing”) systems for which signs stand for other things for (...)
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  39. John C. Maraldo (2012). Four Things and Two Practices: Rethinking Heidegger Ex Oriente Lux. Comparative and Continental Philosophy 4 (1):53 - 74.score: 30.0
    This article re-orients Heidegger’s analyses of things to cast light on two distinct ways of relating to things, one at the root of technological use and the other crucial to artistic creation. The first way, which we may call instrumental practice, denotes the activity of using something to accomplish some goal or objective. This practice underlies the analysis of use-things [Zeuge] that Heidegger presents in Being and Time. Heidegger’s contribution there is twofold: to show how understanding things as zuhanden, there (...)
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  40. Clark Glymour (1998). Buy and Use Thinking Things Through. Minds and Machines 8 (2):309-310.score: 30.0
    Department of Philosophy, University of California at San Diego, La Jolla, Ca 92093, U.S.A., and Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, CA, U.S.A. E-mail: cg09+@andrew.cmu.edu..
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  41. Wendy M. Grossman (2013). Thinking Things. Philosophers' Magazine 60 (-1):30 - 31.score: 30.0
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  42. Farber Ilya, Thomas Brian Mooney, Mark Nowacki, Yoo Guan Tan & John N. Williams, Thinking Things Through: An Introduction to Analytical Skills Second Edition.score: 30.0
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  43. Steven Sloman (2005). Causal Models: How People Think About the World and Its Alternatives. OUP USA.score: 30.0
    Human beings are active agents who can think. To understand how thought serves action requires understanding how people conceive of the relation between cause and effect, that is, between action and outcome. -/- In cognitive terms, the question becomes one of how people construct and reason with the causal models we use to represent our world. A revolution is occuring in how statisticians, philosophers, and computer scientists answer this question. These fields have ushered in new insights about causal models by (...)
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  44. Charles A. Baylis (1960). Review: Maylon H. Hepp, Thinking Things Through. An Introduction to Logic. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 25 (1):76-76.score: 30.0
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  45. David Seedhouse (1997). Recovered Memory: Conflict, Confusion and the Need to Think Things Through. Health Care Analysis 5 (2):93-97.score: 30.0
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  46. Maylon H. Hepp (1956). Thinking Things Through. New York, Scribner.score: 30.0
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  47. T. Brian Mooney & Damien Norris (2007). Merleau-Ponty on Human Motility and Libet's Paradox. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology 7 (1):1-9.score: 30.0
    In 1979, neuroscientists Libet, Wright, Feinstein and Pearl introduced the “delay-and-antedating” hypothesis/paradox based on the results of an on-going series of experiments dating back to 1964 that measured the neural adequacy [brain wave activity] of “conscious sensory experience”. What is fascinating about the results of this experiment is the implication, especially when considered in the light of Merleau-Ponty’s notions of “intentionality” and the “pre-reflective life of human motility”, that the body, and hence not solely the mind, is a thinking (...)
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  48. John Preston (2012). What Are Computers (If They're Not Thinking Things)?. In. In S. Barry Cooper (ed.), How the World Computes. 609--615.score: 30.0
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  49. Susan Russinoff (1995). Review: Clark Glymour, Thinking Things Through. An Introduction to Philosophical Issues and Achievements. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 60 (3):1012-1013.score: 30.0
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  50. George F. Schumm (1993). Thinking Things Through. Teaching Philosophy 16 (4):369-371.score: 30.0
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