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Profile: Thomas Grundmann (University of Cologne)
  1. Thomas Grundmann (forthcoming). How Reliabilism Saves the Apriori/Aposteriori Distinction. Synthese:1-22.
    Contemporary epistemologists typically define a priori justification as justification that is independent of sense experience. However, sense experience plays at least some role in the production of many paradigm cases of a priori justified belief. This raises the question of when experience is epistemically relevant to the justificatory status of the belief that is based on it. In this paper, I will outline the answers that can be given by the two currently dominant accounts of justification, i.e. evidentialism and reliabilism. (...)
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  2. Thomas Grundmann & Joachim Horvath (2014). Erratum To: Thought Experiments and the Problem of Deviant Realizations. Philosophical Studies 170 (3):535-536.
    Erratum to: Philos Stud DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0226-3Dear Reader, due to production systems the following changes could not be made to this article:In the paragraph immediately preceding the case description (ford-iii), the sentenceHere we explicitly state that Smith’s inference is based only on his belief that Jones owns a Ford, and that this logical inference provides Smith’s only justification for believing that someone in his office owns a Ford (to make things fully precise, we also add a time index).should be replaced withHere (...)
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  3. Thomas Grundmann & Joachim Horvath (2014). Thought Experiments and the Problem of Deviant Realizations. Philosophical Studies 170 (3):525-533.
    Descriptions of Gettier cases can be interpreted in ways that are incompatible with the standard judgment that they are cases of justified true belief without knowledge. Timothy Williamson claims that this problem cannot be avoided by adding further stipulations to the case descriptions. To the contrary, we argue that there is a fairly simple way to amend the Ford case, a standard description of a Gettier case, in such a manner that all deviant interpretations are ruled out. This removes one (...)
     
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  4. Thomas Grundmann, Joachim Horvath & Jens Kipper (eds.) (2014). Die Experimentelle Philosophie in der Diskussion. Suhrkamp.
    Philosophen berufen sich in Gedankenexperimenten oft auf Intuitionen. Doch werden diese Intuitionen auch von anderen Philosophen oder von philosophischen Laien geteilt? Und durch welche Faktoren werden sie eigentlich bestimmt? Experimentelle Philosophen gehen solchen Fragen seit einigen Jahren mit empirischen Methoden auf den Grund. Ihre Ergebnisse sind mitunter verblüffend und haben für Aufsehen gesorgt. Der vorliegende Band lässt führende Vertreter und Gegner dieser wachsenden Bewegung zu Wort kommen und will die bislang überwiegend englischsprachige Debatte verstärkt in die deutsche Philosophie hineintragen.
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  5. Thomas Grundmann (2013). Doubts About Philosophy? The Alleged Challenge From Disagreement. In Tim Henning & David Schweikard (eds.), Knowledge, Virtue, and Action. Essays on Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work. Routledge. 72-98.
    In philosophy, as in many other disciplines and domains, stable disagreement among peers is a widespread and well-known phenomenon. Our intuitions about paradigm cases, e.g. Christensen's Restaurant Case, suggest that in such controversies suspension of judgment is rationally required. This would prima facie suggest a robust suspension of judgment in philosophy. But we are still lacking a deeper theoretical explanation of why and under what conditions suspension is rationally mandatory. In the first part of this paper I will focus on (...)
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  6. Joachim Horvath & Thomas Grundmann (eds.) (2012). Experimental Philosophy and its Critics. Routledge.
    Experimental philosophy is one of the most recent and controversial developments in philosophy. Its basic idea is rather simple: to test philosophical thought experiments and philosophers’ intuitions about them with scientific methods, mostly taken from psychology and the social sciences. The ensuing experimental results, such as the cultural relativity of certain philosophical intuitions, has engaged – and at times infuriated – many more traditionally minded "armchair" philosophers since then. In this volume, the metaphilosophical reflection on experimental philosophy is brought yet (...)
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  7. Thomas Grundmann (2011). Defeasibility Theory. In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), The Routleddge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge. 156-166.
    This is a survey article about epistemic defeaters: what is defeated, how defeaters work, different kinds of defeaters, indefeasibility and how defeaters fit into epistemic internalism and externalism.
     
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  8. Thomas Grundmann (2010). Some Hope for Intuitions: A Reply to Weinberg. Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):481-509.
    In a recent paper Weinberg (2007) claims that there is an essential mark of trustworthiness which typical sources of evidence as perception or memory have, but philosophical intuitions lack, namely that we are able to detect and correct errors produced by these “hopeful” sources. In my paper I will argue that being a hopeful source isn't necessary for providing us with evidence. I then will show that, given some plausible background assumptions, intuitions at least come close to being hopeful, if (...)
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  9. Joachim Horvath & Thomas Grundmann (2010). Introduction: Experimental Philosophy and Its Critics, Parts 1 and 2. Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):283-292.
    In this brief introduction, we would first like to explain how these two special issues of Philosophical Psychology ( 23.3 and 23.4 ) actually came about. In addition, we will provide an outline of their overall structure and shortly summarize the featured papers.
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  10. Thomas Grundmann (2009). Introspective Self-Knowledge and Reasoning: An Externalist Guide. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 71 (1):89 - 105.
    According to the received view, externalist grounds or reasons need not be introspectively accessible. Roughly speaking, from an externalist point of view, a belief will be epistemically justified, iff it is based upon facts that make its truth objectively highly likely. This condition can be satisfied, even if the epistemic agent does not have actual or potential awareness of the justifying facts. No inner perspective on the belief-forming mechanism and its truth-ratio is needed for a belief to be justified. In (...)
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  11. Thomas Grundmann (2009). Reliabilism and the Problem of Defeaters. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):65-76.
    It is widely assumed that justification is defeasible, e.g. that under certain conditions counterevidence removes prior justification of beliefs. In this paper I will first (sect. 1) explain why this feature of justification poses a prima facie problem for reliabilism. I then will try out different reliabilist strategies to deal with the problem. Among them I will discuss conservative strategies (sect. 2), eliminativist stragies (sect. 3) and revisionist strategies (sect. 4). In the final section I will present an improved revisionist (...)
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  12. Thomas Grundmann (2007). The Nature of Rational Intuitions and a Fresh Look at the Explanationist Objection. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):69-87.
    In the first part of this paper I will characterize the specific nature of rational intuition. It will be claimed that rational intuition is an evidential state with modal content that has an a priori source. This claim will be defended against several objections. The second part of the paper deals with the so-called explanationist objection against rational intuition as a justifying source. According to the best reading of this objection, intuition cannot justify any judgment since there is no metaphysical (...)
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  13. Thomas Grundmann (2004). Counterexamples to Epistemic Externalism Revisited. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. 2--65.
  14. Thomas Grundmann (2004). Inferential Contextualism, Epistemological Realism and Scepticism: Comments on Williams. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):345 - 352.
    In this paper I will discuss Michael Williamss inferential contextualism – a position that must be carefully distinguished from the currently more fashionable attributer contextualism. I will argue that Williamss contextualism is not stable, though it avoids some of the shortcomings of simple inferential contextualism. In particular, his criticism of epistemological realism cannot be supported on the basis of his own account. I will also argue that we need not give up epistemological realism in order to provide a successful diagnosis (...)
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  15. Thomas Grundmann (2003). Wenn der Determinismus wahr ware... Uber die Möglichkeit von Willensfreiheit in der natiirlichen Welt1. In Andreas Bächli & Klaus Petrus (eds.), Monism. Ontos. 9--293.
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  16. Thomas Grundmann & Catrin Misselhorn (2003). Transcendental Arguments and Realism. In Hans-Johann Glock (ed.), Strawson and Kant. Oxford University Press. 205--218.
  17. Thomas Grundmann (2002). Transcendental Arguments. Problems and Prospects; Transcendental Arguments and Scepticism. Answering the Question of Justification. [REVIEW] Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 56 (2).
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  18. Thomas Grundmann (2002). Warum wir Wissen als einen wichtigen Begriff der Erkenntnistheorie betrachten sollten: Eine Antwort auf Ansgar Beckermann. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 56 (1):118 - 124.
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  19. Thomas Grundmann (2001). Das erkenntnistheoretische Regreßargument. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 55 (2):221 - 245.
    Wenn von dem epistemischen Regreßargument die Rede ist, dann denkt man gewöhnlich an ein Argument für den erkenntnistheoretischen Fundamentalismus: Um einen drohenden Begründungsregreß zu vermeiden, muß man annehmen, daß es sogenannte basale Meinungen gibt, die nicht durch andere Meinungen (oder propositionale Zustände inferentiell gerechtfertigt werden, sondern unmittelbar gerechtfertigt sind. Das fundamentalistische Regreßargument ist jedoch nur eine mögliche Reaktion auf das zugrundeliegende epistemische Regreßproblem. Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich genauer mit den Bedingungen und Konsequenzen des skeptischen Regreßarguments und vertritt die These, daß (...)
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  20. Thomas Grundmann (1999). Begründungsstrategien. Ein Weg durch die analytische Erkenntnistheorie. [REVIEW] Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 53 (2).
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  21. Thomas Grundmann (1999). BonJour's Self-Defeating Argument for Coherentism. Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):463-479.
    One of the most influential arguments for the coherence theory of empirical justification is BonJours a priori argument from the internalist regress. According to this argument, foundationalism cannot solve the problem of the internalist regress since internalism is incompatible with basic beliefs. Hence, coherentism seems to be the only option. In my article I contend that this argument is doomed to failure. It is either too strong or too weak. Too strong, since even coherentism cannot stop the internalist regress in (...)
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  22. Thomas Grundmann (1997). Die Bedingungen des Verstehens als Bedingungen der Gegenstände des Verstehens. In Julian Nida-Rümelin & Georg Meggle (eds.), Analyomen 2, Volume I: Logic, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science. De Gruyter. 232-245.
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  23. Thomas Grundmann (1997). Review: Neuere Tendenzen in der Analytischen Erkenntnistheorie. [REVIEW] Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 51 (4):627 - 648.
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  24. Thomas Grundmann (1996). Gibt es ein subjektives Fundament unseres Wissens? Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 50 (3):458 - 472.
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  25. Thomas Grundmann & Karsten Stüber (1996). Philosophie der Skepsis.
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  26. Thomas Grundmann (1994). XVI. Deutscher Kongreß für Philosophie. "Neue Realitäten: Herausforderung der Philosophie" 20.-24. September 1993 an der TU Berlin. [REVIEW] Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 48 (2):292 - 299.
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  27. Thomas Grundmann (1994). Xvi. Deutscher Kongreß Für Philosophie. "neue Realitäten - Herausforderungen Der Philosophie". Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 48 (2):292-299.
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  28. Thomas Grundmann (1993). Geert-lueke Lueken: Inkommensurabilität AlS problem rationalen argumentierens. [REVIEW] Philosophische Rundschau 40 (4):325.
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