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  1. Lukas Heydrich, Sebastian Dieguez, Thomas Grunwald, Margitta Seeck & Olaf Blanke (2011). Corrigendum to “Illusory Own Body Perceptions: Case Reports and Relevance for Bodily Self-Consciousness” [Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2010) 702–710]. [REVIEW] Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):487.
    In the abstract the word “self-location” is repeated twice. The second “self-location” was meant to be “self-identification”. The correct sentence reads below:This has recently been tested experimentally in healthy subjects showing that integration of multisensory bodily signals from the entire body with respect to the three aspects: self-location, first-person perspective, and self-identification, is crucial for bodily self-consciousness.
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  2. Lukas Heydrich, Sebastian Dieguez, Thomas Grunwald, Margitta Seeck & Olaf Blanke (2010). Illusory Own Body Perceptions: Case Reports and Relevance for Bodily Self-Consciousness☆. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):702-710.
    Neurological disorders of body representation have for a long time suggested the importance of multisensory processing of bodily signals for self-consciousness. One such group of disorders – illusory own body perceptions affecting the entire body – has been proposed to be especially relevant in this respect, based on neurological data as well as philosophical considerations. This has recently been tested experimentally in healthy subjects showing that integration of multisensory bodily signals from the entire body with respect to the three aspects: (...)
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  3. Martin Kurthen, Thomas Grunwald, Christoph Helmstaedter & Christian E. Elger (2003). Continuing Commentary. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26:641-650.
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  4. Martin Kurthen, Thomas Grunwald, Christoph Helmstaedter & Christian E. Elger (2003). The Problem of Content in Embodied Memory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (5):641-642.
    An action-oriented theory of embodied memory is favorable for many reasons, but it will not provide a quick yet clean solution to the grounding problem in the way Glenberg (1997t) envisages. Although structural mapping via analogical representations may be an adequate mechanism of cognitive representation, it will not suffice to explain representation as such.
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  5. Martin Kurthen, Thomas Grunwald & Christian E. Elger (1999). Consciousness as a Social Construction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):197-199.
    If the explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness () and the brain cannot be closed by current naturalistic theories of mind, one might instead try to dissolve the explanatory gap problem. We hold that such a dissolution can start from the notion of consciousness as a social construction. In his target article, however, Block (1995) argues that the thesis that consciousness is a social construction is trivially false if it is construed to be about phenomenal consciousness. He ridicules the idea that (...)
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