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Thomas Metzinger [75]Thomas K. Metzinger [2]
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Profile: Thomas Metzinger (Johannes Gutenberg Universität, Mainz)
  1. Thomas Metzinger (2003). Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. MIT Press.
    " In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of...
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  2. Mannino Adriano, David Althaus, Jonathan Erhardt, Lukas Gloor, Adrian Hutter & Thomas Metzinger (2015). Künstliche Intelligenz: Chancen und Risiken. Diskussionspapiere der Stiftung Für Effektiven Altruismus 2:1-17.
    Die Übernahme des KI-Unternehmens DeepMind durch Google für rund eine halbe Milliarde US-Dollar signalisierte vor einem Jahr, dass von der KI-Forschung vielversprechende Ergebnisse erwartet werden. Spätestens seit bekannte Wissenschaftler wie Stephen Hawking und Unternehmer wie Elon Musk oder Bill Gates davor warnen, dass künstliche Intelligenz eine Bedrohung für die Menschheit darstellt, schlägt das KI-Thema hohe Wellen. Die Stiftung für Effektiven Altruismus (EAS, vormals GBS Schweiz) hat mit der Unterstützung von Experten/innen aus Informatik und KI ein umfassendes Diskussionspapier zu den Chancen (...)
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  3. Bigna Lenggenhager, Tej Tadi, Thomas Metzinger & Olaf Blanke (2007). Video Ergo Sum: Manipulating Bodily Self-Consciousness. Science 317 (5841):1096-1099.
    Genes adjacent to species-specific loci are 6.2% older than genes adjacent to other dynamic loci (P < 10−2 by randomization; gray bars in Fig. 3); thus, species-specific genes are not randomly distributed but are found preferentially in the older regions, indicating that the incipient Escherichia and Salmonella lineages continued to participate in recombination at loci unlinked to lineage-specific genes.
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  4.  80
    Thomas Metzinger & Olaf Blanke (2009). Full-Body Illusions and Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13 (1):7-13.
  5.  15
    Thomas Metzinger (2009). The Ego Tunnel. Basic Books.
    Philosopher and scientist Thomas Metzinger argues that neuroscience's picture of the "self" as an emergent phenomenon of our biology and the attendant fact that the "self" can be manipulated--and even controlled--raises novel and serious ...
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  6. Thomas Metzinger (2005). Out-of-Body Experiences as the Origin of the Concept of a 'Soul '. Mind and Matter 3 (1):57-84.
    Contemporary philosophical and scienti .c discussions of mind developed from a 'proto-concept of mind ',a mythical,tradition- alistic,animistic and quasi-sensory theory about what it means to have a mind. It can be found in many di .erent cultures and has a semantic core corresponding to the folk-phenomenological notion of a 'soul '.It will be argued that this notion originates in accurate and truthful .rst-person reports about the experiential content of a special neurophenomenological state-class called 'out-of-body experiences '.They can be undergone by (...)
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  7. Thomas Metzinger (2015). M-Autonomy. Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-12):270-302.
    What we traditionally call ‘conscious thought’ actually is a subpersonal process, and only rarely a form of mental action. The paradigmatic, standard form of conscious thought is non-agentive, because it lacks veto-control and involves an unnoticed loss of epistemic agency and goal-directed causal self-determination at the level of mental content. Conceptually, it must be described as an unintentional form of inner behaviour. Empirical research shows that we are not mentally autonomous subjects for about two thirds of our conscious lifetime, because (...)
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  8. Thomas Metzinger (2004). The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationalist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective. Networks:285--306.
    Before one can even begin to model consciousness and what exactly it means that it is a subjective phenomenon one needs a theory about what a first-person perspective really is. This theory has to be conceptually convincing, empirically plausible and, most of all, open to new developments. The chosen conceptual framework must be able to accommodate scientific progress. Its ba- sic assumptions have to be plastic as it were, so that new details and empirical data can continuously be fed into (...)
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  9. Thomas Metzinger (2008). Empirical Perspectives From the Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity: A Brief Summary with Examples. In Rahul Banerjee & B. K. Chakrabarti (eds.), Models of Brain and Mind: Physical, Computational, and Psychological Approaches. Elsevier
  10.  62
    Thomas Metzinger (2013). Why Are Dreams Interesting for Philosophers? The Example of Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood, Plus an Agenda for Future Research. Frontiers in Psychology 4:746.
    This metatheoretical paper develops a list of new research targets by exploring particularly promising interdisciplinary contact points between empirical dream research and philosophy of mind. The central example is the MPS-problem. It is constituted by the epistemic goal of conceptually isolating and empirically grounding the phenomenal property of “minimal phenomenal selfhood,” which refers to the simplest form of self-consciousness. In order to precisely describe MPS, one must focus on those conditions that are not only causally enabling, but strictly necessary to (...)
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  11. Thomas Metzinger (2013). The Myth of Cognitive Agency: Subpersonal Thinking as a Cyclically Recurring Loss of Mental Autonomy. Frontiers in Psychology 4:931.
    This metatheoretical paper investigates mind wandering from the perspective of philosophy of mind. It has two central claims. The first is that, on a conceptual level, mind wandering can be fruitfully described as a specific form of mental autonomy loss. The second is that, given empirical constraints, most of what we call “conscious thought” is better analyzed as a subpersonal process that more often than not lacks crucial properties traditionally taken to be the hallmark of personal-level cognition - such as (...)
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  12. Thomas Metzinger (2006). Reply to Gallagher: Different Conceptions of Embodiment. Psyche 12 (4).
    Gallagher is right in pointing out that scientific realism is an implicit background assumption of BNO, and that I did not give an independent argument for it. He is also right in saying that science does not _demonstrate_ the existence of certain entities, but that it assumes those entities in a process of explanation and theory formation. However, it is not true that science, as Gallagher writes (p.2), “simply” assumes the reality of certain things: such assumptions are embedded in the (...)
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  13.  64
    Thomas Metzinger & Vittorio Gallese (2003). The Emergence of a Shared Action Ontology: Building Blocks for a Theory. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):549-571.
    To have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting our world, possesses an ontology too. It creates primitives and makes existence assumptions. It decomposes target space in a way that exhibits a certain invariance, which in turn is functionally significant. We will investigate which are the functional regularities guiding this decomposition process, by answering to the following questions: What are the explicit and implicit assumptions (...)
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  14.  16
    Olaf Blanke & Thomas Metzinger (2009). Full-Body Illusions and Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):7-13.
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  15. Thomas Metzinger (2012). Zehn Jahre Neuroethik des Pharmazeutischen Kognitiven Enhancements – Aktuelle Probleme Und Handlungsrichtlinien Für Die Praxis. Fortschritte der Neurologie Und Psychiatrie 80 (1):36-43.
    An evaluating survey of the development of the neuroethics of pharmaceutical cognitive enhancement (PCE) during the last decade, focussing on the situation in Germany, has been undertaken. This article presents the most important conceptual problems, current substances and central ethical and legal issues. Very first guidelines and recommendations for policy-makers are formulated at the end of the text.
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  16.  57
    Vittorio Gallese & Thomas Metzinger (2003). Motor Ontology: The Representational Reality of Goals, Actions and Selves. Philosophical Psychology 16 (3):365 – 388.
    The representational dynamics of the brain is a subsymbolic process, and it has to be conceived as an "agent-free" type of dynamical self-organization. However, in generating a coherent internal world-model, the brain decomposes target space in a certain way. In doing so, it defines an "ontology": to have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting the world, possesses an ontology too. It decomposes target space (...)
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  17. Thomas Metzinger (2003). Phenomenal Transparency and Cognitive Self-Reference. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):353-393.
    A representationalist analysis of strong first-person phenomena is developed (Baker 1998), and it is argued that conscious, cognitive self-reference can be naturalized under this representationalist analysis. According to this view, the phenomenal first-person perspective is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a cognitive first-person perspective. Cognitive self-reference always is reference to the phenomenal content of a transparent self-model. The concepts of phenomenal transparency and introspection are clarified. More generally, I suggest that the concepts of phenomenal opacity and phenomenal (...)
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  18.  66
    Thomas Metzinger & Jennifer Windt (2015). What Does It Mean to Have an Open MIND? Open MIND.
    We decided to use our editors’ introduction to briefly address a difficult, somewhat deeper, and in some ways more classical problem: that of what genuine open mindedness really is and how it can contribute to the Mind Sciences. The material in the collection speaks for itself. Here, and in contrast to the vast collection that is Open MIND, we want to be concise. We want to point to the broader context of a particular way of thinking about the mind. And (...)
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  19. Thomas Metzinger (ed.) (1995). Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
    The contributions to this book are original articles, representing a cross-section of current philosophical work on consciousness and thereby allowing students and readers from other disciplines to acquaint themselves with the very latest debate, so that they can then pursue their own research interests more effectively. The volume includes a bibliography on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science and brain research, covering the last 25 years and consisting of over 1000 entries in 18 thematic sections, compiled by David Chalmers and Thomas (...)
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  20. Thomas Metzinger (2006). Reply to Ghin: Self-Sustainment on the Level of Global Availability. Psyche 12 (4).
    Of all the current philosophical attempts to rescue the concept of “self” by working out a weaker version, one that does not imply an ontological substance or an individual in the metaphysical sense, Marcello Ghin’s is clearly my favorite. His reconstruction of the original theory is absolutely accurate and without any major misunderstandings. Enriching the concept of a “SMT-system” with the notions of “autocatalysis” and “self- sustainment,” and adding the intriguing idea that we are systems reflecting these processes on a (...)
     
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  21. Thomas Metzinger (2013). Spiritualität und intellektuelle Redlichkeit.
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  22. Thomas Metzinger (2000). The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective. In Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press 285--306.
    This is a brief and accessible English summary of the "Self-model Theory of Subjectivity" (SMT), which is only available as German book in this archive. It introduces two new theoretical entities, the "phenomenal self-model" (PSM) and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality-relation" PMIR. A representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person persepctive is offered. This is a revised version, including two pictures.
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  23.  4
    Thomas Metzinger & Elisabeth Hildt (2011). Cognitive Enhancement. In Judy Illes & Barbara J. Sahakian (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics. Oxford University Press
    Cognitive enhancement aims at optimizing a specific class of information-processing functions: cognitive functions, physically realized by the human brain. This article deals with ethical issues in cognitive enhancement. It discusses some standard conceptual issues related to the notion of “cognitive enhancement” and then continues from a purely descriptive point of view by briefly reviewing some empirical aspects and sketching the current situation. Several enhancement strategies are being tested and used. Then the chapter offers some reflections on the treatment or enhancement (...)
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  24.  82
    Thomas Metzinger (2006). Conscious Volition and Mental Representation: Toward a More Fine-Grained Analysis. In Natalie Sebanz & Wolfgang Prinz (eds.), Disorders of Volition. MIT Press
    A Bradford Book The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England.
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  25.  96
    Thomas Metzinger (2000). Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. MIT Press.
  26. Thomas Metzinger (1995). Faster Than Thought: Holism, Homogeneity, and Temporal Coding. In Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh
  27. Jennifer Michelle Windt & Thomas Metzinger (2007). The Philosophy of Dreaming and Self-Consciousness: What Happens to the Experiential Subject During the Dream State? In Deirdre Barrett & Patrick McNamara (eds.), The New Science of Dreaming Vol 3: Cultural and Theoretical Perspectives. Praeger Publishers/Greenwood Publishing Group 193-247.
  28.  43
    Thomas Metzinger (2003). Motor Ontology: The Representational Reality of Goals, Actions and Selves. Philosophical Psychology 16 (3):365-388.
    The representational dynamics of the brain is a subsymbolic process, and it has to be_.
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  29. Thomas Metzinger (2005). Precis: Being No-One. Psyche 11 (5):1-30.
    This is a short sketch of some central ideas developed in my recent book _Being No One_ (BNO hereafter). A more systematic summary, which focuses on short answers to a set of specific, individual questions is already contained _in _the book, namely as BNO section 8.2. Here, I deliberately and completely exclude all work related to semantically differentiating and empirically constraining the philosophical concept of a "quale" (mostly Chapter 2, 3 & 8), all proposals regarding conceptual foundations for the overall (...)
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  30. Aleksandra Mroczko, Thomas Metzinger, Wolf Singer & Danko Nikolić (2009). Immediate Transfer of Synesthesia to a Novel Inducer. Journal of Vision 9 (12):1-8.
  31. Aleksandra Mroczko, Thomas Metzinger, Wolf Singer & Danko Nikolić (2009). Immediate Transfer of Synesthesia to a Novel Inducer. Journal of Vision 9 (25):1-8.
     
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  32. Thomas Metzinger (1985). The Problem of Consciousness. In Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic 3--40.
  33.  27
    Thomas Metzinger (2010). The No-Self Alternative. In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press
    This article explores the ‘no-self alternative’ in the debate on the metaphysical and phenomenological concept of the self. It suggests that the no-self alternative may not be an alternative at all and it could simply be the default assumption for all rational approaches to self-consciousness and subjectivity. It outlines several different anti-realist arguments about the self and explains why the idea that there are no selves is counter-intuitive. It shows why the intuitions of phenomenology are traceable to the contingent fact (...)
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  34.  38
    Thomas K. Metzinger (1999). Subjekt Und Selbstmodell. Die Perspektivität Phänomenalen Bewußtseins Vor Dem Hintergrund Einer Naturalistischen Theorie Mentaler Repräsentation. In [Book Chapter].
    This book contains a representationalist theory of self-consciousness and of the phenomenal first-person perspective. It draws on empirical data from the cognitive and neurosciences.
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  35. Thomas Metzinger (2004). Appearance is Not Knowledge: The Incoherent Straw Man, Content-Content Confusions and Mindless Conscious Subjects. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):67-71.
     
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  36. Thomas Metzinger (2003). Why Are Identity Disorders Interesting for Philosophers? In T. Schramme & J. Thome (eds.), Philosophy and Psychiatry. De Gruyter
    “Identity disorders” constitute a large class of psychiatric disturbances that, due to deviant forms of self-modeling, result in dramatic changes in the patients’ phenomenal experience of their own personal identity. The phenomenal experience of selfhood and transtemporal identity can vary along an extremely large number of dimensions: There are simple losses of content. There are also various typologies of phenomenal disintegration as in schizophrenia, in depersonalization disorders and in_ Dissociative Identity Disorder_, sometimes accompanied by multiplications of the phenomenal self within (...)
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  37.  69
    Thomas Metzinger (2010). The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity: A Brief Summary with Examples. Humanta Mente 14:1-28.
  38. Thomas Metzinger (1995). Faster Than Thought. In Conscious Experience.
    In this speculative paper I would like to show how important the integration of mental content is for a theory of phenomenal consciousness. I will draw the reader's attention to two manifestations of this problem which already play a role in the empirical sciences concerned with consciousness: The binding problem and the superposition problem. In doing so I hope to be able to leave the welltrodden paths of the debate over consciousness. My main concern is to gain a fresh access (...)
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  39. Thomas Metzinger (2007). Self Models. Scholarpedia.
  40.  11
    Jennifer Windt & Thomas Metzinger, The Self in Dreams.
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  41.  44
    Thomas Metzinger (2004). Inferences Are Just Folk Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):670-670.
    To speak of “inferences,” “interpretations,” and so forth is just folk psychology. It creates new homunculi, and it is also implausible from a purely phenomenological perspective. Phenomenal volition must be described in the conceptual framework of an empirically plausible theory of mental representation. It is a non sequitur to conclude from dissociability that the functional properties determining phenomenal volition never make a causal contribution.
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  42.  65
    Thomas Metzinger, "Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.
    This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive (...)
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  43.  64
    Thomas Metzinger (2004). La Soggettività Dell'esperienza Soggettiva: Un'analisi Rappresentazionale Della Prospettiva in Prima Persona. Networks 3:1-32.
    Sommario. Prima che di definire un modello della coscienza e comprendere che cosa sia un fenomeno soggettivo, è necessario sviluppare una teoria della prospettiva in prima persona. Questa teoria deve essere concettualmente con- vincente, empiricamente plausibile e, soprattutto, aperta a nuovi sviluppi. Il quadro di riferimento concettuale deve essere coerente con il progresso scienti- fico. Le sue ipotesi fondamentali devono essere adattabili in modo da permette- re a nuovi risultati sperimentali di essere inseriti nel modello teorico. Questo ar- ticolo tenta (...)
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  44. Iuliia Pliushch & Thomas Metzinger (2015). Self-Deception and the Dolphin Model of Cognition. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness. MIT Press
     
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  45.  70
    Thomas Metzinger (2000). Commentary on Jakab's Ineffability of Qualia. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (3):352-362.
    Zoltan Jakab has presented an interesting conceptual analysis of the ineffability of qualia in a functionalist and classical cognitivist framework. But he does not want to commit himself to a certain metaphysical thesis on the ontology of consciousness or qualia. We believe that his strategy has yielded a number of highly relevant and interesting insights, but still suffers from some minor inconsistencies and a certain lack of phenomenological and empirical plausibility. This may be due to some background assumptions relating to (...)
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  46. Thomas Metzinger (2006). Reply to Himma: Personal Identity and Cartesian Intuitions. Psyche 12.
    In Kenneth Einar Himma’s substantial commentary, there are a number of conceptual misunderstandings I want to get out of the way first. This will allow us to see the core of his contribution much clearer. On page 2, Himma writes about the problem of “explaining how it is that a particular phenomenal self is associated with a set of neurophysiological processes.” This philosophical question is ill posed: no one is identical to a particular phenomenal self. “Phenomenal self” must not be (...)
     
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  47.  47
    Thomas Metzinger (1990). Kriterien Für Eine Theorie Zur Lösung Des Leib-Seele-Problems. Erkenntnis 32 (1):127 - 145.
    The article presents a critical survey of the philosophical discussion of the mind-body-problem since the collapse of Rylean behaviourism. The major theories (identity theories, supervenience, emergentist materialism, dualist interactionism and functionalism) are sketched and briefly evaluated with regard to their advantages and disadvantages. The conclusion is that no satisfactory theory about the relation between mental and neurophysiological states exists today, but considerable progress has been made regarding the contours of this cluster of problems. A catalogue of criteria which every future (...)
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  48.  15
    Wanja Wiese & Thomas Metzinger (2012). Desiderata for a Mereotopological Theory of Consciousness. In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. John Benjamins Pub. Co. 88--185.
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  49.  43
    Thomas Metzinger (2003). Der Begriff Einer „Bewusstseinskultur“. In G. Kaiser (ed.), E-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie. Wissenschaftszentrum Nordrhein-Westfalen
    Dies ist kein wissenschaftlicher Text im engeren Sinne. Im Gegenteil: Das erste Ziel dieses Beitrags besteht zuerst darin, auf möglichst kurze und allgemeinverständliche Weise eine neue Problemlage zu skizzieren, die mit zunehmender Geschwindigkeit an Bedeutung gewinnt. Zweitens möchte ich einen vorläufigen Arbeitsbegriff anbieten, den Begriff einer „Bewusstseinskultur“. Dieser neue Begriff soll dazu dienen, eine Reihe von ganz unterschiedlichen theoretischen und praktischen Strategien zusammenzufassen, die wir meiner Meinung nach benötigen werden, um der fraglichen Herausforderung gerecht zu werden. Der Begriff „Bewusstseinskultur“ soll (...)
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  50.  42
    Thomas Metzinger (1997). Ich-Störungen Als Pathologische Formen Mentaler Selbstmodellierung. In Georg Northoff (ed.), Neuropsychiatrie und Neurophilosophie. Schöningh
    Was genau ist eigentlich eine Ich-Störung? Ich werde auf den folgenden Seiten dafür argumentieren, daß man die Natur dieses Typs von psychiatrischen Störungsbildern besser verstehen kann, indem man einen Blick über die medizinischen Fachgrenzen hinweg in die analytische Philosophie des Geistes [1] und in die Kognitionswissenschaft [2] wirft. Beiden Disziplinen ist gemeinsam, daß mentale Zustände dort häufig einer funktionalen Analyse unterzogen und als Informationsverarbeitungsereignisse beschrieben werden. Das bedeutet, daß mentale Zustände dabei zunächst mit Blick auf die kausale Rolle untersucht werden, (...)
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