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  1. Thomas Sattig, Ordinary Objects in the Relativistic World.
    Can our ordinary conception of macroscopic objects be transposed to the framework of relativity theory? According to common sense, ordinary objects cannot undergo radical variation in shape, whereas according to a compelling and widely accepted metaphysical picture of ordinary objects’ shapes in Minkowski spacetime, they do undergo such radical variation. This problem raises doubts about the compatibility of the ordinary conception and the relativistic conception of the world. I shall propose to reconcile common sense with relativistic metaphysics by viewing ordinary (...)
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  2. Thomas Sattig, Coincidence and Cardinality.
    Coincidentalism is the view that distinct material things can be composed of the same microphysical simples at the same time. The existence of distinct coincidents is incompatible with any microphysical criterion of identity over time of material composites. This incompatibility constitutes a problem for the coincidentalist only if the coincidentalist needs a microphysical criterion of identity over time. What does the coincidentalist need such a criterion for? I will show that the coincidentalist needs such a criterion for an explanation of (...)
     
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  3. Thomas Sattig (2013). Vague Objects and the Problem of the Many. Metaphysica 14 (2):211-223.
    The problem of the many poses the task of explaining mereological indeterminacy of ordinary objects in a way that sustains our familiar practice of counting these objects. The aim of this essay is to develop a solution to the problem of the many that is based on an account of mereological indeterminacy as having its source in how ordinary objects are, independently of how we represent them. At the center of the account stands a quasi-hylomorphic ontology of ordinary objects as (...)
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  4. Thomas Sattig (2012). The Paradox of Fission and the Ontology of Ordinary Objects. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):594-623.
    What happens to a person in a case of fission? Does it survive? Does it go out of existence? Or is the outcome indeterminate? Since each description of fission based on the persistence conditions associated with our ordinary concept of a person seems to clash with one or more platitudes of common sense about the spatiotemporal profile of macroscopic objects, fission threatens the common-sense conception of persons with inconsistency. Standard responses to this paradox agree that the common-sense conception of persons (...)
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  5. Thomas Sattig (2010). Compatibilism About Coincidence. Philosophical Review 119 (3):273-313.
    It seems to be a platitude of common sense that distinct ordinary objects cannot coincide, that they cannot fit into the same place or be composed of the same parts at the same time. The paradoxes of coincidence are instances of a breakdown of this platitude in light of counterexamples that are licensed by innocuous assumptions about particular kinds of ordinary object. Since both the anticoincidence principle and the assumptions driving the counterexamples flow from the folk conception of ordinary objects, (...)
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  6. Thomas Sattig (2010). Many as One. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 5:145-178.
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  7. Thomas Sattig (2010). 1. The Problem of the Many. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 5:145.
     
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  8. Thomas Sattig (2008). Identity in 4d. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):179 - 195.
    Four-dimensionalists offer a unified picture of various puzzles about identity over time, including the puzzle of fission, the puzzle of constitution and the puzzle of undetached parts. What unifies the four-dimensionalist approaches to these puzzles is the possibility of temporal overlap—the possibility for distinct continuants to share a common temporal part, or stage. I claim that the unified picture is inconsistent, if there are informative criteria of identity over time. I will show that while temporal overlap is compatible with four-dimensionalist (...)
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  9. Thomas Sattig (2008). Review of Christian Kanzian (Ed.), Persistence. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (4).
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  10. Thomas Sattig (2006). The Language and Reality of Time. Oxford University Press.
    Thomas Sattig develops a comprehensive framework for doing philosophy of time, and offers an original three-dimensionalist picture of the material world. He brings together a variety of different perspectives, linking our ordinary conception of time with the physicist's conception, and linking metaphysical questions about time with questions in the philosophy of language.
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  11. Thomas Sattig (2002). Temporal Parts and Complex Predicates. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (3):279–286.
    Those who believe that ordinary things have temporal as well as spatial parts must give an account of the truth conditions of temporally modified predications of the form ‘a is F at t ’ in terms of temporal parts. I will argue that the friend of temporal parts is committed to an account of temporal predication that is incompatible with the classical principle of predicate abstraction.
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  12. Thomas Sattig (1998). Proper Name Change. Theoria 13 (3):491-501.
    Gareth Evans (1973) adduces a case in which a proper name apparently undergoes a change in referent. ‘Madagascar’ was originally the name of a part of Africa. Marco Polo, erroneously thinking he was following native usage, applied the name to an island off the African coast. Today ‘Madagascar’ is the name of that island. Evans argues that this kind of case threatens Kripke’s picture of naming as developed in Naming and Necessity. According to this picture, the (...)
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