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  1. Thor Grünbaum (2014). Transparent Minds. A Study of Self-Knowledge, by Fernández, Jordi. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):413-413.
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  2. Thor Grünbaum (2013). Sensory Imagination and Narrative Perspective: Explaining Perceptual Focalization. Semiotica 2013 (194):111-136.
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  3. Thor Grünbaum (2013). Seeing What I Am Doing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):295-318.
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  4. Thor Grunbaum & Dan Zahavi (2013). Varieties () F Self-Awareness. In K. W. M. Fulford (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press. 221.
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  5. Thor Grünbaum (2012). First Person and Minimal Self-Consciousness. In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag. 47--273.
  6. Thor Grünbaum & Andrea Raballo (2012). Brain Imaging and Psychiatric Classification. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (4):305-309.
    Fielding and Marwede attempt to lay down directions for an applied onto-psychiatry. According to their proposal, such an enterprise requires us to accept certain metaphysical and methodological claims about how brain and experience are related. To put it in one sentence, our critique is that we find their metaphysics questionable and their methodology clinically impracticable.A first fundamental problem for their project, as it is expressed in their paper, is that their overall aim is unclear. At least three different aims might (...)
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  7. Morten Overgaard & Thor Grünbaum (2012). Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Conceptions of Consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16 (3):137.
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  8. Thor Grünbaum (2011). Commonsense Psychology, Dual Visual Streams, and the Individuation of Action. Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):25 - 47.
    Psychologists and philosophers are often tempted to make general claims about the importance of certain experimental results for our commonsense notions of intentional agency, moral responsibility, and free will. It is a strong intuition that if the agent does not intentionally control her own behavior, her behavior will not be an expression of agency, she will not be morally responsible for its consequences, and she will not be acting as a free agent. It therefore seems natural that the interest centers (...)
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  9. Thor Grünbaum (2011). Perception and Non-Inferential Knowledge of Action. Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):153 - 167.
    I present an account of how agents can know what they are doing when they intentionally execute object-oriented actions. When an agent executes an object-oriented intentional action, she uses perception in such a way that it can fulfil a justificatory role for her knowledge of her own action and it can fulfil this justificatory role without being inferentially linked to the cognitive states that it justifies. I argue for this proposal by meeting two challenges: in an agent's knowledge of her (...)
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  10. Morten Overgaard & Thor Grünbaum (2011). Consciousness and Modality: On the Possible Preserved Visual Consciousness in Blindsight Subjects. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1855-1859.
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  11. Thor Grunbaum (2009). Anscombe and Practical Knowledge of What Is Happening. Grazer Philosophische Studien 78 (1):41-67.
  12. Thor Grünbaum (2008). Trying and the Arguments From Total Failure. Philosophia 36 (1):67-86.
    New Volitionalism is a name for certain widespread conception of the nature of intentional action. Some of the standard arguments for New Volitionalism, the so-called arguments from total failure, have even acquired the status of basic assumptions for many other kinds of philosophers. It is therefore of singular interest to investigate some of the most important arguments from total failure. This is what I propose to do in this paper. My aim is not be to demonstrate that these arguments are (...)
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  13. Thor Grunbaum (2008). The Body in Action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):243-261.
    This article is about how to describe an agent’s awareness of her bodily movements when she is aware of executing an action for a reason. Against current orthodoxy, I want to defend the claim that the agent’s experience of moving has an epistemic place in the agent’s awareness of her own intentional action. In “The problem,” I describe why this should be thought to be problematic. In “Motives for denying epistemic role,” I state some of the main motives for denying (...)
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  14. Thor Grünbaum (2007). Action Between Plot and Discourse. Semiotica 2007 (165):295-314.
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  15. Thor Grünbaum (2005). R. Ingarden's Theory of Schematized Profi Les: A Dynamic Version. Nordic Journal of Aesthetics 17 (32).
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