Search results for 'Thought' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. John Zeimbekis (2011). Thought Experiments and Mental Simulations. In Katerina Ierodiakonou & Sophie Roux (eds.), Thought Experiments in Methodological and Historical Contexts. Brill.score: 27.0
    Thought experiments have a mysterious way of informing us about the world, apparently without examining it, yet with a great degree of certainty. It is tempting to try to explain this capacity by making use of the idea that in thought experiments, the mind somehow simulates the processes about which it reaches conclusions. Here, I test this idea. I argue that when they predict the outcomes of hypothetical physical situations, thought experiments cannot simulate physical processes. They use (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Michael G. F. Martin (2002). Particular Thoughts and Singular Thought. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Logic, Thought, and Language. Cambridge University Press. 173-214.score: 27.0
    Book description: Much contemporary philosophical debate centres on the topics of logic, thought and language, and on the connections between these topics. This collection of articles is based on the Royal Institute of Philosophy’s annual lecture series for 2000–2001. Its contributors include a number of those working at the forefront of the field, and in their papers they reflect their own current pre-occupations. As such, the volume will be of interest to all philosophers, whether their own work is within (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Yiftach J. H. Fehige & Harald Wiltsche (2012). The Body, Thought Experiments, and Phenomenology. In Thought Experiments in Philosophy, Science, and the Arts.score: 27.0
    An explorative contribution to the ongoing discussion of thought experiments. While endorsing the majority view that skepticism about thought experiments is not well justified, in what follows we attempt to show that there is a kind of “bodiliness” missing from current accounts of thought experiments. That is, we suggest a phenomenological addition to the literature. First, we contextualize our claim that the importance of the body in thought experiments has been widely underestimated. Then we discuss David (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Declan Smithies (2011). What is the Role of Consciousness in Demonstrative Thought? Journal of Philosophy 108 (1):5-34.score: 24.0
    Perception enables us to think demonstrative thoughts about the world around us, but what must perception be like in order to play this role? Does perception enable demonstrative thought only if it is conscious? This paper examines three accounts of the role of consciousness in demonstrative thought, which agree that consciousness is essential for demonstrative thought, but disagree about why it is. First, I consider and reject the accounts proposed by Gareth Evans in The Varieties of Reference (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Jonathan Ichikawa & Benjamin Jarvis (2009). Thought-Experiment Intuitions and Truth in Fiction. Philosophical Studies 142 (2):221 - 246.score: 24.0
    What sorts of things are the intuitions generated via thought experiment? Timothy Williamson has responded to naturalistic skeptics by arguing that thought-experiment intuitions are judgments of ordinary counterfactuals. On this view, the intuition is naturalistically innocuous, but it has a contingent content and could be known at best a posteriori. We suggest an alternative to Williamson's account, according to which we apprehend thought-experiment intuitions through our grasp on truth in fiction. On our view, intuitions like the Gettier (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Brent Silby, Revealing the Language of Thought.score: 24.0
    Language of thought theories fall primarily into two views. The first view sees the language of thought as an innate language known as mentalese, which is hypothesized to operate at a level below conscious awareness while at the same time operating at a higher level than the neural events in the brain. The second view supposes that the language of thought is not innate. Rather, the language of thought is natural language. So, as an English speaker, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Elke Brendel (2004). Intuition Pumps and the Proper Use of Thought Experiments. Dialectica 58 (1):89–108.score: 24.0
    I begin with an explication of "thought experiment". I then clarify the role that intuitions play in thought experiments by addressing two important issues: (1) the informativeness of thought experiments and (2) the legitimacy of the method of thought experiments in philosophy and the natural sciences. I defend a naturalistic account of intuitions that provides a plausible explanation of the informativeness of thought experiments, which, in turn, allows thought experiments to be reconstructed as arguments. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Edouard Machery (2011). Thought Experiments and Philosophical Knowledge. Metaphilosophy 42 (3):191-214.score: 24.0
    Abstract: While thought experiments play an important role in contemporary analytic philosophy, much remains unclear about thought experiments. In particular, it is still unclear whether the judgments elicited by thought experiments can provide evidence for the premises of philosophical arguments. This article argues that, if an influential and promising view about the nature of the judgments elicited by thought experiments is correct, then many thought experiments in philosophy fail to provide any evidence for the premises (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Yitzhak Y. Melamed (2013). Spinoza's Metaphysics of Thought: Parallelisms and the Multifaceted Structure of Ideas. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):636-683.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I suggest an outline of a new interpretation of core issues in Spinoza’s metaphysics and philosophy of mind. I argue for three major theses. (1) In the first part of the paper I show that the celebrated Spinozistic doctrine commonly termed “the doctrine of parallelism” is in fact a confusion of two separate and independent doctrines of parallelism. Hence, I argue that our current understanding of Spinoza’s metaphysics and philosophy of mind is fundamentally flawed. (2) The clarification (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Donald Davidson (1999). The Emergence of Thought. Erkenntnis 51 (1):511-21.score: 24.0
    A phenomenon “emerges” when a concept is instantiated for the first time: hence emergence is relative to a set of concepts. Propositional thought and language emerge together. It is proposed that the degree of complexity of an object language relative to a given metalanguage can be gauged by the number of ways it can be translated into that metalanguage: in analogy with other forms of measurement, the more ways the object language can be translated into the metalanguage, the less (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Simon Beck (2009). Martha Nussbaum and the Foundations of Ethics: Identity, Morality and Thought-Experiments. South African Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):261-270.score: 24.0
    Martha Nussbaum has argued in support of the view (supposedly that of Aristotle) that we can, through thought-experiments involving personal identity, find an objective foundation for moral thought without having to appeal to any authority independent of morality. I compare the thought-experiment from Plato’s Philebus that she presents as an example to other thought-experiments involving identity in the literature and argue that this reveals a tension between the sources of authority which Nussbaum invokes for her (...)-experiment. I also argue that each of her sources of authority presents further difficulties for her project. Finally, I argue that it is not clear that her thought-experiment is one that actually involves identity in any crucial way. As a result, the case she offers does not offer any satisfactory support for her view on the relation between identity, morality and thought-experiments, but we do gain some insights into what that relation really is along the way. (shrink)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. John Zeimbekis (2010). Pictures and Singular Thought. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 68 (1):11-21.score: 24.0
    How do we acquire thoughts and beliefs about particulars by looking at pictures? One kind of reply essentially compares depiction to perception, holding that picture-perception is a form of remote object-perception. Lopes’s theory that pictures refer by demonstrative identification, and Walton’s transparency theory for photographs, constitute such remote acquaintance theories of depiction. The main purpose of this paper is to defend an alternative conception of pictures, on which they are not suitable for acquainting us with particulars but for acquainting us (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Simon Beck (2006). These Bizarre Fictions: Thought-Experiments, Our Psychology and Our Selves. Philosophical Papers 35 (1):29-54.score: 24.0
    Philosophers have traditionally used thought-experiments in their endeavours to find a satisfactory account of the self and personal identity. Yet there are considerations from empirical psychology as well as related ones from philosophy itself that appear to completely undermine the method of thought-experiment. This paper focuses on both sets of considerations and attempts a defence of the method.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2009). A Role for Ownership and Authorship in the Analysis of Thought Insertion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.score: 24.0
    Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’ thoughts. We (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. James Genone (2014). Evidential Constraints on Singular Thought. Mind and Language 29 (1):1-25.score: 24.0
    In this article, I argue that in typical cases of singular thought, a thinker stands in an evidential relation to the object of thought suitable for providing knowledge of the object's existence. Furthermore, a thinker may generate representations that purport to refer to particular objects in response to appropriate, though defeasible, evidence of the existence of such an object. I motivate these constraints by considering a number of examples introduced by Robin Jeshion in support of a view she (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Alexandre Billon (2011). Does Consciousness Entail Subjectivity? The Puzzle of Thought Insertion. Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):291 - 314.score: 24.0
    (2013). Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 291-314. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.625117.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Marek Picha (2011). How to Reconstruct a Thought Experiment. Organon F 18 (2):154-188.score: 24.0
    The paper is a contribution to the debate on the epistemological status of thought experiments. I deal with the epistemological uniqueness of experiments in the sense of their irreducibility to other sources of justification. In particular, I criticize an influential argument for the irreducibility of thought experiments to general arguments. First, I introduce the radical empiricist theory of eliminativism, which considers thought experiments to be rhetorically modified arguments, uninteresting from the epistemological point of view. Second, I present (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Agustin Vicente (2014). The Comparator Account on Thought Insertion, Alien Voices and Inner Speech: Some Open Questions. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):335-353.score: 24.0
    Recently, many philosophers and psychologists have claimed that the explanation that grounds both passivity phenomena in the cognitive domain and passivity phenomena that occur with respect to overt actions is, along broad lines, the same. Furthermore, they claim that the best account we have of such phenomena in both scenarios is the “comparator” account. However, there are reasons to doubt whether the comparator model can be exported from the realm of overt actions to the cognitive domain in general. There is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Hans-Johann Glock (2006). Thought, Language, and Animals. In Michael Kober (ed.), Deepening Our Understanding of Wittgenstein (Grazer Philosophische Studien, Volume 71, 2006). Rodopi. 139-160.score: 24.0
    This paper discusses Wittgenstein's ideas about the relation between thought, neurophysiology and language, and about the mental capacities of non-linguistic animals. It deals with his initial espousal and later rejection of a 'language of thought', his arguments against the idea that thought requires a medium of images or words, his reasons for resisting the encephalocentric conception of the mind which dominates contemporary philosophy of mind, his mature views about the connection between thought and language, and his (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Basileios Kroustallis (2012). Film as Thought Experiment: A Happy-Go-Lucky Case? Film-Philosophy 16 (1):72-84.score: 24.0
    Can some films be genuine thought experiments that challenge our commonsense intuitions? Certain filmic narratives and their mise-en-scène details reveal rigorous reasoning and counterintuitive outcomes on philosophical issues, such as skepticism or personal identity. But this philosophical façade may hide a mundane concern for entertainment. Unfamiliar narratives drive spectator entertainment, and every novel cinematic situation could be easily explained as part of a process that lacks motives of philosophical elucidation. -/- The paper inverses the above objection, and proposes that (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Darrell P. Rowbottom (forthcoming). Intuitions in Science: Thought Experiments as Argument Pumps. In Anthony R. Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions.score: 24.0
    In this piece, I advocate and motivate a new understanding of thought experiments, which avoids problems with the rival accounts of Brown and Norton.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Robin Jeshion (ed.) (2010). New Essays on Singular Thought. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Leading experts in the field contributing to this volume make the case for the singularity of thought and debate a broad spectrum of issues it raises, including ...
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. John-Michael M. Kuczynski (2006). Formal Operations and Simulated Thought. Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):221-234.score: 24.0
    A series of representations must be semantics-driven if the members of that series are to combine into a single thought. Where semantics is not operative, there is at most a series of disjoint representations that add up to nothing true or false, and therefore do not constitute a thought at all. There is necessarily a gulf between simulating thought, on the one hand, and actually thinking, on the other. A related point is that a popular doctrine - (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Max Seeger (2013). Commentary on Martin & Pacherie. Out of Nowhere: Thought Insertion, Ownership and Context-Integration. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):261-263.score: 24.0
    In their article “Out of nowhere: thought insertion, ownership and context-integration”, Jean-Remy Martin & Elisabeth Pacherie criticize the standard approach to thought insertion. However, their criticism is based on a misunderstanding of what the standard approach actually claims. By clarifying the notions ‘sense of ownership’ and ‘sense of agency’, I show that Martin & Pacherie’s own approach can be construed as a refined version of the standard approach.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. David J. Cole (1984). Thought and Thought Experiments. Philosophical Studies 45 (May):431-44.score: 24.0
    Thought experiments have been used by philosophers for centuries, especially in the study of personal identity where they appear to have been used extensively and indiscriminately. Despite their prevalence, the use of thought experiments in this area of philosophy has been criticized in recent times. Bernard Williams criticizes the conclusions that are drawn from some experiments, and retells one of these experiments from a different perspective, a retelling which leads to a seemingly opposing result. Wilkes criticizes the method (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Richard Heck (ed.) (1997). Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    In this exciting new collection, a distinguished international group of philosophers contribute new essays on central issues in philosophy of language and logic, in honor of Michael Dummett, one of the most influential philosophers of the late twentieth century. The essays are focused on areas particularly associated with Professor Dummett. Five are contributions to the philosophy of language, addressing in particular the nature of truth and meaning and the relation between language and thought. Two contributors discuss time, in particular (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. David Atkinson (2003). When Are Thought Experiments Poor Ones? Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 34 (2):305 - 322.score: 24.0
    A characteristic of contemporary analytic philosophy is its ample use of thought experiments. We formulate two features that can lead one to suspect that a given thought experiment is a poor one. Although these features are especially in evidence within the philosophy of mind, they can, surprisingly enough, also be discerned in some celebrated scientific thought experiments. Yet in the latter case the consequences appear to be less disastrous. We conclude that the use of thought experiments (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Lenny Clapp (2012). Is Even Thought Compositional? Philosophical Studies 157 (2):299-322.score: 24.0
    Fodor (Mind Lang 16:1–15, 2001 ) endorses the mixed view that thought, yet not language, is compositional. That is, Fodor accepts the arguments of radical pragmatics that language is not compositional, but he claims these arguments do not apply to thought. My purpose here is to evaluate this mixed position: Assuming that the radical pragmaticists are right that language is not compositional, what arguments can be provided in support of the claim that thought is compositional? Before such (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Maarten Van Dyck (2003). The Roles of One Thought Experiment in Interpreting Quantum Mechanics. Werner Heisenberg Meets Thomas Kuhn. Philosophica 72 (3):79-103.score: 24.0
    Recent years saw the rise of an interest in the roles and significance of thought experiments in different areas of human thinking. Heisenberg's gamma ray microscope is no doubt one of the most famous examples of a thought experiment in physics. Nevertheless, this particular thought experiment has not received much detailed attention in the philosophical literature on thought experiments up to date, maybe because of its often claimed inadequacies. In this paper, I try to do two (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Mona Mamulea (2012). A Thought Experiment of Cross-Cultural Comparison. The Question of Rationality. Cercetări Filosofico-Psihologice 4 (2):105-114.score: 24.0
    David Bloor’s thought experiment is taken into consideration to suggest that the rationality of the Other cannot be inferred by way of argument for the reason that it is unavoidably contained as a hidden supposition by any argument engaged in proving it. We are able to understand a different culture only as far as we recognize in it the same kind of rationality that works in our own culture. Another kind of rationality is either impossible, or indiscernible.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. H. G. Callaway (2010). Memories and Portraits, Explorations in American Thought. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.score: 24.0
    In Memories and Portraits: Explorations in American Thought, H. G. Callaway embeds his distinctive contextualism and philosophical pluralism within strands of history and autobiography, spanning three continents. Starting in Philadelphia, and reflecting on the meaning of home in American thought, he offers a philosophically inspired narrative of travel and explorations, in Europe and Africa, illuminating central elements of American thought—partly out of diverse foreign and domestic reactions and fascinating cultural contrasts. -/- This book is of interest for (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Adele Mercier (1998). On Communication-Based De Re Thought, Commitments De Dicto and Word Individuation. In R. Stainton & Murasagi (eds.), Philosophy and Linguistics. Westview Press. 85--111.score: 24.0
    Provides an account of how necessary subjective syntactic investments on the part of speakers affect the semantic contents of their words and the possibilities for their thought-contents.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Dustin Stokes (2011). Minimally Creative Thought. Metaphilosophy 42 (5):658-681.score: 24.0
    Creativity has received, and continues to receive, comparatively little analysis in philosophy and the brain and behavioural sciences. This is in spite of the importance of creative thought and action, and the many and varied resources of theories of mind. Here an alternative approach to analyzing creativity is suggested: start from the bottom up with minimally creative thought. Minimally creative thought depends non-accidentally upon agency, is novel relative to the acting agent, and could not have been tokened (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Stephen R. Coleman (2000). Thought Experiments and Personal Identity. Philosophical Studies 98 (1):51-66.score: 24.0
    Thought experiments are profitably compared to compasses. A compass is a simple but useful device for determining direction. Nevertheless, it systematically errs in the presence of magnets ...it becomes unreliable near the North Pole, in mine shafts, when vibrated, in the presence of metal ...experts will wish to use the compass as one element in a wider portfolio of navigational techniques. Analogously, thought experiments are simple but useful devices for determining the status of propositions. Sadly, they systematically err (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Pascal Engel (2002). The Norms of Thought: Are They Social? Mind and Society 2 (3):129-148.score: 24.0
    A commonplace in contemporary philosophy is that mental content has normative properties. A number of writers associate this view to the idea that the normativity of content is essentially connected to its social character. I agree with the first thesis, but disagree with the second. The paper examines three kinds of views according to which the norms of thought and content are social: Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations, Davidson’s triangulation argument, and Brandom’s inferential pragmatics, and criticises each. It is argued (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Peter Langland-Hassan (2008). Fractured Phenomenologies: Thought Insertion, Inner Speech, and the Puzzle of Extraneity. Mind and Language 23 (4):369-401.score: 24.0
    Abstract: How it is that one's own thoughts can seem to be someone else's? After noting some common missteps of other approaches to this puzzle, I develop a novel cognitive solution, drawing on and critiquing theories that understand inserted thoughts and auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia as stemming from mismatches between predicted and actual sensory feedback. Considerable attention is paid to forging links between the first-person phenomenology of thought insertion and the posits (e.g. efference copy, corollary discharge) of current (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Richard Swinburne (1985). Thought. Philosophical Studies 48 (September):153-172.score: 24.0
    AN OCCURRENT THOUGHT IS DISTINGUISHED FROM BELIEF, INTELLIGENT BEHAVIOR, AND THE ACTIVE PROCESS OF THINKING. THE OCCURRENCE OF THOUGHTS IS NOT TO BE ANALYZED IN TERMS OF THE OCCURRENCE OF IMAGES OF WORDS OF SENTENCES WHICH EXPRESS THEM AND OFTEN ACCOMPANY THEM. THOUGHTS HAVE INBUILT INTENTIONALITY.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Erik C. Banks (2004). The Philosophical Roots of Ernst Mach's Economy of Thought. Synthese 139 (1):23-53.score: 24.0
    A full appreciation for Ernst Mach's doctrine of the economy of thought must take account of his direct realism about particulars (elements) and his anti-realism about space-time laws as economical constructions. After a review of thought economy, its critics and some contemporary forms, the paper turns to the philosophical roots of Mach's doctrine. Mach claimed that the simplest, most parsimonious theories economized memory and effort by using abstract concepts and laws instead of attending to the details of each (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Henry Jackman (2003). Expression, Thought, and Language. Philosophia 31 (1-2):33-54.score: 24.0
    This paper discusses an "expressive constraint" on accounts of thought and language which requires that when a speaker expresses a belief by sincerely uttering a sentence, the utterance and the belief have the same content. It will be argued that this constraint should be viewed as expressing a conceptual connection between thought and language rather than a mere empirical generalization about the two. However, the most obvious accounts of the relation between thought and language compatible with the (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Nicola Mößner (2011). Thought Styles and Paradigms—a Comparative Study of Ludwik Fleck and Thomas S. Kuhn. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42 (2):362–371.score: 24.0
    At first glance there seem to be many similarities between Thomas S. Kuhn’s and Ludwik Fleck’s accounts of the development of scientific knowledge. Notably, both pay attention to the role played by the scientific community in the development of scientific knowledge. But putting first impressions aside, one can criticise some philosophers for being too hasty in their attempt to find supposed similarities in the works of the two men. Having acknowledged that Fleck anticipated some of Kuhn’s later theses, there seems (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Jeremy Pierce (2013). Glasgow's Race Antirealism: Experimental Philosophy and Thought Experiments. Journal of Social Philosophy 44 (2):146-168.score: 24.0
    Joshua Glasgow argues against the existence of races. His experimental philosophy asks subjects questions involving racial categorization to discover the ordinary concept of race at work in their judgments. The results show conflicting information about the concept of race, and Glasgow concludes that the ordinary concept of race is inconsistent. I conclude, rather, that Glasgow’s results fit perfectly fine with a social-kind view of races as real social entities. He also presents thought experiments to show that social-kind views give (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Michael V. Antony (1993). Social Relations and the Individuation of Thought. Mind 102 (406):247-61.score: 24.0
    Tyler Burge has argued that a necessary condition for individual's having many of the thoughts he has is that he bear certain relations to other language users. Burge's conclusion is based on a thought experiment in which an individual's social relations are imagined, counterfactually, to differ from how they are actually. The result is that it seems, counterfactually, the individual cannot be attributed many of the thoughts he can be actually. In the article, an alternative interpretation of Burge's (...) experiment is offered on which the intuitions Burge evokes can be accepted while his conclusion about the social character of thought is denied. The alternative interpretation given, it is then argued that it is preferable to Burge's. (shrink)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Komarine Romdenh-Romluc (2008). First-Person Thought and the Use of 'I'. Synthese 163 (2):145 - 156.score: 24.0
    The traditional account (TA) of first-person thought draws conclusions about this type of thinking from claims made about the first-person pronoun. In this paper I raise a worry for the traditional account. Certain uses of ‘I’ conflict with its conception of the linguistic data. I argue that once the data is analysed correctly, the traditional approach to first-person thought cannot be maintained.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Lawrence Weiskrantz (1997). Thought Without Language: Thought Without Awareness? In Thought and Language. New York: Cambridge University Press. 127-.score: 24.0
  45. Massimo Pigliucci (2006). What is a Thought Experiment, Anyhow? Philosophy Now (Nov/Dec):30.score: 24.0
    Thought experiments are cheap and popular, but how do they work?
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Roy A. Sorensen (1992). Thought Experiments. Oxford University Press.score: 24.0
    Sorensen presents a general theory of thought experiments: what they are, how they work, what are their virtues and vices. On Sorensen's view, philosophy differs from science in degree, but not in kind. For this reason, he claims, it is possible to understand philosophical thought experiments by concentrating on their resemblance to scientific relatives. Lessons learned about scientific experimentation carry over to thought experiment, and vice versa. Sorensen also assesses the hazards and pseudo-hazards of thought experiments. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Norman Y. Teng (1999). The Language of Thought and the Embodied Nature of Language Use. Philosophical Studies 94 (3):237-251.score: 24.0
    This paper attempts to clarify and critically examine Fodor's language of thought (LOT) hypothesis, focusing on his contention that the systematicity of language use provides a solid ground for the LOT hypothesis. (edited).
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. James Maffie (1997). “Just-so” Stories About “Inner Cognitive Africa”: Some Doubts About Sorensen's Evolutionary Epistemology of Thought Experiments. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 12 (2):207-224.score: 24.0
    Roy Sorensen advances an evolutionary explanation of our capacity for thought experiments which doubles as a naturalized epistemological justification. I argue Sorensens explanation fails to satisfy key elements of environmental-selectionist explanations and so fails to carry epistemic force. I then argue that even if Sorensen succeeds in showing the adaptive utility of our capacity, he still fails to establish its reliability and hence epistemic utility. I conclude Sorensens account comes to little more than a just-so story.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Wayne A. Davis (2008). Thought Structure, Belief Content, and Possession Conditions. Acta Analytica 23 (3):207-231.score: 24.0
    According to Peacocke, concepts are individuated by their possession conditions, which are specified in terms of conditions in which certain propositions containing those concepts are believed. In support, Peacocke tries to explain what it is for a thought to have a structure and what it is for a belief to have a propositional content. I show that the possession condition theory cannot answer such fundamental questions. Peacocke’s theory founders because concepts are metaphysically fundamental. They individuate the propositions and thoughts (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis (1997). Regress Arguments Against the Language of Thought. Analysis 57 (1):60-66.score: 24.0
    The Language of Thought Hypothesis is often taken to have the fatal flaw that it generates an explanatory regress. The language of thought is invoked to explain certain features of natural language (e.g., that it is learned, understood, and is meaningful), but, according to the regress argument, the language of thought itself has these same features and hence no explanatory progress has been made. We argue that such arguments rely on the tacit assumption that the entire motivation (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000