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John L. Tienson [29]John Tienson [29]John Leander Tienson [1]
  1. Terence Horgan & John Tienson (2002). The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. OUP Usa 520--533.
  2.  30
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1996). Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. MIT Press.
    In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson articulate and defend a new view of cognition.
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  3. Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2004). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. Walter De Gruyter
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  4.  66
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2001). Deconstructing New Wave Materialism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press 307--318.
    In the first post World War II identity theories (e.g., Place 1956, Smart 1962), mind brain identities were held to be contingent. However, in work beginning in the late 1960's, Saul Kripke (1971, 1980) convinced the philosophical community that true identity statements involving names and natural kind terms are necessarily true and furthermore, that many such necessary identities can only be known a posteriori. Kripke also offered an explanation of the a posteriori nature of ordinary theoretical identities such as that (...)
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  5.  43
    George Graham, Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2007). Consciousness and Intentionality. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell 468--484.
  6. Terence Horgan, John Tienson & Graham George (2006). Internal-World Skepticism and the Self-Presentational Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness. In Kriegel Uriah & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-representational Approaches to Consciousness. Bradford
  7.  30
    Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2003). The Phenomenology of First-Person Agency. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic 323.
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  8.  22
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.) (1991). Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Kluwer.
    "A third of the papers in this volume originated at the 1987 Spindel Conference ... at Memphis State University"--Pref.
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  9.  93
    Terry Horgan & John Tienson, The Phenomenology of Embodied Agency.
    For the last 20 years or so, philosophers of mind have been using the term ‘qualia’, which is frequently glossed as standing for the “what-it-is-like” of experience. The examples of what-it-is-like that are typically given are feelings of pain or itches, and color and sound sensations. This suggests an identification of the experiential what-it-islike with such states. More recently, philosophers have begun speaking of the “phenomenology“ of experience, which they have also glossed as “what-it-is-like”. Many say, for example, that any (...)
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  10.  54
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1994). A Nonclassical Framework for Cognitive Science. Synthese 101 (3):305-45.
    David Marr provided a useful framework for theorizing about cognition within classical, AI-style cognitive science, in terms of three levels of description: the levels of (i) cognitive function, (ii) algorithm and (iii) physical implementation. We generalize this framework: (i) cognitive state transitions, (ii) mathematical/functional design and (iii) physical implementation or realization. Specifying the middle, design level to be the theory of dynamical systems yields a nonclassical, alternative framework that suits (but is not committed to) connectionism. We consider how a brain's (...)
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  11.  15
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1990). Soft Laws. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):256-279.
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  12.  23
    Terence Horgan & John Tienson (1989). Representations Without Rules. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):147-174.
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  13.  44
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1992). Cognitive Systems as Dynamic Systems. Topoi 11 (1):27-43.
  14. Terry Horgan & John Tienson (2002). The Phenomenology of Intentionality and the Intentionality of Phenomenology. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press 520--533.
     
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  15. Terence Horgan & John Tienson (1989). Representations Without Rules in Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):147-174.
  16. George Graham, Terence Horgan & John Tienson (2009). Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of Mind. In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press 512--537.
     
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  17.  25
    John L. Tienson (1988). An Introduction to Connectionism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (S1):1-16.
  18. George Graham, Terence Horgan & John Tienson (2009). Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. OUP Oxford
     
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  19.  56
    John Tienson (1977). Can Things of Different Natural Kinds Be Exactly Alike? Analysis 37 (4):190 - 197.
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  20.  10
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1987). Settling Into a New Paradigm. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 26 (S1):97-113.
  21.  54
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2006). Cognition Needs Syntax but Not Rules. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing 147--158.
    Human cognition is rich, varied, and complex. In this Chapter we argue that because of the richness of human cognition (and human mental life generally), there must be a syntax of cognitive states, but because of this very richness, cognitive processes cannot be describable by exceptionless rules. The argument for syntax, in Section 1, has to do with being able to get around in any number of possible environments in a complex world. Since nature did not know where in the (...)
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  22.  34
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1995). Connectionism and the Commitments of Folk Psychology. Philosophical Perspectives 9:127-52.
  23. Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1991). Structured Representations in Connectionist Systems? In S. Davis (ed.), Connectionism: Theorye and Practice. OUP
     
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  24.  28
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1989). Representation Without Rules. Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):147-74.
  25.  15
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1992). Levels of Description in Nonclassical Cognitive Science. Philosophy 34:159-188.
    David Marr provided an influential account of levels of description in classical cognitive science. In this paper we contrast Marr'ent with some alternatives that are suggested by the recent emergence of connectionism. Marr's account is interesting and important both because of the levels of description it distinguishes, and because of the way his presentation reflects some of the most basic, foundational, assumptions of classical AI-style cognitive science . Thus, by focusing on levels of description, one can sharpen foundational differences between (...)
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  26.  23
    John Tienson (2013). Kasimir Twardowski on the Content of Presentations. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):485-499.
    In On the Content and Object of Presentations, Kasimir Twardowski presents an interesting line of thought concerning the content of a presentation and its relation to the object of that presentation. This way of thinking about content is valuable for understanding phenomenal intentionality, and it should also be important for the project of “naturalizing” the mental (or at least for discovering the neural correlates of the phenomenal). According to this view, content is that by virtue of which a presentation of (...)
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  27.  39
    John L. Tienson (1987). Brains Are Not Conscious. Philosophical Papers 16 (November):187-93.
  28.  25
    John Tienson (1984). Hume on Universals and General Terms. Noûs 18 (2):311-330.
  29.  8
    Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (1994). Representations Don't Need Rules: Reply to James Garson. Mind and Language 9 (1):1-24.
  30.  25
    John Tienson (1974). On Analysing Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 25 (4):289 - 293.
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  31.  42
    John L. Tienson (2002). Higher-Order Causation. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):89-101.
    We have a familiar idea of levels of description or levels of theory in science: microphysics, atomic physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and the various social sciences. It is clear that philosophers - such as Terry Horgan - who want to be nonreductive materialists with regard to the mental must hold that this is not mere description; there must be genuine higher-level causes, and hence, genuine higher-level properties, in particular mental properties and causes. But there appears to be a deep problem (...)
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  32.  27
    Terry Horgan, John Tienson & Matjaž Potrč (2002). Editors' Introduction. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (S1):7-8.
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  33.  23
    John L. Tienson (1988). Resemblance and General Terms. Philosophical Studies 54 (1):87 - 108.
    Any successful account of general terms must explain our ability to apply terms correctly to new instances. Many philosophers have thought resemblance offers an ontologically sparse basis for such an account. However, Any natural and plausible account of general terms on the basis of resemblance requires quite a rich ontology, Including at least second order properties and relations. Given a sufficiently rich structure of resemblances, We can surely account for the application of many general terms. I argue, However, That our (...)
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  34.  2
    Terence Horgan & John Tienson (1993). Levels of Description in Nonclassical Cognitive Science. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 34:159-188.
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  35. John Tienson (2002). Questions for Blobjectivism. Facta Philosophica 2:301-10.
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  36.  8
    John L. Tienson (1989). A Conception of Metaphysics. American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (1):63 - 71.
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  37. Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham (2006). Internal-World Skepticism and Mental Self-Presentation. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press 41-61.
  38.  24
    John Tienson (1984). Hesperus and Phosphorus. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1):16 – 25.
  39.  24
    John L. Tienson (1982). Synonyms and the Objects of Belief. Philosophical Studies 42 (3):297 - 313.
  40.  15
    John Tienson (1986). An Observation on Common Names and Proper Names. Analysis 46 (2):73 - 76.
    Common names, for Mill, have both connotation and denotation. Thus ‘horse’ connotes certain properties, and the name ‘horse’ denotes the things that have those properties. By contrast, proper names have no connotations; they do not denote in virtue of the possession of certain properties by their denotations, but so to speak, directly. Thus Socrates received his name by being dubbed ‘Socrates’; and he might just as well have been given any other name. This contrast is misleading. After all, we might (...)
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  41.  16
    John Tienson (2007). What Does a Deceived Cartesian Meditator Know? Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):49-59.
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  42.  18
    John L. Tienson (1987). An Argument Concerning Quantification and Propositional Attitudes. Philosophical Studies 51 (2):145 - 168.
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  43.  4
    John L. Tienson (1990). About Competence. Philosophical Papers 19 (1):19-36.
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  44.  5
    John Tienson (1984). Review: Nathan U. Salmon, Reference and Essence. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 49 (4):1417-1419.
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  45.  16
    Terence Horgan & John Tienson (1997). Pr Cis of Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):337 – 356.
    Connectionism was explicitly put forward as an alternative to classical cognitive science. The questions arise: how exactly does connectionism differ from classical cognitive science, and how is it potentially better? The classical “rules and representations” conception of cognition is that cognitive transitions are determined by exceptionless rules that apply to the syntactic structure of symbols. Many philosophers have seen connectionism as a basis for denying structured symbols. We, on the other hand, argue that cognition is too rich and flexible to (...)
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  46.  13
    John L. Tienson (1985). Entia Successiva and Ordinary Things. Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):475-479.
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  47.  17
    Terence Horgan & John Tienson (1998). Resisting the Tyranny of Terminology: The General Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):643-643.
    What van Gelder calls the dynamical hypothesis is only a special case of what we here dub the general dynamical hypothesis. His terminology makes it easy to overlook important alternative dynamical approaches in cognitive science. Connectionist models typically conform to the general dynamical hypothesis, but not to van Gelder's.
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  48. John L. Tienson (1987). Introduction to Connectionism. Southern Journal of Philosophy (Suppl.) 1:1-16.
     
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  49.  3
    John Tienson (1986). Review: Leonard Linsky, Oblique Contexts. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (3):821-822.
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  50.  5
    John Tienson (1975). Hintikka's Argument for the 'Basic Restriction'. Philosophical Studies 28 (1):33 - 40.
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