Global firms need to decide on the correspondence between their corporate ethics and the globalization of their activities. When firms go global, they face ethical complexities as they operate in different legal and cultural environments that may impact the admissibility and appropriateness of their approach to institutionalize and implement corporate ethics. Global firms may have good reasons to establish global codes of ethics that are to be obeyed by all employees worldwide. However, developing and implementing such codes can be rather (...) difficult due to various, and partly competing, conditions in the countries of operation. In this article, two legal disputes are analyzed to illustrate some of the difficulties that may emerge when firms globalize their codes of ethics. I argue that these conflicts can be mitigated when firms carefully design their codes and the processes of code implementation. (shrink)
Cancer-related electronic support groups (ESGs) may be regarded as a complement to face-to-face groups when the latter are available, and as an alternative when they are not. Advantages over face-to-face groups include an absence of barriers imposed by geographic location, opportunities for anonymity that permit sensitive issues to be discussed, and opportunities to find peers online. ESGs can be especially valuable as navigation aids for those trying to find a way through the healthcare system and as a guide to the (...) cancer journey. Outcome indicators that could be used to evaluate the quality of ESGs as navigation aids need to be developed and tested. Conceptual models for the navigator role, such as the Facilitating Navigator Model, are appropriate for ESGs designed specifically for research purposes. A Shared or Tacit Model may be more appropriate for unmoderated ESGs. Both conceptual models raise issues in Internet research ethics that need to be address. (shrink)
First, I'd like to thank Professors Van Till, Pun, and McMullin for their careful and thoughtful replies. There is a deep level of agreement among all four of us; as is customary with replies and replies to replies, however, I shall concentrate on our areas of disagreement. In the cases of Van Till and McMullin, this may give an impression of deeper disagreement than actually exists. In the case of Pun it leaves me with little to say except (...) Yea and Amen; I find no serious disagreement between us. (shrink)
Howard Van Till's review of my book No Free Lunch exemplifies perfectly why theistic evolution remains intelligent design's most implacable foe. Not only does theistic evolution sign off on the naturalism that pervades so much of contemporary science, but it justifies that naturalism theologically -- as though it were unworthy of God to create by any means other than an evolutionary process that carefully conceals God's tracks.
We propose to model preference change as the change of an agent’s preference state in response to the agent accepting a preference affect. The preference state of an agent is ruled by various inferential commitments. Accepting a preference affect will likely bring the preference state into inconsistency. The model shows how the preference state needs to be adjusted to restore consistency. In particular, it shows which path restoration will take, conditional on the previous preference state and the available dynamic information, (...) and it determines how the ensuing preference state will look like. (shrink)
This paper explores the educational significance of the critique of representationalism. As it includes the notion of non-representational knowledge, Rudolf Steiner’s epistemology is introduced and further linked to elements in Bergson and Deleuze. Humboldt’s idea of Menschenbildung as the central function of knowledge is brought in, since both Humboldt and Steiner emphasise knowledge as mediating the interplay between self and world, producing a deeper sense of reality. Such an education must respect the living nature of genuine concepts as well as (...) the aesthetic aspects of learning. After a note on the educational abuse of language in discursive closures, some traits of Steiner’s practical pedagogy are presented as possible practical implications. (shrink)
_shazam!–_ the explosive generation of £100.03 of ordinary cash (minus a small quantity extracted by the bank) plus, perhaps, a few stray photons or quarks or gravity waves. He wonders: What kind of containers does the bank use to hold the anti-cash till the regular cash arrives? How are they insulated? Can you store cash and anti-cash in the same box and somehow prevent them from getting in contact? Might there be zombanks that only _seemed_ to store cash and (...) anti-cash? How could we tell? This is a hard problem indeed! (shrink)
Ever since the formation of the field of economic methodology in the 1990s, doubts have been raised about its discursive closure from both inside and outside the field. Rather than embarking on a programmatic discussion, I present a historical narrative regarding the conditions of the formation of the field, which may have necessitated this closure. These conditions are found in the role methodological reflections played in the formalist revolution of the 1950s and in its critique in the 1970s. Both episodes (...) gave occasion to, but did not require the import of philosophy of science in the mid-1970s. Since the 1980s, when the field became separately established through post-Popperian methodology, it remains an open question whether this imposition still holds. (shrink)
I became interested in normative ethics in my last term as a philosophy undergraduate at the University of Toronto. Influenced by a traditional conception of the discipline, I’d till then studied mostly history of philosophy, with a special interest in, of all things, Hegel. But seeing the value of a balanced philosophy program, I enrolled in an ethics seminar in the winter of 1975. I’d studied the ethics of Plato, Leibniz, Hegel, and others in my history courses, but this (...) was my first exposure to contemporary thought on the subject. The seminar had only one other student, and since he was fairly quiet I had something close to a one-on-one tutorial with the instructor, Wayne Sumner – another contributor to this volume. I was immensely taken both by Wayne’s teaching and by the seminar’s topic, which was utilitarianism. Our study of it included both theoretical questions such as act- vs. ruleutilitarianism and applied ones such as our obligations to future generations. I found all these questions intellectually engaging and also humanly important, given their connection to live ethical issues – in short, I was hooked. I was especially impressed by two non-utilitarian texts we read. One was the last chapter of G. E. Moore’s Principia Ethica, meant to illustrate a non- 1 utilitarian or ideal consequentialist theory. I was attracted by Moore’s general account of the good, which values states such as love and aesthetic appreciation alongside pleasure, and saw in his principle of organic unities a far clearer statement of ideas I had encountered in more pretentious form in Hegel. The second was Chapter 2 of W. D. Ross’s The Right and the Good, which defends a pluralist deontology against consequentialism. I thought Ross’s criticisms of consequentialism were right on the mark, and again clearly and precisely expressed. I had no idea these texts were largely passé in current discussions of the subject. At this time I was applying to graduate programs in philosophy, and given my new interest decided to specialize in ethics.. (shrink)
Carl Gustav Hempel (1905-1997) was one of the preeminent figures in the philosophical movement of logical empiricism. He was a member of both the Berlin and Vienna circles, fled Germany in 1934 and finally settled in the US where he taught for many years in New York, Princeton, and Pittsburgh. The essays in this collection come from the early and late periods of Hempel's career and chart his intellectual odyssey from a rigorous commitment to logical positivism in the 1930s (when (...) Hempel allied himself closely with Carnap) to a more sociological approach close in spirit to the work of Neurath and Kuhn. The collection brings together essays which have up till now been difficult to find, four of which are appearing in English for the first time. Cumulatively they offer a fresh perspective on Hempel's intellectual development and on the rise and demise of logical empiricism. (shrink)
At the end of part 3 of Book 1 of his Treatise,1 Hume had given a touchstone by which to judge any account of the human mind, namely that, where other animals appear to display the same cognitive operation that we do, our account applies as well to them as to us.2 He tests his own account of causal inference this way and finds that it comes through with flying colors, since the effects of experience of constant conjunctions on animal (...) minds is just as he has claimed it to be on ours. Some of their actions, such as nest building and sitting on their eggs till they hatch, are "extraordinary instances of sagacity" (T 1.3.16.5; SBN 177), but on other matters, they, like us, learn from experience, so that the older one .. (shrink)
Moral dissensus is a distinct feature of our time. This is not only true of our post-modern culture in general, but also of business culture specifically. In this paper I start by explaining how modernist rationality has produced moral dissensus without offering any hope of bringing an end to it in the foreseeable future. Opting for a form of post-modernist rationality as the only viable way of dealing with moral dissensus, I then make an analysis of a number of ways (...) proposed by both specialists in the field of business ethics, as well as philosophers to deal with moral decision-making in this situation of moral dissensus. The conclusion reached is that none of these attempts succeeds in coming to terms with moral dissensus. I then formulate an alternative approach to moral decision-making which I call: Rational interaction for moral sensitivity. After explaining this approach, I defend it against some of the most obvious objections that might be raised against it in a business environment. When you''re talking birth control, what blocks it and freezes it out is that it''s not a matter of more or fewer babies being argued. That''s just on the surface. What''s underneath is a conflict of faith, of faith in empirical social planning versus faith in the authority of God as revealed by the teachings of the Catholic Church. You can prove the practicality of planned parenthood till you get tired of listening to yourself and it''s going to get nowhere because your antagonist isn''t buying the assumption that anything socially practical is good per se. Goodness for him has other sources which he values as much as or more than social practicality. (Robert M. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance.). (shrink)
Following the initiative of Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā'ī, the Baṣran Mu'tazilites rejected the view of language, dominant till then in the Islamic milieu, according to which humanity had received it by way of divine revelation, and defended the position that language had arisen by means of a human convention. On the Baṣran understanding of this convention, the connection between words and things was effected by means of a momentous act of intention to assign a name, which was revealed to another (...) through a bodily gesture or act of pointing. In considering the signifying powers of this bodily manifestation of intention, I discuss two points of difficulty, one internal and one external (grounded in Wittgenstein's critical framework) which beset the Baṣran Mu'tazilite account. (shrink)
The intelligibility of our artifacts suggests to many seventeenth century thinkers that nature works along analogous lines, that the same principles that explain the operations of artifacts explain the operations of natural bodies.1 We may call this belief ‘corpuscularianism’ when conjoined with the premise that the details of the analogy depend upon the sub-microscopic textures of ordinary bodies and upon the rapidly moving, imperceptibly tiny corpuscles that surround these bodies.2 Locke’s sympathy for corpuscularianism comes out clearly where he describes the (...) implications of our inability to perceive the sub-microscopic world. If we could, he conjectures, various perplexities would be unknotted. We would solve mysteries of pharmacology, since did we know the Mechanical affections of the Particles of Rhubarb, Hemlock, Opium, and a Man, as a Watchmaker does those of a Watch, whereby it performs its Operations, and of a File which by rubbing on them will alter the Figure of any of the Wheels, we should be able to tell before Hand, that Rhubarb will purge, Hemlock kill, and Opium make a man sleep; as well as a Watch-maker can, that a little piece of Paper, laid on the Balance, will keep the Watch from going, till it be removed; or that some small part of it, being rubb’d by a file, the Machin would quite lose its Motion, and the Watch go no more3 (4.3.25). (shrink)
Our visual experience seems to suggest that no continuous curve can cover every point of the unit square, yet in the late nineteenth century Giuseppe Peano proved that such a curve exists. Examples like this, particularly in analysis (in the sense of the infinitesimal calculus) received much attention in the nineteenth century. They helped instigate what Hans Hahn called a “crisis of intuition”, wherein visual reasoning in mathematics came to be thought to be epistemically problematic. Hahn described this “crisis” as (...) follows: Mathematicians had for a long time made use of supposedly geometric evidence as a means of proof in much too naive and much too uncritical a way, till the unclarities and mistakes that arose as a result forced a turnabout. Geometrical intuition was now declared to be inadmissible as a means of proof... (p. 67) Avoiding geometrical evidence, Hahn continued, mathematicians aware of this crisis pursued what he called “logicization”, “when the discipline requires nothing but purely logical fundamental concepts and propositions for its development.” On this view, an epistemically ideal mathematics would minimize, or avoid altogether, appeals to visual representations. This would be a radical reformation of past practice, necessary, according to its advocates, for avoiding “unclarities and mistakes” like the one exposed by Peano. (shrink)
Special issue. With contributions by Anouk Barberouse, Sarah Francescelli and Cyrille Imbert, Robert Batterman, Roman Frigg and Julian Reiss, Axel Gelfert, Till Grüne-Yanoff, Paul Humphreys, James Mattingly and Walter Warwick, Matthew Parker, Wendy Parker, Dirk Schlimm, and Eric Winsberg.
It is argued that one can learn from minimal economic models. Minimal models are models that are not similar to the real world, do not resemble some of its features, and do not adhere to accepted regularities. One learns from a model if constructing and analysing the model affects one’s confidence in hypotheses about the world. Economic models, I argue, are often assessed for their credibility. If a model is judged credible, it is considered to be a relevant possibility. Considering (...) such relevant possibilities may affect one’s confidence in necessity or impossibility hypotheses. Thus, one can learn from minimal economic models. (shrink)
“The great field for new discoveries,” said a scientific friend to me the other day, “is always the Unclassified Residuum.” Round about the accredited and orderly facts of every science there ever floats a sort of dust-cloud of exceptional observations, of occurrences minute and irregular, and seldom met with, which it always proves less easy to attend to than to ignore. The ideal of every science is that of a closed and completed system of truth. The charm of most sciences (...) to their more passive disciples consists in their appearing, in fact, to wear just this ideal form. Each one of our various ologies seems to offer a definite head of classification for every possible phenomenon of the sort which it professes to cover; and, so far from free is most men’s fancy, that when a consistent and organized scheme of this sort has once been comprehended and assimilated, a different scheme is unimaginable. No alternative, whether to whole or parts, can any longer be conceived as possible. Phenomena unclassifiable within the system are therefore paradoxical absurdities, and must be held untrue. When, moreover, as so often happens, the reports of them are vague and indirect, when they come as mere marvels and oddities rather than as things of serious moment, one neglects or denies them with the best of scientific consciences. Only the born geniuses let themselves be worried and fascinated by these outstanding exceptions, and get no peace till they are brought within the fold. Your Galileos, Galvanis, Fresnels, Purkinjes, and Darwins are always getting confounded and troubled by insignificant things. Anyone will renovate his science who will steadily look after the irregular phenomena. And when the science is renewed, its new formulas often have more of the voice of the exceptions in them than of what were supposed to be the rules. (shrink)
The aim of the paper is to present the main trends and tendencies in the philosophy of mathematics in the 20th century. To make the analysis more clear we distinguish three periods in the development of the philosophy of mathematics in this century: (1) the first thirty years when three classical doctrines: logicism, intuitionism and formalism were formulated, (2) the period from 1931 till the end of the fifties - period of stagnation, and (3) from the beginning of the (...) sixties till today when new tendencies putting stress on the knowing subject and the research practice of mathematicians arose. (shrink)
The importance of The Phenomenological Mind cannot easily be overstated. Philosophy of mind is a predominantly analytical affair and up till now there has been relatively little recognition by analytical philosophers of the relevance of phenomenology as a philosophical discipline. This lack of recognition is sometimes explained in terms of hostility or presumed incommensurability. In all likelihood, ignorance is a better explanation and one couldn’t wish for a better remedy against that than this book. Phenomenology does have a lot (...) to contribute to philosophy of mind, as Gallagher and Zahavi show. This book, being the first systematic overview of philosophy of mind from a phenomenological angle, may change what is generally perceived to be the standard range of problems and options in the philosophy of mind. The fact that it is a textbook—influencing future generations of philosophers—is strategically a very wise choice in this respect. (shrink)
Commentators have contested the role of resulting harm in criminal law since the time of Plato. Unfortunately, they have neglected what may be not only the best discussion of the issue, but also the first - namely, Plato's one-paragraph discussion in the "Laws." Plato's discussion succeeds in reconciling two, seemingly irreconcilable viewpoints that till now have been in stalemate. Thus, Plato reconciles the view, that an offender's desert is solely a function of his subjective willingness to act in disregard (...) of the legitimate interests of others, with the view that criminal sentences can appropriately be made to depend upon how indignant, angry, and upset society is at an offender based upon the results of his culpable conduct. In doing so, Plato casts light on retributive theories of punishment by suggesting that an adjudicator can be committed to retribution and yet rightly believe that it is inappropriate to give an offender the full punishment he deserves. He also lays a basis for the view that causation, rather being predicates for the just punishment of offenders toward whom the public is intuitively angry for harm, is the consequence of the public's being intuitively angry at offenders for harm. (shrink)
"Though this be madness, yet there is method in't." Hamlet , act II, scene ii Abstract: Inherent normativity is the claim that intentional action explanations necessarily have to comply with normatively understood rationality constraints on the ascribed propositional attitudes. This paper argues against inherent normativity in three steps. First, it presents three examples of actions successfully explained with propositional attitudes, where the ascribed attitudes violate relevant rationality constraints. Second, it argues that the inference rules that systematise propositional attitudes are qualitatively (...) different from rationality constraints both in their justification and their recipients. Third, it rejects additional conditions on propositional attitudes, which purport to necessitate a normative commitment. Thus, inherent normativity is rejected; and with it the claim that intentional action explanations differ substantially from other explanations because they are inherently normative. (shrink)
Tänk dig att du kommit som Robinson Crusoe till en nästan öde ö, dvs till en ö du trodde var öde till dess att du träffade Fredag. Fredag förefaller tala ett språk, men det är helt olikt varje språk du hittills stött på. Du bestämmer dig efter ett tag för att försöka lära dig det. Det förefaller gå bra. Av allt att döma får du god kontakt med Fredag. Ni delar med er av mat till varandra. (...) Ni lyckas uppfatta en del av varandras åtbörder: pekgester, uttryck för uppskattning, en anmodan att komma eller gå, och annat. På grundval av detta lyckas du, eller åtminstone förefaller det så, inleda ett samarbete med Fredag ifråga om att skaffa fram mat. Fredag börjar till och med hjälpa dig att bygga en inhägnad för några höns ni fångat. Under tiden detta pågår börjar du försöka använda en del ord eller andra uttryck du hört Fredag yttra. Du har t.ex. hört honom ibland yttra "ptocha" när ni pekat ut hönsfåglar för varandra, och försöker göra detsamma själv. Några gånger ler han uppmuntrande men andra gånger brummar han misstroget och gör en huvudrörelse som du börjat uppfatta som nekande. Du förstår först inte varför. Senare märker du att en fågel du pekat ut när Fredag gjort den nekande rörelsen plötsligt fäller ut vingarna och flyger ut ur inhägnaden. Samma sak händer igen. Och efter ett tag börjar du märka små skillnader i färg, ifråga om näbbens storlek och klornas längd, så att du själv kan skilja mellan fåglar som flyger iväg och fåglar som inte gör det. Du drar slutsatsen att "ptocha" står för den art av hönsliknande fåglar som har flygförmåga. Den här processen fortsätter. Du identifierar verb och adjektiv, pronomen, prepositioner och räkneord, liksom logiska partiklar som (Fredags motsvarigheter till) "och", "eller", "inte", "om..., så...". Du kan sätta ihop hela meningar som Fredag själv inte yttrat, men som består av delar som han yttrat.. (shrink)
The poster boy for my paper is the King's Messenger in Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking Glass. Recall that since the White Queen lives backwards, her memory works forwards. She pities Alice who can only remember things after they happen. Alice asks which things the Queen remembers best: `Oh, things that happened the week after next,' the Queen replied in a careless tone. `For instance, . . . there's the King's Messenger. He's in prison now, being punished: and the trial (...) doesn't even begin till next Wednesday: and of course the crime comes last of all.' (Chapter V) Is the King's Messenger being treated unjustly? Why not prepunish people for their future crimes? True, it is generally easier to have knowledge about past crimes than future crimes. But is unpredictability the only problem with prepunishment? (shrink)
When social scientists began employing evolutionary game theory (EGT) in their disciplines, the question arose what the appropriate interpretation of the formal EGT framework would be. Social scientists have given different answer, of which I distinguish three basic kinds. I then proceed to uncover the conceptual tension between the formal framework of EGT, its application in the social sciences, and these three interpretations. First, I argue that EGT under the biological interpretation has a limited application in the social sciences, chiefly (...) because strategy replication often cannot be sensibly interpreted as strategy bearer reproduction in this domain. Second, I show that alternative replication mechanisms imply interpersonal comparability of strategy payoffs. Giving a meaningful interpretation to such comparisons is not an easy task for many social situations, and thus limits the applicability of EGT in this domain. Third, I argue that giving a new interpretation both to strategy replication and selection solves the issue of interpersonal comparability, but at the costs of making the new interpretation incompatible with natural selection interpretations of EGT. To the extent that social scientists seek such a natural selection interpretation, they face a dilemma: either face the challenge that interpersonal comparisons pose, or give up on the natural selection interpretation. By identifying these tensions, my analysis pleas for greater awareness of the specific purposes of EGT modelling in the social sciences, and for greater sensitivity to the underlying microstructure on which the evolutionary dynamics and other EGT solution concepts supervene. (shrink)
In nature scent is important for man primarily as a marker of food and sexual attractiveness, it polarizes as objects of life and decay, death. Scent, just like touch and taste exists till subject and object get opposed to each other, it is the sphere where body is included into material world, and flesh of the world is incrusted into the body. Aesthetics in its anthropologic meaning is limited by a body- perceptible dimension. Development of such categories as the (...) sublime, tragic, comic are not possible here. Creation of compound aromas, including those which do not exist in nature, can not overstep the limits of the beautiful- -ugly opposition. There is no contradiction, nourishing the comic, the tragic or the sublime, in blending of body with the world by means of scent. The spectrum of the aesthetic in the sphere of aromas is expanded in the plane from the beautiful to the ugly: fragrant, heady, amber, garlic, carpic, putrid, hideous, stinking. (shrink)
We study logic translations from an abstract perspective, without any commitment to the structure of sentences and the nature of logical entailment, which also means that we cover both proof- theoretic and model-theoretic entailment. We show how logic translations induce notions of logical expressiveness, consistency strength and sublogic, leading to an explanation of paradoxes that have been described in the literature. Connectives and quantifiers, although not present in the definition of logic and logic translation, can be recovered by their abstract (...) properties and are preserved and reflected by translations under suitable conditions. (shrink)
In this paper an attempt is made to draw out an outline of present social evils generated from Caste-Discrimination and this system is the misinterpreted conception of Varynavyavastha where the four varnas are divided on the basis of division of labour and since history it converted to caste system. With these Human Rights issues are directly related and human rights are an important concept in civilized and democratic society. But from the part of Government and judiciary the above said both (...) are separated and cannot be treated equally and it can be see in the latest examples of inhuman acts with Dalits in Haryana. First this paper also highlights the schemes and policies of the government to eliminate this system and their failure in part of unavailability to socially deprived persons. These policies are only in the paper form and cannot become part of practical concerns. Secondly these problems related to caste- discrimination can be solved only by social awareness and social interaction among different communities but not only by policies and schemes. Since independence there is not a single case of social awareness programme conducted by political parties and government and this become the root cause of social inequality till now. The present examples of violation and injustice with poor and deprived persons show the failure of our judiciary system and so-called democratic & secular society. With this background some recommendations will be discussed in the last of the paper so that a humane society can be modeled according to our constitutional commitment of social equality, freedom and brotherhood. (shrink)
Social behaviour is but an expression of instinctive mechanisms whereby the aggressive instinct is of particular importance, having given rise to most of the complexity of social behaviour through processes of phylogenetic and cultural ritualisation. The role of the aggressive instinct is to dynamically maintain the ranking order in a group, and much of social interaction is concerned with this, including monetary exchange. What is certain, is that with the elimination of aggression, … the tackling of a task or problem, (...) the self-respect [in] everything that a man does from morning till evening, from the morning shave to the sublimest artistic or scientific creation, would lose all impetus; everything associated with ambition, ranking order, and countless other equally indispensable behaviour patterns would probably also disappear from human life. — Konrad Lorenz (1963/2002, p. 269) (Published Online April 5 2006). (shrink)
he landscape of every career contains a few crevasses, and usually a more extensive valley or two—for every Ruth's bat a Buckner's legs; for every lopsided victory at Agincourt, a bloodbath at Antietam. Darwin's Origin of Species contains some wonderful insights and magnificent lines, but this masterpiece also includes a few notable clunkers. Darwin experienced most embarrassment from the following passage, curtailed and largely expunged from later editions of his book: In North America the black bear was seen by Hearne (...) swimming for hours with widely open mouth, thus catching, like a whale, insects in the water. Even in so extreme a case as this, if the supply of insects were constant, and if better adapted competitors did not already exist in the country, I can see no difficulty in a race of bears being rendered, by natural selection, more aquatic in their structure and habits, with larger and larger mouths, till a creature was produced as monstrous as a whale. Why did Darwin become so chagrined about this passage? His hypothetical tale may be pure speculation and conjecture, but the scenario is not entirely absurd. Darwin's discomfort arose, I think, from his failure to follow a scientific norm of a more sociocultural nature. Scientific conclusions supposedly rest upon facts and information. Speculation is not entirely taboo, and may sometimes be necessary faute de mieux . But when scientists propose truly novel and comprehensive theories—as Darwin tried to do in advancing natural selection as the primary mechanism of evolution—they need particularly good support, and invented hypothetical cases just don't supply sufficient confidence for crucial conclusions. (shrink)
Since we cannot put stars in a laboratory, astrophysicists had to wait till the invention of computers before becoming laboratory scientists. For half a century now, we have been conducting experiments in our virtual laboratories. However, we ourselves have remained behind the keyboard, with the screen of the monitor separating us from the world we are simulating. Recently, 3D on-line technology, developed first for games but now deployed in virtual worlds like Second Life, is beginning to make it (...) possible for astrophysicists to enter their virtual labs themselves, in virtual form as avatars. This has several advantages, from new possibilities to explore the results of the simulations to a shared presence in a virtual lab with remote collaborators on different continents. I will report my experiences with the use of Qwaq Forums, a virtual world developed by a new company (see http://www.qwaq.com). (shrink)
This paper describes the historical background and early formation of Wilhelm Johannsen's distinction between genotype and phenotype. It is argued that contrary to a widely accepted interpretation (For instance, W. Provine, 1971. "The Origins of Theoretical Population Genetics". Chicago: The University of Chicago Press; Mayr, 1973; F. B. Churchill, 1974. "Journal of the History of Biology" 7: 5-30; E. Mayr, 1982. "The Growth of Biological Thought," Cambridge: Harvard University Press; J. Sapp, 2003. Genesis. "The Evolution of Biology". New York: Oxford (...) University Press) his concepts referred primarily to properties of individual organisms and not to statistical averages. Johannsen's concept of genotype was derived from the idea of species in the tradition of biological systematics from Linnaeus to de Vries: An individual belonged to a group - species, subspecies, elementary species - by representing a certain underlying type (S. Müller-Wille and V. Orel, 2007. "Annals of Science" 64: 171-215). Johannsen sharpened this idea theoretically in the light of recent biological discoveries, not least those of cytology. He tested and confirmed it experimentally combining the methods of biometry, as developed by Francis Galton, with the individual selection method and pedigree analysis, as developed for instance by Louis Vilmorin. The term "genotype" was introduced in W. Johannsen's 1909 ("Elemente der Exakten Erblichkeitslehre". Jena: Gustav Fischer) treatise, but the idea of a stable underlying biological "type" distinct from observable properties was the core idea of his classical bean selection experiment published 6 years earlier (W. Johannsen, 1903. "Ueber Erblichkeit in Populationen und reinen Linien". "Eine Beitrag zur Beleuchtung schwebender Selektionsfragen," Jena: Gustav Fischer, pp. 58-59). The individual ontological foundation of population analysis was a self-evident presupposition in Johannsen's studies of heredity in populations from their start in the early 1890s till his death in 1927. The claim that there was a "substantial but cautious modification of Johannsen's phenotype-genotype distinction" (Churchill, 1974, p. 24) from a statistical to an individual ontological perspective derives from a misreading of the 1903 and 1909 texts. The immediate purpose of this paper is to correct this reading of the 1903 monograph by showing how its problems and results grow out of Johannsen's earlier work in heredity and plant breeding. Johannsen presented his famous selection experiment as the culmination of a line of criticism of orthodox Darwinism by William Bateson, Hugo de Vries, and others (Johannsen, 1903). They had argued that evolution is based on stepwise rather than continuous change in heredity. Johannsen's paradigmatic experiment showed how stepwise variation in heredity could be operationally distinguished from the observable, continuous morphological variation. To test Galton's law of partial regression, Johannsen deliberately chose pure lines of self-fertilizing plants, a pure line being the descendants in successive generations of one single individual. Such a population could be assumed to be highly homogeneous with respect to hereditary type, and Johannsen found that selection produced no change in this type. Galton, he explained, had experimented with populations composed of a number of stable hereditary types. The partial regression which Galton found was simply an effect of selection between types, increasing the proportion of some types at the expense of others. (shrink)
In his new book, eminent psychologist - Daniel Stern, author of the classic 'The interpersonal world of the infant', explores the hitherto neglected topic of 'vitality' - that is, the force or power manifested by all living things. -/- Vitality takes on many dynamic forms and permeates daily life, psychology, psychotherapy and the arts, yet what is vitality? We know that it is a manifestation of life, of being alive. We are very alert to its feel in ourselves and its (...) expression in others. Life shows itself in so many different forms of vitality. But just how can we study this phenomenon? Till now, this has been a topic considered impervious to any kind of scientific study, but according to the Stern, it is possible to trace vitality to real physical and mental operations - including movement, time, perception of force - as well as spatial aspects of the movement and its underlying intention. Within this fascinating book he shows how an understanding of vitality can help the psychotherapeutic process (including a look at the developmental origins of forms of vitality) and looks at how these theories of vitality might fit with our current knowledge of the workings of the brain. Truly a tour de force from a brilliant clinician and scientist, Forms of Vitality is a profound and groundbreaking book - one that will be essential reading for psychologists, psychotherapists, and those in the creative arts. (shrink)
Economists evaluate their models in terms of credibility. For example, Rothschild and Stiglitz argued from a model of a completive insurance market that under the “plausible” (632) assumption of information asymmetry, one can “credibly” infer the non-existence of equilibria in specific situations – despite the fact that, as they admit, the real ‘market … for insurance is probably not competitive’ (648).1 Another example is Richard Thaler’s column on anomalies of (micro-) economic theory. From 1987 to 2001, he headed every article (...) with the following sentence: ‘An empirical result is anomalous if it is difficult to rationalize, or if implausible assumptions are necessary to explain it within the paradigm’.2 Or, yet another example, Hans Lind concludes in a survey of mathematical models of rent control that ‘what is shown in the model[s]…is just one type of argument…for why a certain story is more credible than a competing story. (shrink)
Those masterful images because complete Grew in pure mind, but out of what began? A mound of refuse or the sweepings of a street, Old kettles, old bottles, and a broken can, Old iron, old bones, old rags, that raving slut Who keeps the till. Now that my ladder's gone, I must lie down where all the ladders start In the foul rag and bone shop of the heart.
The question of the unity of the soul is posed in the Midle Ages, at the crossing point of the Aristotelician theory, which distinguishes several potencies, even several parts in the soul, and the Augustinian doctrine, which underlines the unity of the mind using corporeal powers. John Buridan, when commenting the Treatise on the Soul of Aristotle, emphasizes the unity, probably in reaction against John of Jandun's position. From the middle of 14th century till the end of 17th, this (...) problem goes on being debated through the two questions of the substantial unity of the soul and of the the relation between the soul and its potencies. This article studies some stages of this development, some of them immediately after Buridan, in Nicole Oresme's and Peter of Ailly's positions, another more distant, in Antoine Rubio's work. It suggests that we find still the same problematics, reelaborated and transformed, in Descartes. (shrink)
Philosophers of science studying scientific practice often consider it a methodological requirement that their conceptualization of "model" closely connects with the understanding and use of models by practicing scientists. Occasionally, this connection has been explicitly made (Hutten 1954, Suppes 1961, Morgan and Morrison 1999, Bailer-Jones 2002, Lehtinen and Kuorikoski 2007, Kuorikoski 2007, Morgan 2012a). These studies have been dominated by a focus on the—relatively similar forms of—mathematical models in physics and economics. Yet it has become increasingly evident that the way (...) models are conceptualized is very different in some other sciences, where philosophers' accounts of models' characteristics and .. (shrink)
The evolutionary circuit design is an approach allowing engineers to realize computational devices. The evolved computational devices represent a distinctive class of devices that exhibits a specific combination of properties, not visible and studied in the scope of all computational devices up till now. Devices that belong to this class show the required behavior; however, in general, we do not understand how and why they perform the required computation. The reason is that the evolution can utilize, in addition to (...) the “understandable composition of elementary components”, material-dependent constructions and properties of environment (such as temperature, electromagnetic field etc.) and, furthermore, unknown physical behaviors to establish the required functionality. Therefore, nothing is known about the mapping between an abstract computational model and its physical implementation. The standard notion of computation and implementation developed in computer science as well as in cognitive science has become very problematic with the existence of evolved computational devices. According to the common understanding, the evolved devices cannot be classified as computing mechanisms. (shrink)
The paper discusses the impact of the thought of Stanisław Brzozowski (1878–1911) on several Polish emigré writers, including Józef Czapski and Gustaw Herling-Grudziński, but first of all Czesław Miłosz (1911–2004) and Aleksander Wat (1900–1967). Miłosz’ approach oscillated between early fascination through an unjust rejection during the war, due to the “appropriation” of Brzozowski’s thought by the right wing publicists, to the new phase of fascination after the war, culminating in the publication of a book on Brzozowski ( A Man Among (...) Scorpions , 1962) and prolonged in several important articles till the very end of his life. Wat’s approach shifted from the communist practice of “overcoming” Brzozowski through the affirmation of his criticism and rejection of catholic obscurantism to the process of the internalization of the catholic faith. (shrink)
MDI.4 So much as I have been able to put together the pieces of the universe in my small head, there is no absolute right or wrong; there is only a relativity, depending on the consciously though very slowly altering condition of a social race in respect to the rest of the world. Right and wrong are social conceptions: mind, I do not say human conceptions. The names “right” and “wrong,” truly, are of human invention only; but the conception “right” (...) and “wrong,” dimly or clearly, has been wrought out with more or less effectiveness by all intelligent social beings. And the definition of Right, as sealed and approved by the successful conduct of social beings, is: That mode of behavior which best serves the growing need of that society. MDI.5 As to what that need is, certainly it has been in the past, and for the most part indicated by the unconscious response of the structure (social or individual) to the pressure of its environment. Up till a few years since I believed with Huxley, Von Hartman, and my teacher Lum, that it was wholly so determined; that consciousness might discern, and obey or oppose, but had no voice in deciding the course of social development: if it decided to oppose, it did so to its own ruin, not to the modification of the unconsciously determined ideal. MDI.6 Of late years I have been approaching the conclusion that consciousness has a continuously increasing part in the decision of social problems; that while it is a minor voice, and must be for a long time to come, it is, nevertheless, the dawning power which threatens to overhurl old processes and old laws, and supplant them by other powers and other ideals. I know no more fascinating speculation than this, of the rôle of consciousness in present and future evolution. However, it is not our present speculation. I speak of it only because in determining what constitutes well being at present, I shall maintain that the old ideal has been considerably modified by unconscious reaction against the superfluities produced by unconscious striving towards a certain end. MDI.7 The question now becomes: What is the growing ideal of human society, unconsciously indicated and unconsciously discerned and illuminated? MDI.8 By all the readings of progress, this indication appears to be the free individual ; a.... (shrink)
Many scientific models are non-representational in that they refer to merely possible processes, background conditions and results. The paper shows how such non-representational models can be appraised, beyond the weak role that they might play as heuristic tools. Using conceptual distinctions from the discussion of how-possibly explanations, six types of models are distinguished by their modal qualities of their background conditions, model processes and model results. For each of these types, an actual model example – drawn from economics, biology, psychology (...) or sociology – is discussed. For each case, contexts and purposes are identified in which the use of such a model offers a genuine opportunity to learn – i.e. justifies changing one’s confidence in a hypothesis about the world. These cases then offer novel justifications for modelling practices that fall between the cracks of standard representational accounts of models. (shrink)
It is often claimed that artificial society simulations contribute to the explanation of social phenomena. At the hand of a particular example, this paper argues that artificial societies often cannot provide full explanations, because their models are not or cannot be validated. Despite that, many feel that such simulations somehow contribute to our understanding. This paper tries to clarify this intuition by investigating whether artificial societies provide potential explanations. It is shown that these potential explanations, if they contribute to our (...) understanding, considerably differ from potential causal explanations. Instead of possible causal histories, simulations offer possible functional analyses of the explanandum . The paper discusses how these two kinds explanatory strategies differ, and how potential functional explanations can be appraised. (shrink)
Den moralfilosofiska traditionen har sina begränsningar. De frågor som stått i centrum för den moralfilosofiska diskussionen har ofta varit helt andra än de som människor i det praktiska livet har uppfattat som centrala moraliska problem. En viktig begränsning är att moralfilosofin, liksom beslutsteorin, nästan uteslutande har handlat om hur man hanterar välavgränsade problem där handlingsalternativen är givna. I det verkliga livet löser vi ofta moraliska problem genom att finna på nya handlingsalternativ, som inte fanns med från början.1 En annan begränsning (...) är att moralfilosofin till allra största delen har handlat om situationer där konsekvensen av de olika handlingsalternativen är välkänd. I det praktiska livet är det annorlunda. Vi vet sällan med säkerhet vad som kommer att bli följden av de olika alternativ som vi väljer mellan. Man kan också uttrycka detta så att moralfilosofin i huvudsak rör sig i en tänkt deterministisk värld, där man inte behöver räkna med någon slump. Detta är aningen märkligt mot bakgrund av det oerhörda genomslag som sannolikhetstänkande och på senare år även kaos har fått inom andra vetenskapsområden. Det finns naturligtvis förklaringar till detta moralfilosofins kvardröjande i en äldre världsbild. Redan i det deterministiska fallet uppstår svårhanterliga problem som man gärna ger sin odelade uppmärksamhet. Dessutom finns det en särskild disciplin, beslutsteorin, som behandlar beslut under risk och osäkerhet. Man har i allmänhet tänkt sig ett slags arbetsfördelning, där problemen med risk och osäkerhet utelämnas i moralfilosofin för att i stället hanteras inom beslutsteorin med rena rationalitetsprinciper (dvs. utan att moraliska principer är inblandade). Enligt min mening är denna arbetsfördelning inte hållbar. Betrakta t ex osäkerheten om hur klimatet kommer att förändras med nuvarande utsläppstrender för växthusgaser. Denna osäkerhet ger upphov inte enbart till ett problem om rationellt beslutsfattande utan också till moraliska problem.. (shrink)
Chang Tsai is one of the three major Chinese philosophers who, in the eleventh century, revitalised Confucian thought after centuries of stagnation and formed the foundation for the neo-Confucian thinking that was predominant till the nineteenth century. The book analyses in depth Chang's views of man, his nature and endowments, the cosmos, heaven and earth, the problems of learning and self cultivation, the ideal of the sage - and how that ideal might be attained. It looks at the intellectual (...) climate of the eleventh century, the assumptions Chinese intellectuals shared, and the problems, which concerned them. It describes the triumph of Chang's rivals within the neo-Confucian movement and the subsequent emergence of neo-Confucianism to state orthodoxy in the thirteenth century. (shrink)
The ?West? is inclined to blame Asian countries, especially China, for its disrespect of human rights without looking at it's own record of human rights violations! This makes a fair dialogue very difficult till improbable. Social work on the international level can't avoid this dialogue if it wants to live up to its internationally consensual documents which all refer to human rights. The thesis of this article is, that it will only succeed, if it clarifies some philosophical and ethical (...) premisses of so-called ?western? and ?oriental/asian? thinking. Thus, the article tries to show that concepts of ?holism?, ?atomism/individualism? and ?systemic thinking? might be helpful for a ?rejonder? and discussion platform for the analysis of different modes of thinking about ethical issues. A systemic approach tries to avoid the problematic and combine the positive aspects of individualistic and holistic approaches. An example for this combination is the ?Asian Human Rights Charter: A People's Charter? of 1998 which doesn't divide the freedom and participatory versus social rights, a divide which is typical ? and problematic ? for the western version. (shrink)
The effect of prism adaptation on movement is typically reduced when the movement at test (prisms off) differs on some dimension from the movement at training (prisms on). Some adaptation is latent, however, and only revealed through further testing in which the movement at training is fully reinstated. Applying a nonlinear attractor dynamic model (Frank, Blau, & Turvey, 2009) to available data (Blau, Stephen, Carello, & Turvey, 2009), we provide evidence for a causal link between the latent (or secondary) aftereffect (...) and an additive force term that is known to account for symmetry breaking. The evidence is discussed in respect to the hypothesis that recalibration aftereffects reflect memory principles (encoding specificity, transfer-appropriate processing) oriented to time-translation invariance—when later testing conserves the conditions of earlier training. Forgetting or reduced adaptation effects follow from the loss of this invariance and are reversed by its reinstatement. (shrink)
For Jari-Erik Nurmi, the practice of model-making in psychology is a complex process operating on different levels simultaneously. At first sight, his account seems to reflect Suppes' (1962) notion of a hierarchy of models: from low-level data models to high-level theoretical models, where at each level the model represents "structure" at a different degree of abstraction, and the levels are connected through structural isomorphism.1In this commentary, I want to complement and perhaps somewhat redirect Nurmi's analysis of his own modeling efforts—away (...) from the idea of an interconnected hierarchy of isomorphic structures, towards more autonomous roles of the models at different levels, each with its own .. (shrink)
Som de första vetenskapliga tidskrifterna brukar man räkna den franska Journal des Sça- vants och den engelska Philosophical Transactions, som båda började ges ut år 1665. Redan under dessa tidskrifters första årtionden skaffade sig redaktörerna vanan att ta hjälp av experter inom olika områden med att granska manuskript. Detta system har sedan dess kommit att utvecklas och systematiseras, och kallas med en svåröversättlig engelsk term ”peer review”. Termen anger att manuskripten granskas av experter inom sitt specialområde. Dessa experter, som kallas (...) ”referees” (referenter) är författarens kolleger inom respektive specialitet, men behöver inte alls vara mer kunniga eller erfarna än författaren själv. Systemet med referentgranskning har ofta kritiserats, men ingen har funnit något bättre sätt att kvalitetsgranska vetenskapliga arbeten än att lämna ut granskningen till experter inom respektive område. (shrink)
Claims about the economic motivations of population groups in the American past are a staple of contemporary political argument, as polemicists of one side seek to impeach the moral standing of the other side by impeaching the moral standing of the forebears of the people on the other side. Sometimes such polemics are presented to the public in the guise of nonpartisan works of popular history. This paper, applying the training of a litigator in preparing an "opposition" or "reply" brief, (...) examines and exposes the "spin" in the economic history offered by popular author Nathaniel Philbrick in his 207 book Mayflower, in the sections of the book addressing the bloody conflict in New England in 1675-76 known as "King Philip's War." The paper uses the facts Mr. Philbrick himself reports in his book to refute his conclusions, showing that the English colonists fought in legitimate self-defense and not out of greed or racism, against certain (not all) Indian tribes whose warriors, in the words of one of their own chiefs, were like "sticks laid on a heap, till by the multitude of them a great fire came to be kindled.". (shrink)
Modelling cannot be characterized as isolating, nor models as isolations. This article presents three arguments to that effect, against Uskali Mäki's account of models. First, while isolation proceeds through a process of manipulation and control, modelling typically does not proceed through such a process. Rather, modellers postulate assumptions, without seeking to justify them by reference to a process of isolation. Second, while isolation identifies an isolation base?a concrete environment it seeks to control and manipulate?modelling typically does not identify such a (...) base. Rather, modellers construct their models without reference to concrete environments, and only later seek to connect their models to concrete situations of the real world. Third, Mäki argues that isolation employs idealization to control for disturbing factors, but does not affect the factors or mechanisms that are supposed to be isolated. However, models typically make idealizing assumptions about the factors and mechanisms that are the focus of investigation. Thus, even the product of modelling often cannot be characterized as isolation. (shrink)
This paper discusses the meaning of expressed preference statements. A holistic explanation of preferences is proposed: preference relations between propositions are explained by preference relations over worlds. Only those world-preferences function as explanans which are maximally similar to the actual world, and which are maximally similar to each other. The concept of similarity as intuitive is rejected, and is interpreted instead with reference to causal structure: 'closest to the actual world' is interpreted as compatible with the causal structure of the (...) actual world, and 'most similar to each other' as sharing the same causal background conditions. (shrink)
När är det befogat att tillskriva mening (betydelse) till beteenden? I början av 2001 presenterade en av Stockholms gratistidningar en artikel om det så kallade kroppsspråket. Rubriken var "Kroppen ljuger inte". Ämnet för artikeln var egentligen den evidens som en persons gester och kroppshållning ger om hennes sinnestillstånd eller personlighet ("självsäker", "stressad", "osäker", "nervös", "ljuger", "arg", "manipulativ", "spänd" eller "misstänksam"). Enligt artikeln är dessa gester och kroppshållningar inte avsedda att ge andra information om ens inre tillstånd. De är alltså (...) inte kommunikativa. Likafullt ger de sådan information, ibland kanske mot personens egen önskan. Trots det beskrivs de som semantiskt meningsfulla: "Varje min och rörelse kan tolkas symboliskt". (shrink)
Zermelos Zeit in Göttingen (1897?1910) kann als wissenschaftlich fruchtbarste Periode in seiner Karriere angesehen werden. Gleichwohl stehen bisher Untersuchungen aus. die eine Einbettung von Zermelos Werk in den biographischen und sozialen Kontext ermöglichen Die vorliegende Studie will diese Lücke unter Konzentration auf zwei Gegenstandsbereiche teileweise ausfüllen: (1) den historischen Entstehungskontext von Zermelos ersten Arbeiten über die Grundlagen der Mengenlehre; (2) die Vorgeschichte und näheren Umstände des 1907 an Zermelo verliehenen Lehrauftrages für mathematische Logik und verwandte Gegenstände. mit dem ein erster (...) Schritt zur Institutionalisierung dieses Faches als mathematischer Teildisziplin gemacht wurde. Beides wird in enger Verbindung zur ersten Phase des Hilbertschen Programms zur Grundlegung der Mathematik gesehen. Es wird aber auch gezeigt, daß für die Erteilung des Lehrauftrages neben diesen systematischen und forschungspolitischen Motiven auch persönliche und institutspolitische Rücksichten ausschlaggebend waren. Im Anhang werden Teile eines Briefwechsels zwischen Ernst Zermelo und dem Göttinger Philosophen Leonard Nelson ediert sowie die Anträge der Direktoren des Göttinger mathematisch-physikalischen Seminars auf Erteilung des Lehrauftrags und auf Ernennung Zermelos zum außerordentlichen Professor. Zermelo's Göttingen period (1897?1910) can be regarded as the most fruitful period in his scientific career. Nevertheless, up till now there have been no investigations which enable us to embed his work in its biographical and social contexts. This study tries to partially fill the gap, concentrating on two major themes: (I) the historical context of the development of Zermelo's early work on the foundations of set theory; (2) the prehistory and particulars of his lectureship for mathematical logic and related topics, this lectureship, which he was awarded in 1907, being the first step taken in Germany towards the establishment of this subject as a separate mathematical discipline. Both will be seen in close connection with the first phase of Hilbert's programme of founding mathematics. It is shown, however, that this lectureship was not only created to further the aims of Hilbert's research programme but that personal and institutional motives also played a role. In the appendices, parts of a correspondence between Ernst Zermelo and the Göttingen Philosopher Leonard Nelson are edited, as well as the applications of the directors of the Göttingen Mathematisch-physikalisches Seminar for awarding the lectureship to Zermelo in 1907, and for appointing Zermelo to an extraordinary professorship in 1910. (shrink)
Paul Konitzer was one of the outstanding and well-known physicians in the years after the World War II in East-Germany. The paper describes his professional way as hygienist, social medical, municipal physician and last but not least as health politician in the times of four different political regimes: the imperial era in Germany till 1918, the time of Weimarer Republic till 1933, the Nazi dictatorship till 1945 and the early years in the Soviet occupation zone of Germany. (...) The life of Konitzer is a typical example of the fate of a German doctor in the first half of the 20th century. Konitzer was arrested in February 1947 by the Soviet Military Government in Berlin in connection with some political troubles and reproach with a typhus epidemic in a German camp for Russian Prisoners of War in the Nazi era. On April 22nd 1947 he died in prison of Dresden by suicide without condemnation. (shrink)
Before we bury postmodernism, let us praise it -- for a nanosecond anyway, because this was surely one of the least lovable fads to hit American campuses since drinking-till-you-barf. You know, I hope, who I'm talking about.
In many countries worldwide, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, a shortage of physicians limits the provision of lifesaving interventions. One existing strategy to increase the number of physicians in areas of critical shortage is conditioning medical school scholarships on a precommitment to work in medically underserved areas later. Current practice is usually to demand only one year of service for each year of funded studies. We show the effectiveness of scholarships conditional on such precommitment for increasing physician supplies in underserved areas. (...) Then we defend these scholarships against ethical worries that they constitute slavery contracts; rely on involuntary, biased, or unauthorized early consent by a young signatory; put excessive strains on signed commitments; give rise to domination; and raise suspicion of slavery contracts. Importantly, we find that scholarships involving far longer commitment than current practice allows would also withstand these worries. Policymakers should consider introducing conditional scholarships, including long-term versions, as a means to increasing the supply of physicians to medically underserved areas. (shrink)
The value of a statistical life (VSL) is an important tool for cost?benefit analysis of regulatory policies that concern fatality risks. Its proponents claim that it measures people's risk preferences, and that VSL therefore is a tool of vicarious governance. This paper criticizes the revealed preference method for measuring VSL. It specifies three minimal conditions for vicarious governance: sensitivity, fairness and hypothetical compromise, and shows that the VSL measure, in its common application in policy formation and analysis, violates these conditions. (...) It therefore concludes that the revealed preference VSL measure, in its current form, is not a tool of vicarious governance. (shrink)
Game?theoretic models consist of a formal game structure and an informal model narrative or story. When game theory is employed to model economic situations, the stories play a central role in interpreting, constructing and solving game structures. We analyse the architecture of game theory and distinguish between game models and the theory proper. We present the different functions of the model narrative in the application of game models to economic situations. In particular, we show how model narratives support the choice (...) of solution concepts defined and provided by the theory proper. We further argue that the narrative's role in interpretation, construction and solution makes it a necessary part of a game model that is intended to be a model of an economic situation. We conclude that game theory is not a universal theory of rationality, but only offers tools to model specific situations at varying degrees and kinds of rationality. (shrink)
In a late reminiscence, Goethe recalled that during his close association with the poet Friedrich Schiller, he was constantly defending “the rights of nature" against his friend's “gospel of freedom.”1 Goethe’s characterization of his own view was artfully ironic, alluding as it did to the French Revolution's proclamation of the "Rights of Man." His remark implied that values lay within nature, values that had authority comparable to those ascribed to human beings by the architects of the Revolution. During the time (...) Goethe made his defense, he also faced another revolution, in which Schiller was a partisan—that of Kant in the intellectual sphere. Both upheavals had undermined the autonomy of nature, replacing her authority with that of human will and understanding. Previous papers in this volume have recorded the shifting fortunes of nature that brought her to this stage of jeopardy. In the early classical period, nature as a unified whole had not yet arisen. Animate and inanimate objects had natures— characteristic modes of action—but there was as yet, according Slatkin, no articulate concept of nature as a whole standing over against human beings. Park has described a long period of transition, when nature became personified in the form of a didactic female, a figure imaginatively based, it would seem, upon the system of a 1 natural philosophy (philosophia naturalis) that stood in contrast to the revealed wisdom of God. Nature in this guise yet derived her authority and nurturing capacity from that higher, divine power. During the seventeenth century, writers like Mandeville, as Allen has shown, began to suspect that nature might be a chimera, a fictive creature that disguised humanity's own hidden desires and inclinations. These doubts grew during the next century—with the likes of Hume accelerating the skepticism—till finally, in the two revolutions that so troubled Goethe, nature was completely stripped of her authority. Goethe had become confirmed in his defense of the rights of nature during his travels to Italy during the years 1786-1788.. (shrink)
A few miles farther on, we came to a big, gravelly roadcut that looked like an ashfall, a mudflow, glacial till, and fresh oatmeal, imperfectly blended. "I don't know what this glop is," [Kenneth Deffeyes] said, in final capitulation. "You need a new geologist. You need a Californian.".
The name is from the 20th chapter of the Book of Revelations. Christ has just defeated the Beast, and cast him and his false prophet into a "lake of fire burning with brimstone". Christ has also slaughtered the army of the beast, including the kings of the earth, slaying them with a sword which "proceeded out of his mouth". (A conservation-minded angel had earlier called together the birds of the air, that they might "eat the flesh of kings, and the (...) flesh of captains, and the flesh of mighty men, and the flesh of horses, and of them that sit on them, and the flesh of all men, both free and bond, both small and great".) And I saw an angel come down from heaven, having the key of the bottomless pit and a great chain in his hand. And he laid hold on the dragon, that old serpent, which is the Devil, and Satan, and bound him a thousand years, and cast him into the bottomless pit, and shut him up, and set a seal upon him, that he should deceive the nations no more, till the thousand years should be fulfilled: and that that he must be loosed a little season. And I saw thrones, and they sat upon them, and judgment was given unto them: and I saw the souls of them that were beheaded for the witness of Jesus, and for the word of God, and which had not worshiped the beast, neither his image, neither had they received his mark upon their foreheads, or in their hands; and they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years. But the rest of the dead lived not again until the thousand years were finished. This is the first resurrection. Blessed and holy is he that hath part in the first resurrection: on such the second death hath no power, but they shall be priests of God and of Christ, and shall reign with him a thousand years. Hence the millennium: the thousand-year reign of Christ and his saints upon the earth, after they defeat the forces of evil. Millenarianism, originally, was the belief, among Christians, that this epoch was coming very soon, and that they, the righteous witnesses (martyrs) of Christ, would be part of it.. (shrink)
. Lamarck and Darwin agreed on the inconstancy of species and on the exclusive gradualism of evolution (nature does not jump). Darwinism, revived as neo-Darwinism, was almost generally accepted from about 1930 till 1960. In the sixties the evolutionary importance of selection has been called in question by the neutralists. The traditional conception of the gene is disarranged by recent molecular-biological findings. Owing to the increasing confusion about the concept of genotype, this concept is reconsidered. The idea of (...) the genotype as a cluster of genes is replaced by a cybernetical interpretation of the genotype. As nature does jump, exclusive gradualism is dismissed. Saltatory evolution is a natural phenomenon, provoked by a sudden collapse of the thresholds which resist against evolution. The fossil record and the taxonomic system call for a macromutational interpretation. As Lamarck and Darwin overlooked the resistance of evolutionary thresholds, an alternative evolution model is needed, the first to be constructed on a palaeontological and taxonomic basis. (shrink)
Some men can obtain hundred years or more, but the grounds are as yet unknown. Till now medical research has given no specific clues. Intensive consideration shows that life under quite natural (no longer found), not too hard social and climatic conditions (more maritime than arid) and in mountainous regions is decisive. It is clear that few territories of the earth come into consideration. The specific mental situation of mountain dwellers which contrasts in important points to that of the (...) inhabitants of flat country, plays a decisive part. (shrink)
Ever since game theory has become a dominant mode of investigation in economics, critics have pointed out that it is a formally strong but empirically weak, if not empty, practice.1 We argue against the empirical irrelevance of game theory by investigating the architecture of game theoretic explanations more closely. In particular, we study the role of game models, and find that they assume the role of mediators as autonomous relaters of theory and phenomena. We further argue that stories play an (...) essential part in the mediating function of models: stories that recount the phenomena in such a way that it becomes compatible with the theoretical framework. Contrary to some claims, these stories are subject to evaluation by various criteria, some of which are criteria derived from intuitive judgment. These criteria provide the means to judge whether a model represents a phenomenon or not. Through good stories, phenomena can therefore be related to highly abstract models. Applied game theory, we conclude, has therefore empirical content by representing phenomena in an abstract fashion. (JEL B4,C7. Keywords: Economic methodology, Game theory.). (shrink)
