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Profile: Tim Bayne (Oxford University)
  1. Tim Bayne, Agency as a Marker of Consciousness.
    One of the central problems in the study of consciousness concerns the ascription of consciousness. We want to know whether certain kinds of creatures—such as non-human animals, artificially created organisms, and even members of our own species who have suffered severe brain-damage—are conscious, and we want to know what kinds of conscious states these creatures might be in if indeed they are conscious. The identification of accurate markers of consciousness is essential if the science of consciousness is to have any (...)
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  2. Tim Bayne, The Presence of Consciousness in Absence Seizures.
    Although the study of epileptic absence seizures has the potential to contribute a great deal to the scientific understanding of consciousness, this potential has yet to be fully exploited. There have been a number of insightful discussions of consciousness in the context of epileptic seizures [12, 17, 22, 23, 33], but the basic conceptual issues are still poorly understood and many empirical questions remain unexplored. In this paper I review a number of questions that are of interest to consciousness scientists (...)
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  3. Tim Bayne, The Unity of Consciousness: A Cartography.
    theorists insist that consciousness is essentially unified. Other theorists assert that the unity of consciousness is an illusion, and that consciousness is often, if not invariably, disunified. Unfortunately, it is rare for proponents of either side of the debate to explain what the unity of consciousness might involve. What would it mean for consciousness to be unified? In this chapter I provide a brief cartography of the unity of consciousness. In the next section I introduce a number of unity relations (...)
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  4. Tim Bayne, Consciousness.
    After being sorely neglected for some time, consciousness is well and truly back on the philosophical and scientific agenda. This entry provides a whistle-stop tour of some recent debates surrounding consciousness, with a particular focus on issues relevant to the scientific study of consciousness. The first half of this entry (the first to fourth sections) focuses on clarifying the explanandum of a science of consciousness and identifying constraints on an adequate account of consciousness; the second half of this entry (the (...)
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  5. Tim Bayne, Delusion and Self-Deception: Mapping the Terrain.
    The papers in this volume are drawn from a workshop on delusion and self-deception, held at Macquarie University in November of 2004. Our aim was to bring together theorists working on delusions and self-deception with an eye towards identifying and fostering connections—at both empirical and conceptual levels—between these domains. As the contributions to this volume testify, there are multiple points of contact between delusion and self-deception. This introduction charts the conceptual space in which these points of contact can be located (...)
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  6. Timothy J. Bayne, Putting the Experience of Acting in its Place.
    Although the notion can be found in Anscombe.
     
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  7. Tim Bayne & Avery Kolers (forthcoming). Parenthood and Procreation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  8. Timothy J. Bayne (forthcoming). Unified Phenomenology and Divided Brains: Critical Notice of Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. Philosophical Psychology.
     
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  9. Tim Bayne (2013). Précis of The Unity of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):200-208.
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  10. Tim Bayne (2013). Potential Persons. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  11. Tim Bayne (2013). Response to Commentators. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):223-229.
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  12. Tim Bayne (2013). Thought: A Very Short Introduction. Oup Oxford.
    In this lively Very Short Introduction, Tim Bayne looks at the nature of thought. Exploring questions such as 'What are thoughts?' and 'How is thought realized in the brain?', he draws on research in philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and anthropology to look at what we know - and don't know - about the capacity for thought.
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  13. Aaron Henry & Tim Bayne (2013). Review of Attention is Cognitive Unison: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology, by Christopher Mole. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):199 - 202.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-4, Ahead of Print.
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  14. Ryan Perkins & Tim Bayne (2013). Representationalism and the Problem of Vagueness. Philosophical Studies 162 (1):71-86.
    This paper develops a novel problem for representationalism (also known as "intentionalism"), a popular contemporary account of perception. We argue that representationalism is incompatible with supervaluationism, the leading contemporary account of vagueness. The problem generalizes to naive realism and related views, which are also incompatible with supervaluationism.
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  15. Tim Bayne (2012). How to Read Minds. In Sarah Richmond, Geraint Rees & Sarah J. L. Edwards (eds.), I Know What You're Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy. Oxford University Press. 41.
  16. Tim Bayne (2011). Delusions as Doxastic States: Contexts, Compartments, and Commitments. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4):329-336.
    Although delusions are typically regarded as beliefs of a certain kind, there have been worries about the doxastic conception of delusions since at least Bleuler’s time. ‘Anti-doxasticists,’ as we might call them, do not merely worry about the claim that delusions are beliefs, they reject it. Reimer’s paper weighs into the debate between ‘doxasticists’ and ‘anti-doxasticists’ by suggesting that one of the main arguments given against the doxastic conception of delusions—what we might call the functional role objection—is based on a (...)
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  17. Tim Bayne (2011). Libet and the Case for Free Will Scepticism. In Richard Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science. Oup/British Academy.
    Free will sceptics claim that we do not possess free will—or at least, that we do not possess nearly as much free will as we think we do. Some free will sceptics hold that the very notion of free will is incoherent, and that no being could possibly possess free will (Strawson this volume). Others allow that the notion of free will is coherent, but hold that features of our cognitive architecture prevent us from possessing free will. My concern in (...)
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  18. Tim Bayne (2011). The Sense of Agency. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives.
    Where in cognitive architecture do experiences of agency lie? This chapter defends the claim that such states qualify as a species of perception. Reference to ‘the sense of agency’ should not be taken as a mere façon de parler but picks out a genuinely perceptual system. The chapter begins by outlining the perceptual model of agentive experience before turning to its two main rivals: the doxastic model, according to which agentive experience is really a species of belief, and the telic (...)
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  19. Tim Bayne (2010). In Defence of Genethical Parity. In David Archard & David Benatar (eds.), Procreation and Parenthood: The Ethics of Bearing and Rearing Children. Oup Oxford.
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  20. Tim Bayne (2010). The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford ;Oxford University Press.
    Foundations. The phenomenal field ; Phenomenal unity : mereology ; Phenomenal unity : closure -- Consciousness unified?. Motivating the unity thesis ; How to evaluate the unity thesis ; Fragments of consciousness? ; Anosognosia, schizophrenia, and multiplicity ; Hypnosis ; The split-brain syndrome -- Implications. The quilt of consciousness ; The body ; The self.
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  21. Tim Bayne & Maja Spener (2010). Introspective Humility. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):1-22.
    Viewed from a certain perspective, nothing can seem more secure than introspection. Consider an ordinary conscious episode—say, your current visual experience of the colour of this page. You can judge, when reflecting on this experience, that you have a visual experience as of something white with black marks before you. Does it seem reasonable to doubt this introspective judgement? Surely not—such doubt would seem utterly fanciful. The trustworthiness of introspection is not only assumed by commonsense, it is also taken for (...)
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  22. Timothy Bayne (2010). Agentive Experiences as Pushmi-Pullyu Representations. In A. Buckareff, J. Aguilar & K. Frankish (eds.), New Waves in the Philosophy of Action. Palgrave Macmillan. 219--36.
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  23. Nicholas Shea & Tim Bayne (2010). The Vegetative State and the Science of Consciousness. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3):459.
    Consciousness in experimental subjects is typically inferred from reports and other forms of voluntary behaviour. A wealth of everyday experience confirms that healthy subjects do not ordinarily behave in these ways unless they are conscious. Investigation of consciousness in vegetative state patients has been based on the search for neural evidence that such broad functional capacities are preserved in some vegetative state patients. We call this the standard approach. To date, the results of the standard approach have suggested that some (...)
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  24. Tim Bayne (2009). Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):385-404.
    The phenomenal character of perceptual experience involves the representation of colour, shape and motion. Does it also involve the representation of high-level categories? Is the recognition of a tomato as a tomato contained within perceptual phenomenality? Proponents of a conservative view of the reach of phenomenal content say 'No', whereas those who take a liberal view of perceptual phenomenality say 'Yes'. I clarify the debate between conservatives and liberals, and argue in favour of the liberal view that high-level content can (...)
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  25. Tim Bayne, Axel Cleeremans & Patrick Wilken (eds.) (2009). The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Five years in the making and including over 250 concise entries written by leaders in the field, the volume covers both fundamental knowledge as well as more ...
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  26. Tim Bayne & Greg Restall (2009). A Participatory Model of the Atonement. In Yujin Nagasawa & Erik J. Wielenberg (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Macmillan. 150.
    In this paper we develop a participatory model of the Christian doctrine of the atonement, according to which the atonement involves participating in the death and resurrection of Christ. In part one we argue that current models of the atonement—exemplary, penal, substitutionary and merit models—are unsatisfactory. The central problem with these models is that they assume a purely deontic conception of sin and, as a result, they fail to address sin as a relational and ontological problem. In part two we (...)
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  27. Axel Cleeremans, Tim Bayne & Patrick Wilken (2009). Spock. In Bayne Tim, Cleeremans Axel & Wilken Patrick (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
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  28. Patrick Wilken, Timothy J. Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.) (2009). The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Five years in the making and including over 250 concise entries written by leaders in the field, the volume covers both fundamental knowledge as well as more recent advances in this rapidly changing domain.
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  29. Tim Bayne (2008). The Phenomenology of Agency. Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.
    The phenomenology of agency has, until recently, been rather neglected, overlooked by both philosophers of action and philosophers of consciousness alike. Thankfully, all that has changed, and of late there has been an explosion of interest in what it is like to be an agent. 1 This burgeoning field crosses the traditional boundaries between disciplines: philosophers of psychopathology are speculating about the role that unusual experiences of agency might play in accounting for disorders of thought and action; cognitive scientists are (...)
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  30. Tim Bayne (2008). The Unity of Consciousness and the Split-Brain Syndrome. Journal of Philosophy 105 (6):277-300.
    According to conventional wisdom, the split-brain syndrome puts paid to the thesis that consciousness is necessarily unified. The aim of this paper is to challenge that view. I argue both that disunity models of the split-brain are highly problematic, and that there is much to recommend a model of the split-brain—the switch model—according to which split-brain patients retain a fully unified consciousness at all times. Although the task of examining the unity of consciousness through the lens of the split-brain syndrome (...)
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  31. Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (eds.) (2008). Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Psychology Press.
    This collection of essays focuses on the interface between delusions and self-deception.
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  32. Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernández (eds.) (2008). Imagination, Delusion, and Self-Deception. Psychology Press.
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  33. Tim Bayne (2007). Conscious States and Conscious Creatures: Explanation in the Scientific Study of Consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):1–22.
    Explanation does not exist in a metaphysical vacuum. Conceptions of the structure of a phenomenon play an important role in guiding attempts to explain it, and erroneous conceptions of a phenomenon may direct investigation in misleading directions. I believe that there is a case to be made for thinking that much work on the neural underpinnings of consciousness—what is often called the neural correlates of consciousness—is driven by an erroneous conception of the structure of consciousness. The aim of this paper (...)
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  34. Tim Bayne (2007). Hypnosis and the Unity of Consciousness. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press. 93-109.
    Hypnosis appears to generate unusual—and sometimes even astonishing—changes in the contents of consciousness. Hypnotic subjects report perceiving things that are not there, they report not perceiving things that are there, and they report unusual alterations in the phenomenology of agency. In addition to apparent alterations in the contents of consciousness, hypnosis also appears to involve alterations in the structure of consciousness. According to many theorists—most notably Hilgard—hypnosis demonstrates that the unity of consciousness is an illusion (Hilgard 1977).
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  35. Tim Bayne & Jorge Fernandez, Resisting Ruthless Reductionism: A Comment on Bickle.
    The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com.
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  36. Tim Bayne & Yujin Nagasawa (2007). The Grounds of Worship Again: A Reply to Crowe. Religious Studies 43 (4):475-480.
    Although one would not have guessed it from the amount of attention that the topic has received from recent philosophers of religion, the God of theism is first and foremost a being that is worthy of worship. In the paper that forms the target of Crowe’s discussion we attempted to shed some much-needed light on worship. Our focus was not on the question of whether theists hold that human beings are obliged to..
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  37. Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie (2007). Narrators and Comparators: The Architecture of Agentive Self-Awareness. [REVIEW] Synthese 159 (3):475 - 491.
    This paper contrasts two approaches to agentive self-awareness: a high-level, narrative-based account, and a low-level comparator-based account. We argue that an agent's narrative self-conception has a role to play in explaining their agentive judgments, but that agentive experiences are explained by low-level comparator mechanisms that are grounded in the very machinery responsible for action-production.
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  38. Yujin Nagasawa & Tim Bayne (2007). The Grounds of Worship Again: A Reply to Crowe. Religious Studies 43 (4):475-480.
    In this paper we respond to Benjamin Crowe's criticisms in this issue of our discussion of the grounds of worship. We clarify our previous position, and examine Crowe's account of what it is about God's nature that might ground our obligation to worship Him. We find Crowe's proposals no more persuasive than the accounts that we examined in our previous paper, and conclude that theists still owe us an account of what it is in virtue of which we have obligations (...)
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  39. Jason Arndt, Bruno G. Bara, Tim Bayne, Cristina Becchio, Cordula Becker, Derek Besner, Mark Blagrove, Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, Stephan G. Boehm & Francesca Marina Bosco (2006). Adenzato, Mauro, 64 Allilaire, Jean-François, 258 Alonso, Diego, 386 Andrade, Jackie, 1, 28. Consciousness and Cognition 15:767-768.
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  40. Tim Bayne & Yujin Nagasawa (2006). The Grounds of Worship. Religious Studies 42 (3):299-313.
    Although worship has a pivotal place in religious thought and practice, philosophers of religion have had remarkably little to say about it. In this paper we examine some of the many questions surrounding the notion of worship, focusing on the claim that human beings have obligations to worship God. We explore a number of attempts to ground our supposed duty to worship God, and argue that each is problematic. We conclude by examining the implications of this result, and suggest that (...)
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  41. Timothy J. Bayne & Neil Levy (2006). The Feeling of Doing: Deconstructing the Phenomenology of Agnecy. In Natalie Sebanz & Wolfgang Prinz (eds.), Disorders of Volition. MIT Press.
    Disorders of volition are often accompanied by, and may even be caused by, disruptions in the phenomenology of agency. Yet the phenomenology of agency is at present little explored. In this paper we attempt to describe the experience of normal agency, in order to uncover its representational content.
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  42. Elisabeth Pacherie, Melissa Green & Timothy J. Bayne (2006). Phenomenology and Delusions: Who Put the 'Alien' in Alien Control? Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):566-577.
    Current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusional beliefs are based on unusual experiences of various kinds. For example, it is argued that the Capgras delusion (the belief that a known person has been replaced by an impostor) is triggered by an abnormal affective experience in response to seeing a known person; loss of the affective response to a familiar person’s face may lead to the belief that the person has been replaced by an impostor (Ellis & Young, 1990). (...)
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  43. Tim Bayne (2005). Divided Brains and Unified Phenomenology: A Review Essay on Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):495-512.
    In Consciousness and persons, Michael Tye (Tye, M. (2003). Consciousness and persons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.) develops and defends a novel approach to the unity of consciousness. Rather than thinking of the unity of consciousness as involving phenomenal relations between distinct experiences, as standard accounts do, Tye argues that we should regard the unity of consciousness as involving relations between the contents of consciousness. Having developed an account of what it is for consciousness to be unified, Tye goes on to (...)
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  44. Tim Bayne & Neil Levy (2005). Amputees by Choice: Body Integrity Identity Disorder and the Ethics of Amputation. Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1):75–86.
    In 1997, a Scottish surgeon by the name of Robert Smith was approached by a man with an unusual request: he wanted his apparently healthy lower left leg amputated. Although details about the case are sketchy, the would-be amputee appears to have desired the amputation on the grounds that his left foot wasn’t part of him – it felt alien. After consultation with psychiatrists, Smith performed the amputation. Two and a half years later, the patient reported that his life had (...)
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  45. Timothy J. Bayne (2005). Divided Brains and Unified Phenomenology: A Review Essay on Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):495-512.
    In Consciousness and persons, Michael Tye (Tye, M. (2003). Consciousness and persons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.) develops and defends a novel approach to the unity of consciousness. Rather than thinking of the unity of consciousness as involving phenomenal relations between distinct experiences, as standard accounts do, Tye argues that we should regard the unity of consciousness as involving relations between the contents of consciousness. Having developed an account of what it is for consciousness to be unified, Tye goes on to (...)
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  46. Timothy J. Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (2005). Resisting Ruthless Reductionism: A Commentary on Bickle. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):239-48.
    Philosophy and Neuroscience is an unabashed apologetic for reductionism in philosophy of mind. Bickle chides his fellow philosophers for their ignorance of mainstream neuroscience, and promises them that a subscription to Cell, Neuron, or any other journal in mainstream neuroscience will be amply rewarded. Rather than being bogged down in the intricacies of two-dimensional semantics or the ontology of properties, philosophers of mind need to get neuroscientifically informed and ruthlessly reductive.
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  47. Timothy J. Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie (2005). In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions. Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88.
    In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of (...)
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  48. Barry F. Dainton & Timothy J. Bayne (2005). Consciousness as a Guide to Personal Persistence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):549-571.
    Mentalistic (or Lockean) accounts of personal identity are normally formulated in terms of causal relations between psychological states such as beliefs, memories, and intentions. In this paper we develop an alternative (but still Lockean) account of personal identity, based on phenomenal relations between experiences. We begin by examining a notorious puzzle case due to Bernard Williams, and extract two lessons from it: first, that Williams's puzzle can be defused by distinguishing between the psychological and phenomenal approaches, second, that so far (...)
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