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Profile: Tim Crane (Cambridge University)
  1. Tim Crane, Existence and Quantification Reconsidered.
    The currently standard philosophical conception of existence makes a connection between three things: certain ways of talking about existence and being in natural language; certain natural language idioms of quantification; and the formal representation of these in logical languages. Thus a claim like ‘Prime numbers exist’ is treated as equivalent to ‘There is at least one prime number’ and this is in turn equivalent to ‘Some thing is a prime number’. The verb ‘exist’, the verb phrase ‘there is’ and the (...)
     
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  2. Tim Crane, Introduction: The Mental and the Physical.
    The theme of these is essays is what might be called, rather ambitiously, the nature of the human mind. Psychologists and philosophers both investigate the nature of the mind, but from rather different angles. Psychologists and neuroscientists investigate the actual mechanisms in the brain, the body and the world which underpin mental events and processes. Philosophers, by contrast, ask more abstract questions: for example, about what makes any process mental at all, or how mental reality fits into the rest of (...)
     
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  3. Tim Crane (2014). Aspects of Psychologism. Harvard University Press.
    Dummett is claiming, then, that Frege's attack on psychologism can be extended to views outside logic. Psycholo- gism in Dummett's discussion is a view about understanding the meanings of words ('grasp of sense'). Psychologism holds that  ...
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  4. Steinvör Thöll Árnadóttir & Tim Crane (2013). There is No Exclusion Problem. In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press. 248.
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  5. Tim Crane (2013). Human Uniqueness and the Pursuit of Knowledge. In Bana Bashour Hans Muller (ed.), Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and its Implications. Routledge. 13--139.
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  6. Tim Crane (2013). Philosophie, Logik, Naturwissenschaft, Geschichte. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 61 (1):3-19.
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  7. Tim Crane (ed.) (2013). Routledge Encyclopedia of Philsophy. Routledge.
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  8. Tim Crane (2013). The Given. In Joseph Schear (ed.), Mind, Reason and Being-in-the-World: the McDowell-Dreyfus Debate. Routledge. 229-249.
    In The Mind and the World Order, C.I. Lewis made a famous distinction between the immediate data ‘which are presented or given to the mind’ and the ‘construction or interpretation’ which the mind brings to those data (1929: 52). What the mind receives is the datum – literally, the given – and the interpretation is what happens when we being it ‘under some category or other, select from it, emphasise aspects of it, and relate it in particular and unavoidable ways’ (...)
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  9. Tim Crane (2013). The Objects of Thought. Oup Oxford.
    Tim Crane addresses the ancient question of how it is possible to think about what does not exist. He argues that the representation of the non-existent is a pervasive feature of our thought about the world, and that to understand thought's representational power ('intentionality') we need to understand the representation of the non-existent.
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  10. Tim Crane (2013). Unconscious Belief and Conscious Thought. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oup Usa. 156.
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  11. Tim Crane (2012). Philosophy, Logic, Science, History. Metaphilosophy 43 (1-2):20-37.
    Analytic philosophy is sometimes said to have particularly close connections to logic and to science, and no particularly interesting or close relation to its own history. It is argued here that although the connections to logic and science have been important in the development of analytic philosophy, these connections do not come close to characterizing the nature of analytic philosophy, either as a body of doctrines or as a philosophical method. We will do better to understand analytic philosophy—and its relationship (...)
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  12. Tim Crane (2012). Tye on Acquaintance and the Problem of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):190-198.
  13. Tim Crane (2012). Wittgenstein and Intentionality. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 17 (1):88-104.
    The concept of intentionality --- what Brentano called ‘the mind’s direction on its obj ects’ --- has been a preoccupation of many of the most significant twentieth century philosophers. The purpose of this essay is to examine the place of the concept of intentionality in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, and to criticize one aspect of his treatment of intentionality. Although the word ‘intentionality’ is not (to my knowledge) used in Wittgenstein’s philosophical writings, the idea it expresses was central at all stages (...)
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  14. Tim Crane (2012). What is the Problem of Non-Existence? Philosophia 40 (3):417-434.
    It is widely held that there is a problem of talking about or otherwise representing things that not exist. But what exactly is this problem? This paper presents a formulation of the problem in terms of the conflict between the fact that there are truths about non-existent things and the fact that truths must be answerable to reality, how things are. Given this, the problem of singular negative existential statements is no longer the central or most difficult aspect of the (...)
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  15. Tim Crane (2011). I Drink Therefore I Am A Philosopher's Guide to Wine. By Roger Scruton. London and New York: Continuum, 2009, Pp. 211 ISBN 9781847065087. [REVIEW] Philosophy 86 (1):138-142.
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  16. Tim Crane (2011). The Singularity of Singular Thought. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):21-43.
    A singular thought can be characterized as a thought which is directed at just one object. The term ‘thought’ can apply to episodes of thinking, or to the content of the episode (what is thought). This paper argues that episodes of thinking can be just as singular, in the above sense, when they are directed at things that do not exist as when they are directed at things that do exist. In this sense, then, singular thoughts are not object-dependent.
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  17. Tim Crane (2011). Wittgenstein on Intentionality and Mental Representation. In Anne Reboul (ed.), Philosophical papers dedicated to Kevin Mulligan.
    The concept of intentionality — what Brentano called ‘the mind’s direction on its obj ects’ — has been a preoccupation of many of the most significant twentieth century philosophers. The purpose of this essay is to examine the place of the concept of intentionality in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, and to criticize one aspect of his treatment of intentionality. Although the word ‘intentionality’ is not (to my knowledge) used in Wittgenstein’s philosophical writings, the idea it expresses was central at all stages (...)
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  18. Tim Crane (2010). Cosmic Hermeneutics Vs. Emergence: The Challenge of the Explanatory Gap. In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oup Oxford.
    This paper is a defence of Terence Horgan’s claim that any genuinely physicalist position must distinguish itself from (what has been traditionally known as) emergentism. I argue that physicalism is necessarily reductive in character -- it must either give a reductive account of apparently non-physical entities, or a reductive explanation of why there are non-physical entities. I argue that many recent ‘nonreductive’ physicalists do not do this, and that because of this they cannot adequately distinguish their view from emergentism. The (...)
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  19. Tim Crane (2009). Is Perception a Propositional Attitude? Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469.
    It is widely agreed that perceptual experience is a form of intentionality, i.e., that it has representational content. Many philosophers take this to mean that like belief, experience has propositional content, that it can be true or false. I accept that perceptual experience has intentionality; but I dispute the claim that it has propositional content. This claim does not follow from the fact that experience is intentional, nor does it follow from the fact that experiences are accurate or inaccurate. I (...)
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  20. Tim Crane & Brian P. McLaughlin (2009). Introduction. Synthese 170 (2):211-215.
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  21. Tim Crane (2008). Causation and Determinable Properties : On the Efficacy of Colour, Shape, and Size. In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press.
    This paper presents a puzzle or antinomy about the role of properties in causation. In theories of properties, a distinction is often made between determinable properties, like red, and their determinates, like scarlet (see Armstrong 1978, volume II). Sometimes determinable properties are cited in causal explanations, as when we say that someone stopped at the traffic light because it was red. If we accept that properties can be among the relata of causation, then it can be argued that there are (...)
     
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  22. Tim Crane (2008). Reply to Nes. Analysis 68 (299):215–218.
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  23. Tim Crane (2008). Should Atheists Be Against Religion? Think 6 (17-18):109-119.
    Tim Crane responds to the several recent attacks on religion made by Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, et al.
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  24. Tim Crane (2008). Sainsbury on Thinking About an Object (Sainsbury Sobre Pensar Acerca de Un Objeto). Critica 40 (120):85 - 95.
    R.M. Sainsbury's account of reference has many compelling and attractive features. But it has the undesirable consequence that sentences of the form "x is thinking about y" can never be true when y is replaced by a non-referring term. Of the two obvious ways to deal with this problem within Sainsbury's framework, I reject one (the analysis of thinking about as a propositional attitude) and endorse the other (treating "thinks about" as akin to an intensional transitive verb). This endorsement is (...)
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  25. Tim Crane & Peter Cave (2008). What on Earth is Humanism? The Philosophers' Magazine 41 (41):55-62.
    Some people clearly do think of humanism as being a kind of creed or value system. The first “humanist manifesto” published in 1933 talked of humanism as a “new religion”. Nowhere does this idea ring more true than at weekend meetings of Ethical Societies in chilly and austere halls which can resemble Methodist chapels or Christian Scientist temples. It’s hard to resist the cheap shot that a lot of what has passed for atheistical humanism has been a kind of non-conformism (...)
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  26. Tim Crane (2007). Wine as an Aesthetic Object. In Barry C. Smith (ed.), Questions of Taste: The Philosophy of Wine. Oxford University Press. 141-156.
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  27. Tim Crane (2007). Czas. Roczniki Filozoficzne 55 (1):249-265.
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  28. Tim Crane (2007). El problema de la percepción en la filosofía analítica. In David P. Chico & Moisés Barroso Ramos (eds.), Pluralidad de la Filosofía Analítica. Plaza y Valdés Editores. 3--217.
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  29. Tim Crane (2007). Intentionalism. In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. 474--493.
    The central and defining characteristic of thoughts is that they have objects. The object of a thought is what the thought concerns, or what it is about. Since there cannot be thoughts which are not about anything, or which do not concern anything, there cannot be thoughts without objects. Mental states or events or processes which have objects in this sense are traditionally called ‘intentional,’ and ‘intentionality’ is for this reason the general term for this defining characteristic of thought. Under (...)
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  30. Tim Crane (2007). Intentionalität als Merkmal des Geistigen: Sechs Essays zur Philosophie des Geistes. Fischer Verlag.
    A German translation of six essays (‘The Non-Conceptual Content of Experience’, ‘The Mental Causation Debate’, ‘Mental Substances’, ‘Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental’, ‘Subjective Knowledge’, ‘The Intentional Structure of Consciousness’) with a new introduction, ‘The Mental and the Physical’.
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  31. Tim Crane (2007). Review of Gbor Forrai, George Kampis (Eds.), Intentionality: Past and Future. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (1).
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  32. Barry C. Smith & Tim Crane (2007). In Vino Veritas. The Philosophers' Magazine 39 (39):75-78.
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  33. Tim Crane (2006). Brentano's Concept of Intentional Inexistence. In Mark Textor (ed.), The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy. Routledge. 1--20.
    Franz Brentano’s attempt to distinguish mental from physical phenomena by employing the scholastic concept of intentional inexistence is often cited as reintroducing the concept of intentionality into mainstream philosophical discussion. But Brentano’s own claims about intentional inexistence are much misunderstood. In the second half of the 20th century, analytical philosophers in particular have misread Brentano’s views in misleading ways.1 It is important to correct these misunderstandings if we are to come to a proper assessment of Brentano’s worth as a philosopher (...)
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  34. Tim Crane (2006). Comment on Ted Honderich's Radical Externalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):28-43.
    Ted Honderich's theory of consciousness as existence, which he here calls Radical Externalism, starts with a good phenomenological observation: that perceptual experience appears to involve external things being immediately present to us. As P.F. Strawson once observed, when asked to describe my current perceptual state, it is normally enough simply to describe the things around me (Strawson, 1979, p. 97). But in my view that does not make the whole theory plausible.
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  35. Tim Crane (2006). Intencionalidad. Laguna 19:9-28.
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  36. Tim Crane (2006). Intentionality and Emotion: Comment on Hutto. In Richard Menary (ed.), Radical Enactivism: Intentionality, Phenomenology and Narrative: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto. John Benjamins Publishing Company. 107-119.
    I am very sympathetic to Dan Hutto’s view that in our experience of the emotions of others “we do not neutrally observe the outward behaviour of another and infer coldly, but on less than certain grounds, that they are in such and such an inner state, as justified by analogy with our own case. Rather we react and feel as we do because it is natural for us to see and be moved by specific expressions of emotion in others” (Hutto (...)
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  37. Tim Crane (2006). Is There a Perceptual Relation? In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
    P.F. Strawson argued that ‘mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself as … an immediate consciousness of the existence of things outside us’ (1979: 97). He began his defence of this very natural idea by asking how someone might typically give a description of their current visual experience, and offered this example of such a description: ‘I see the red light of the setting sun filtering through the black and thickly clustered branches of the elms; I see the dappled deer (...)
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  38. Tim Crane (2006). U Čemu Je Problem Opažanja? Filozofska Istrazivanja 26 (2):257-282.
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  39. Tim Crane (2005). Papineau on Phenomenal Concepts. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):155-162.
    Over the past decade or so, David Papineau has given an account of the content and motivation of a physicalist conception of the world with more thoroughness and argumentative defence than many physicalists have thought necessary. In doing this, he has substantially advanced the debate on physicalism, and physicalists and non-physicalists alike should be grateful to him.1 At the heart of Papineau’s defence of physicalism in his recent book (2002) is his theory of phenomenal concepts. Like many physicalists, Papineau diagnoses (...)
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  40. Tim Crane (2005). Qu'est-Ce Que le Problème de la Perception ? Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):237-264.
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  41. Tim Crane, The Problem of Perception. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Sense-perception—the awareness or apprehension of things by sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste—has long been a preoccupation of philosophers. One pervasive and traditional problem, sometimes called “the problem of perception”, is created by the phenomena of perceptual illusion and hallucination: if these kinds of error are possible, how can perception be what it intuitively seems to be, a direct and immediate access to reality? The present entry is about how these possibilities of error challenge the intelligibility of the phenomenon of (...)
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  42. Tim Crane (2005). Was ist Das problem der wahrnehmung? Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):237-264.
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  43. Tim Crane (2005). What is the Problem of Perception? Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):237-264.
    It will be obvious to anyone with a slight knowledge of twentieth-century analytic philosophy that one of the central themes of this kind of philosophy is the nature of perception: the awareness of the world through the five senses of sight, touch, smell, taste, and hearing. Yet it can seem puzzling, from our twenty-first-century perspective, why there is a distinctively philosophical problem of perception at all. For when philosophers ask ‘what is the nature of perception?’, the question can be confused (...)
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  44. Tim Crane (2004). Book Review of "The Mind's Provisions" by Vincent Descombes. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 12 (3):399-406.
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  45. Tim Crane (2004). Summary of Elements of Mind and Replies to Critics. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):223-240.
    Elements of Mind (EM) has two themes, one major and one minor. The major theme is intentionality, the mind’s direction upon its objects; the other is the mind–body problem. I treat these themes separately: chapters 1, and 3–5 are concerned with intentionality, while chapter 2 is about the mind–body problem. In this summary I will first describe my view of the mind–body problem, and then describe the book’s main theme. Like many philosophers, I see the mind–body problem as containing two (...)
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  46. Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.) (2004). Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
    A complete and self-contained introduction to metaphysics, this anthology provides an extensive and varied collection of fifty-four of the best classical and contemporary readings on the subject. The readings are organized into ten sections: God, idealism and realism, being, universals and particulars, necessity and contingency, causation, space and time, identity, mind and body, and freewill and determinism. It features a substantial general introduction and detailed section introductions that set the selections in context and guide readers through them. Discussion questions and (...)
     
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  47. Tim Crane & Vladimír Svoboda (2004). Causation, Omniscience and Interpretation: A Note on Davidson's Epistemology. Organon F, Filozoficky Casopis:117-127.
     
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  48. Tim Crane (2003). Mental Substances. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. 229-250.
    Philosophers of mind typically conduct their discussions in terms of mental events, mental processes, mental properties, mental states – but rarely in terms of minds themselves. Sometimes this neglect is explicitly acknowledged. Donald Davidson, for example, writes that ‘there are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties, which is to say that certain psychological predicates are true of them. These properties are constantly changing, and such changes are mental events’.2 Hilary Putnam agrees, though for somewhat different reasons: (...)
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