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  1. Timm Triplett (2011). Justifying Morality, Part I: Bernard Gert's Justification. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (3):299-308.
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  2. Timm Triplett (2011). Justifying Morality, Part II: Beyond Justification as Clarification. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (4):403-417.
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  3. Timm Triplett (2007). Gert on Unresolvable Moral Debates. Metaphilosophy 38 (4):370-379.
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  4. Timm Triplett (2007). Tye's Missing Shade of Blue. Analysis 67 (294):166–170.
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  5. Timm Triplett & Willem A. deVries (2007). Does Observational Knowledge Require Metaknowledge? A Dialogue on Sellars. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (1):23 – 51.
    In the following dialogue between TT - a foundationalist - and WdeV - a Sellarsian, we offer our differing assessments of the principle for observational knowledge proposed in Wilfrid Sellars's 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind'. Sellars writes: 'For a Konstatierung "This is green" to "express observational knowledge", not only must it be a symptom or sign of the presence of a green object in standard conditions, but the perceiver must know that tokens of "This is green" are symptoms of (...)
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  6. Willem deVries & Timm Triplett (2006). Is Sellars'a Rylean Hypothesis Plausible? A Dialogue. In The Self-Correcting Enterprise: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. 85-114.
    A dialogue between someone who finds Sellars's Rylean myth in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" quite implausible and another who defends it.
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  7. Timm Triplett (2006). Shoemaker on Qualia, Phenomenal Properties and Spectrum Inversions. Philosophia 34 (2):203-208.
    Sydney Shoemaker offers an account of color perception that attempts to do justice, within a functionalist framework, to the commonsense view that colors are properties of ordinary objects, to the existence of qualia, and to the possibility of spectrum inversions. Shoemaker posits phenomenal properties as dispositional properties of colored objects that explain how there can be intersubjective variation in the experience of a particular color. I argue that his account does not in fact allow for the description of a spectrum (...)
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  8. Timm Triplett & Willem A. DeVries (2006). Is Sellars's Rylean Hypothesis Plausible? A Dialogue. In Michael P. Wolf & Mark Norris Lance (eds.), The Self-Correcting Enterprise: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Rodopi. 85-114.
    A dialogue between someone who finds Sellars's Rylean myth in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" quite implausible and another who defends it.
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  9. Timm Triplett (2002). Bernard Gert's Morality and its Application to Computer Ethics. Ethics and Information Technology 4 (1):79-92.
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  10. Willem A. deVries & Timm Triplett (2000). Knowledge, Mind, and the Given: A Reading of Sellars’ “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”. Hackett.
    This is a careful explication of and commentary on Wilfrid Sellars's classic essay "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" [EPM]. It is appropriate for upper-level undergraduates and beyond. The full text of EPM is included in the volume.
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  11. Willem deVries & Timm Triplett (2000). Knowledge, Mind, and the Given: A Reading of Sellars’ “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”. Hackett.
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  12. Timm Triplett (1999). Rescher's Metaphilosophy. Metaphilosophy 30 (3):209-230.
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  13. Timm Triplett (1994). Is There Anthropological Evidence That Logic is Culturally Relative?: Remarks on Bloor, Jennings, and Evans-Pritchard. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):749-760.
    Logical relativism is the view that a logical proposition is known just in case it is collectively endorsed in some culture. This striking and controversial view is defended by David Bloor and Richard C. Jennings. They cite in its support distinctive reasoning practices among the Azande as described by E. E. Evans-Pitchard. Jennings has challenged my critique of Bloor's logical relativism, claiming that my analysis is based on misunderstandings of Bloor and Evans-Pritchard. I argue that Jennings' clarifications of Bloor do (...)
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  14. Timm Triplett (1991). Knowledge and Evidence, by Paul K. Moser. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):945-949.
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  15. Timm Triplett (1990). Recent Work on Foundationalsim. American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (2):93 - 116.
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  16. Timm Triplett (1988). Azande Logic Versus Western Logic? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (3):361-366.
    , David Bloor suggests that logical reasoning is radically relativistic in the sense that there are incompatible ways of reasoning logically, and no culturally transcendent rules of correct logical inference exist which could allow for adjudication of these different ways of reasoning. Bloor cites an example of reasoning used by the Azande as an illustration of such logical relativism. A close analysis of this reasoning reveals that the Azande's logic is in fact impeccably Aristotelian. I argue that the conclusions Bloor (...)
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  17. Timm Triplett (1987). Rorty's Critique of Foundationalism. Philosophical Studies 52 (1):115 - 129.
    Rorty's critique concentrates on one aspect of foundationalism: the claim that nonpropositional sensory awareness serves as the basis for propositional justification. This claim is an essential component of classical foundationalism, though not necessarily of the more moderate versions of foundationalism that have been proposed. Thus even if it were a successful critique it would tell against only one type of foundationalism. But nothing in Rorty's argument provides any reason to doubt the plausibility of a classical foundationalist explanation of why sensory (...)
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  18. Timm Triplett (1986). Relativism and the Sociology of Mathematics: Remarks on Bloor, Flew, and Frege. Inquiry 29 (1-4):439-450.
    Antony Flew's ?A Strong Programme for the Sociology of Belief (Inquiry 25 {1982], 365?78) critically assesses the strong programme in the sociology of knowledge defended in David Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery. I argue that Flew's rejection of the epistemological relativism evident in Bloor's work begs the question against the relativist and ignores Bloor's focus on the social relativity of mathematical knowledge. Bloor attempts to establish such relativity via a sociological analysis of Frege's theory of number. But this analysis only (...)
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  19. Timm Triplett (1986). Barnes on Heraclitus and the Unity of Opposites. Ancient Philosophy 6:15-23.
    Jonathan barnes argues that heraclitus's unity of opposites doctrine is logically contradictory in that it requires the coinstantiation of contrary properties. but barnes relies on rather strained interpretations of the doxography. heraclitus's unity of opposites doctrine is better understood as consisting of two aspects: (1) a claim that opposing qualities, rather than being coinstantiated in one thing, are related to one another via a process of cyclic transformation; and (2) an attempt to illustrate the limited and incomplete perspectives through which (...)
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  20. Timm Triplett (1980). Chisholm's Foundationalism. Philosophical Studies 38 (2):141 - 153.
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