1. Timothy A. Kenyon (2000). Indeterminacy and Realism. In Andrew Brook, Don Ross & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press. 77--94.
    This article considers a Quine-Dennett style of argument from the indeterminacy of intentional content against the reducibility of mental states to neurological states. The most compelling version of such an argument, I suggest, is one that exploits a semantic anti-realist notion of truth; this holds out the promise of a relatively sophisticated story about the respects in which mental state attributions may be true or false of physical systems, without those states themselves being physical states.
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  2. Timothy A. Kenyon (1998). Searle Rediscovers What Was Not Lost. Dialogue 37 (1):117-130.
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  3. Timothy A. Kenyon (1991). Russell on Pastness. Dialogue:57-59.
    In "On the Experience of Time", Russell claims that a knowledge of an objective earlier/later relation cannot establish our original awareness of "pastness". He proposes a special knowledge of pastness derived from introspection upon memory. My paper summarizes both accounts, examining Russell's rejection of the former. I conclude that the objective relation could indeed form the epistemic basis of pastness. Thus, for Russell's purposes, the psychological account is unnecessary.
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