1.  58
    Timothy A. O. Endicott (1998). Herbert Hart and the Semantic Sting. Legal Theory 4 (3):283-300.
    Even to disagree, we need to understand each other. If I reject what you say without understanding you, we will only have the illusion of a disagreement. You will be asserting one thing and I will be denying another. Even to disagree, we need some agreement.
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  2.  29
    Timothy A. O. Endicott (1994). Putting Interpretation in its Place. Law and Philosophy 13 (4):451 - 479.
    What can a philosophical analysis of the concept of interpretation contribute to legal theory? In his recent book,Interpretation and Legal Theory, Andrei Marmor proposes a complex and ambitious analysis as groundwork for his positivist assault on “interpretive” theories of law and of language. I argue (i) that the crucial element in Marmor's analysis of interpretation is his treatment of Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on following rules, and (ii) that a less ambitious analysis of interpretation than Marmor's can take better advantage of (...)
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  3.  5
    Timothy A. O. Endicott (1999). The Impossibility of the Rule of Law. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 19 (1):1-18.
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