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  1. Timothy D. Lyons (2014). A Historically Informed Modus Ponens Against Scientific Realism: Articulation, Critique, and Restoration. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (4):369-392.
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  2. Timothy D. Lyons (2012). Axiological Scientific Realism and Methodological Prescription. In. In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), Epsa Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. 187--197.
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  3. Timothy D. Lyons (2011). The Problem of Deep Competitors and the Pursuit of Epistemically Utopian Truths. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42 (2):317-338.
    According to standard scientific realism, science seeks truth and we can justifiably believe that our successful theories achieve, or at least approximate, that goal. In this paper, I discuss the implications of the following competitor thesis: Any theory we may favor has competitors such that we cannot justifiably deny that they are approximately true. After defending that thesis, I articulate three specific threats it poses for standard scientific realism; one is epistemic, the other two are axiological (that is, pertaining to (...)
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  4. Timothy D. Lyons (2009). Non-Competitor Conditions in the Scientific Realism Debate. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (1):65-84.
    A general insight of 20th-century philosophy of science is that the acceptance of a scientific theory is grounded, not merely on a theory's relation to data, but on its status as having no, or being superior to its, competitors. I explore the ways in which scientific realists might be thought to utilise this insight, have in fact utilised it, and can legitimately utilise it. In more detail, I point out that, barring a natural but mistaken characterisation of scientific realism, traditional (...)
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  5. Timothy D. Lyons (2006). Peter Lipton: Inference to the Best Explanation London, Routledge, 2004, 2nd Edition Paperback $33.95 Isbn 0-415-24203-. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1):255-258.
  6. Timothy D. Lyons (2006). Peter Lipton Inference to the Best Explanation London, Routledge, 2004, Paperback $33.95 Isbn 0-415-24203-7. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1):255-258.
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  7. Timothy D. Lyons (2006). Scientific Realism and the Stratagema de Divide Et Impera. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):537-560.
    In response to historical challenges, advocates of a sophisticated variant of scientific realism emphasize that theoretical systems can be divided into numerous constituents. Setting aside any epistemic commitment to the systems themselves, they maintain that we can justifiably believe those specific constituents that are deployed in key successful predictions. Stathis Psillos articulates an explicit criterion for discerning exactly which theoretical constituents qualify. I critique Psillos's criterion in detail. I then test the more general deployment realist intuition against a set of (...)
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  8. Timothy D. Lyons (2005). Toward a Purely Axiological Scientific Realism. Erkenntnis 63 (2):167 - 204.
    The axiological tenet of scientific realism, “science seeks true theories,” is generally taken to rest on a corollary epistemological tenet, “we can justifiably believe that our successful theories achieve (or approximate) that aim.” While important debates have centered on, and have led to the refinement of, the epistemological tenet, the axiological tenet has suffered from neglect. I offer what I consider to be needed refinements to the axiological postulate. After showing an intimate relation between the refined postulate and ten theoretical (...)
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  9. Timothy D. Lyons (2003). Explaining the Success of a Scientific Theory. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):891-901.
    Scientific realists have claimed that the posit that our theories are (approximately) true provides the best or the only explanation for their success. In response, I revive two nonrealist explanations. I show that realists, in discarding them, have either misconstrued the phenomena to be explained or mischaracterized the relationship between these explanations and their own. I contend nonetheless that these nonrealist competitors, as well as their realist counterparts, should be rejected; for none of them succeed in explaining a significant list (...)
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  10. Sandra D. Mitchell, Anjan Chakravartty, Ioannis Votsis, Timothy D. Lyons, Hasok Chang, P. Kyle Stanford, Justin Garson, Uljana Feest, Andrea Scarantino & Xiang Chen (2003). 1. Preface Preface (P. Vii). Philosophy of Science 70 (5).
     
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