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  1. Timothy J. Bayne, Putting the Experience of Acting in its Place.
    Although the notion can be found in Anscombe.
     
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  2. Timothy J. Bayne (forthcoming). Unified Phenomenology and Divided Brains: Critical Notice of Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. Philosophical Psychology.
     
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  3. Patrick Wilken, Timothy J. Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.) (2009). The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Five years in the making and including over 250 concise entries written by leaders in the field, the volume covers both fundamental knowledge as well as more recent advances in this rapidly changing domain.
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  4. Timothy J. Bayne & Neil Levy (2006). The Feeling of Doing: Deconstructing the Phenomenology of Agnecy. In Natalie Sebanz & Wolfgang Prinz (eds.), Disorders of Volition. MIT Press.
    Disorders of volition are often accompanied by, and may even be caused by, disruptions in the phenomenology of agency. Yet the phenomenology of agency is at present little explored. In this paper we attempt to describe the experience of normal agency, in order to uncover its representational content.
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  5. Elisabeth Pacherie, Melissa Green & Timothy J. Bayne (2006). Phenomenology and Delusions: Who Put the 'Alien' in Alien Control? Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):566-577.
    Current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusional beliefs are based on unusual experiences of various kinds. For example, it is argued that the Capgras delusion (the belief that a known person has been replaced by an impostor) is triggered by an abnormal affective experience in response to seeing a known person; loss of the affective response to a familiar person’s face may lead to the belief that the person has been replaced by an impostor (Ellis & Young, 1990). (...)
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  6. Timothy J. Bayne (2005). Divided Brains and Unified Phenomenology: A Review Essay on Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):495-512.
    In Consciousness and persons, Michael Tye (Tye, M. (2003). Consciousness and persons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.) develops and defends a novel approach to the unity of consciousness. Rather than thinking of the unity of consciousness as involving phenomenal relations between distinct experiences, as standard accounts do, Tye argues that we should regard the unity of consciousness as involving relations between the contents of consciousness. Having developed an account of what it is for consciousness to be unified, Tye goes on to (...)
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  7. Timothy J. Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (2005). Resisting Ruthless Reductionism: A Commentary on Bickle. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):239-48.
    Philosophy and Neuroscience is an unabashed apologetic for reductionism in philosophy of mind. Bickle chides his fellow philosophers for their ignorance of mainstream neuroscience, and promises them that a subscription to Cell, Neuron, or any other journal in mainstream neuroscience will be amply rewarded. Rather than being bogged down in the intricacies of two-dimensional semantics or the ontology of properties, philosophers of mind need to get neuroscientifically informed and ruthlessly reductive.
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  8. Timothy J. Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie (2005). In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions. Mind and Language 20 (2):163-88.
    In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of (...)
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  9. Barry F. Dainton & Timothy J. Bayne (2005). Consciousness as a Guide to Personal Persistence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):549-571.
    Mentalistic (or Lockean) accounts of personal identity are normally formulated in terms of causal relations between psychological states such as beliefs, memories, and intentions. In this paper we develop an alternative (but still Lockean) account of personal identity, based on phenomenal relations between experiences. We begin by examining a notorious puzzle case due to Bernard Williams, and extract two lessons from it: first, that Williams's puzzle can be defused by distinguishing between the psychological and phenomenal approaches, second, that so far (...)
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  10. Timothy J. Bayne (2004). Closing the Gap: Some Questions for Neurophenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4):349-64.
    In his 1996 paper Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem, Francisco Varela called for a union of Husserlian phenomenology and cognitive science. Varela''s call hasn''t gone unanswered, and recent years have seen the development of a small but growing literature intent on exploring the interface between phenomenology and cognitive science. But despite these developments, there is still some obscurity about what exactly neurophenomenology is. What are neurophenomenologists trying to do, and how are they trying to do it? To (...)
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  11. Timothy J. Bayne (2004). Phenomenology and the Feeling of Doing : Wegner on the Conscious Will. In Susan Pockett (ed.), Does Consciousness Cause Behaviour? Mit Press.
    Given its ubiquitous presence in everyday experience, it is surprising that the phenomenology of doing—the experience of being an agent—has received such scant attention in the consciousness literature. But things are starting to change, and a small but growing literature on the content and causes of the phenomenology of first-person agency is beginning to emerge.2 One of the most influential and stimulating figures in this literature is Daniel Wegner. In a series of papers and his book The Illusion of Conscious (...)
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  12. Timothy J. Bayne (2004). Peer Commentary on Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Phenomenal Holism, Internalism, and the Neural Correlates of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):32-37.
  13. Timothy J. Bayne (2004). Phenomenal Holism, Internalism, and the NCC. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1).
  14. Timothy J. Bayne (2004). Phenomenal Holism, Internalism and the Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Comment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):32-37.
  15. Timothy J. Bayne (2004). Self-Consciousness and the Unity of Consciousness. The Monist 87 (2):219-236.
    Consciousness has a number of puzzling features. One such feature is its unity: the experiences and other conscious states that one has at a particular time seem to occur together in a certain way. I am currently enjoying visual experiences of my computer screen, auditory experiences of bird-song, olfactory experiences of coffee, and tactile experiences of feeling the ground beneath my feet. Conjoined with these perceptual experiences are proprioceptive experiences, experiences of agency, affective and emotional experiences, and conscious thoughts of (...)
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  16. Timothy J. Bayne & Elisabeth Bacherie (2004). Experience, Belief, and the Interpretive Fold. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):81-86.
    Elisabeth Pacherie is a research fellow in philosophy at Institut Jean Nicod, Paris. Her main research and publications are in the areas of philosophy of mind, psychopathology and action theory. Her publications include a book on intentionality (_Naturaliser_ _l'intentionnalité_, Paris, PUF, 1993) and she is currently preparing a book on action and agency.
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  17. Neil Levy & Timothy J. Bayne (2004). A Will of One's Own: Consciousness, Control, and Character. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27 (5):459-470.
     
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  18. Timothy J. Bayne & David J. Chalmers (2003). What is the Unity of Consciousness? In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    At any given time, a subject has a multiplicity of conscious experiences. A subject might simultaneously have visual experiences of a red book and a green tree, auditory experiences of birds singing, bodily sensations of a faint hunger and a sharp pain in the shoulder, the emotional experience of a certain melancholy, while having a stream of conscious thoughts about the nature of reality. These experiences are distinct from each other: a subject could experience the red book without the singing (...)
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  19. Timothy J. Bayne (2002). Moral Status and the Treatment of Dissociative Identity Disorder. Journal Of Medicine And Philosophy 27 (1):87-105.
    Many contemporary bioethicists claim that the possession of certain psychological properties is sufficient for having full moral status. I will call this thepsychological approach to full moral status. In this paper, I argue that there is a significant tension between the psychological approach and a widely held model of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID, formerly Multiple Personality Disorder). According to this model, the individual personalities or alters that belong to someone with DID possess those properties that proponents of the psychological approach (...)
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  20. Timothy J. Bayne (2001). Chalmers on the Justification of Phenomenal Judgments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):407-19.
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  21. Timothy J. Bayne (2001). Co-Consciousness: Review of Barry Dainton's Stream of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (3):79-92.
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  22. Timothy J. Bayne (2001). The Inclusion Model of the Incarnation: Problems and Prospects. Religious Studies 37 (2):125-141.
    Thomas Morris and Richard Swinburne have recently defended what they call the ‘two-minds’ model of the Incarnation. This model, which I refer to as the ‘inclusion model’ or ‘inclusionism’, claims that Christ had two consciousnesses, a human and a divine consciousness, with the former consciousness contained within the latter one. I begin by exploring the motivation for, and structure of, inclusionism. I then develop a variety of objections to it: some philosophical, others theological in nature. Finally, I sketch a variant (...)
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  23. Timothy J. Bayne (2000). Charles P. Siewert, The Brentano Puzzle Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 20 (3):217-221.
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  24. Timothy J. Bayne (2000). The Unity of Consciousness: Clarification and Defence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):248-254.
    In "The Disunity of Consciousness," Gerard O'Brien and Jon Opie argue that human consciousness is not synchronically unified. They suggest that the orthodox conception of the unity of consciousness admits of two readings, neither of which they find persuasive. According to them, "a conscious individual does not have a single consciousness, but several distinct phenomenal consciousnesses, at least one for each of the senses, running in parallel." They call this conception of consciousness the _multi-track account. I make three points in (...)
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  25. Timothy J. Bayne (2000). William Seager, The Significance of Consciousness Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 20 (3):217-221.
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