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  1. Timothy Williamson, Reply to John Hawthorne and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio.
    1. As John Hawthorne and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio appreciate, some of the central issues raised in their ‘Knowledge and Objective Chance’ arise for all but the most extreme theories of knowledge. In a wide range of cases, according to very plausible everyday judgments, we know something about the future, even though, according to quantum mechanics, our belief has a small but nonzero chance (objective probability) of being untrue. In easily constructed examples, we are in that position simultaneously with respect to many (...)
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  2. Timothy Williamson, Scepticism and Sensitivity.
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  3. Timothy Williamson (forthcoming). Objects, Properties and Contingent Existence. In W. K. Essler (ed.), Themes from Barcan Marcus.
    Second-order logic and modal logic are both, separately, major topics of philosophical discussion. Although both have been criticized by Quine and others, increasingly many philosophers find their strictures uncompelling, and regard both branches of logic as valuable resources for the articulation and investigation of significant issues in logical metaphysics and elsewhere. One might therefore expect some combination of the two sorts of logic to constitute a natural and more comprehensive background logic for metaphysics. So it is somewhat surprising to find (...)
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  4. Timothy Williamson (forthcoming). A Note on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic. Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    The paper explains how Gettier’s conclusion can be reached on general theoretical grounds within the framework of epistemic logic, without reliance on thought experiments. It extends the argument to permissive conceptions of justification that invalidate principles of multi-premise closure and require neighbourhood semantics rather than semantics of a more standard type. The paper concludes by recommending a robust methodology that aims at convergence in results between thought experimentation and more formal methods. It also warns against conjunctive definitions as sharing several (...)
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  5. Timothy Williamson (forthcoming). In Memoriam: Ruth Barcan Marcus 1921-2012. Association for Symbolic Logic: The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic.
    Timothy Williamson The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Volume 19, Issue 1, Page 123-126, March 2013.
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  6. Timothy Williamson (forthcoming). On Rigidity and Persistence. Logique Et Analyse.
    This note makes a small correction to Nathan Salmon's account of rigid designators and persistent designators in Reference and Essence.
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  7. Timothy Williamson (forthcoming). Review of Joshua Alexander, Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction. Philosophy.
  8. Timothy Williamson (forthcoming). Themes From Barcan Marcus. Lauener Library of Analytical Philosophy, Vol. 3.
  9. Timothy Williamson (forthcoming). Very Improbable Knowing. Erkenntnis.
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  10. Timothy Williamson (2014). Précis of Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):713-716.
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  11. Timothy Williamson (2014). Replies to Bricker, Divers, and Sullivan. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):744-764.
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  12. Timothy Williamson (2013). Anti-Exceptionalism About Philosophy. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):1-3.
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  13. Timothy Williamson (2013). Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction. By Joshua Alexander. Polity Press, 2012, Pp. Vi+154, £15.99. ISBN-13: 978-0745649184. [REVIEW] Philosophy 88 (3):467-474.
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  14. Timothy Williamson (2013). Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic. Inquiry 56 (1):1-14.
    The possibility of justified true belief without knowledge is normally motivated by informally classified examples. This paper shows that it can also be motivated more formally, by a natural class of epistemic models in which both knowledge and justified belief (in the relevant sense) are represented. The models involve a distinction between appearance and reality. Gettier cases arise because the agent's ignorance increases as the gap between appearance and reality widens. The models also exhibit an epistemic asymmetry between good and (...)
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  15. Timothy Williamson (2013). I What is Naturalism? In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge. 29.
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  16. Timothy Williamson (2013). Knowledge Still First. In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 22.
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  17. Timothy Williamson (2013). Logic, Metalogic and Neutrality. Erkenntnis:1-21.
    The paper is a critique of the widespread conception of logic as a neutral arbiter between metaphysical theories, one that makes no `substantive’ claims of its own (David Kaplan and John Etchemendy are two recent examples). A familiar observation is that virtually every putatively fundamental principle of logic has been challenged over the last century on broadly metaphysical grounds (however mistaken), with a consequent proliferation of alternative logics. However, this apparent contentiousness of logic is often treated as though it were (...)
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  18. Timothy Williamson (2013). Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oup Oxford.
    Timothy Williamson gives an original and provocative treatment of deep metaphysical questions about existence, contingency, and change, using the latest resources of quantified modal logic. Contrary to the widespread assumption that logic and metaphysics are disjoint, he argues that modal logic provides a structural core for metaphysics.
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  19. Timothy Williamson (2013). Response to Cohen, Comesaña, Goodman, Nagel, and Weatherson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic. Inquiry 56 (1):77-96.
    The five commentators on my paper ‘Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic’ (GCEL) demonstrate how fruitful the topic can be. Especially in Brian Weatherson's contribution, and to some extent in those of Jennifer Nagel and Jeremy Goodman, much of the material constitutes valuable development and refinement of ideas in GCEL, rather than criticism. In response, I draw some threads together, and answer objections, mainly those in the papers by Stewart Cohen and Juan Comesaña and by Goodman.
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  20. Timothy Williamson (2013). Replies to Trobok, Smokrović, and Miščević on the Philosophy of Philosophy. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):49-64.
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  21. Timothy Williamson (2013). 3 The Unclarity of Naturalism. In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge. 36.
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  22. Timothy Williamson (2013). Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy – By Paul Horwich. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 21 (S2):e7-e10.
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  23. Timothy Williamson (2012). Boghossian and Casalegno on Understanding and Inference. Dialectica 66 (2):237-247.
    In response to Paul Boghossian's objections in ‘Inferentialism and the epistemology of logic’, this paper defends counterexamples offered by Paolo Casalegno and the author to an inferentialist account of what it is to understand a logical constant, on which Boghossian had relied in his explanation of our entitlement to reason according to basic logical principles. The importance for understanding is stressed of non-inferential aspects of the use of logical constants. Boghossian's criteria for individuating concepts are also queried.
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  24. Timothy Williamson (2012). Wright and Casalegno on Meaning and Assertibility. Dialectica 66 (2):267-271.
    In Crispin Wright's ‘Meaning and Assertibility’, the main point of disagreement with Paolo Casalegno's critique of verificationist semantics in ‘The Problem of Non-conclusiveness’ concerns Wright's diagnosis of one of Casalegno's arguments as depending on an over-estimation of the proper explanatory task of a semantic theory. The present note argues that there is no such dependence.
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  25. Timothy Williamson (2011). Improbable Knowing. In T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
    Can we turn the screw on counter-examples to the KK principle (that if one knows that P, one knows that one knows that P)? The idea is to construct cases in which one knows that P, but the epistemic status for one of the proposition that one knows that P is much worse than just one’s not knowing it. Of course, since knowledge is factive, there can’t be cases in which one knows that P and knows that one doesn’t know (...)
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  26. Timothy Williamson (2011). Philosophical Expertise and the Burden of Proof. Metaphilosophy 42 (3):215-229.
    Abstract: Some proponents of “experimental philosophy” criticize philosophers' use of thought experiments on the basis of evidence that the verdicts vary with truth-independent factors. However, their data concern the verdicts of philosophically untrained subjects. According to the expertise defence, what matters are the verdicts of trained philosophers, who are more likely to pay careful attention to the details of the scenario and track their relevance. In a recent article, Jonathan M. Weinberg and others reply to the expertise defence that there (...)
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  27. Timothy Williamson (2011). Précis of The Philosophy of Philosophy. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):470-471.
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  28. Timothy Williamson (2011). Reply to Boghossian. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):498-506.
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  29. Timothy Williamson (2011). Reply to Horwich. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):534-542.
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  30. Timothy Williamson (2011). Reply to Peacocke. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):481-487.
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  31. Timothy Williamson (2011). Reply to Stalnaker. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):515-523.
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  32. Timothy Williamson (2011). The Metaphysical Conception of Analyticity Reply. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):515-523.
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  33. Timothy Williamson (2011). Understanding, Modality, Logical Operators Reply. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):481-487.
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  34. Timothy Williamson (2011). Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic Reply. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):498-506.
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  35. Timothy Williamson (2011). Williamson's Philosophy of Philosophy Reply. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):534-542.
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  36. Timothy Williamson (2010). Anti-Exceptionalism. The Philosophers' Magazine 50 (50):116-117.
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  37. Timothy Williamson (2010). Barcan Formulas in Second-Order Modal Logic. In Themes From Barcan Marcus. Ontos Verlag.
    Second-order logic and modal logic are both, separately, major topics of philosophical discussion. Although both have been criticized by Quine and others, increasingly many philosophers find their strictures uncompelling, and regard both branches of logic as valuable resources for the articulation and investigation of significant issues in logical metaphysics and elsewhere. One might therefore expect some combination of the two sorts of logic to constitute a natural and more comprehensive background logic for metaphysics. So it is somewhat surprising to find (...)
     
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  38. Timothy Williamson (2010). Modal Logic Within Counterfactual Logic. In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oup Oxford.
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  39. Timothy Williamson (2010). The Use of Pejoratives. In Daniel Whiting (ed.), The Later Wittgenstein on Language. Palgrave Macmillan.
     
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  40. Timothy Williamson (2010). Vagueness and Ignorance. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing About Language. Routledge. 145 - 177.
  41. Patrick Greenough, Duncan Pritchard & Timothy Williamson (eds.) (2009). Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    16 leading philosophers offer critical assessments of Timothy Williamson's ground-breaking work on knowledge and its impact on philosophy today.
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  42. Timothy Williamson (2009). Conditionals and Actuality. Erkenntnis 70 (2):135 - 150.
    It is known that indicative and subjunctive conditionals interact differently with a rigidifying "actually" operator. The paper studies this difference in an abstract setting. It does not assume the framework of possible world semantics, characterizing "actually" instead by the type of logically valid formulas to which it gives rise. It is proved that in a language with such features all sentential contexts that are congruential (in the sense that they preserve logical equivalence) are extensional (in the sense that they preserve (...)
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  43. Timothy Williamson (2009). Knowledge of Counterfactuals. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84 (64):45-.
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  44. Timothy Williamson (2009). Reference, Inference, and the Semantics of Pejoratives. In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press. 137--159.
    Two opposing tendencies in the philosophy of language go by the names of ‘referentialism’ and ‘inferentialism’ respectively. In the crudest version of the contrast, the referentialist account of meaning gives centre stage to the referential semantics for a language, which is then used to explain the inference rules for the language, perhaps as those which preserve truth on that semantics (since a referential semantics for a language determines the truth-conditions of its sentences). By contrast, the inferentialist account of meaning gives (...)
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  45. Timothy Williamson (2009). Review: Replies to Ichikawa, Martin and Weinberg. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 145 (3):465 - 476.
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  46. Timothy Williamson (2009). Replies to Critics. In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 279--384.
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  47. Timothy Williamson (2009). Reponses to Critics. In Patrick Greenough & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oup Oxford.
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  48. Timothy Williamson (2009). Reply to Goldman. In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 305--312.
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  49. Timothy Williamson (2009). Replies to Ichikawa, Martin and Weinberg. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 145 (3):465 - 476.
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  50. Timothy Williamson (2009). Replies to Kornblith, Jackson and Moore. Analysis 69 (1):125-135.
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