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Profile: Tobias Schlicht (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
  1. Leonhard Schilbach, Bert Timmermans, Vasudevi Reddy, Alan Costall, Gary Bente, Tobias Schlicht & Kai Vogeley (2013). A Second-Person Neuroscience in Interaction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):441-462.
    In this response we address additions to as well as criticisms and possible misinterpretations of our proposal for a second-person neuroscience. We map out the most crucial aspects of our approach by (1) acknowledging that second-person engaged interaction is not the only way to understand others, although we claim that it is ontogenetically prior; (2) claiming that spectatorial paradigms need to be complemented in order to enable a full understanding of social interactions; and (3) restating that our theoretical proposal not (...)
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  2. Leonhard Schilbach, Bert Timmermans, Vasudevi Reddy, Alan Costall, Gary Bente, Tobias Schlicht & Kai Vogeley (2013). Toward a Second-Person Neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):393-414.
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  3. Tobias Schlicht (2012). Phenomenal Consciousness, Attention and Accessibility. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (3):309-334.
    This article re-examines Ned Block‘s ( 1997 , 2007 ) conceptual distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. His argument that we can have phenomenally conscious representations without being able to cognitively access them is criticized as not being supported by evidence. Instead, an alternative interpretation of the relevant empirical data is offered which leaves the link between phenomenology and accessibility intact. Moreover, it is shown that Block’s claim that phenomenology and accessibility have different neural substrates is highly problematic in (...)
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  4. Tobias Schlicht (2011). Non-Conceptual Content and the Subjectivity of Consciousness. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):491 - 520.
    Abstract The subjectivity of conscious experience is a central feature of our mental life that puzzles philosophers of mind. Conscious mental representations are presented to me as mine, others remain unconscious. How can we make sense of the difference between them? Some representationalists (e.g. Tye) attempt to explain it in terms of non-conceptual intentional content, i.e. content for which one need not possess the relevant concept required in order to describe it. Hanna claims that Kant purports to explain the subjectivity (...)
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  5. Tobias Schlicht (2010). Folk Psychological Narratives. The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons. Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):341-346.
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  6. Albert Newen & Tobias Schlicht (2009). Understanding Other Minds: A Criticism of Goldman's Simulation Theory and an Outline of the Person Model Theory. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):209-242.
    What exactly do we do when we try to make sense of other people e.g. by ascribing mental states like beliefs and desires to them? After a short criticism of Theory-Theory, Interaction Theory and the Narrative Theory of understanding others as well as an extended criticism of the Simulation Theory in Goldman's recent version (2006), we suggest an alternative approach: the Person Model Theory . Person models are the basis for our ability to register and evaluate persons having mental as (...)
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  7. Tobias Schlicht, Anne Springer, Kirsten G. Volz, Gottfried Vosgerau, Martin Schmidt-Daffy, Daniela Simon & Alexandra Zinck (2009). Self as Cultural Construct? An Argument for Levels of Self-Representations. Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):687 – 709.
    In this paper, we put forward an interdisciplinary framework describing different levels of self-representations, namely non-conceptual, conceptual and propositional self-representations. We argue that these different levels of self-representation are differently affected by cultural upbringing: while propositional self-representations rely on “theoretical” concepts and are thus strongly influenced by cultural upbringing, non-conceptual self-representations are uniform across cultures and thus universal. This differentiation offers a theoretical specification of the distinction between an independent and interdependent self-construal put forward in cross-cultural psychology. Hence, this does (...)
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  8. Alexandra Zinck, Daniela Simon, Martin Schmidt-Daffy, Gottfried Vosgerau, Kirsten G. Volz, Anne Springer & Tobias Schlicht (2009). Self as Cultural Construct? An Argument for Levels of Self-Representations. Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):687-709.
    In this paper, we put forward an interdisciplinary framework describing different levels of self-representations, namely non-conceptual, conceptual and propositional self-representations. We argue that these different levels of self-representation are differently affected by cultural upbringing: while propositional self-representations rely on “theoretical” concepts and are thus strongly influenced by cultural upbringing, non-conceptual self-representations are uniform across cultures and thus universal. This differentiation offers a theoretical specification of the distinction between an independent and interdependent self-construal put forward in cross-cultural psychology. Hence, this does (...)
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  9. Gottfried Vosgerau, Tobias Schlicht & Albert Newen (2008). Orthogonality of Phenomenality and Content. American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (4):309 - 328.
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  10. Tobias Schlicht (2007). Erkenntnistheoretischer Dualismus. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 10:113-136.
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